

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
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
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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

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MORE PHILOLOGICAL CRITICISM OF ACTS^{*}

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Yale University

NO problem in the field of New Testament criticism more deeply involves its fundamental principles than that of the relation of Acts to the Pauline Epistles. From Marcion to Baur those who sought a critical check upon the overgrowths of later tradition have fixed upon the Pauline Epistles as the surely authenticated standard with reference to which post-apostolic convention, as represented in the double work attributed to "Luke," must be judged. The "Lukan" writings are the only examples in the New Testament of professed historical inquiry. Acts is our only extant record of the most vital period of the church's history. From Marcion's time to our own, historical criticism has therefore tended, by a sort of natural gravitation, to these writings as its predestined battleground. Here, too, the harmonist, for like reasons, has intrenched himself, obliterating differences, twisting letters and tradition into forced agreement, that historical inquiry may find no loophole in the citadel of inherited dogma.

Only the most recent phase of the discussion goes so far as to invert Baur's principle: Paul before tradition. Of late, under the cry "Back to tradition," Baur's most famous opponent, in four

^{*} *Harvard Theological Studies*, I, "The Composition and Date of Acts," by Charles Cutler Torrey, professor of Semitic languages in Yale University. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916.

"Contributions to New Testament Criticism" (all four having the Lukan writings as their objective), calls upon us to treat the sworn statements of Paul in Galatians with "elasticity," seeing that these are clearly polemic and *ex parte*, and in general not to rest so heavily on Galatians. The Lukan story furnishes, according to Harnack, a more reliable account of the great issue in question, the transition of Christianity from the particularism of the mother-faith to the universalism of a world-religion. True, the tradition of Lukan authorship is itself sorely in need of rehabilitation; but the champion of tradition removes this difficulty by his own investigations as critic and philologist. On philological grounds he declares the Third Gospel and Acts to be the work of Luke the companion of Paul, and ultimately, reversing his own earlier judgment, concludes, *solely on the ground of the silence of Acts 28:30-31*, that the entire work was completed in its present form before Paul's death. We are therefore called upon to take the tradition thus critically vindicated as equal or even in some respects superior in authority to Paul.

Now as respects the great difference. As Harnack fully admits, Luke holds to a double standard: Jews to continue subject to the law, Gentiles to be free (save for the four observances prescribed by "the Apostles and Elders in Jerusalem").¹ Not only Peter, but Paul himself, Acts represents, set an example of obedience to this apostolic solution of the great problem. Paul, it declares, disproved by official public act the slander that he did not teach "the Jews which are among the Gentiles that they must obey the customs and circumcise their children." This then, says Harnack, was the real fact. Paul's "Jewish limitations (!) were his ruin."²

We must conclude, then, that Irenaeus is right when he tells us (*Haer.* III, xiii): "The apostles who were with James allowed the Gentiles to act freely yielding us [Gentiles] up to [the guidance of] the Spirit of God. But they themselves continued in the ancient observances." Irenaeus proceeds to appeal to the action of Peter and Barnabas in withdrawing from eating with the Gentiles at Antioch as *commendable*, because Peter and James and John, "apostles whom the Lord made witnesses of every action and every

¹ *Acts*, Excursus IV.

² *Date of Acts* (Engl.), p. 88.

teaching, acted scrupulously according to the dispensation of the Mosaic law." Tertullian even maintains (*Adv. Marc.* I, xx, and IV, iii) that Paul repented of having blamed the apostles and afterward changed his conduct to conform to theirs.

Harnack's exegesis at least deserves commendation for its candor when it frankly abandons the harmonistic denial of the double standard of Acts. It deserves further credit for audacity, if nothing more, when it attempts a new harmonization based on the proposition that Paul himself did not consider the cross to have abolished the yoke of the law for Jews (who were subject to it), but only for Gentiles (who never had been). The boldness wherewith Harnack defines Paulinism against Baur rivals that of Tertullian against Marcion; for Tertullian himself has no exegesis to rival the translation of *περιτεμνομένων* in Gal. 5:3 as if it were *περτεμνημένων* from which Harnack obtains the sense: "I testify again to every *circumcised man* (including himself and Peter) that he is a debtor to do the whole law"¹

No wonder the revolutionary results announced by Harnack from his rehabilitation of the Lukan tradition make a stir among scholars. When the Pauline epistles are fitted to the procrustean bed of Acts, the cry of "Back to tradition" has probably attained its ultimate triumph. It is, at all events, high time that New Testament critics examined the grounds of these startling conclusions.

But meantime an American philologist of note as an Old Testament critic, and specially qualified to speak on the phenomena of "translation Greek," has new light to shed upon the problem.

Readers of *Studies in the History of Religions Presented to Crawford Howell Toy* in 1912, will remember with great appreciation Professor Charles C. Torrey's able and important paper entitled "The Translations Made from the Original Aramaic Gospels."

Here Luke 1:5—2:52 is shown to represent a Hebrew (not Aramaic) document translated by the evangelist himself, and incorporated in his narrative along with other Greek documents and translations from the Aramaic. Torrey's earlier demonstration (the term is not too strong) is now supplemented by equally

¹Harnack, *Date of Acts*, p. 44 (Engl. Trans.). For the whole amazing argument of harmonization by discount from Paul see chap. ii, A and B.

cogent proof that Acts 1:2—15:35 is a translation from the Aramaic. The thesis is not new. So long ago as Kuinoel¹ we find references to Ziegler's suggestion that the Semitic forms of the early chapters of Acts (some phrases are retranslated into Hebrew) indicate derivation from a Semitic source such as an Acts of Peter, or the (Greek) Preaching of Peter quoted by Clement. Torrey for the first time reduces these vague and oft-repeated surmises to definition and proof. The very fact that his evidences stop abruptly at 15:35, leaving the remainder of the book practically without a trace of "translation Greek," lends corroboration. Were the phenomena due to delusion on the investigator's part they would not be likely to show a sudden change at this point,² considering that the story of chapters 13-14 is obviously continued in 15:36 ff. The more careful the reader's verification of Torrey's evidences of translation (presented in chapter i), the more hearty will probably be his consent to the verdict:³

For the first fifteen chapters the language is distinctly translation-Greek; in the remaining chapters, on the contrary, the idiom is not Semitic, and there is no evidence that we are dealing with a version. The whole book, however, shows unmistakable uniformity of vocabulary and phraseology, so that it is obvious (to him who recognizes the Semitic source) that the author of 16-28 was the translator of 1-15.

The two new facts here alleged, (a) I Acts a translated document, (b) the author (or compiler) of II Acts himself the translator of I Acts, are so vital that New Testament critics may well acknowledge deep indebtedness to Torrey, irrespective of the inferences as to date and authorship which he proceeds to draw in chapters ii and iii entitled, respectively, "The Integrity of the Second Half of Acts" and "The Relation of II Acts to I Acts." These inferences, it must be confessed, are so momentous as to cast even the revolutionary proclamations of Harnack into the shade. It is these

¹ *Comm. in Nov. Test.* Vol. IV, Proleg., § 4, pp. xii-xv, 1818.

² Harnack writes (*Acts*, p. xxxii): "The first part closes with 15:35"; but this has reference to the final redaction. Knopf (*Schriften d. N.T.*) more properly divides after 12:24. Blass also (*Philol. of Gosps.*) limits the Aramaic source to chapters 1-12.

³ Allowance should be made for some degree of overstatement as to the absence of Semitisms from II Acts (p. 7) and absence of revision by the Greek editor from I Acts, e.g., in 1:18-20. (Note *την ἐπισκοπήν* in vs. 20.)

inferences bearing on the "Date and Composition of Acts" which it is our purpose to scrutinize.

Torrey is far from shrinking from the conclusions of Harnack as to the identity of the Diarist of II Acts with the Autor ad Theophilum and a date within the lifetime of Paul. On the contrary he considers it "a conjecture which is more than merely plausible, that during the two years (Acts 24:27) of Paul's imprisonment at Caesarea Luke was collecting, examining, and translating the materials for his Gospel." He therefore "ventures the conclusion" that the Third Gospel (as distinct from its still earlier "materials," among which was our Gospel of Mark) "was written before the year 61, probably in the year 60."

The "Aramaic Document" (practically identical with I Acts) may be dated, as Torrey believes, with even greater confidence.

It is a very significant fact that its author *did not know* (see 15:32 f.) *that Silas had started on a new missionary journey in company with Paul*. A man of his interests and information could not have remained for many months in ignorance of this most important turn of events. We are accordingly enabled to date the Document with unusual precision; it must have been composed in the year 49, or early in the year 50.

These startling conclusions are not accompanied by even Harnack's very cavalier treatment of historico-critical objections. Harnack tabulates and rejects these. Torrey dismisses them with the verdict "I am unable to regard [them] as valid." His references as to date and composition depend entirely upon the absolute "homogeneity of II Acts," which Harnack frankly admits "is certainly not homogeneous."¹

The composite origin of I Acts would not perhaps be fatal to a dating in 49-50, though it greatly complicates a supposition which (as we shall see) incurs quite enough of difficulty without the need of supposing a long period of literary development before the Pauline Epistles! With II Acts the issue is more critical. If this be not homogeneous, both as to authorship and even (substantially) as to *date*, the whole basis of the theory collapses. Unless the Autor ad Theophilum be the same as the Diarist, he need not have written earlier than *ca.* 100, the date which many first-class critics

¹ *Acts*, p. 232, note.

regard as positively established by repeated evidences of dependence on Josephus. According to Torrey "the idea of writing this history [Acts] was first suggested to Luke when the Aramaic Document came into his hands"—a truly marvelous coincidence seeing that this Aramaic Document turned up in Rome within two or three years after the period represented by Luke's own "incidental, loosely connected, and often unimportant reminiscences," and was found in its closing chapters (Acts, chaps. 12-15) to lead up exactly to the point where the reminiscences began.¹

But what ground have we for imagining this happy and romantic discovery, instead of the ordinary critical view that a Greek Autor ad Theophilum has combined a Greek Acts of Paul with an Aramaic Acts of Peter, each document being more or less supplemented from and adapted to the other?

There is a kind of mental inertia which inclines us to take for granted the priority of documents in Semitic languages over those written in Greek. Especially are we disposed, like Jerome and many earlier Fathers, to take for granted that a gospel or kindred work, if written in Aramaic or Hebrew, must be older than corresponding Greek writings. A late midrashic paraphrase of our own Greek Matthew, sprinkled freely with unmistakable additions from Luke, was discovered by Jerome in the library of Pamphilus in Caesarea. Because it was in Aramaic (which Jerome could not read) he immediately heralded his discovery far and near as "the original Matthew," the "authentic Hebrew." As a matter of fact, the earliest known Gospels are all Greek (probably because Palestinian Christians relied longer on oral tradition), whereas *all* the Aramaic Gospels of which we have actual record are more or less elaborated translations from Greek originals.

Both Jerome's mare's nest, and the assumption of Papias on which it rests, that because Jesus and Matthew spoke "Hebrew" our First Gospel must originally have been "written in Hebrew," are pure illusion. The extant Gospels (possibly excepting Mark) are Greek compositions, though much of their *materials* has been

¹ On the real care and long elaborated thought displayed in the structure of Luke-Acts see the judicious observations of Harnack (*Acts*, p. xxii—apparently forgotten in *Date of Acts*, pp. 96-99), and below, p. 20.

translated. Not only so, but we have specific information from Epiphanius (who on such a point can be trusted) that the contemporary Christians of Tiberias used besides the "Hebrew Matthew" Aramaic translations of the Gospel of John *and of the Book of Acts*.¹

These instances should suffice to prove that the common assumption of priority of Aramaic over Greek in early Christian sources is quite unwarranted. So far as known documents are concerned, the Greek are the earlier. This applies especially to the type of document known as *Acts* (πράξεις), *Preachings* (κηρύγματα), or *Travels* (περιόδοι) of Apostles. It is a *Greek* type of literature.

Why, then, should it be assumed that the Aramaic Document underlying I Acts is older than the Greek Document underlying II Acts; and why should not its author have availed himself in the portions relating to Paul of the contemporary record which we call the Diary? For parts of II Acts are admitted to date from the period 50-60 A.D. even by the school of hypercriticism which denies the authenticity of every other writing of the New Testament. These travel-notes *may* even be by Luke, "the beloved physician" and *gentile* companion of Paul mentioned in Col. 4:14, though to this there are some serious objections.² The notes, however, are largely expanded and overlaid, some, at least, of the expansions showing the same apologetic interest and purpose as the Apologia ad Theophilum considered as a whole. Nevertheless, in spite of this working over, II Acts remains, as is well known, incomparably nearer than I Acts to the work and ideas of Paul as shown by his own great letters.

Does the Aramaic Document, then, give corresponding evidence of age and authenticity? Even Harnack, its chief champion, is obliged to admit its highly legendary and "idealized" conception of the history. Invariably, when apologists begin to glory in Luke as "a historian of the first order" whose assertions are being "corroborated by archaeological evidence," we find a wide berth given to I Acts (possibly excepting chapters 13-14, which have

¹ *Haer.* XXX, 3, 13.

² For example, its use of the Jewish festal calendar, which Harnack himself calls "the chief paradox of Acts" (*Acts*, p. 19).

special affinity with II Acts), and an endeavor to cling as closely as possible to II Acts, more especially the Diary sections.

Let us see, for example, what is implied in Professor Torrey's supposition of the author framing his narrative in the region of Jerusalem (as implied by the Judean Aramaic) in 49-50 A.D. What knowledge does he show of local conditions and recent events? We will take the tremendous occurrences of 44-49, fully and accurately reported by Josephus, by which Palestine, from having regained its position of a quasi-independent "allied kingdom" under Agrippa I (to whom the favor of Caius and Claudius had restored the whole kingdom of his grandfather Herod the Great), was suddenly plunged into the most appalling disaster, national enslavement, civil war, foreign invasion suppressing revolt, followed by the horrors of a long-remembered famine. No wonder Paul, writing to Thessalonica in 50, could say of his fellow-countrymen in Judea, "Wrath is come upon them unto the uttermost." It is safe to say that an author of the type supposed, writing in Palestine in 49-50 A.D., had some acquaintance with the course of these disastrous events. Even if he were not an actual associate of Manahem, "foster brother of Herod the tetrarch" (Acts 13:1), we could hardly expect him to antedate these recent events by more than forty years, speaking of the revolt of Theudas as having occurred before that of "Judas of Galilee," which had taken place "in the days of the [famous] census," and placing a reference to it in the mouth of Gamaliel *ca.* 30 (Acts 5:35-37).

In adopting the date 49-50 for the Aramaic Document we shall also be compelled to suppose that the Roman garrison, established after the suppression of this revolt of 45-46 in Caesarea, the capital of the province, had long been resident there during the reign of Agrippa and that its commandant had even endeared himself to the whole Jewish population because "he was a devout man, and one that feared God with all his house, and gave much alms to the people, and prayed to God alway" (Act 10:1 ff).¹ It seems really a pity that Agrippa should not have known of the presence of this amiable officer when, shortly after (Acts 12:19-23), he came down

¹ Does Mercier sometimes by lapse of memory speak of von Bissing in Brussels during the reign of Leopold?

to Caesarea threatening war against "them of Tyre and Sidon." Or can it be that the author of I Acts did not remember that the rule of the procurators with its "Italic cohort" stationed in Caesarea did not begin till after the death of Agrippa?

But, however aloof from even such political events as the loss of his country's independence, our Aramaic historian of the church in 49-50 cannot well have forgotten that the frightful famine of 46-48 to which he expressly refers as the occasion of Antioch's contribution "by the hands of Barnabas and Saul" was not *before* the persecution and death of Agrippa (11:27-30), but at least a year or two after it. In view of these three egregious anachronisms, which are mere examples from a whole series of corroborative evidences, a date earlier than the death of Paul for the Aramaic Document becomes incredible. A date in the later years of Domitian, when expressions such as "suffering for the Name" (Acts 5:41) had begun to obtain currency, and when theories of apostolicity such as those of 1:8, and of the gift of "tongues" like that of Acts 2:1-12, had had time to supersede the realities reflected in the Pauline Epistles, would be more reasonable. Instead of such extraordinarily precarious arguments as that concerning the knowledge implied in Acts 15:32 of the movements of Silas, throwing back the composition, not only of the Aramaic Document, but of the Synoptic tradition based on Mark which it presupposes *before the Pauline Epistles*, let us ask how long a period must be allowed for the *post-apostolic* resurrection-gospel which centers on the empty tomb, the women's vision, and the connected physical manifestations culminating in the bodily ascension, *entirely to supersede the* non-physical resurrection-gospel of I Cor. 15:1-11. *This* gospel, as Paul there explicitly affirms, was not only his but that of *all* the apostolic witnesses. When we have allowed time for the Markan sepulcher-tradition and its *still later* developments in Matthew and Luke to supersede the apostolic so entirely as

* The original Aramaic author of I Acts is not really to blame for this bad "break." In his composition 9:32-11:18 was *subsequent* to 12:1-23, so that Peter (domiciled in Jerusalem in 12:1-17) is "visiting all parts" of the plain of Sharon from Jaffa as headquarters in 9:32-11:18. The transposition is due to the compiler for reasons connected with his theory of the evangelizing of the Gentiles from Antioch after the persecution of Herod.

to leave it almost without a trace, we have taken one step toward measuring the interval between the authentic Pauline Epistles and the later tradition with its overgrowth of legend.¹

A single pervasive hand is responsible for the final form of the entire *Apologia ad Theophilum*. This is required not only by the phenomena of vocabulary and style, but quite as convincingly by the consistent, logical outline and structure of the whole. This post-apostolic, gentile, Greek writer is the author of Luke 1:1-4, the translator of Luke 1:5-2:52 and possibly some further *relatively late* fragments from the Hebrew, the transcriber of practically the entire Greek Gospel of Mark, the translator from the Aramaic of considerable portions of the Gospel and nearly the whole of I Acts, and the revising editor of the appended Greek document *solely concerned with the missionary fortunes of Paul*² which has been designated II Acts.

Let us see how this conception can be maintained. Professor Torrey justly argues for diversity of origin between I Acts and II Acts, from the Scripture quotations employed. Thus I Acts contains nearly one hundred quotations from the Old Testament, most of them showing more or less assimilation by the translator to the LXX text. II Acts contains only *four*, of which only *one* (Acts 28:26-27) is of any considerable extent. To whom then shall we attribute this *one* very long and exceptional quotation of II Acts? Manifestly to the final redactor, since it forms the Q.E.D. of the entire work. It is the classic passage first faintly suggested in Paul's anti-Jewish polemic in Rom. 11:8 to prove that the hardening of Israel was the preordained divine plan to bring about the proclamation of the gospel to the Gentiles, and thereafter adopted by all our evangelists. Now the Autor ad Theophilum being admittedly a Gentile and (as now appears) no Apollos in the polemic use of Scripture, where does he obtain this long and

¹ The relatively late appearance of the sepulcher-story of Mark 16:1-8 is indicated by its closing words, which forestall the objection: Why do we now for the first time hear this?—"And they said nothing to any man; for they were afraid."

² Harnack (*Acts*, pp. xxxiv f.) asks why "Luke" should so restrict himself to the career of Paul. The real answer is far simpler than that he proposes. The real answer is that the Autor ad Theophilum is *not* Luke, but a writer so much later as to know little beyond the contents of his two main sources.

felicitous quotation? Manifestly again from Mark 4:12; for in his parallel (Luke 8:10) he omits the quotation,¹ though the phraseology he retains is tinged by it. It is then the same writer who makes Mark the basis of his Gospel who also rounds off with this proof-text the moral of his whole Apologia. In other words, the homogeneity of Acts 28:17-28 extends backward over the whole of Luke-Acts.

The same thing is proved in the reverse direction by a comparison of the so-called Programmatic Discourse of Luke 4:16-30 with the endless repetition in Acts of substantially the same theme: Violent rejection by the Jews of the gracious offer of the gospel followed by its messengers turning to the-Gentiles. Were further evidence required, it could be drawn from such phenomena as the notable discovery of Turner² that Acts is divided by a fivefold colophon in 6:7, 9:31, and 12:24; 16:5 and 19:20 into two principal divisions of three parts each. A comparatively brief scrutiny of the specific object and logical structure of Luke-Acts would easily show that its author had in mind from the beginning what he has carried out to the end, and that he availed himself (as his preface intimates) of "many" narratives, including not only Greek documents such as Mark and the Diary, but other "narratives" (*διηγήσεις*) both Hebrew and Aramaic, as Torrey has now proved. Why then should it be assumed as "altogether reasonable" that "the idea of writing this history was first suggested to Luke when the Aramaic Document came into his hands"? We are far from denying Torrey's argument that if the plan of writing II Acts alone (to say nothing of Luke-Acts as a whole) had been in the mind of the Diarist when he made up his notes, they would not have had their "loosely connected, unimportant, incidental" character. But the disparity is far better explained if the Diarist never did compose either II Acts or I Acts, but merely left his notes to be worked up by others. We may easily conceive the early development on this basis of a Greek *πράξεις, περιόδοι*, or *κήρυγμα Παύλου* of the type made familiar to us by Norden in his

¹ Cf. the similar omission of the accusation brought against Jesus in Mark 14:58 for insertion in Acts 6:13-14.

² Hastings' *B.D.*, s.v. "Chronology."

comparison of II Acts with the well-known *Life of Apollonius* by Philostratus, and its partial employment in the Aramaic Document, which so largely parallels the story of Paul, taking Peter as its missionary hero. The *Autor ad Theophilum*, translating into Greek the Aramaic Document, could hardly fail to supplement it at the close with the unused part of the Greek work, seeing that I Acts alone was far from doing justice to the work of Paul. Indeed *Peter*, according to I Acts, is the true Apostle to the Gentiles (15:7), and "Barnabas and Saul" are mere subordinates (15:23-35).

As an alternative to Torrey's hypothesis let us then assume the finding by the *Autor ad Theophilum* (who was really in search of such documents [Acts 1:1-4]) of a Greek Acts of Paul based fundamentally on the Diary, and the appending of it so far as its contents had not been already utilized, to his translation of the larger (and to him more authoritative) Aramaic Document. Is there anything contrary to our knowledge of the actual vicissitudes of ancient writings in such a theory? For answer it will be worth while to recall a brilliant essay in Old Testament criticism by K. Budde, who in his *Richter und Samuel* (1890) attempts to solve the problem of the relation of the story of the conquest of Canaan in Josh., chaps. 13-24, to the briefer parallel *appended to it* in Judg. 1:1-2:5. The principal peculiarity of this case is that the appended narrative is certainly far earlier and more authentic, parts of it being already taken up in elaborated and amended form in Josh., chaps. 13-24. Whether Budde's explanation be correct or not, it rests on a sound basis of observed fact in the circulation of ancient books; and that is the point now in question. Budde uses the Darwinian term "survival" to designate the phenomenon. The fact is this: A book when superseded by some later "revised and improved" edition does not immediately cease to circulate. It continues a dwindling and relatively discredited currency in the same region as its more popular (and generally expanded) rival, until at last forgotten. But meantime some of its neglected elements will often come to be valued. In that case they tend very strongly to become attached to the larger, more modern narrative of superior currency which has already absorbed the connected material. New Testament textual criticism furnishes more than one example

of this tendency. The attachment of the Pericope Adulterae after Luke 21:38 in the Ferrariani is almost certainly due to the occurrence of the story at the corresponding point of the Gospel according to the Hebrews, which in Eusebius' time alone contained it. Now the two verses Luke 21:37-38 are apparently the evangelist's *substitute* for the story. They use its phraseology¹ and employ its descriptive setting to bridge the interval between chap. 21 and chap. 22. Now for obvious reasons our evangelist might well prefer to drop the Pericope Adulterae, although his source contained it.² But the story "survived," as Eusebius tells us, both in Papias and in the Gospel according to the Hebrews. From a source of this type it was attached in a family of texts which explicitly draw upon a Semitic gospel under the title τὸ Ἰουδαϊκόν, after Luke 21:37-38, thus duplicating the very passage which was written to take its place. Phenomena of this kind show that the theory of "survival" has perfectly reasonable application to the appending of the (basically) older Greek document of II Acts to the (translated) Aramaic Document.

So far we have merely framed a working hypothesis. Whether I Acts or II Acts can supply evidence in its support remains to be seen. Whether this hypothesis or Professor Torrey's can better explain the curious fact that Acts, chaps. 13-14, contains the indispensable *Vorgeschichte* to 16:1 ff. is also a question for later determination. Up to the present no more is claimed than that such a relation of II Acts to the remainder of the *Apologia ad Theophilum* (not merely to I Acts) is at least as reasonable, at least as conformable to the known phenomena of ancient book-making, as the theory that "the idea of writing this history was first suggested to Luke when the Aramaic Document came into his hands."

The issue between the two hypotheses, as already intimated, will be determined primarily by the question of the *homogeneity* of I Acts and II Acts.

Considering how vital is the question of the homogeneity of II Acts to our author's whole theory of "Composition and Date,"

¹ Note the ἑρμηνείαν of Luke 21:38 in comparison with John 8:1.

² For similarity of pathos, tone, style, and interest cf. Luke 7:36-50.

the lightness and nonchalance of his treatment of the historico-critical objections dealt with (however unconvincingly) by Harnack¹ is truly astonishing. Chapter ii, entitled "The Integrity of the Second Half of Acts," is restricted to the consideration of *two* critical observations, neither of which is of special moment to the main question. The two observations are as follows: (a) Wellhausen, in his *Noten zur A.G.*, declares Acts 27:9-11 an interpolation by the editor. Professor Torrey pronounces this arbitrary. Quite justly; for it is certainly not supported by adequate evidence. It may or may not be "a typical specimen of the attempts to find interpolations in the original account." But the accusation is no answer to the whole series of historico-critical objections which Harnack admits can be met only by reversing the accepted interpretation of the Pauline Epistles. (b) The rest of chapter ii is *all* devoted to a criticism (often keen and trenchant) of Norden's brilliant comparison of the Speech on Mars Hill (Acts 17:22-31) with parallels from Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius*. Professor Torrey agrees with the rest of liberal critics and with Norden himself that "all the speeches and letters in I Acts and II Acts are presumably free compositions of the authors of the two documents in which they stand," so that it is difficult to see what bearing Norden's attempt to find literary parallels (or sources) for this particular speech has upon the question whether the Autor ad Theophilum is himself the original Diarist. The proof that Acts is not dependent on Philostratus, nor even on his Greek predecessors, is as easy as the proof that such *κρήγματα* are commonplaces of Hellenistic propaganda back to pre-Christian times; only it has nothing to do with the question in hand.

It is indeed pleasant to find appreciation (on p. 43) of Norden's convincing parallels to the retention of the first person in the "We" sections. Professor Torrey's own studies in Ezra-Nehemiah, where fragments of a diary of Nehemiah still preserve their cherished use of the first person even in the framework of an elaborated history composed almost two centuries later, show how ill founded is the inference to homogeneity commonly based on this phenomenon in II Acts. On the other hand it is not an evidence of good judgment

¹ *Date of Acts*, chap. ii.

in things pertaining to New Testament criticism to be met with a repetition of one of the weakest of Harnack's arguments as if it were really decisive. Why should the non-mention of the death of Paul make it "highly probable" that the entire *Apologia ad Theophilum* was written "before Luke had received news of the apostle's death"? Harnack's own statement (*Acts*, p. xxii; cf. *Date*, p. 95) of the conditions of "suspense" presupposed by this theory as those under which the great composition was undertaken, carried to completion, *and given out for publication*, should have made the propounding of it impossible. The Autor ad Theophilum was not a war-correspondent rushing his "story" through the press in advance of the expected crisis to effect a "scoop" on his rivals.

Take, as against this romancing, the literary parallel cited by Norden. Philostratus leaves his readers in uncertainty as to the fate of Apollonius on the ground that his alleged source, the diary of Damis, broke off before it could be known whether Apollonius died or was translated. Now the diary of Damis may or may not have been a real source for the *Life of Apollonius*; but the parallel gives all the explanation we need for similar reticence on the part of the Autor ad Theophilum, or his predecessor, the author of the conjectured Acts of Paul. As Harnack justly observes, Luke-Acts is not concerned with biography, even in the cases of Peter and Paul. It chronicles only the triumphs of the gospel from Jerusalem to Rome. The silence on Paul's fate is no exception in Acts. The martyrdom of James (61-62) is equally unmentioned. The career of Peter is completely dropped after Acts, chap. 15. But as to Paul the reader is *not* really left in ignorance. His fate *is* made known, but made known with that chaste reticence which the Greek poets employ when they only report through others the tragedies enacted behind the scenes. In the great Farewell discourse of Acts 20:17-38 the martyr takes his leave. In Acts 28:17-31 the tragedy itself is veiled behind the triumph of the cause. Probably both Philostratus and the Autor ad Theophilum had seen plays of Sophocles and Euripides. Dismissing, then, this fanciful evidence of early date, let us return to the question of homogeneity.

As evidence of the homogeneity of I Acts our author assures us that he has read several attempts at documentary analysis and been convinced by none (p. 61). Probably there is not a single advocate of the theory of composite origin who would not say the same. Each finds enough of error in the method of his fellow-workers to reject much of their individual results, and enough of truth to corroborate, strengthen, and enlarge his own. Historical critics who are still engaged in the task of comparing the point of view of the *Autor ad Theophilum* with the often apparently quite different point of view of his sources should perhaps be grateful for the kind assurance that their toil is needless. They are told that the discrepancies of I Acts are "created by a forced exegesis" (p. 62); that "if the fact of translation is granted it is not likely that any convincing theory of composition [of I Acts] will ever be put forth." This kind offer of the Semitists to relieve their historico-critical co-laborers of all further trouble will be likely, we fear, to provoke the reply: "Ye take too much upon you, ye sons of Levi."

In this sweeping disregard of historico-critical objections there may be greater consistency than in Harnack's partial consideration. For the present theory makes even shorter work of Harnack's evidences for A, B, and C sources in I Acts than Harnack does of the same kind of evidences in II Acts. The stages of Harnack's retrogression are instructive. (1) Hobart convinces him that the language of "Luke" is "medical" (a discovery which loses some of its luster when Cadbury proves that the language of Lucian, who was not a physician, is equally "medical"). The Diary is therefore Luke's. (2) Sir J. C. Hawkins convinces him that the language of Luke-Acts is uniform. Therefore Luke wrote the whole. (3) I Acts seems composite and late; but "Luke" is silent as to the death of Paul. Therefore all accepted dates must be canceled. Acts must go back to the early sixties carrying its three sources and the still earlier Gospels still farther back. (4) The objections of the critics who point to the conflict of II Acts with the Pauline Epistles are silenced by a new interpretation of the Epistles. If linguistic arguments can prove so much, subsequent philologists may be expected to maintain, not only that "phraseology and lit-

erary style, as well as the close connection (of Acts 27:1—28:15) with what has preceded, show plainly enough that the same writer is composing the narrative" (p. 44 f.), but further that the homogeneity of all I Acts in the Aramaic Document "is made certain by the uniformity in language and treatment" (p. 59). But the peculiarity of the whole situation is just here: The fundamental proposition really demonstrated in the present scholarly contribution is the translation of certain Hebrew and Aramaic sources by the author (or editor) of II Acts in the earlier part of his work. *But this very proposition deals the coup de grace to Harnack's (and his successor's) attempt to build theories of composition and date on mere phenomena of vocabulary and style.* The "homogeneity" thus established can never go below the surface.

Look for a moment at Harnack's philological discussion of the Magnificat and adjoining material (Luke 1:5—2:52) in comparison with our present philologist's convincing demonstration of the derivation of these same chapters from a special Hebrew source. Harnack's entire effort is directed to proving *from the identity of style and vocabulary with the remainder of Luke-Acts* that the author of the whole, i.e., "Luke the Physician," *composed* these chapters, canticles and all. Professor Torrey's more thorough philological argument proves, if it proves anything at all, that just the contrary is true. The *Autor ad Theophilum* borrowed almost every word of Luke 1:5—2:52 ready made from a Hebrew document. The "homogeneity" with the remainder of the Gospel and Acts so laboriously established by Harnack is nothing more than the translator's tincture of the source by his own distinctive style and vocabulary. The present contention that the author of II Acts is himself the translator of I Acts rests on precisely the same kind of evidence, and (with some limitations as regards extent) will probably carry conviction. It appears then that it is entirely possible for a skilful stylist and translator to remain extraordinarily faithful to his sources while at the same time setting upon them the stamp of his own style and language to a degree which makes all reasoning to deeper-going homogeneity from such data *absolutely valueless*. For the Greek writer who would do this in translating a Semitic source might be expected to do at least as much in

transcribing (and editing) a source written in his own language. In short, as Bousset has justly remarked, "Particularly in the most recent works, more especially the investigations of Harnack, this fact has become salient, that Luke (R) has so fully worked over his documentary material, even as respects linguistic form, that in this field almost every recognizable distinction is hopelessly obliterated."¹

Since, then, it is Professor Torrey's own work which completes the twofold demonstration (a) that the *Autor ad Theophilum* did use written sources in several languages, and (b) that mere similarity of style and vocabulary counts for little or nothing as an evidence of homogeneity, it would have been well to treat less cavalierly those historico-critical objections to the homogeneity of II Acts which even Harnack does not venture wholly to disregard, but only dismisses *because opposed to his argument from style and vocabulary*.² It might have been well, for example, to offer some explanation of the extraordinary discrepancy between (a) the circumstances presupposed by the Diary for Paul's coming to Rome (Acts 28:11-16, 30-31), which are in complete agreement with the letter of Paul to the great Christian church there, announcing his coming some three years beforehand, and (b) the circumstances contemplated in the succeeding narrative (Acts 28:17-29), which rounds off the entire *Apologia ad Theophilum* with the quotation already mentioned as borrowed from Mark 4:12. This closing summary, interjected between 28:16 and 30, conforms completely to the stereotyped formula of the *Apologia*: (a) the gospel is offered to the Jews; (b) a few believe, the rest oppose; (c) the messengers turn thereupon to the Gentiles, declaring that so the Scriptures had predicted; (d) the Gentiles gladly receive the message. Now a later *Autor ad Theophilum* might easily thus supplement the Diarist's account of Paul's coming to Rome and his warm welcome

¹ Das hat sich gerade bei den neuesten Arbeiten, vor allem den Untersuchungen von Harnack, herausgestellt, dass Lukas (R) sein Quellenmaterial derartig auch sprachlich überarbeitet hat dass hier fast alle erkennbaren Unterschiede unwiederherstellbar verwischt sind (Bousset in *ZNW*, XV [1914], 142).

² *Acts*, p. 233; cf. *Lukas der Arzt*, chap. ii, § (2), pp. 80-81, where it is also admitted that the inconsistencies of 16:16-40 would *otherwise* be most naturally explained by regarding vss. 24-34 "as a later insertion."

by "the brethren" through a body of delegates sent all the way to Appii Forum. The *compiler* might naturally add on his own account the stereotyped representation which reports Paul's entry precisely as if Rome were virgin soil for the missionary. Such a *later editor* would find no difficulty in describing Paul's beginning at Rome by calling together "the chief of the Jews," who as yet know nothing concerning the new sect "save that everywhere it is spoken against." He would bring his story to an end with the usual moral of the division in the synagogue, Paul's appeal to prophecy and successful "turning to the Gentiles."¹ But to imagine the *Diarist* winding up with these glittering generalities is another matter. The *Diarist* had just recorded Paul's reception at Puteoli, Appii Forum, and at last by the great and long-established church in Rome. How could *he* depict Paul's beginning there as if no such church existed? Possibly if he were writing after the lapse of many years; but when we are asked to believe that this ignoring of the Roman church was exhibited at Rome itself, *not more than four years after the event*, credulity is taxed beyond the breaking-point.

Space forbids repetition here of considerations already advanced elsewhere to show the systematic adaptation of the sense of II Acts away from what would agree with the Pauline Epistles, to conform it to the Petrine standard made central in the chapter on the Apostolic Council (chap. 15).² The main evidence is the misinterpretation of Paul's action in 16:3 and 21:26 and the suppression and perversion of the real object of the great delegation to Jerusalem. Paul briefly states what this was in Rom. 15:16, 25-32. It can hardly be supposed that the *Diarist* was ignorant of the object for which Paul was laying down both liberty and life, nor why the delegation of which he himself was a member was carrying up the long and hardly gathered treasure of all the Pauline churches. Such ignorance is as improbable as prevarication on Paul's part to Felix (Acts 24:17). These and other reasons set

¹ Cf., for example, Acts 28:17-31 with Acts 13:13-48 and 18:1-11.

² See the summary of Harnack in *Date*, etc., pp. 67-87. With this compare the discussion above, and the two articles published by the present writer in *American Journal of Theology* for July, 1907, and January, 1909, entitled respectively "Acts versus Galatians, the Crux of Apostolic History" and "Harnack and the Lukan Narrative."

forth elsewhere make it insupposable that the present form of II Acts is due to the original Diarist and companion of Paul. The adaptations point to the later Autor ad Theophilum, whose doctrinal standpoint is precisely that of the Petrine "weak brethren" of the Pauline Epistles, and dominates the Aramaic Document in spite of the evidence of the very sources which it combines. For the *underlying* lack of homogeneity in the Aramaic Document¹ is by no means to be disregarded when we discuss questions of "Composition and Date."

For a bare tabulation of the discrepancies noted by Wellhausen and others as pointing to composite origin for II Acts, and for a somewhat fanciful attempt at reconstruction of three sources in I Acts on the basis of similarly noted discrepancies and duplications, the English reader needs no better guide than Harnack's summary and reconstruction.² But the real ground for declaring the materials of both halves of the book to have been readjusted and fitted together from partly duplicate and overlapping sources lies deeper. The conviction is not a matter of some scores or hundreds of discrepant details which may be listed and tabulated. Still less is it a matter of mere style and vocabulary, as Harnack himself makes abundantly clear (*Acts*, p. 163). It is a question of the general structure of the work as compared with its constituent elements. As Harnack justly notes, Acts is not a loose agglutination of anecdotes. It is not even biographic, however its two main elements focus respectively on the dominating figures of Peter and Paul. The Autor ad Theophilum may be limited by his sources to data having a biographic horizon, but he builds his great Apologia around an idea. This latter fact is a true and great appreciation of Harnack's. Professor Torrey's statement of that idea is even better than Harnack's. It is "the wonderful transition from Jewish sect to world-religion."³ It was anything but a new idea. It had been the theme of Rom., chaps. 9-11. It underlies Eph. 2:1-3:12.

¹ Many of the data collected by Harnack in *Acts*, pp. 162-202, will be found with others in the articles already referred to (*American Journal of Theology*, 1907-9) and in addition a special treatment of Acts, chaps. 6-8, in the Bicentennial (1901) volume of "Contributions to Semitic and Biblical Science" by Yale professors, s.v. "Stephen's Speech," by B. W. Bacon.

² *Acts*, chap. v.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 65.

The new contribution of the *Autor ad Theophilum* is the definition of its terms. It was accomplished, he maintains, on the *two-standard* basis. By this compromise, adopted by the Jerusalem Council on the proposal of James, Jews to continue subject to the law, Gentiles to be free save in four particulars, the threatened schism in the church was avoided. Not only the Aramaic Document, but the entire book, is in reality, as Harnack well says, "a skilful arrangement of his material by which he makes it all lead up, in successive steps, to the first great triumphs of the new faith on foreign soil, and to *the true climax in chapter 15.*" Chapters 16-28 contain, as we have seen, a supplementary rebuttal of the representation that Paul did not teach the double standard, and a juster appreciation of his work in carrying the gospel to the goal of the west. Now the real proof that I Acts is composite is not a mere enumeration and tabulation of particular discrepancies, but the demonstration (too long for present discussion) that chapters 6-8, with their sequel in 11:19-26, contain a presentation of the same central idea which is fundamentally at variance with the compiler's. The best efforts of the *Autor ad Theophilum* to harmonize and adjust remain powerless to suppress the testimony of this fundamentally Hellenistic account of gentile mission work whose beginnings center on the persons of Stephen, Philip, and the rest of the seven Hellenistic "evangelists." It implies the same uncontrolled freedom to which Paul explicitly testifies in Gal. 1:11-2:10. Irenaeus unconsciously witnesses to its real significance when he speaks of the eunuch of Acts 8:26-39 as "the herald of the gospel to Ethiopia." In like manner the harmonizing transpositions, omissions, and corrections of the editor are of no avail against the irrepressible testimony of Acts 12:1-23; 9:32-11:18. Here we have another presentation of the same fundamental idea, and one which is equally free with that of the Hellenistic source, though it substitutes Peter for the seven evangelists and the plain of Sharon and Caesarea¹ for Philistia, Egypt, and Ethiopia as the field of expanding missionary activity. This second source also denies the two-standard doctrine of the *Autor*

¹ The church in Caesarea has *two* foundings: once by Philip, 8:40, and a second time by Peter, 10:1-11:18, in consequence of slight overlapping of the two sources.

ad Theophilum. It seems to be the author of the Aramaic Document who combined these sources on the theory that the Jerusalem Conclave of 11:1-18 was a mere *preliminary* to the Apostolic Council of chapter 15. But the former decision is the wider and more comprehensive of the two. The Aramaic harmonist seeks to make of Peter's vision, his association with Gentiles, his conversion and baptism of the household of Cornelius, mere latent precedents pigeon-holed until required by representatives of Antioch at the Jerusalem Council (15:7-11). But this forced harmonization breaks down before the intrinsic nature of the vision itself, in which Peter is rebuked for endeavoring to maintain his Jewish ceremonial purity by *distinctions of meats* (10:14-15) which are as clearly repudiated in 10:15 as merely *human* distinctions as by Paul himself in Col. 2:22 or Mark in 7:7. The subject passed upon by the Conclave is whether Peter is justified in "eating with the Gentiles" (11:3), with the result that the church agrees to gentile missions *without regard to* "the customs" (11:18). Against such remaining traces of the earlier and broader doctrine of the source the camouflage of chapter 15 with its compromising "decrees of the apostles and elders" is impotent. Thus the two mutually independent representations of the great "transition" contained in chapters 6-8 and 9:32-11:18 are both *irreconcilable* with the apostolic-compromise, or two-standard, theory, which the Autor ad Theophilum borrows from the Aramaic Document. In appending the Greek Acts of Paul he was of course compelled to narrow down its representations to the same harmonizing standard his Aramaic predecessor had adopted.

Our limitations forbid consideration of the further question whether the incorporation into I Acts (especially in 7:58; 8:1-3; 9:1-30; 11:25-30, and chapters 13-15) of elements directly or indirectly connected with II Acts is due to the Autor ad Theophilum, or had been already accomplished by the compiler of the Aramaic Document. Probably some incorporations are due to each. The study called for would be minute, and chiefly philological. We must limit ourselves to a single example taken from the culminating chapter of the Aramaic Document. It should suffice to show that, however convinced we may be that chapters 13-15 come directly

from the Aramaic, they have nevertheless as their ultimate background a *Greek* Source.

The speech of James in 15:13-21 is the very climax of the Aramaic Document (as we might expect in a *Judean* narrative). But this whole speech is founded on an argument based on Amos 9:11-12 that, after the fallen "tabernacle of David" is set up again and the gaps in it closed, "the residue of mankind will seek out the Lord." The argument of James (and of the Aramaic compiler) is that for the sake of the Gentiles themselves the Jews which are among them must be loyal to Moses (vs. 21), because such was the declared purpose of God. Where, then, is this culminating proof-text found? *Only* in the LXX. By the minute change of a single *yodh* to *daleth*,¹ the LXX obtains from "to the end that they may possess [יִירָשׁוּ] the residue of Edom" a form not only more acceptable to Gentiles, but one which really reflects that missionary spirit of which there is not the remotest suggestion in the Hebrew. The LXX renders: "to the end that the residue of *mankind* [vocalizing אֲדָם as אָדָם] may *seek out* [יִדְרֹשׁוּ] the Lord." This proof-text, as we have seen, is to the author of the Aramaic Document what the proof-text of Acts 28:25-28 is to the compiler of the whole work. But did the author from whom he borrowed it (as the Autor ad Theophilum borrows Mark 4:12) use the Semitic or the *Greek* bible?

¹ Some texts of the LXX do not attempt to render the אָדָם. Others, including that followed in Acts, supply ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

ON ISRAEL'S ORIGINS

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There is a peculiar fascination in the study of origins. The beginnings of social and religious institutions, the elements which have gone into the mental and physical structures of man, the genesis of life itself, both in the animal and in the vegetable kingdoms, the origin of our earth and of the solar systems of the universe—these are the problems toward the attempt of whose solution man seems to be drawn as irresistibly as the moth to the candle, and, one may add, often with considerable damage to fancy's wings. I suspect that this tendency is to be accounted for not wholly by the assumption that man is unable to find rest until he has discovered the "why" and "whence" of things, but in part by the fact that here there is room for the free play of the imagination. We like to construct, and, next to the building of castles in the air, the construction of hypotheses satisfies this craving. We grow restive as we arrange in order the well-attested events of history or analyze the character of even the most daring innovator; but when we turn from these prosaic tasks to the study of a people's myths and legends, to the problem of extracting therefrom what we choose to regard as the underlying facts and of combining these with those scraps of historical narrative which are always imbedded in the "early histories" of nations, we are immediately placed in a position where hypotheses are necessary, and we are happy.

But we must not suppose that this interest in beginnings is of recent origin. We turn to the Old Testament and find that the men who set about to write the history of the Hebrew people felt that so important a theme demanded an exhaustive treatment, and so, like Mr. Knickerbocker of a later day, they began with the creation of the world. These men were not driven to hypotheses, as are our moderns, by the exhaustion of the supply of historical

data; they calmly availed themselves of the inexhaustible store of myths and legends which were afloat in the land, and, thus supplied, easily filled in all gaps. Their only embarrassment was an *embarras de richesses*. Where the scientific mind puts forth a hypothesis the primitive mind creates a myth, and my readers will surely agree with me when I add that the positive statements of the latter usually make more interesting reading than the "ifs" and "perhapses" of the former.

A great advance in our understanding of the mythology of the Hebrews was brought about by Gunkel in his *Sagen der Genesis* and other works. The stories of Genesis are similar to those of other peoples. Naïve folk-tales answering such questions as whence came heaven and earth, why men observe the Sabbath, how speech originated and why different peoples speak different languages, why we wear clothes, why the serpent crawls on its belly, and a hundred others, constitute a group of aetiological myths. Then there is a group of ethnological myths, explaining why Canaan is the servant of his brothers, why Japheth has so large a territory, why this or that people lives where it does, and so forth. Many cult-myths explain the origin of the sacredness of this or that national sanctuary—Bethel, Beersheba, Hebron, and others; or the reasons underlying ritual customs such as the anointing of sacred stones. The etymological stories account for the names of the patriarchs (Isaac, Jacob, Israel, etc.) as well as for many place-names, and, like the other classes of myths, contain much that is of value for the study of Hebrew life and thought, even if they do jar the nerves of modern linguistic science. With such a supply of myths at hand, the writers who desired to go into the origins of the Hebrew people had only to choose and arrange their materials. When the stories of the heroes of the nation were to be told, the supply of popular legends, which was probably even greater than that of the myths, was an ever-present help in times when historical records failed.

There was a point, however, at which some of the writers of about the ninth and eighth centuries B.C. were probably genuinely embarrassed—namely, the point at which it was necessary for them to decide as to the way in which to approach the matter of the origin of

the national religion. Yahweh was in theory at least, if not in practice, the God and only God of Israel. He was worshiped in different places. But the myths connected with some of these seemed to indicate that they had originally been sacred to other gods, to certain *el*'s—El-Olam of Beersheba, El-Bethel of Bethel, El-Roi of Kadesh, El-Berith of Shechem, El-Pachad of Mizpah, El-Shaddai and El-Elyon, whose place connections we cannot determine. Furthermore, the common people kept making pilgrimages to shrines like Bethel and Gilgal where they practiced cults which were objectionable to those who stood for what they regarded as pure and undefiled Yahweh-worship. The writers we have in mind belonged to this puritan party, but they were not extremists. One of them, whom modern scholars call E,¹ held that Yahweh first revealed himself to Moses (Exod. 3:14), and consequently Yahweh's name does not appear in his stories of the patriarchs;² the other, whom we call J,³ has Yahweh prepare the way from the foundation of the world for the people of his choice. Both E and J make Moses the organizer of the nation and of the national worship—that is, of the worship of Yahweh. The nation and the religion were organized, according to these writers, in the period between the exodus from Egypt and the entrance into Canaan. If doubts were being expressed in their day as to the legitimacy of the worship at such places as Bethel, Hebron, and Beersheba, the sacredness of these shrines was vouched for by the stories which told of Yahweh's appearance there to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. This procedure may seem to us similar to that of the pious Christian monks who sprinkled holy water upon the sacred lakes and tarns or inserted images of the Virgin into the trunks of oaks, which were the objects of worship of the heathen Germanic tribes; but we must always bear in mind the fact that canons of historical criticism were non-existent in those days—for which some of us are exceedingly grateful—and, further, that these "warblers of poetic prose" were enunciating their expanding faith in an eternal, almighty, and ubiquitous god.

¹ Whether J and E are to be regarded as individuals or groups of writers is immaterial for our discussion.

² He held, however, that Yahweh had appeared to these as El-Roi, El-Pachad, etc.

It was J and E, then, who gathered together most of the material out of which the Old Testament hypothesis¹ of Israel's origins was constructed. We have already indicated the probable source of much of that material. What has modern biblical scholarship done with this hypothesis?

Modern critical² scholarship is almost unanimously of the opinion that Yahweh was originally a Midianite god connected with Mount Sinai, whither neighboring tribes, probably including those which later made up Israel, repaired from time to time to worship.

But even though Yahweh was originally the name of the god of Sinai [I quote from Marti's *Religion of the Old Testament*—one would find almost the same words in any other work on the religion of Israel by a scholar of the Wellhausen school], it immediately received a higher significance under the Israelites than that which it had possessed as the god of the confederate tribes of Mount Sinai. The reason is this: Yahweh manifested himself in history by the liberation of the Israelites from the Egyptian bondage; he led them safely to Kadesh, and there united them with the kindred tribes to form one people. . . . The instrument which Yahweh used in order to make known his power both in Egypt and at Kadesh was Moses, the leader of the people and the prophet. . . . The nation's very first steps were taken in the direction which led to the highest goal: this we realize as we notice, firstly, that the ideal of later ages is nothing else than the further development of the principles laid down by Moses, and, secondly, that in the ethical demands which the prophets made they were conscious of being in harmony with the origins of the religion of Israel.

Briefly put, the critical scholars of our day make the covenant at Sinai the starting-point of Yahwism in Israel. In case the excursion to Mount Sinai is ruled out, and this is done by many, the "enthronement of Yahweh at Kadesh" (I use Gressmann's phrase) takes the place of the covenant at Sinai. In any case Moses is regarded as the "leader of the people" (organizer of the nation) and "prophet" (organizer of the religion). In other words, critical scholars have accepted the essential features of the JE hypothesis of Israel's beginnings. Of course these scholars admit the legendary character of the whole cycle of Moses stories, but believe that it is possible by critical methods to get at the history back of these

¹ To them it was, of course, history.

² "Conservative" scholars, like J and E, regard the stories of the Pentateuch as history, so we need not tarry with them.

legends. They also recognize the necessity of keeping constantly before one's eyes, during these excursions into pre-history, the later development of the religion of Israel as this may be traced in the historical records and the prophetic writings. The results arrived at are, therefore, based upon careful and cautious reasoning. Nevertheless, the writer doubts the validity of much of this reasoning, and it is the purpose of this paper to air this doubt.

For reasons which will become apparent as we go along, our discussion will be opened with a brief résumé of the connections between Babylonia and the Westland, Syria-Palestine, before the entrance of the Israelites into the latter region. The Exodus and Conquest will next engage our attention. We shall then be ready to attack some of the problems connected with the religious origins of Israel. Let me add, by way of parenthesis, that it is not to be inferred from the opening sentence of the program here outlined that any flirtation with the theories of the pan-Babylonists is contemplated.

From the very dawn of history Amurru, the Amorite land, seems to have attracted every Babylonian king whose prowess had subdued all rivals in the Tigris-Euphrates valley and whose ambition was now urging him to seek new worlds to conquer. Lugalzaggisi, king of Uruk (Erech, Gen. 10:10), whose date is to be put at about 2850 B.C., tells us, in an inscription on a votive vase dedicated to the god Enlil of Nippur, that his conquests extended "from the rising of the sun to the setting thereof," and that Enlil had "made straight his path from the Lower Sea over the Euphrates and the Tigris to the Upper Sea." The "Lower Sea" was the Persian Gulf, and the "Upper Sea" was probably at this time, as it certainly was later, the Mediterranean. After a reign of twenty-five years the Sumerian Lugalzaggisi was overthrown and taken captive by the Semite Sargon (Sharru-kin), founder of the dynasty of Akkad. The legend of Sargon, according to which he was the son of a poor woman who exposed him on the river in a basket of reeds, is probably the prototype of the stories relating the hairbreadth infantile escapes of Moses, Romulus, and other legendary heroes connected with the beginnings of nations. We shall see later that the story of Sargon's western conquests formed one of the cuneiform

copy-book exercises of a Hittite scribe in Egypt in the fourteenth century B.C. According to Sargon's own inscriptions, which came to light only recently,¹ his victorious march westward was across the countries of Mari, Yarmuti, and Ibla, and extended as far as the "Cedar Forest" and the "Silver Mountain." Mari² lay about halfway up the Euphrates from Babylonia, while the location of Yarmuti, which is undoubtedly the same as the Yarimuti of the Amarna Letters and which was, until the discovery of the new Sargon texts, thought to be a district in the Egyptian Delta, must be sought for in Northern Syria or possibly along the Cilician coast. Ibla must also have been located in this corner of Western Asia. The Cedar Forest may have been the Lebanons or Mount Amanus, while the Silver Mountain was in all probability some part of the Taurus Range where silver was mined in ancient times. These latter names undoubtedly furnish the clue to the object of this campaign of Sargon's. He was after the precious metal and the equally precious building material.

We have inscriptional evidence that two more kings of this dynasty, Naram-Sin and Shargani-sharre, reached the Westland.

Our attention is now directed to a ruler of Southern Babylonia, or Sumer, Gudea by name and patesi of Lagash (modern Telloh) by title. His date is 2600 B.C., plus or minus. Gudea was a great builder of temples and brought cedars and other building materials from "Amanus the mountains of Amurru" as well as from "Tidanu" (probably the anti-Lebanons). The inscriptions which tell of this contain no allusions to warlike operations on Gudea's part, from which it has been inferred, and probably rightly so, that the relations of this ruler with foreign countries were of a peaceful nature. It is possible, however, that the absence of such references is due to a certain delicacy of feeling, also found later in Nebuchadrezzar and some other neo-Babylonian kings, which forbade the boastful narration of military achievements in the humble record of pious deeds.

When we reach the time of the dynasty of Ur, *ca.* 2469-2353 B.C., we begin to find increasing evidence of movements in the reverse

¹ Poebel, *Historical Texts*, pp. 173 f.

² See Clay, *Miscellaneous Inscriptions in the Yale Babylonian Collection*, p. 4.

direction, namely, from the Westland toward Babylonia. That such movements did not, however, begin at this time is shown by a reference in an inscription of Eannadum, who lived probably two centuries before the time of Sargon of Akkad, which indicates that Mari (see above) was in league with the kings of Kish, the old enemies and frequently the overlords of the city-kingdoms of Sumer. Ur was of course a Sumerian city, but the Semitic names of the last kings of this Ur dynasty, Bur-Sin, Gimil-Sin, and Ibi-Sin, as well as a reference to a Dagan temple in the date formulae of the time of Dungi, the second king, show that the whole of the line was Semitic and, more than that, West-Semitic.

The earliest historical records which have been preserved for us picture the Sumerian city-kingdoms in a state of chronic warfare with each other. It evidently was an easy matter for some West-Semitic chieftain to fight his way into the land and establish himself as ruler of one or more cities. But what one could do others might try, and that they did is shown by a date formula of Gimil-Sin which reads: "Year in which Gimil-Sin, king of Ur, built the wall of the Amorites called 'warding off Tidnim'" (cf. Tidanu of the Gudea inscription). But walls (there are no natural defenses of Babylonia on the Arabian side) could not hold back the Amorites. About 2352 B.C. Ishbi-Urra came from Mari (see above) and founded a dynasty in Isin, another city of Sumer.

The Isin dynasty had a rival in the dynasty of Larsa (Ellasar of Gen. 14:1), which was established soon after the advent of Ishbi-Urra. About 2143 B.C. the Elamite Kudur-Mabuk succeeded in putting his son Warad-Sin upon the throne of Larsa. This king was followed by his brother Rim-Sin, who captured Isin in 2115 B.C. But while these rival dynasties were fighting for the control of Sumer, another band of West-Semites pushed into and subdued Akkad, the northern part of Babylonia. Their first center in the valley seems to have been Sippar, but Babylon was soon made their capital and gave the name to their line of kings—the First Dynasty of Babylon (2223–1926 B.C.). Our chief interest is in the sixth and greatest of these rulers, Hammurabi, who in his thirty-first year overthrew Rim-Sin and became master of the whole of

Sumer and Akkad. A number of references in the inscriptions from his reign and from those of his successors indicate that Amurru may have been brought fairly well under the control of these kings. But, whatever the extent and degree of the Babylonian authority in the Westland, it was of comparatively short duration, for the First Dynasty came to an end in 1926 B.C.

That the kings of the First Dynasty, who, as we have seen, hailed from the Westland, early became good Babylonians is to be taken for granted. Their problem was the same as that of the kings of Ur before them, namely, to hold back, or at least control, the ever-increasing stream of westerners which was sweeping from the desert and steppes to the westward down into the rich alluvial plain of Babylonia. How small their success was in the first regard is to be seen in the large number of West-Semitic personal names found on the documents from this epoch.

We now jump across half a millennium to the Amarna period, roughly 1400 B.C. The Babylonian records from the intervening centuries are few and for our purpose unimportant.

The documents which are to interest us now are the well-known Amarna Tablets, found in Egypt in 1886. Part of these form the correspondence between the Egyptian Pharaohs, the Amenhoteps III and IV and their "brothers," the kings of Karduniash (Babylonia), Assyria, Mitanni, Arzawa, Alashia (Cyprus), and Hatti (the Hittite land), but the majority are letters which passed between the Egyptian court and the Syrian and Palestinian vassals of the Pharaohs.

The first thing that strikes us about these letters is the script and language in which they were written. That the Assyrian and Babylonian kings should have written to the Pharaoh in the cuneiform script and the Babylonian tongue is not surprising, but that the Hittites, Mitannians, and other non-Semitic peoples should have made use of these when writing to the Egyptian king is certainly remarkable. And most astonishing of all is the fact that the correspondence carried on between the Pharaohs and their vassals in Syria-Palestine should have been in the Babylonian language and script. And the explanation of this phenomenon? Babylonian was the diplomatic and commercial language, the *lingua franca* of

the ancient world in this period.¹ The Amarna Letters are not our only witness to this fact. Cuneiform documents dating from about the same period as the Amarna Tablets and containing the correspondence which passed between Syrian chieftains were unearthed by the excavations in Palestine. In 1907 Professor Winckler published a preliminary account of the royal archives of the Hittites which he uncovered at Boghaz-Keui, a village lying east of the Halys in Central Asia Minor and occupying the site of the ancient capital of the Hittites. Here, too, the cuneiform script and the Babylonian language were employed for the writing of domestic and foreign documents. The Babylonian script was also used to write the Hittite language. The same state of affairs obtained in Mitanni and Arzawa.

Let us look at this situation for a moment longer. The ancient world was divided between two great civilizations, the one on the Nile, the other on the Euphrates. The rulers of both of these empires regarded the territory which lay between them as their legitimate prey. The Babylonian kings for the most part were content to make occasional raids to the West for such plunder as these might bring and to keep the paths open to the cedar forests and other sources of much-coveted building material. Only in the case of Hammurabi and his successors do we have evidence of what may have been an attempt to organize some of these western regions (the Aleppo district?) under Babylonian rule. But we are not even sure of this. Certainly the Kassite kings of the Amarna period recognized the Pharaohs as lords of Syria.²

Egypt, on the other hand, seems to have put forth efforts from earliest times to dominate the whole of Syria-Palestine and was actually master here for centuries. And yet it was not the Egyptian tongue with the facile reed and the almost imponderable papyrus, but the Babylonian language written in an awkward script upon cumbersome clay tablets, that won the day.

How this came about is easily understood when we study our Babylonian history. The Babylonians were pre-eminently a commercial people. Their neighbors and kinsmen the Assyrians had

¹ In a later day the Aramaic played this rôle.

² "Kinahhi (Canaan) is thy land" (Kn. No. 8, 25 f.), the words of Burraburiasb to the Pharaoh.

planted a trading colony in Cappadocia as early as the middle of the third millennium B.C. The Amarna Letters furnish ample evidence that Babylonian merchants were actively engaged in trade with Syria-Palestine and the Westland generally about the middle of the following millennium. The history we have passed in review showed that the only barriers between Babylonia and Amurru were walls built by the Babylonian kings to "ward off Tidnim." The western campaigns of these rulers prevented the rise of dangerously large states in Syria and, what is more important, kept open the paths of trade.

We may be sure, therefore, that from time immemorial the caravans of the Babylonian merchants regularly visited the Westland and brought to this region, not only Babylonian wares, but also the Babylonian language and script. This was not all. If we examine the commercial conquest of Africa now being accomplished by the Arabic-speaking Moslems, we find that the traders are carrying even more than Arabic commercial terms along with their merchandise. Mohammedan customs, law, and religion penetrate as far as the trader goes; every Moslem is a missionary. To be sure, we have no evidence that the Babylonian merchant was interested in the soul's salvation of his western customers; his interests were probably strictly commercial; nevertheless he was the bearer of other than material goods.

Now it looks as if most of the Syrian-Palestinian weights and measures had come from Babylonia. Who but the Babylonian merchant could have brought them? It is a well-known fact that many of the laws found in the Torah of the Hebrews, especially those found in the so-called Book of the Covenant, are strikingly similar to laws found in the Code of Hammurabi, a code which was in existence a thousand years before the Torah and which defined business procedure, not only for Hammurabi's day, but for all future time in Babylonia. And business in Babylonia was much more of a legal matter than it is with us. The written document, drawn up by the notary and bearing the names and seals (or equivalent) of witnesses, was absolutely essential to any business transaction.¹ Is it not highly probable that the Babylonian

¹ That it was not safe to do business otherwise may be seen from sections 9 and following of the Code of Hammurabi.

merchants brought west with them their Babylonian way of doing business—in other words, introduced into Syria-Palestine Babylonian business law? We shall come back to this matter of the connections between Hebrew and Babylonian law later. Professor Zimmern has gathered together many of the commercial and other technical terms common to the Babylonian language and one or more of the other Semitic tongues (the Hebrew of course included), and it is clear that in a large number of cases the evidence points to Babylonia as the original source of much of the culture of the other Semitic peoples.¹ We have already called attention to the fact that a Hittite scribe in Egypt used as his copy-book exercise a story concerning the western conquests of Sargon of Akkad. In this story another hero, Adamu by name, is mentioned.² This may be the source of the Old Testament name of the ancestor of the race. Other scribes practiced their cuneiform by copying the Adapa-myth, the myth of Nergal and Ereshkigal, and other bits of Babylonian literature. Is it not probable that the Babylonian account of the Deluge, which certainly was the source of the Old Testament Flood Story, reached Canaan in the same way? The similarity of the infantile adventures of Moses and Sargon has already been referred to. The legend of Sargon may well have lightened the labors of the Canaanite scribes as they plodded on toward the mastery of the cuneiform. Finally, lest we forget that the Babylonian merchant had wares for sale, let me remind you that according to the Old Testament tradition among the first spoil taken by the Israelites as they entered the Promised Land was “a goodly Babylonish mantle” (Josh. 7:21).

Our further interest in the Amarna Letters centers in the remarkable picture which these furnish us of conditions in Syria in the fourteenth century B.C. It is a picture of chaos. A century before, the Pharaoh Thutmose III had re-established Egyptian rule in Syria, which had been lost in the confusion of the Hyksos period. His immediate successors seem to have been able to maintain order in the land, but under Amenhotep III and especially under Amenhotep IV, who was more interested in theology than in political problems, there was a complete relapse. The Amarna Letters,

¹ *Die akkadische Lehnwörter*, etc.

² See Sayce in *PSBA*, 1915, pp. 227 f.

supplemented by the Boghaz-Keui documents already referred to, allow us not only to follow but also to account for this decline of Egyptian authority in Syria. A strong Hittite state was forming in Central Asia Minor, and before long it was pushing into Northern Syria. The local Syrian princes were compelled to make their choice between loyalty to the Pharaoh and submission to the Hittite king. The latter was at hand with his army, while the former seemed unable to realize the gravity of the situation in spite of the numerous and frantic letters which came to him from those who would gladly have remained loyal, and so we are not surprised to find the Pharaoh's vassals making the best possible terms with the Hittite. At the same time that the Hittites were encroaching upon the northern portions of Syria and alienating, by force or intrigue, the subjects of the Pharaoh, there were steadily advancing into the fertile regions of Syria-Palestine bands of nomadic and semi-nomadic people from the desert and steppe land to the eastward. In the Letters these invaders of Syria-Palestine are referred to as the *Sutu* or the *Habiri* (*SA-GAZ*). It is evident that they were ready to attach themselves to any local dynast who could pay them well or to any free-lance who could guarantee them booty—and more and more of these were springing up. Most scholars have assumed that the *Hebrews* of a later day were part of the *Habiri*. This brings us to the problems connected with the Exodus and Conquest.

If it were necessary to settle the problems which confront us here before going on, there would be no going on. But this is not necessary, for it is the object of this discussion to show, or try to show, that the attempt to make the exodus from Egypt and the covenant at Sinai (or Kadesh) the starting-point of Israel's national life as well as of Yahwism must be given up. We need not even pass in review the many attempts that have been made at the solution of these problems. There is one point—and it is about the only one—on which there is agreement, and that is the point of departure. That the starting-point of any discussion of the Exodus must be the so-called Israel-stela of Merneptah, found in 1896, is generally recognized. From this stela we learn that Israel was in Canaan, and probably in the hills of Ephraim, about the

year 1225 B.C. This is the earliest historical reference to Israel that has yet come to light. Most scholars hold that Israel must have left Egypt a generation or more before this date; Eerdmans, on the other hand, believes that Israel did not enter Egypt until after it. Then again we find scholars trying to overcome some of the difficulties that confront them by dividing Israel. According to their hypothesis, it was only the Rachel tribes (or Jacob) who sojourned in Egypt and came out from there in or before Merneptah's day. The Leah tribes (or Israel) were in Canaan as early as the Amarna period. There are even those who would compel us to take down our dictionary and look up the plural of exodus.

Besides the name of Israel found on the Merneptah stela, there are two other names occurring in extra-biblical documents which have been drawn into this discussion. The first of these is the name of a body of foreigners who did task work on the temples of Ramses II (1292-1225 B.C.) and were still working in Egyptian quarries a century or more later. They were called *aper* or *apri* (*pr* or *prj*: the Egyptian script does not vocalize its words). The second name is that of the people whom we found pushing into Canaan in the Amarna period, namely, the Habiri. Both of these names have been identified with the Old Testament word "Hebrew," *ibri*. At the present time the majority of scholars are inclined to reject the first identification, while they accept the second. It is noticeable, however, that since a reference to the "gods of the Habbiri" was discovered on one of the Boghaz-Keui documents it has been found more necessary than ever to insist that the Hebrews could have been only a *part* of the Habiri mentioned in the Amarna Letters. This became imperative when it developed that *SA-GAZ* people were mentioned as early as 2000 B.C. in a letter of Hammurabi to Sin-idinnam. The fact is that *habbiri* seems to have been one of two (the other was *habbatu*) words meaning "plunderer," or the like, which might be written ideographically in the Babylonian as *SA-GAZ*. Furthermore it seems evident that this ideogram and its phonetic equivalents were used to designate from at least 2000 B.C. the nomadic tribes living to the west of Babylonia, whose depredations no doubt warranted the application of the name "plunderer" to them. The writer is of the opinion that

the linguistic difficulties in the way of identifying *habbiri* with "Hebrew" are much more serious than is usually supposed;¹ nevertheless, he is of the firm conviction that the tribes which were then, or later became, Israel entered Canaan in the Amarna times—that is, about 1400–1300 B.C. The reasons for this belief follow.

Israel was in Canaan in 1225 B.C. or thereabouts. This is the historical fact with which we must start. In the next place, the Amarna Letters furnish us the indubitable evidence of an invasion of Syria-Palestine during the reigns of Amenhotep III and Amenhotep IV (1411–1358) by the *Sutu* and *SA-GAZ* (*habiri*) peoples—that is, by the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes which roamed the desert and steppe lands which stretch along the Euphrates from Babylonia to Syria. As already indicated the cuneiform texts mention these "plunderers" as early as the days of Hammurabi, and no doubt they had been collecting *baksheesh* from the Babylonian merchants from time immemorial. Now they were pushing, or more likely being pushed, out of their old stamping-grounds. In other words, Arabia, the cradle of the Semites, was sending forth one of its periodic waves of hungry tribesmen into the more favored regions round about. Such a wave of migration extends over centuries of time, and we cannot, therefore, be absolutely certain that the particular hordes we read about in the Amarna Letters included the tribes which then or later made up Israel. These might have entered the land before or after the Amarna period. Gressmann, for example, speaks without qualification of a second and more gentle wave of Aramean tribesmen which the "Eastland spat out" and which spread over the south of Palestine, the Negeb and Desert of Judea, where they lived the sorry but untrammelled life of the semi-nomad until drought and famine compelled to new wanderings.² Egypt, or Goshen, was the refuge of such starving tribes. This second wave of Aramean tribesmen, the Hebrews of the Old Testament, came out of the East, according to Gressmann,

¹ The word *habbiri* is probably a *kattil*-form, like *habbatu* (*kattal*), not = *ʿabir* <*ʿabēr* (participle), as Böhl thinks (*Kanaaner und Hebräer*, p. 89). Besides, the gentilic *ʿibrit* = "Hebrew" can hardly have come from the participial form *ʿabir*. The Old Testament is right in regarding *ʿeber*, "Heber," as the name from which the gentilic is derived. No more could the gentilic be formed from a *kattil*-form like *habbiri*.

² Gressmann, *Mose und seine Zeit*, chap. iii, pp. 393 f.

by 1300 B.C. at the latest. We need not inquire into the reasons for Gressmann's assumption (there is not a scrap of evidence to prove it fact) of a second wave of migration. At this point we are merely interested in the implications of such a hypothesis.

Let us return to the Amarna Letters. Is it possible to determine from these letters whether the invading tribes from the East succeeded in establishing themselves in the land? If so, in what parts? The answer of the letters to these questions has already been given by Böhl,¹ who calls our attention to the interesting fact that, while in most instances the names of the cities from which the Palestinian letters were sent are not mentioned, nevertheless, when such names are given, they are those of cities which the Israelites never conquered or which did not fall into their hands until long after the entrance into Canaan (cf. Judg., chap. 1). The coast cities like Tyre, Sidon, Akko, and Askelon, together with Megiddo, Gezer, Lachish, and, most important of all, Jerusalem, are examples. Why do we not have letters from such old centers as Bethel, Hebron, Beersheba, Shiloh, and Gibeon? Böhl admits that their absence may be accidental, but believes that another explanation is more probable, namely, that we have no letters from these cities because they were already in the hands of the Israelites. To this *argumentum e silentio* he is able to add positive evidence. Besides Jerusalem, Shechem was one of the most important centers of the Israelite territory. We have only to recall our Old Testament history to realize this. Furthermore, it is evident from the tradition as well as from the early history that this was one of the first Canaanite cities to fall into the hands of the invading Israelites (cf. Gen., chap. 34; 48:22; Josh., chap. 24; Judg., chap. 9). Now Shechem is mentioned but once in the Amarna Letters (Kn. 289, 23), and, although the passage presents linguistic difficulties, it is almost certain from this reference that the Habiri were at the time in possession of that city.

Böhl also calls attention to the biblical chronology which puts the exodus from Egypt 480 years before the beginning of the building of Solomon's Temple (I Kings 6:1). The entrance into Canaan would fall, according to this chronology, at about 1414 B.C. Judg.

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 67 f.

11:26 estimates the length of Israel's occupation of the east Jordan country up to Jephthah's day at 300 years. Now the writer is aware (as was Böhl) of the usual treatment these figures receive at the hands of critical scholars. But have we really disposed of them when they are bracketed and declared late insertions into the text? Where did the later writers get hold of them? Out of their thumbs? Before we can get rid of these figures, which were undoubtedly rough estimates, we must show cause for doubting the possibility that there was preserved for these later writers in the tradition or even in writing the number of generations which had come and gone since Israel entered Canaan. However, we do not care to insist upon using these figures as evidence of the date of Israel's entrance into the Promised Land. But we do insist that the Amarna Letters make it as clear as we could possibly expect documents of this nature to do, that the invaders of Canaan mentioned therein were gaining or had already gained a foothold in the regions later occupied by the Israelite tribes. Of course it is possible that the invasion of Canaan in the Amarna period was similar to the exploit of the king of France who marched up the hill and then marched down again. But if the invaders stayed, what then? Either they absorbed the native population or were absorbed by this. In either case the process must have been a slow one. Gressmann's second wave of migration—that is, the Hebrews—after their sojourn in the Negeb, their experiences in Egypt and Kadesh, entered the Promised Land about 1230 B.C., roughly a century after the Amarna period, and began the conquest of the land all over again. Unless the previous invaders had left the land or had become Canaanites in a remarkably short time, it is difficult to harmonize Gressmann's hypothesis with the early history of the Israelites as found in Judges. Sisera's nine hundred chariots of iron would alone be evidence that the Israelites in their conquest of Canaan did not come up against newcomers, but against an old and highly civilized population. Gressmann's hypothesis is merely an attempt to wave the magic wand of criticism over admitted legend and have history issue therefrom.

There is a further bit of evidence which points to the Amarna period as the time of Israel's invasion of Canaan. The excavators

of the site of the ancient Jericho are convinced on archaeological grounds that the destruction of the Canaanite wall and city cannot be put later than the Amarna times.¹ Now, according to the Old Testament traditions the capture of Jericho was the first exploit of the invading Israelites. How does this fit in with Gressmann's second-wave hypothesis? It would mean that the Canaanite Jericho had withstood the *SA-GAZ* and Sutu whose activities in the Amarna period threatened every city in the land and brought to an end Egyptian rule in Canaan and then fell a victim to a handful of Israelites a century later.

Just a word about the sojourn in Egypt. That there is a kernel of history in the tradition of Israel's stay in Egypt is not to be doubted. We know that Edomite clans were allowed to pasture their flocks in Goshen, but this does not compel us to accept the Old Testament legends as history. The only evidence as to the date of the sojourn in Egypt is furnished by the reference to the store-cities Pithom and Raamses (Exod. 1:11). These cities were built by Ramses II, who reigned from about 1292 to 1225 B.C. The whole or part of the stay in Egypt must have fallen between these two dates. Gressmann puts the exodus from Egypt and the conquest of Canaan between the years *ca.* 1260 and 1225 B.C. The latter date is determined by the Merneptah stela (see above). This would, of course, exclude the possibility of placing the Conquest in the Amarna period unless the sojourn in Egypt came after the Conquest (Eerdmans). Now it seems to the writer that the problem has been made unnecessarily difficult by the assumption that all or practically all of the tribes that later made up Israel had been in Egypt. Meyer, in page after page of the most cogent argument, based upon the Old Testament records themselves, has shown what should have been clear from the most casual reading of these—namely, the fact that Israel and Judah developed almost entirely independent of each other, the former in the North, the latter in the South (Negeb). For a short time only, under David and Solomon, were the southern tribes a part of Israel.² When "Rehoboam went to Shechem: for all Israel were come to Shechem to

¹ Sellin und Watzinger, *Jericho*, p. 181.

² Ed. Meyer, *Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme*, especially pp. 442 f.

make him king," and "when all Israel saw that the king hearkened not unto them, the people answered the king, saying, What portion have we in David? neither have we inheritance in the son of Jesse: to your tents, O Israel: now see to thine own house, David. So Israel departed unto their tents" (I Kings 12:1, 16) and stayed there. The conquest of Canaan by *Israel* in the Amarna period is, therefore, not rendered improbable by the admission of a sojourn of one (Levi?) or more of the *southern* tribes in Egypt in the days of Ramses II. Whether the same wave of migration which brought the Israelites into the hills of Ephraim and the surrounding territory also took the southern tribes into the Negeb is a question which cannot be answered. But the events which took place in the full light of history make it almost impossible to assume that there had been any such organization into one nation of the northern and southern tribes as the stories of the Exodus, the Covenant at Sinai, and the Conquest take for granted. If Israel's conquest of the North and gradual growth into a nation were independent of developments in the South, as we believe was the case, then the first part of the Old Testament and higher-critical hypothesis which makes Moses the leader of the people (organizer of the nation) and prophet (organizer of the religion) falls to the ground.

What about Moses as organizer of the religion? Here we approach our main problem. Fortunately, most of the labor toward the solution of this problem has already been done, and it is possible for us to be very brief.

The Covenant at Sinai, according to the Old Testament hypothesis, the enthronement of Yahweh at Kadesh under the leadership of Moses the prophet, according to the hypothesis of our critical scholars, marks the beginning of the worship of Yahweh in Israel. Over against the hypothesis of the Covenant at Sinai I would place the results of the brilliant work of Bernhard Luther and Eduard Meyer on the cult of Shechem (*Israeliten*, pp. 542 f.). They begin with an analysis of Deut. 11:26-30 and 27:1-26, and find that the underlying account *traced the worship at Shechem with its altar on Mount Gerizim and the ceremony of the blessings and curses back to a command of Moses*. This was evidently the story as told by an Israelite, namely E, who saw in Shechem the chief

sanctuary of the land. The account was worked over by Deuteronomic writers (11:26-28; 27:8, 9 f., 11-13) and cut in two by the insertion of the book of the law (chaps. 12-26). Later the ceremony of the blessings and curses was transferred together with the mountains Gerizim and Ebal to Gilgal near Jericho (Deut. 11:30). The passage in Josh. 8:30-35 was also "corrected." The reason is evident. Gerizim and Shechem could not be allowed such honors by those who saw in Zion and Jerusalem the center of Yahwism. Finally, the clumsy substitution of Ebal for Gerizim was made in Deut. 27:4 and Josh. 8:30.

The next step takes us to the account of the last days of Joshua (Josh., chap. 24). At the close of his career Joshua gathered all the tribes of Israel to Shechem (vs. 1) and "made a covenant with the people that day, and set them a statute and an ordinance in Shechem. And Joshua wrote these words in the book of the law of God; and he took a great stone and set it up there under the oak that was by the sanctuary of Jehovah. And Joshua said unto all the people, Behold, this stone shall be a witness against us; for it has heard all the words of Jehovah which he spake unto us: it shall be therefore a witness against you, lest ye deny your God" (vss. 25 f.). This great stone is evidently the same as the one mentioned in Judg. 9:6, *אלון מצב*, "the oak of the pillar, *maššebah*." Note particularly the words "and set them a statute and an ordinance in Shechem," *וישים לו חק ומשפט בשכם*. Almost the same words are put into the mouth of Moses at Marah, *שם שם לו חק ומשפט* (Exod. 15:25). The making of the covenant is mentioned in Exod. 34:28, at the end of the older Decalogue, and in Exod. 24:3-8, in connection with the Book of the Covenant. It is, of course, a well-known fact that we have two accounts of the acceptance of Yahweh as the only God of Israel, the putting away of strange gods, the giving of the law and making of a covenant. These epoch-making events in the history of Israel's religion are the work of Moses at Sinai (Horeb) and Kadesh. But the job is done all over again by Joshua at Shechem. That we have here but variant accounts of the same events has long been suspected, but it remained for Luther and Meyer to insist that the account which attributes this work to Joshua at Shechem is undoubtedly the

older. The law-giving and entrance into covenant relationship, accompanied with the ceremony of the blessings and curses, clearly belong to Shechem, the home of the old *Baal-berith* or *El-berith* (lord or god of the covenant). It would appear, therefore, as if the law-giving and covenant at Sinai would have to be set aside as unhistorical, and that the fathers of the Samaritan woman, who "worshiped in this mountain" had been worshiping in the "place where men ought to worship" (John 4:20). In a word, *Gerizim and not Sinai was the mountain of the law.*

It has been suggested that the Book of the Covenant, Exod. 20:22—23:19, originally stood in Josh., chap. 24—that is, formed the "book of the law of God" mentioned in vs. 26. This is doubted by Luther, but, the writer believes, for insufficient reasons. Here at Shechem stood the "oak of the lawgiver" (אלון מורדכי, Gen. 12:6 and elsewhere) with a *maṣṣebah* and an altar called "El, god of Israel" (Gen. 33:20). By this same oak, called in this case the "oak of the *maṣṣebah*," אלון מצב, the Shechemites gathered to make Abimelech king (Judg. 9:6). Another sacred tree in this neighborhood was the "oak of the soothsayers" אלון מטננים (Judg. 9:37). Such passages as these show clearly that law-giving was associated with Shechem. The Abimelech episode (Judg., chaps. 9 f.) is but one of the numerous passages in the Old Testament writings which point to Shechem as the political center of Israel in the early days, and the incidents recorded in I Kings 12:1 f. bear witness to the continued political importance of this city even after the union of the North and the South. Although Omri moved the capital to Samaria, Mount Gerizim evidently continued to be the sacred mountain of the Israelites. It has remained to this day the center of the Samaritan worship. If Joshua promulgated any code of laws at Shechem, and if any of this legislation has survived, the writer can think of no part of the Torah as more likely to contain these survivals than the Book of the Covenant. Luther believes that, since Joshua's law-giving was in connection with the covenant, the act whereby Yahweh became the God of Israel, his laws may hardly be looked for in the legal decisions (*Rechtsbestimmungen*) of the Book of the Covenant. Joshua's laws, he thinks, must have been in part, at least, cult-regulations (*kultische Bestimmungen*).

Consequently Exod., chap. 34, makes a greater appeal to him. However, he admits that the "curses" contain no cultregulations whatever. The Shechem-Torah cannot, therefore, have consisted wholly of such. But since the Book of the Covenant contains both kinds of legislation, as he admits it does, it is difficult to see any weight in his objections.

The writer believes that there can be no doubt that the legislation contained in the Book of the Covenant originated in the North. It is almost inconceivable that the South ever produced the material civilization which this code presupposes. We have already pointed out the fact that there is much evidence to show that this Book of the Covenant probably contains the Canaanite adaptation of the Babylonian laws which the merchants from the Tigris-Euphrates valley gradually carried with them to the West-land during the centuries of trade with these regions. This does not, of course, mean that all Canaanite (and Israelite) law came from Babylonia. Canaanite customs crystallized into law just as surely as did Babylonian customs. Soon after the discovery of the Code of Hammurabi the late Professor D. H. Müller, of Vienna, whose sympathies were never with the so-called "higher critics," pointed out, among other things, the fact that the arrangement of the laws in the Code of Hammurabi and in the Book of the Covenant is so nearly identical that it seemed necessary to assume some kind of connection between the two codes. We need not stop to discuss his attempt to derive both codes from an *ur-Semitisches* law and to show that Abraham was the carrier of this to Canaan.¹ The whole question was canvassed again only recently by Johns,² who concludes that borrowing from the Babylonian law seems certain. I shall give but one of several of his very ingenious arguments. According to the Book of the Covenant a Hebrew slave served six years and then went free (Exod. 21:2). Now in Deut. 15:12-18, where the same matter is taken up, a curious statement is added: "It shall not seem hard to thee, when thou lettest him go free from thee; for to the double of the hire of a hireling hath he served thee six years" (vs. 18). Now, says Johns, the last clause can only mean

¹ *Die Gesetze Hammurabis*, especially pp. 210 f.

² *The Relation between the Laws of Babylonia and the Laws of the Hebrew People*.

that six years' service is the double of something, and that something is evidently *three* years' service. But three years is exactly the length of time the Babylonian slave (for debt) served. Consequently we must assume that a three-year period of service was all the older (Canaanite) law allowed. This three-year period was probably one of the many Babylonian institutions which were taken over into the Canaanite civilization and from there into the Israelite.

The writer would like to call attention to a few more points of possible contact between the Babylonian and the Hebrew legislation. They deal with externals only.

The first point has to do with the matter of the "blessings and curses." In the Deuteronomy passages mentioned above (Deut. 11:29; 27:14 f.) we have an account of the ceremony of the blessings and curses which concluded the law-giving and covenant episode. The twelve curses to which all the people answered and said "Amen" are preserved; the blessings have not come down to us. This has always seemed strange to scholars. The writer believes that the Code of Hammurabi may throw some light upon this matter. At the end of that Code we find a few perfunctory remarks (covering sixteen lines) as to the blessings which will make glad the reign of the future prince who shall uphold the law which Hammurabi laid down. Then follow at great length and in minutest detail (over 280 lines) the curses which all the gods whose names Hammurabi could recall will bring upon the prince who shall set aside that law. A similar preponderance of curses over blessings is to be observed in the "blessings and curses" found at the end of Assyrian inscriptions. The curses were the important thing from the oriental viewpoint. So it is possible that in the ceremony of the blessings and curses, which is perhaps the Canaanite adaptation of the blessings and curses appended to the Babylonian code, and which followed the law-giving and covenant at Shechem, the blessings were passed over with a word, while the curses were recited at great length and with much emphasis. The curses rather than the blessings were depended on to impress the popular mind.

In the second place, if the law-giving and covenant at Shechem, by the hand of Joshua, are the historical facts upon which the account of the Sinai law-giving and covenant are based, then it is

probable that many of the details which stand in the latter account were also derived from the story of the events at Shechem. To one of these details I should like to direct attention.

In Exodus (31:18; 32:15, etc.) we read of Moses' descent from the mount with "the two tables of the testimony in his hand; tables that were written on both their sides; on the one side and on the other were they written." Now the word for "tables" (לוחות) is also known in the Assyrian-Babylonian (*liu*), and may there denote cuneiform tablets. Whether the tables which Moses (Joshua) brought down from the mount were tables of clay or "tables of stone"—in the Babylonian it might also denote the latter—the fact that they were written on both sides makes one think of cuneiform tablets at once. The official copy of the Code of Hammurabi was inscribed upon a stone pillar, but copies on clay tablets were made for use in the law courts of the different cities of the empire. Fragments of such have come down to us. From these one may estimate the probable number of tablets in such an edition. Six or at most seven is the writer's estimate. Now the Book of the Covenant plus the "curses" would not crowd two cuneiform tablets of similar size. We have laid great stress on the fact that in the Amarna period the Babylonian language and script were in general use in Canaan. Has the Old Testament story preserved the evidence that the *Canaanite* laws handed down from Mount Gerizim were written on clay tablets and in the cuneiform script?

The question of the origin of Yahweh-worship in Israel still remains. Luther states frankly his belief that we are altogether in the dark as to how and when Yahweh came to the Israelites. The writer believes, however, that we have one line of trustworthy evidence open to us, namely, that of the personal names found in the Old Testament. The study of the personal names found in the cuneiform has been of the greatest value for determining the movements of the different racial elements in the Nearer Orient. Gray, in his *Studies in Hebrew Proper Names* (1896), has summarized the evidence of the Old Testament names for us:

Moses, according to the Old Testament tradition, revealed to the Hebrews the name Yahweh. Whether the name was known before his time, either in

other tribes or in Moses' own family or not, has long been a matter of dispute; and it is a question which the present investigation cannot decide. . . . The next point to be considered is the infrequency of the compounds with יה in the earliest period [before David]; for in view of two facts—(1) the greater frequency in the same period of compounds with אל, (2) the rapid increase of compounds with יה in the following period—we may safely infer that the infrequency of these names in the literature of the earliest period corresponds to infrequency in actual life. . . . Further, the only name which is philologically quite certain and unambiguous, and which goes far back beyond the Davidic period, is יהונתן (Judg. 18:30), and this, significantly enough, is the name of a member of the family of Moses. The other quite early name is יהושע [pp. 257 f.].

In short, with a very few exceptions, the personal names of the Hebrews before the Davidic period were not compounded with the name of their deity. On the other hand, beginning with this period such compounds become increasingly common. Did Moses introduce Yahweh into Israel?

But, before answering this question, we must tarry a moment over the names found in extra-biblical, cuneiform sources, which have been produced as evidence to show that Yahweh-names are known from at least 2000 B.C.

Barton, in an article "Yahweh before Moses,"¹ has gathered the names together. His attitude is generally skeptical, but he admits the possibility that a goodly number of these examples may contain the name of Yahweh. Now Daiches,² whose work Barton ignored, had already disposed of most of these supposed Yahweh-compounds. Indeed we might have been spared all sorts of wild conjectures had those who took up this matter been willing to keep before them the known facts when they set out to attempt the interpretation of uncertain ones.

First of all, we must bear in mind that there are no personal names containing the element Yahweh (יהוה), either in the Old Testament itself or in the extra-biblical sources (the Aramaic papyri found at Elephantine). The names found in the Old Testament and the papyri which contain the name of the Hebrew deity as an element give that name as Jeho (or Jahu יהו), Jo (י), or Jah (יה).

¹ *Studies in the History of Religion Presented to C. H. Toy* (1912), pp. 187 f.

² In *ZA*, XXII (1909), 125 f.

Furthermore, and this point is particularly emphasized by Daiches, both the biblical and extra-biblical *post-exilic* names invariably have Jah (יָה) as second element, never Jahu (יָהוּ), which is used interchangeably with Jah (יָה) in the names of the earlier periods. Now these are known quantities. Let us turn to the known quantities in the cuneiform documents. We begin with a few Hebrew names found in the historical texts from the Assyrian period: *Ia-u-ha-zi*=Jehoahaz (יְהוֹאָחָז, evidently the fuller form of the name of which Ahaz, אֲחָז, is an abbreviation), *Ha-za-ki-ia-a-u* (variant forms are found)=Hezekiah (חֲזַקְיָהוּ), *Az-ri-ia-a-u*=Azariah (עֲזַרְיָהוּ; the name is not that of the king of Judah). These Assyrian renderings of western names agree with the Old Testament forms in giving the name of the deity as Jeho or Jahu (יָהוּ). The *h* (ה) of the Hebrew forms would naturally fall out in the Assyrian version. The Murashû texts from Nippur give us the late Babylonian (Persian period) writing of Hebrew names, the names of exiles or their descendants. Here we find *u-Ia-a-bu-u-na-lan-nu*=Jehonathan (יְהוֹנָתָן). Note that the Hebrew *h* (ה) is here rendered by *b*, the Babylonian equivalent of Hebrew *h* (ח), but more particularly that the determinative for deity (*ilu*) stands before the name. Here יָהוּ is the first element of the name. What about the forms with the name of the deity as second element? Professor Clay¹ has gathered together "no less than twenty-five names which have as a first element a word that has its exact equivalent or parallel in the Bible, which is followed by Jâma or Jâwa." This Jâma (*always* written *ja-a-ma*) should and undoubtedly does correspond to the element Jah (יָה) of the post-exilic names mentioned above. The theory of Professor Clay is "that the Babylonian scribe, recognizing the element as being the Hebrew god Yahweh, arbitrarily decided to write it, when it was final in these West-Semitic names, always in accordance with the way they heard the full name pronounced." In other words, Jâma or Jâwa gives the pronunciation of the tetragrammaton יְהוָה. But, if the Babylonian scribe knew that this was the name of the Hebrew deity, why did he in every case fail to add the determinative *ilu*? Its absence is rendered more noticeable by its

¹ *Light on the Old Testament from Babyl.*, pp. 244 f.

presence in the form ^u*Idhānatannu*. And why did he invariably write it *ja-a-ma*? Why not occasionally *ja-ma* or *ja-mi*? There is no reason for thinking that this *ja-a-ma* is anything else than the Babylonian rendering of the Hebrew Jah (יָה). The *ma* is in all probability the emphatic particle appended hundreds of times to verbal and other forms to draw the accent to the final syllable. The *a* of יָה was long and *stressed*.¹ Thus we see that the known quantities of the cuneiform agree with the known quantities of the biblical and non-cuneiform extra-biblical sources in rendering the name of the Hebrew deity as יָה (contracted to י) or יָה when it appears as an element in personal names. If the form יָהִי (an *x* so far as our knowledge of its pronunciation goes) never occurs as an element in the personal names found in biblical and extra-biblical documents, why should we insist on finding it in the cuneiform? The whole vicious circle of reasoning which gathers together names containing elements like *ja-pa*, *ja-ba*, *ja-mi*, and heaven only knows what else, derives from these the pronunciation of the tetragrammaton יְהוָה, ignores the fact that in no case are these supposed renderings of יְהוָה preceded by the determinative for deity (which would be the only final test in case the names were not on other grounds clearly recognizable as Hebrew), and then, on the basis of this *x* derived from *y*, concludes that Yahweh was known practically over the whole Semitic world 2000 B.C. and earlier—certainly such reasoning needs no refutation. The elements *ja-pa*, *ja-mi*, and the like are beyond the shadow of a doubt West-Semitic imperfect forms similar to the first elements of names like *jadah-ilu*, *jahbarilu*,

¹ I wonder whether we shall not be compelled to reconsider the significance of the element יָה. Is it an abbreviated form of יָהִי? Or is it the hypocoristic ending *ja*, found in the cuneiform rendering of Semitic (including West-Semitic) names from the earliest to the latest periods? (For the literature on hypocoristic endings see Clay, *Personal Names from the Cassite Period*, p. 23.) That Jah is a form of the name of the Hebrew deity follows from יָהִי. But Jah is always written יָה in this formula (the one exception is Ps. 104:35) which is not the case in personal names. The form Abijam (אֲבִיָּאִם), variant of Abijah (אֲבִיָּאִה), in which the *jam* is the exact equivalent of the *ja-a-ma* of the names mentioned above, certainly looks more like a hypocoristic than like a name containing a shortened form of Jahu. That the Hebrews of the later period may have looked upon this hypocoristic ending *ja* as a shortened form of the name of their deity is possible. But it is significant that the determinative *ilu* is never found before *ja-a-ma*, which is, as we saw above, undoubtedly the cuneiform equivalent of יָה.

iaḫub-ilu, and dozens of others. Such a name as *ia-u-ba-ni* of the Cassite period looks at first sight as if it might contain the cuneiform equivalent of Jahu or Jeho. But so long as there are no other reasons for supposing that the name of the Hebrew deity would occur in a Babylonian (*not a Hebrew*) name five hundred years before the time of David, and there certainly are no such reasons, and until the determinative for deity is found prefixed to such a name, we must look elsewhere for an explanation of the form. To the writer it seems quite probable that the element *ia-u* is but a variant form of the interrogative pronoun *a-a-u* (*ajju*). It is true that no example of a writing *ia-u* for this pronoun has been found. But when we turn to the indefinite pronoun *ajjuma* (where *ma* is added to *a-a-u*, *ajju*) we find the variant writing *ia-um-ma* (cf. Delitzsch, *AGr.*, pp. 153 f.). Furthermore, the hypocoristic forms of *ia-u-ba-ni* (or similar names), namely, *ia-u* and *ia-(a)-u-tum*, found in the same period, certainly argue against taking *ia-u* as the name of a deity.

The cuneiform versions of names containing the name of the Hebrew deity as first or second element all *date from the Assyrian (after 750 B.C.) and later periods and agree with the Old Testament and Aramaic forms of such names in giving the name of that deity as יְהוָה or יְהוֹ*.

How and when did Yahwism come to Israel? Perhaps all of the tribes which later made up Israel and Judah knew and worshiped Yahweh before they entered their later homes. If so, it would appear as if we had to assume that all of the stories connected with the patriarchs, the judges, and early heroes were Canaanite stories taken over bodily into the Hebrew tradition. Or, on the other hand, Yahweh was introduced by Moses at a date not long before the time of David—the time when names compounded with יְהוָה and יְהוֹ become common, largely superseding the older *El*-compounds.¹ The writer believes that *unless Yahweh was one of the negligible gods of the pantheon of the early Israelites, he was unknown to them until the missionary Levites brought him to them not many generations before the time of David.* An account of one of these missionaries activities

¹ The cuneiform documents from the time of the First Dynasty of Babylon show that *El*-compounds were common in the West in 2000 B.C. and earlier.

(naturally worked over by later editors) may be seen in Judg., chaps. 17 f.

Summing up: In the Amarna period, roughly 1400 B.C., a wave of Aramean tribesmen flowed into Canaan from the desert and steppes to the east. Among these were the people who later made up the tribes of Israel. That the names of these tribes as well as their number were changing all the time is to be taken for granted. About 1225 B.C. we hear for the first time of Israel, probably at this time the name of a tribe. Later the name came to be applied to a loose confederacy of the "sons of Jacob." Gradually these newcomers, who at first had simply sat down in the territory of those who could not oust them, absorbed the more advanced civilization of the old Canaanites, intermarried with them, took over the cults connected with the sacred places of the land, and told their children the same stories about these places which had been told by the older population from time immemorial. Thus the heroes (patriarchs) of Israel, as well as the Israelites themselves, came to have names such as are known to have been common in Amurru (the Westland) from before 2000 B.C., names like Jacob-el, Jephthah-el (cf. Josh. 19:14, 27), Joseph-el, etc. That these people, however, retained customs and cults which had been theirs before they entered the land is certain. But just which of the customs and cults mentioned in the Old Testament were pre-Canaanite it is hardly possible to determine. At Shechem, Joshua (the name need not have been the same in the oldest versions of the story¹) handed down a code of laws to the Israelites—laws which may for the most part have been codified long before by the Canaanites, perhaps on the basis of the Babylonian legal system (the Code of Hammurabi). Here also the people entered into covenant relationship with Yahweh, who now became the God of Israel. That this God had been known to the Israelites before they entered the land is possible, but not probable. It is more likely that his worship was the result of the missionary propaganda of the Levites from the south (cf. Judg., chaps. 17 f.). These Levites

¹ Note that Joshua is called Hoshea in Deut. 32:44, Num. 13:8, and in Num. 13:16 this is given as the original name. Was Hoshea the Canaanite predecessor of the Israelite Joshua?

may once have been a tribe in the country to the south of the Israelites (among the Israelites themselves, Benjamin, "the son of the right-hand, the south," was evidently the southernmost), but they seem to have been without a country when our history begins. Moses, whose name is Egyptian, was their eponymous hero (Deut. 33:8 f.). The work of the Levite missionaries was taken up and continued by the prophets. But their activities belong to the historical period and need not detain us here. The one thing that seems certain about the ultimate source of Yahwism is that it belongs to "Sinai." "Yahweh came from Sinai, And rose from Seir unto them; He shined forth from mount Paran, And came from Meribah-Kadesh" (Deut. 33:2).

We return to those writers who took their pens in hand to write the history of the Hebrews. They were Yahweh-worshippers. They insisted that the Baal-worship of the Canaanites must go. But the common people loved to gather at the sacred places to listen to the stories of the appearances of the *el*'s to men. J and E told the people that these *el*'s were but manifestations of the true God, Yahweh. Finally, Moses, in whose hands were the Urim and Thummim and who may have introduced Yahweh to Levi (Deut. 33:8 f.), became the great lawgiver of Israel, and Joshua, the earlier lawgiver, became Moses' "minister" who looked on at Sinai. All law-giving was traced back to Moses, just as Solomon received credit for all the proverbs and David for all the psalms which the Hebrews produced. It was the religious experience of the prophets of Israel that made Yahwism the religion which it became, not their adherence to and partial realization of an ideal set up centuries before by Moses.

This paper is nothing more than a modest attempt to show the necessity of keeping constantly before us the history of the whole Nearer Orient when we try to visualize the earliest steps in the political and religious evolution of the Israelites. Wellhausen's great work appeared in 1878, and since that date more than a dozen histories of Israel have been written from the Wellhausenian point of view. That steady progress has been made goes without saying, but the writer feels that, like Darwinism, the evolutionary theory

¹ Following Wellhausen's emendation of the text.

of the Wellhausen school has shown a tendency to become rigid or "orthodox." Meanwhile the rapid advances made in the decipherment of the cuneiform and hieroglyphic inscriptions have made it necessary to rewrite, perhaps one had better say have made it possible to write for the first time, the ancient history of the Nearer East. The Amarna Letters have thrown a flood of light upon the condition of Syria-Palestine in the middle of the second millennium B.C.—roughly speaking, the "patriarchal period." The discovery of the Code of Hammurabi, which dates from a period more than half a millennium before the traditional date of Moses, has been regarded by many as sufficient reason for reopening the whole question of the development of Israelite legislation. The excavation of mound after mound in Palestine has brought to light an enormous mass of archaeological material which must be taken into consideration in any discussion of the early history of the Hebrews. I believe that most Old Testament scholars feel that the results of all of these new discoveries may be fitted into the Wellhausen theory of Israel's evolution. This is probably true. But that the theory, as far as it applies to the beginnings of Israel, needs radical revision is the view of the historian Eduard Meyer. That some Old Testament scholars have the same feeling is shown by the incisive article on "Some Problems in the Early History of Hebrew Religion" by my colleague Professor J. M. Powis Smith (*AJSL*, XXXII [1916], 81 f.). Indeed, I know of no article in which the problems raised by our larger vision of the early history of the Nearer Orient have been more clearly seen or more forcibly stated. I have approached these problems from the viewpoint of the Assyriologist and have no doubt unduly stressed the Babylonian influences upon the civilization of Canaan. If I have ventured in some cases to suggest answers where my colleague in the Old Testament field was content to state the problems, it may be only another demonstration of the truth of the proverb concerning the rash fools and the reluctant angels, but if I have succeeded in bringing these problems once more before students of the Old Testament then the good old Assyrian phrase, *ulluṣ libbi*, "rejoicing of the heart," will best describe my feelings.

PRIMITIVE CHRISTIANITY AN IDEALISTIC SOCIAL MOVEMENT

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In the last analysis religion is to be considered sociologically; experience, worship, and doctrine must be interpreted and evaluated in terms of their social function, according to what they accomplish for human welfare. From this point of view primitive Christianity was an idealistic social movement. Its chief aspects, as we find them exhibited on the pages of the New Testament, may be summarized as follows:

1. Its comprehensive and supreme principle was love of man toward man—brotherliness in feeling, action, and thought.
2. It inculcated the sacrifice of self for the good of others.
3. It made the common welfare the chief aim of life.
4. It sought to establish consideration and justice in the social relations of men.
5. It aimed to diminish the valuation and to check the pursuit of material things.
6. It sought to control and suppress sex immorality.
7. It elevated the marriage ideal and practice.
8. It forbade envy and strife, fraud and theft, drunkenness and reveling.
9. It condemned pride, ostentation, and hypocrisy.
10. It censured the self-complacency, arrogance, and selfishness of the better class.
11. It placed the social duties above the ritual duties, right conduct and character above worship and ordinance.
12. It interpreted the will of God in the direction of reasonable living.
13. It made the individual free, autonomous, responsible.
14. It rebuked legalism in law and in social administration.

15. It sought to prevent the domination of the weak by the strong.

16. It opposed the use of force to accomplish social ends.

17. It undertook to replace the law and practice of retribution, i.e., revenge, retaliation, by the principle of returning good for evil and overcoming evil with good.

18. It created so high and free a conception of the right social relations as to disaffect the Christians toward the Roman government.

19. It developed local groups of persons throughout the Empire bound together religiously and socially in close fellowship.

20. It unified Orientals and Occidentals in a real brotherhood, surmounting the barriers of race antipathy and national alignment.

21. It brought together on a common plane the rich and the poor, the educated and the ignorant, the prominent and the obscure, the master and the slave.

22. It welded new social bonds, detaching people from previous groups and associations and uniting them on a higher basis.

23. It founded a solid, permanent social organization within the Roman Empire that was to survive the latter's decline and fall.

24. It made life idealistic, hopeful, joyful, and courageous.

25. It assured men of eternal welfare and a perfect social order in an imminent new age.

This statement of the social principles of primitive Christianity combines in a single program the teachings of Jesus and Paul. The nineteen points stated in Nos. 1-17, 24, 25 were presented with almost equal explicitness and force by both Jesus and Paul in their ministry, though with much difference of perspective and expression. The six points stated in Nos. 18-23 belonged especially to Paul in his establishment of the Christian movement throughout the Roman Empire.

The term "primitive Christianity" is here used of the whole first-century movement, the term "idealistic" is meant in an ethical sense, and the terms "ethical" and "social" are used synonymously.

The customary view of primitive Christianity has been theological rather than social. Its doctrine has been the matter of

interest and the object of study. New Testament interpretation has been chiefly a process of inculcating the teaching of Jesus and Paul about God, man, sin, judgment, Christ, the Holy Spirit, faith, atonement, justification, salvation, immortality, the Kingdom of God. Even at the present time divinity-school courses in the Teaching of Jesus and the Teaching of Paul habitually pursue this doctrinal exposition and give to the social principles, aims, and achievements of primitive Christianity only a secondary, conventional homiletical treatment.

Besides this traditional theological view of primitive Christianity, which is historic, and still acceptable and useful to the Christian churches, we now have a social view constructed in accordance with the anthropological sciences. Primitive Christianity was essentially a social product and factor. In a scientific analysis the teaching of Jesus and the teaching of Paul are to be interpreted and evaluated in terms of social science. That the primitive-Christian social program, effort, and achievement were saturated with religion and theology was due to the Jewish and Hellenistic sources from which they came and to the first-century conditions of the Mediterranean world which they served. Primitive Christianity aimed at human welfare for as many individuals as possible. The means it employed to accomplish this social end belonged to the origin, time, and circumstances of the Christian mission and may be regarded as on the whole the most effective means that could then have been used.

The modern conception, point of view, and method in the pursuit of human welfare are different from those of historical Christianity because of the new scientific knowledge, world-view, and social aim. The best characteristic of the twentieth century is its social consciousness, study, and effort. The social sciences dominate, or will dominate, the whole scheme and process of education, law, and government.

A fundamental feature of this scientific treatment of society is that religion in all its forms is viewed socially. The facts of religion are social facts. Even theology, ritual, and mysticism have been and continue to be agents of social welfare in that they satisfy the minds, inspire the hearts, and improve the lives of men. The

religious feelings, ideas, and actions make for human welfare, individual and collective. All facts of human life are true and valuable, relatively speaking, in so far as they promote the welfare of mankind. Had not religion been in the main helpful to humanity, men would not have instituted and maintained it. Science therefore views religion as a social phenomenon, as an expression of human experience and a factor of human progress. Religion comes to be interpreted as a medium and a measure of civilization.

Religion has five main aspects: mystical experience, ritual, doctrine, ecclesiastical organization, ethics. The order in which the five aspects are named is the order of historical development and of ascending social value. Religion has been defined as "the effective desire to be in right relation with the Power manifest in the universe."¹ Compare with this Ellwood's definition: "Religion is essentially a projection and a universalization of social values."² Both statements are correct, from different points of view: the one is theological, the other is social; the one is descriptive in terms of the church, the other is functional in terms of society.

Religion is first of all *feeling*—a sense of dependence upon God (however conceived) for material and spiritual welfare, in the present and in the future; and a desire for personal relationship on friendly terms with God. This is religion as mystical experience: it means fear, appeal, faith, love, toward the Divine.

This religious feeling prompts men to acts of propitiation and worship, designed to secure the favor, assistance, and companionship of God. In this way arises religious *ritual*: prayer, sacrifice, circumcision, food laws, baptism, Eucharist, religious services, and all kinds of priestly and liturgical ceremonies.

In reflection upon their religious experience and practice, men construct ideas and theories about God, the world, mankind, salvation. Hence *doctrine*, which is the product of this intellectual activity. Its purpose is to enable men the better to obtain the welfare that they seek.

¹ This definition is by Howerth; it is quoted and used by Fowler in *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, chap. i.

² Ellwood, *The Social Problem*, p. 204; also his article, "The Social Function of Religion," *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1913. The social aspect of religion is fully expounded in Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*.

Since man is by nature social, he socially organizes his religious feelings, actions, and thoughts. This results in *ecclesiastical organization* in all its forms: temple, priesthood, theocracy, synagogue, church, and all the ritual and social institutions founded and operated in the name of religion.

Last and most important of all, religion is *ethics* in that it develops, inculcates, and enforces standards of conduct and character, and defines and insists upon individual and social righteousness. We are accustomed to classify the historical religions as lower and higher according to their ethical ideal and efficiency.

Religion has been, and it is not too much to hope that it may continue to be, the highest solvent of all human differences and antagonisms, overcoming racial, national, economic, and social obstacles to the common welfare. Society requires an efficient agent of universal love and co-operation as a corrective for the pugnacity, exploitation, conceit, and general selfishness of individuals and of conventional groups of men. Religion functions for the consciousness and the maintenance of the social values which human experience has laboriously achieved. It provides a universal sanction for man's ideals, giving them validity, authority, and permanence. These ideals are partly of an individual import, pronouncing what shall be regarded as the perfect man; and partly of collective import, pronouncing what shall be regarded as the perfect society. Christianity, at its beginning in Jesus and Paul, established a higher standard of individual and social ethics than any which had preceded it, and thereby became the chief social factor of the centuries from the first until our own. It has been the achievement and the glory of the Christian church for nearly nineteen hundred years to preserve, teach, and actuate the highest ethics of the race with the ideal and the aim of a universal righteousness and brotherhood. The process of realization is slow, in spite of the aspiration, devotion, and energy of men, because of the cosmic constitution of things.

The first century A.D. was a time of social advance. One of the great forward movements of history was taking place at the time Jesus and Paul performed their missions. It involved the structure of society, man's thought-world, the ethical ideal, and the religious

faith of the Mediterranean peoples. From one point of view Jesus and Paul were the products and agents of this social advance; from another point of view they, with others, were creators of this movement. The Roman Empire brought about the conditions of progress, revealed the need of it, and provided the means and the persons for its accomplishment.

To be sure, vast wealth and power, the mixture of peoples, the disintegration of national standards and customary controls, the competition of philosophies and religions, brought some confusion and disorder. The ethical idealists of that period—Roman, Jewish, and Christian idealists—described in vivid language and rebuked with forceful expression the transgressions and shortcomings of first-century mankind. A superficial reading of these satires and philippics might lead one to suppose that the world was at its worst in their day. The ethical idealism of any age, in its effort at reform, has this extreme way of judging and condemning the current life. Modern melodramatists and apologists, reading this ancient literature homiletically and using these ancient materials polemically, have reported loudly and vehemently that the first century A.D. was a time of utter moral degradation and decay. Of course there was moral imperfection in the Roman Empire of Paul's day. Civilization was undergoing a transition that involved the taking to pieces and the higher synthesis of the existing political, social, ethical, and religious systems.

These conditions and changes, however, were incident to the fundamental social advance that was in process. A new, universal civilization, made up of the best elements which Greeks, Romans, and Jews could contribute, was taking shape in the Mediterranean world when primitive Christianity arose. The possibility and the means of social advance in the first century A.D. were the achievement of the Mediterranean peoples in their humanitarian development. The Greeks advanced civilization most of all by their philosophy, science, and art; the Romans advanced civilization most of all by their law, government, and administration; the Jews advanced civilization most of all by their idealism, religion, and ethics. Judaism was the highest type of religion and ethics in the ancient world previous to Christianity. And Christianity was the

outgrowth chiefly of Judaism; it was in fact a *higher Judaism* created by Jesus and Paul, the foremost reformers of Judaism in the first century A.D.

World-conditions demanded a new, universal, triumphant religion and ethics, to subsume and supersede the nationalistic systems which were declining as the Empire unified mankind. The Roman state religion, the several particularistic religions, the Hellenistic philosophies, and even the more general oriental religions needed all to *dissolve* into some one complete, satisfying, and efficient world-religion and ethics which could do the work of all its predecessors, and do it better than they. Judaism had aspired and had striven to be this supreme universal religion. She counted her religion the one true religion, appointed by God to displace all others. But Judaism could not relinquish her ritual law, and the Gentiles would not submit to the Jewish ritual. Therein Judaism failed of her world-opportunity—she would not stoop to conquer. Her spiritual religion and her ethics the world as a whole would appreciate and use; but Judaism would not sacrifice her particularism.

The way was therefore open, and in fact the demand was imperative, for a higher Judaism that would maintain the Jewish spiritual religion and ethics and at the same time would so interpret and administer these elements of civilization that the entire Mediterranean world would find in them an adequate faith, worship, joy, ideal, and imperative. Jesus made this necessary reform of Judaism for Palestine, and Paul made the corresponding reform for the gentile field. Under the name, first of "The Gospel," and later of "Christianity," this higher Judaism of the first century A.D. made its way against all rivals, and in due time became by obvious right *the* religion and ethics of the Empire.

Primitive Christianity combined in superior degree and proportion all the five aspects of religion. In *mystical experience* Christianity surpassed Judaism, and by a development along similar lines it even surpassed the oriental mystery-religions that were meeting with so much favor throughout the Empire. In *ritual* Christianity was freer and simpler than Judaism, simpler and more reasonable than the oriental religions, eliminating much, but retaining and developing the ritual idea and practice in certain essential

ways. In *doctrine* Christianity had, or came to have, the most elaborate, systematic, and vivid theology of any ancient religion; it was fundamentally Jewish, but underwent remarkable modification and expansion, notably in its doctrine of the person and the atoning work of Christ and in its doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Certain features of the Pauline and Johannine theology were influenced by Hellenistic mystery-doctrine and philosophical theology. The total effect was to develop a Christian theology that met both the emotional and the intellectual requirements of the Mediterranean peoples. In *ecclesiastical organization* primitive Christianity followed on the one hand the Jewish synagogue, and on the other the Hellenistic religious societies. The Christians were organized in local groups (churches) at important centers of the Empire. Peoples of all sorts and conditions were thus united in simple, independent, and complete brotherhoods for edification, worship, and propaganda. Such organization constituted Christianity an ecclesiastical institution within the Mediterranean world, and went far toward securing to Christianity its supreme place. In *ethics* primitive Christianity was easily foremost over all its predecessors and competitors. It carried the highest ethical ideals, principles, imperatives, and literature of the Jewish people, freed from the particularisms, the incumbrances, and the limitations of legalistic Judaism. In the Pauline field this distilled, elevated, and universalized Jewish ethics was somewhat Hellenized at first, and gradually developed a synthesis with the best Greco-Roman ethics, principally Stoicism. By this union of the best Jewish and the best gentile ethics Christianity achieved a standard of conduct and character that became in time the law and custom of the Mediterranean world.

We may pause to note that Christianity, by reason of its superior quality and power in all five aspects of religion—mystical experience, ritual, doctrine, ecclesiastical organization, and ethics—has continued for nineteen centuries to be the religion and morality of all European nations, whence it has spread to both Americas, to Australia, and in part to Asia and Africa. In other words, Christianity is already the religion and morality of four out of the six continents, and is in process of becoming the same for the remaining

two. The rise of such a social movement in the first century A.D. was an event of world-significance, a forward step in the history of mankind, well deserving of the painstaking historical study that is being given it. To understand primitive Christianity as a social factor in the Roman Empire, to interpret it as a phase and agent of social progress, to point out its immeasurable contribution to human welfare, is the best service that New Testament scholars can now render to the cause of science and education.

But was not primitive Christianity a mystery-religion and a religion of redemption? Was not its faith a supernaturalistic theology? Did not soteriological doctrine constitute its primary aim and content? Was not primitive Christianity elaborately and intensely eschatological? Did not the first Christians believe in the essential evil of the world and the human race, in a new and perfect age at hand, to be inaugurated by Christ at his parousia, with a resurrection and a judgment, and an eternal Kingdom of God upon a renovated earth?

The answer is yes to all these questions. But there is another question to be asked: Why did the first Christians believe all these things, why did they take this eschatological view of salvation? *Because of their ethical idealism.* Their high and strenuous moral-social ideas and aspirations produced their mysticism, soteriology, eschatology, Christology.¹ Fundamentally their ethical idealism and their doctrine of salvation were from Judaism, because the Jewish people through the centuries had been the most conscious of world-evil and human sin, had been the most thoughtful and earnest seekers after righteousness. Jewish theology was an expression and an inculcation of Jewish ethics. Men habitually define the character, purpose, and activity of God in accordance with their own most vital ideas of what is right and best in man and in the universe. Religion, in its doctrine of God and of salvation, has

¹ The terms soteriology, eschatology, and Christology are differentiable as follows: soteriology is the most comprehensive of the three terms, comprising from beginning to end of creation God's whole plan and accomplishment of salvation; eschatology includes only the "last things," the final acts of God which consummate salvation by the establishment of the Kingdom of God; Christology is the doctrine of the person and work of Christ, who is God's son and agent for the accomplishment of the salvation of men to eternal life in the Kingdom.

moved upward with the development of human experience and ideals. Theology is essentially the product and the servant of ethics—that is, of the whole social ideal and effort of the race. This was notably true of primitive-Christian soteriology, eschatology, and Christology. They were ethically derived and ethically useful. They constituted a main part of a great social movement.

The first Christians—Jesus and Paul, with their Jewish and gentile followers—could not tolerate the world as it was and men as they were, because of their high and strenuous moral idealism. Mankind and the age seemed irrecoverably bad because the Christians had so lofty and intense a conception of the good. They were of the opinion that God, reacting in the same way as themselves against the realities of life, must shortly intervene by divine power to exterminate all evil and so start anew with the cosmos and the human race. Because they could not themselves endure the evil and sin of the world, they maintained that God himself could not endure it, that he was therefore about to bring it all to an end. In its place he would establish an age and a kingdom of perfect righteousness. He would overthrow Satan and his host, who in the present age disputed and thwarted his reign. He would abolish the suffering and death of men, which belonged to the realm of sin and evil. The elect ones, the righteous, would be gathered together and saved out of this evil age doomed to destruction, and would become the glorified members of the eternal Kingdom of God.

It was only the *ethical idealists* who reacted in this way against the current realities of the cosmos. The mass of men assumed a submissive and commonplace attitude toward life. They took life as they found it, and made no sharp criticism. They put up with its imperfections and got along with their fellow-men in a general confidence that it was all right enough and was to be taken for granted. They were well aware of the cosmic evil and they knew that all men were sinners; but they did not repudiate their citizenship in the world as it is or consign the mass of their fellow-men to destruction. They did not strenuously accuse themselves or others. They did not count upon a cosmic catastrophe to reverse conditions. As a matter of fact, the idealistic anticipations of the Jewish and primitive-Christian eschatologists were not realized. The complete

overthrow of sin and evil did not take place, and has not yet taken place. If we are entitled to judge by eighteen hundred years more of human experience and consideration, God's plan of salvation is not altogether what they supposed it to be. Their ethical ideal was not too high, their enthusiasm for righteousness was not too great; but their theory as to when and how righteousness would come to prevail in the earth was partly misconceived. The error may be plain to modern men. But the first Christians were not conscious of it; on the contrary, they held their doctrine of eschatological salvation with absolute conviction of its truth and certainty. They saw it as the necessary corollary of their ethical conceptions, purposes, and demands.

Not only was their salvation faith ethically derived; it also functioned ethically. It was the standard moral-religious teaching of primitive Christianity that men could be saved only by a complete obedience to the will of God. This will of God was made known to them in their Scriptures (the Old Testament) and in the teaching of Jesus and Paul and their disciples. Only by an adequate righteousness, actually achieved by men, could one inherit or enter the Kingdom of God. All who fell short of this righteousness would be disapproved by God at the judgment and rejected from eternal life in the new age. "Good Master, what must I do that I may inherit eternal life?" "You know the commandments. Besides, go and sell what you have and give to the poor; and come, follow me." "The time is fulfilled and the kingdom of God is at hand; *repent*." "Except ye *repent*, ye shall all likewise perish." "Except your righteousness shall exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven." "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father who is in heaven."

So Jesus taught, and similarly Paul. "We must all be made manifest before the judgment-seat of Christ; that each one may receive the things done in the body, according to what he hath done, whether good or bad." "Be not deceived; God is not mocked; for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap. For he that soweth unto his own flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption; but

he that soweth unto the Spirit shall of the Spirit reap eternal life." "The works of the flesh are manifest; of which I forewarn you that they who practice such things shall not inherit the Kingdom of God." "Reckonest thou this, O man, that thou shalt escape the judgment of God? Or despisest thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance and longsuffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance? but after thy hardness and impenitent heart treasurest up for thyself wrath in the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God; who will render to every man according to his works: to them that by patience in well-doing seek for glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life: but unto them that are factious, and obey not the truth, but obey unrighteousness, shall be wrath and indignation, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that worketh evil; for there is no respect of persons with God." "I buffet my body, and bring it into bondage: lest by any means, after that I have preached to others, I myself should be rejected." "Brethren, I count not myself yet to have laid hold: but one thing I do, forgetting the things which are behind, and stretching forward to the things which are before, I press on toward the goal unto the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus."

In all this homiletical teaching of Jesus and Paul, given to impel men to the highest and most complete righteousness, it was recognized that men would inevitably sin and could not possibly render a perfect obedience to God's will; and it was understood, according to the best Jewish doctrine, that on the basis of men's penitence and pursuit of righteousness God in his love and mercy would forgive their deficiency. At this point Paul connected his doctrine of justification by faith through the atoning death of Christ. Paul, following a legalistic and ritualistic thought-form, supposed that God, in order to maintain his holiness, his government, and his cosmic purpose, required an expiatory atonement for men's sins, which he provided in the death of Christ, whereby he could forgive men their transgressions and shortcomings and so admit them to salvation. In accordance with this conception, Paul predicated a divine righteousness bestowed by God upon men to make up their lack.

Our modern disaffection toward primitive-Christian eschatology makes it difficult for us to perceive how powerfully this vivid belief functioned ethically. To know that the Judgment with its eternal issues was at hand (they were certain of it) was a most effective moral influence upon the first Christians. They set themselves devoutly and strenuously to the preparation for this cosmic climax and their own eternal destinies. They sought to get others to repent and do righteousness in order that they too might be saved. With only a little time left in which to qualify for the new age, every energy would be aroused, every effort would be put forth. There are those who tell us that we must still teach this eschatological doctrine of primitive Christianity, because it is necessary for the moral control of men. However that may be, the New Testament leaves us in no doubt that this eschatological doctrine functioned in the first century A.D. with tremendous efficiency. If the doctrine was in fact illusory, they were not aware of it, and it drove them to repentance and righteousness.

It is more important that we should understand and appreciate the eschatological ethics of the first Christians than that we should repudiate and rebuke it. Primitive-Christian ethics was taken over from Judaism, and Jewish ethics was intensely religious. The modern mind may prefer ethics without the dress of ancient eschatology and religion. Science offers, instead of the eschatological imperative for ethics, a social imperative. It demands right living because the welfare of mankind, individually and collectively, is all the time conditioned upon good conduct and character. Science may replace the doctrine of a revealed will of God by the teaching that men discover in their common experience of life what makes for and what makes against welfare, so that it is the social judgment and will which determines right and wrong. To fix the attention and the effort, not upon the ultimate future, but upon the time in hand, may now make for the better realization of our ethical ideals. It may not be to the disadvantage of mankind that humanitarian ethics proposes to supersede eschatological ethics.

Jesus and Paul did indeed teach human duty in terms of the divine will rather than in terms of the social will. But in an essen-

tial sense it is true that "the voice of the people is the voice of God." We have our knowledge of God through our human experience. And if the doctrine of supernatural revelation should fail us, it would result that "the voice of the people" would be the only "voice of God" in our possession. But though Jesus and Paul presented the theological imperative for right conduct and character, their teaching does not stand in real opposition to the social imperative. Their ethics, with proper explanation, could still function under a régime of modern social science. The supernaturalistic and the naturalistic conceptions of how men discover the principles of life are only two differing thought-forms interpreting the same reality. Both have stood the practical test and have warranted the belief that men have given them. The modern unitary world-view, which threatens to drive us from supernaturalism to naturalism, may come to be regarded as the correct philosophy of the universe, and may then replace the ancient dualistic world-view which underlay Jewish and primitive-Christian theology, giving form to the eschatological ethics of Jesus and Paul. But the conflict of philosophies, and the final decision between them, are a part of the age-long process. Society, bent upon the immediate negotiation of life, uses one world-view or another as may serve its practical purpose. Ethics may be interpreted at one time dualistically, and at another time monistically, according to the world-view that is in favor. Jesus and Paul based ethics upon a doctrine of supernatural revelation and of eschatological rewards and punishments because that was the philosophy and the theology of their day. They did not inculcate goodness for its own sake, as modern ethics does; but they might have done so. Their thought-forms, teachings, and methods were a part of their first-century existence. Practical living in the twentieth century is not so different from the practical living of nineteen hundred years ago as to antiquate essentially the social message of the New Testament. But such differences as have arisen must be allowed for in turning the social message of the New Testament to account for modern social use. New Testament ethics must not be modernized, misrepresented, in order to get from the New Testament a message of modern appeal and utility.

The sociologist, reading the New Testament, may say that the primitive Christians had no social program. They certainly did not undertake a biological study of man, or a historical study of human standards, laws, customs, institutions, and beliefs. They did not conduct sociological investigations, or make social analyses, or subject the phenomena of society to scientific tests. They did not attempt to reconstruct the social order, to revise the law, or to improve the judiciary. They did not advocate constitutional amendments, or publicly organize charity. In short, they did not anticipate the modern theory and process of scientific social work.

Nevertheless, Jesus and Paul had a kind of social program. They undertook to promote the welfare of men, and they did not work altogether without a plan. Their method of social reform was the customary homiletical method of Jewish prophets and scribes and Hellenistic practical philosophers, namely, preaching. They went about declaring their ideals, inculcating their principles, enjoining right living, setting an example of what they taught, and so arousing individuals to higher conduct and character. Their reform was primarily a talking of reform, but that was the established method of the day. It is customary to explain that their eschatological doctrine prevented the primitive Christians from attempting a systematic social renovation and reconstruction. But such a program was not undertaken, or even proposed, by any first-century reformers; it did not belong to the thought or manner of the time.

Jesus and Paul pointed out forcefully the defects in certain social standards, practices, and institutions. Their criticisms were true and helpful. But they did not point out all the faults in all the standards, practices, and institutions. Jesus showed the shortcomings of Pharisaism, but not of Sadduceeism. He showed how to improve the observance of the Sabbath, but not how to improve the synagogue worship. He abrogated the *lex talionis* and the food laws, but he did not abrogate the institution of slavery, the use of intoxicating liquors, child-labor, or the rite of circumcision. The method of Paul was similar. He pointed out the gross sins of the Greco-Roman world and condemned them. He enjoined his con-

verts to separate themselves from non-Christians. He denounced the gentile religions, and enjoined Christianity in their stead. He looked upon the Roman government as a part of the evil age about to be overthrown by Christ, but he counseled the Christians at Rome to be in subjection to that government. He told his slave converts that Christianity did not give them political freedom. He insisted that woman should keep her place of social subjection to man.

The primitive Christian plan of work was not specifically a social reconstruction, but a moral revival and advance, a new vision of, a new grip upon, the fundamental principles of right living. One might say that it was an individualistic ethics that Jesus and Paul taught, but it was social ethics as well, because man's duty was explicitly presented and urged in respect to his relations with his fellow-men. In the same way it might be said that their doctrine of salvation was individualistic, inasmuch as each person was to stand or fall on his individual record. But there was a social aspect also to this salvation, for the Kingdom of God was conceived as a society of saved persons doing perfectly the will of God and living ideally together.

But while the primitive-Christian mission was in the main a preaching reform, the movement also developed a social organization that contributed essentially to its success. Jesus seems to have made a start in this direction by selecting a group of his disciples to accompany and assist him in his ministry. It does not, however, appear that Jesus had in mind to create an organization of all his adherents. Here again the customary explanation is offered, that his eschatological expectations made such a plan unnecessary. But in this case also it is more correct to say that he followed the custom of religious teachers in his day and place; he did not intend to detach his disciples from the Jewish synagogue, and no other organization seemed to him to be required. After his death, however, his followers felt the need of a special Christian grouping, to keep together and to carry on Jesus' work. The Palestinian Christians naturally and wisely took the synagogue as their model, and gradually developed churches of regular organization for fellowship, worship, and propaganda.

Paul perhaps from the first arranged his converts in local groups, to maintain their Christian faith and to foster their Christian life. In the gentile field it was the more necessary that the new converts should be separated from non-Christians, because their belief, worship, relationship, and manner of life were so different from those of paganism. For this organization Paul also had the model of the Jewish synagogue, which was nearly as desirable and efficient a type for gentile as for Jewish Christians. But in the Pauline field there were also the independent religious societies that arose in connection with the mystery-religions. The churches of Paul learned from both kinds of organization. Paul made much of the church relationship, bidding his Christians to arrange their social and their civic as well as their religious life within these circles. Besides he built up between his churches a common spirit of unity, fraternity, and co-operation. In fact, primitive Christianity could not have made its way successfully in the Mediterranean world without this local and comprehensive organization. The movement required individualization and solidification, it required the social machinery of perpetuation and propaganda. Primitive Christianity had several strong rivals in the first-century competition between religions, each of which aspired and strove to become the world-religion. Christianity succeeded against the others because of its inherent doctrinal, ritual, and ethical superiorities, but also because of the organized status and efficiency which Paul gave the movement. He created a social institution about his social ideal, to give it stability, appeal, and promotion.

Many events of great significance took place in the first century A.D., but among them the rise of Christianity was clearly the most important. There was in it the making of a new world, a higher humanitarianism. The Roman Empire needed a unifying, vital, and impelling religion and ethics to set the social ideal for the universal race and civilization. Primitive Christianity met this need, and met it adequately. The numbers of Christian converts and churches were considerable in the first century A.D., but the success of this idealistic social movement was still more to be measured by its renewing influence, its leavening of religious faith and moral enthusiasm, its consolidation of mankind about their

highest visions and purposes, its construction of a social system within the Roman Empire true enough and strong enough to continue through the centuries and to dominate European civilization even after the Mediterranean world became the possession of the new peoples from the north. Our own twentieth century is the heir of primitive Christianity, for our social idealism is, in one line of its inheritance, the gift and product of the New Testament and the Christian church.

CHURCH AND STATE IN MEDIAEVAL GERMANY. I

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History affords few more striking examples of revolutionary change than the contrast between the relations of the German crown, the German church, and the papacy in Saxon (919-1024) and Franconian (1024-1125) times. Under the Saxon emperors the church was the friend and ally of the dynasty. This good relation became somewhat strained under Conrad II and Henry III, the first Franconians, and under the last two Franconian rulers, Henry IV and Henry V, the German church in large part, and the papacy wholly, were the implacable foe of the emperors and strove with might and main to compass the destruction of the German crown.

The conflict between Henry IV and Gregory VII has usually been portrayed with the dramatic grandeur of a Greek tragedy. Dramatic qualities and dramatic personalities that struggle certainly possessed. But in general its history has been pitched upon too sublimated a plane. The character of Hildebrand is one of the most complex and difficult to understand in all history. He was at once a superlative idealist imbued with the Augustinian dream of a world-church supreme over a world-state, and a shrewd politician. Such a man is rarely always consistent in his conduct. Depending upon mood or circumstance he sometimes responds to one motive or stimulus, sometimes to another. It is the endeavor of this article to show that a primary, if not really the principal, issue in the struggle between Gregory VII and Henry IV was an economic one; that the immediate and fundamental, though carefully concealed, purpose of the papacy was to acquire complete proprietary control of the German church (indeed the church throughout all Europe); and that the Cluny reform was sedulously propagated as a means to that end. Karl Wilhelm Nitzsch (1818-80) in his

Geschichte des deutschen Volkes was the first who discerned this factor in the war of investiture.¹ Since his death other scholars, in many monographs, have widened the field which he first tilled, and the enormous influence of the proprietary interests of the German church upon the history of the mediaeval empire has been abundantly demonstrated.²

One of the most certain achievements of modern historical research is the proof which precludes denial of the interrelation of all the facts and forces of an epoch. The war of investiture cannot be rightly understood except in the light of the economic and social history of Germany in the tenth and eleventh centuries.³ The root

¹ Vol. II, 15; cf. Inama-Sternegg, *DWG*, II, 135.

² See my article on "The German Church and the Conversion of the Baltic Slavs" in *American Journal of Theology*, April and July, 1916. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, V, 7, has suggestively said, "The task of administering property was more important to the German church than the political and dogmatic debates of the neighboring French hierarchy." So again, *ibid.*, VI, 16, he says, "It was about the property of the bishops and . . . who was the true ruler of the divine state that the great battle was really waged between the empire and the reformed papacy."

Ficker first clearly formulated the idea that the war of investiture was primarily one for control of the church's proprietary power (*ein Eigentumsrecht*)—"Ueber das Eigentum des Reiches am Reichskirchengute," *Sitzungsberichte der philosoph.-histor. Klasse der kaiserl. Akad. d. Wissenschaften*, LXXII (1872), 55-146, 381-450. To this article Waitz replied the next year in the same journal (1873), p. 825, admitting the presence of proprietary elements in the struggle between emperor and pope, but contending that Ficker exaggerated its importance. Cf. Waitz, *Deutscher Verfassungsgesch.*, VII, 199, n. 1. Since these epoch-making articles a large amount of supplementary work has been done by more recent scholars, which, it seems to me, bears out Ficker's contention, as Matthäi, *Die Klosterpolitik Kaiser Heinrich II* (Göttingen diss., 1877); Stutz, *Die Eigenkirche als Element des mittelalterlich-german. Kirchenrechts* (Berlin, 1895); and his *Gesch. des kirchlichen Beneficialwesens* (1895) and article entitled "Lehen und Pfründe" in *Zeitschrift der Savignystiftung für Rechtsgesch.* XXXIII, N.F., 20 (1899), 213-47; Hauck, *Kirchengesch. Deutschlands* (1887 f.), III (1905), 441 ff.; Werminghoff, *Gesch. der Kirchenverfassung Deutschlands im Mittelalter* (Leipzig, 1905), 179 ff.; Feierabend, *Die politische Stellung der deutschen Reichsabteien während des Investiturstreites* (Breslau diss., 1913); Voigt, *Die Klosterpolitik der Salischen Kaiser und Könige mit besonderer Berücksichtigung Heinrich IV bis zum Jahre 1077* (Leipzig diss., 1888); Koeniger, *Burchard I von Worms* (1905), c. 4. Waitz's great work, Vol. VII, c. 2, *Die hohe Geistlichkeit*, is invaluable for the wealth of references to sources. For the "royal" abbeys, see *ibid.*, III, 434-35; IV, 153-57.

³ In the last work from his pen before the war, *Belgian Democracy*, 30, note (English trans.), Professor Henri Pirenne has written, "There is here, i.e., in economic history, a whole group of phenomena in general too little heeded by the students of this great conflict."

of the problem between church and state in the Middle Ages, and the chief root of the evil in the church, was its immense landed wealth. Between the alternative of renouncing her feudal revenues, her temporalities, her privileges, her political power, and so seeking deliverance from secular control, and the alternative of keeping her temporalities and yet securing freedom from the authority of the state by crushing the state, the church did not hesitate. She chose the latter course, and the identification of the Cluny reform with the papal power by Hildebrand went far toward making the aspiration a reality.

The supreme test of the church's sincerity was made in 1111, when Pascal II offered to buy the church's freedom from lay investiture at the price of renunciation of the church's temporalities and secular power. At once a storm of protest arose. Like the rich young man who came to Jesus [Matt. 19:16-22], the church had too great possessions to make the sacrifice. Its idealization of poverty was belied by its avarice. A few rare spirits like Arnold of Brescia daringly advocated the true remedy and expiated at the stake the zeal of the reformer born out of due season. The greatest spirits of the Middle Ages, like St. Francis, Dante, Pierre Du Bois, Nicholas de Clamanges, for example, deplored the church's choice. But few churchmen and never any pope save Pascal II had the courage to advocate the true solution of the church's corruption. The argument and the protest of the church of Liège, at the height of the strife over lay investiture, fell upon deaf ears.¹

The beginning of the material contamination of the church is coeval with the official establishment of Christianity by Constantine. The rapid narrowing of the line between the church and the world during the fourth century, owing to the enormous increase in the number and amount of the church's endowments, chiefly in the form of gifts of land, is an amazing fact. The process was accentuated and accelerated in the fifth century when the church, having converted the city populace of the Roman Empire, began

¹ In justifying itself against the threats of Pascal II the church of Liège quoted St. Ambrose with telling force, "Si Christus non habuit imaginem Caesaris, cur dedit censum? Non de suo dedit: sed reddidit mundo quae erant mundi. Et tu, si non vis esse obnoxius Caesari, noli habere quae mundi sunt. Sed si habes divitias, obnoxius es Caesari. Si vis nihil debere regi terreno, dimitte omnia et sequere Christum."—Udalr. Babenb., Cod. Lib., II, c. 234.

to reach out into the country areas and to establish the first rural parishes. Thereby the church became profoundly involved in the feudal régime, for long since free landed proprietorship had disappeared in the Roman Empire. Millions of serfs and slaves in Italy, Gaul, Spain, Africa, lived bound to the soil upon the huge patrimonies of the nobles, who formed a landed aristocracy powerful enough to defy the imperial government.

The evangelization of the fields was largely due to the initiative of, and much under the control of, these great proprietors. For the creation of rural parishes independent of the landed nobles and subject only to the authority of the bishop was very difficult and usually impossible. The rights of the bishop over these seigneurial or manorial churches were very limited. The proprietor, having borne all the expense of foundation, claimed the right to choose the incumbent. The rural church was the property of the founder.¹ The council of Orleans (ch. 33), as early as 541, formally recognized the proprietary right of patronage in the case of rural churches, and the curé came to be regarded as a petty feudatory of the lord. In every parish a body of church property was gradually formed by gift and testament of which the lord of the manor had control, and a series of customary services developed which he could exact.²

A proprietor's motives in founding a church were often far from disinterested or pious. For

ever since the Germanic invasions there had been few more profitable investments than the building of a church. The proprietor who built a church or a

¹ For the origins of church patronage see the article in *Dictionary of Christian Antiquities*, II, col. 1545, by Hatch, and his *Organization of the Early Christian Church*, 200-205 (the notes are very valuable); P. Thomas, *Le droit de propriété, des laïques sur les Eglises . . . en Moyen Age* (1896); Lesne, *La propriété ecclésiastique en France I*, 49-69; Marignan, *La société mérovingienne*, 200-206; 'Imbart de la Tour,' *La paroisse rurale*. The synod of Worms in 453 required every church to have at least one free allotment (*Hufe*), and every bishop one hundred Hefe (*Conciliengesch.*, IV, 543; Gerdes, *Gesch. d. deutsch. Volkes*, I, 532; Koeniger, *Burchard von Worms*, 44, n. 1). Charlemagne's *Cap. de partibus Saxoniae*, c. 15, ordained a house and two manors of land for every priest, "and for each 120 men, noble and free, and likewise *liti*, let them give to the same church a man-servant and a maid-servant," *MGH, LL*, sec. 2, Tome I, Part I, p. 68, No. 26, ed. Boretius. For commentary see Waitz, III (2d ed.), 207 f.

² The principal sources for this condition are *Cap. of Frankfort*, 794, c. 54; *MGH, CONC. II*, 171; *Cap. ecclésiastique ad Sals.*, 803, c. 13, *ibid.*, 119; *Cap. ecclésiastique*, 818, *MGH, CAPIT. i*, 275.

chapel upon his land owned that church or chapel. He could put a slave or villein into the benefice. He could charge burial fees and christening fees. He could force his villeins to attend. He could sell or otherwise alienate the church. He could dismiss the priest, or flog him, or make him pay gifts upon his appointment. He could use him as a secretary, or a bailiff, or farm servant. He could make him wait at table, or tend dogs, or lead a lady's horse, or watch sheep.¹

In a word, the lord of the manor in whose hands lay the right of presentation to the living could treat the incumbent, who not infrequently was the son of one of his own serfs, with impunity. Jonas of Orleans in the ninth century complained that "poor priests" were compelled to serve as varlets.² Agobard of Lyons echoed the complaint, citing instances of priests attached to oratories being compelled to wait at table, to trim vines, to take care of dogs, to dress ladies' hair, etc.³ The council of Metz in 888 complained of a priest having been mutilated by his patron because the priest had had the courage to reprimand him for his immorality.⁴

Even in Britain, in spite of the relatively late entrance of Christianity there, the feudalization of the church early and rapidly obtained. A letter of Bede to Archbishop Egbert protests against the ill-considered donations made by the Anglo-Saxon kings to whoever wanted to establish a monastery, of which the founders made themselves "lay" abbots.⁵

Given the prevalent feudal conditions and ideas, it was inevitable that in course of time the practice of patronage should be extended upward in the church and at last involve the hierarchy too. The combination of landed wealth and political power possessed by the bishops and abbots in the Frankish church made control of their offices by the Merovingian kings a necessity of state. It is no matter of surprise that the council of Orleans (ch. 5) was forced to acknowledge that the high clergy held their lands of the crown.

¹ Fisher, *The Mediaeval Empire*, I, 254.

² D'Achery, *Spicilegium*, I, 112.

³ Thomas, *Anc. et nouv. discipl. de l'église* (ed. 1725), II, 322; Le Provost, *L'Eglise et les Campagnes au moyen-âge*, 34.

⁴ Mansi, *Concilia*, IX, 415.

⁵ Bedae, *Opera historica* (ed. Plummer), I, 414-15.

Bishoprics and abbeys in law and in fact were lordships like lay seigneuries and subject to almost identical laws and practices.

By the eighth century the conditions and obligations governing landed proprietorship, whether lay or clerical, had become conventionalized, and, with the transformation of land ownership into benefices in the time of Karl Martel, the church, like secular society, passed completely into the feudal régime. Such a state of things for the church was perfectly adapted both to the ideas and to the practices of a feudal age. There was nothing incongruous or unseemly in the arrangement, however strange it may seem to us today, when fighting abbots and the blazon of episcopacy have vanished. Like every other institution the system was capable of great abuse, and it gave rise to grievous conditions within the church. But we must free our minds from preconceived notions and avoid judging the mediaeval church by modern conditions. The church was a historical institution, a part of the organic, human life of the mediaeval epoch. As it functioned in that society it must be studied and judged. Because in its best moments the church taught a quality of life and cherished an ideal above the world, that did not separate it from the world. To have been less human than it was, the mediaeval church would have had to function in a vacuum or lived in a world of the fourth dimension.

The legislation of Pepin and Charlemagne was particularly instrumental in combining the church with the state. Pepin introduced the bishops into the national Frankish assembly (Marchfeld, Champ de Mars) not only as proprietors but as prelates, in order to counterbalance the power of the lay feudality. Henceforth the councils inclined to supersede the former national assemblies, and civil and ecclesiastical legislation tended to fuse together.¹ It was even within the prerogative of the king to fix dogma (both

¹ Nitzsch, *Gesch. d. deutschen Volkes*, I, 249; Viollet, *Inst. polit. de la France*, I, 356-571; Lesne, 424-38. In 755 the Marchfeld was changed to May in order that there might be more pasturage for the horses of those attending (Schröder, *Rechtsgesch.*, 155). The councils of the church ceased to be purely ecclesiastical bodies, but performed a large amount of civil legislation. See Harzheim, *Concilii Germaniae*, III, 187. Fisher, II, 92, gives some interesting examples of this fusion of secular and ecclesiastical affairs. "Every bishop and abbot governs his territory by the aid of a little parliament of nobles and ministeriales."

Childebert and Charlemagne did so), and from Pepin's time forward the state required the *credo* and the *pater noster* as law, and legislated in its capitularies upon the things of the church as well as upon secular matters. All matters relative to the Frankish church were done in the name of the temporal power.

Charlemagne treated the bishops and abbots of his empire exactly as he treated secular dignitaries and was as cautious in dispensing favors to them as he was to the great lay nobles.

He would never give more than one county to any of his counts unless they happened to live on the borders or marches of the barbarians; nor would he ever give a bishop any abbey or church that was in the royal gift unless there were very special reasons for so doing. When his counsellors or friends asked him the reason for doing this, he would answer: "With that revenue or that estate, with that abbey or that church I can secure the fidelity of some vassal, as good a man as any bishop or count, and perhaps better."¹

After Charlemagne everything melted away. The political system established by him was impotent before the power of the revolutionary forces of the time. In the tumultuous laboratory of the ninth century the old order of things was broken up and a new civilization came out of the crucible. Feudalism emerged as a complete political, economic, and social polity, and the feudal states of France, Germany, and Italy came into being.² In the anarchy of the times the lands of bishops and abbots were given by the rulers to dukes and counts as the price of their military service, or were seized by the latter and more or less assimilated with their own feudal holdings.³

¹ Monachus S. Galli, *De vita Caroli*, I, c. 13. Guilhaumez, *L'origine de la noblesse en France au moyen-âge*, 126, n. 5, has amassed the evidence to illustrate the Carolingian handling of church offices for political purposes. All abbeys were in the gift of the crown. "Abbatibus quoque et laicis specialiter jukemus ut in monasteriis quae ex nostra largitate habeat," etc. (Cap. Lud. Pii, 823, c. 8).

² On the nature and significance of the dissolution of the Carolingian empire see Bourgeois, *Le capitulaire de Kiersey*, espec. 271-83; Prou, *De ordine palatii*, Introd.; Ellendorf, *Die Karolinger und die Hierarchie*; Lavis, *Histoire de France*, II, Part I, Book 3, and bibliographies there given.

³ Lesne, *La propriété ecclésiastique en France*, I, 439-52; Waitz, IV, 165-73; Parisot, *Royaume de Lorraine sous les Carolingiens*, 31, n. 5; 81, notes, 185, 331, 687; Poupardin, *Royaume de Provence sous les Carolingiens*, 337, n. 6; 373-76, 384; Kurth, *Notger de Liège*, 28; Pirenne, *Hist. de Belgique*, I, 39-41. Pope Nicholas I approved the diversion of abbey revenues for the support of Queen Teutberge of Lorraine-Parisot, 308. Charles the Bald sold the abbey of St. Bertin for thirty gold pieces (*ibid.*, 358).

With the break-up of the Carolingian empire in the ninth century, the relations of state and church began to be reversed. Hitherto the state had controlled the church. Now the church began to control the state. The amalgamation of church and state became more complete than before,¹ and the church saw to it that it was well repaid for its services to the government. By the end of the ninth century the dilapidation of the royal domain, owing to lavish, gratuitous, or forced donations to the church, seriously impoverished the monarchy. It is true that few of them were outright grants. Most of them were in the form of benefices which, at least theoretically, reserved for the crown the right to exact feudal service of the holders thereof. But a crown so weak that it was unable to refuse the demands of the church for more land was too weak to enforce the actual terms of the grant.

The church, however, was not long in discovering that a peril was attached to this rapid acquisition of landed wealth, which, like the shirt of Nessus, was destined to poison the wearer. For its increasing proprietorship entangled the church more and more in the coil of feudalism. The rivalry between the high clergy and the great lay feudality for possession of the crown lands was intense, and the church, in order to sate the land hunger of the feudal nobles, was often compelled to effect an accommodation with them by enfiefing its lands to them. In an age of blood and iron such an arrangement was frequently of mutual advantage. The bishop or abbot did not give nor the baron get something for nothing. The baron might have bullied the bishop into making the enfiefment, but he was subject to the feudal contract which always required the rendering of military service by the vassal to the suzerain. Thus originated that class of *milites ecclesiae* which played so great a part in the period of the crusades; thus the church entered more deeply than ever into the feudal polity. The art of war was not long in becoming an important episcopal accomplishment. The fighting bishop, helmed and hauberked, was a development of the late ninth century.

¹ On this process see Lea, *Studies in church history*, 326-42; Viollet, I, 370-71; Prou, *De ordine palatii*, Introd.; Ellendorf, *Die Karolinger und die Hierarchie*, II, c. 4; Bourgeois, *Capitulaire de Kiersey*, 271-83.

But it was impossible for any government with a remnant of self-respect to let the church wholly escape from secular control without a struggle, and the kings of the ninth century, weak as they were, had recourse to an expedient which in part recouped their waning material fortune and partially compensated them for the compulsory alienation of their domains to the church. This was the institution of the "advocate" (French *avoue*, German *Vogt*) an outgrowth of the highly feudalized organization of society. The office, in its narrower functions, was almost as old as the church's landed proprietorship. The advocate represented his ecclesiastical superior in the administration of the purely secular affairs which fell to the bishop or the abbot to perform in pursuance of his double rôle of an ecclesiastic and a landed proprietor. He pleaded the causes of the bishop or abbot in the courts of the count or suzerain; he administered justice in their name among the church's vassals; he represented his principal in the judicial duel, participation in which was forbidden to ecclesiastics; he presided over cases of trial by battle between the bishop's or abbot's vassals, and, most important of all, he commanded the *milites ecclesiae* when the church was called upon to do military service.

In the anarchy of the ninth century, when the monasteries began to wall their houses,¹ the office of advocate acquired great extension. Protection was the crying need of the time. Often, though, the bishop or abbot had no choice in selecting the incumbent. The post was eagerly coveted by the lay feudality, since it

¹ "Tunc quoque domus ecclesiarum per Gallias universas, preter quas municipia civitatum vel castrorum servarunt" (Rod. Glaber [ed. Prou], I, c. 5, sec. 9). For the effect of the Norse invasions in the ninth century and the anarchy of the tenth upon the walling of monasteries, villages, towns, granges, and the erection of castles, first of wood (block houses), later of stone, see Favre, *Eudes, roi de France*, 220-21; Lavissee, *Hist. de France*, II, Part 2, 14-16 (bib.); Flach, *Les Origines de l'ancienne France*, II, 312-27, 329-42; Waitz, IV, 629; Parisot, 55, n. 2, 458, n. 4, 461, 499; Poupardin, 337, n. 6; Fagniez, *Documents relatifs à l'histoire du commerce . . . de la France*, I, Introd. xli; Lefranc, *Hist. de Noyon*, 12-14; Mortet, *Recueil de Textes relatifs à l'histoire de l'Architecture*, Introd. xlii-lit. Cf. also the index under the words *donjons*, *motles de donjons*, *tours*, *maisons fortes*, *fermes*, *palissades*. In Germany Henry the Fowler was the first to require monasteries and nunneries to be inclosed—Sommerlad, II, 234-35; Nitzsch, I, 288. For these constructions, and Henry I's castella, see my article on "German East Colonization" in *Proceedings of American Historical Association*, 1915.

gave the holder control of certain ecclesiastical revenues and the use of certain church vassals for military purposes. As a consequence, in practice the bishop or abbot had frequently to appease the greed of a neighboring noble by purchasing his protection, for otherwise his lands were liable to be pillaged by the noble. Under this form of blackmail the remedy became worse than the disease.¹ The Capetian kings of France made themselves "lay" abbots of half a dozen of the richest abbeys in France.² The counts of Flanders so built up their power.³ In Germany the practice was carried to an extreme by Frederick Barbarossa, whose Italian campaigns were largely fought with church vassals.⁴

Under these conditions the hierarchy tended more and more to become a military caste like the feudality. Bishops and abbots became dukes and counts. Miter and mace, crosier and coat of mail, became interchangeable insignia of the high clergy, who increasingly were recruited from among the powerful families of the feudal noblesse, which put cadets of the house in church preferments, so that bishoprics and abbeys often became dependencies of the feudality. Bishops and abbots became centers of feudo-territorial groups, exercising a temporal sovereignty analogous

¹ On the institution of the advocate see Waitz, IV, 409 f.; Brunner, *Rechtsgesch.*, II, 320 f.; Bethmann-Hollweg, *Civilprozess*, III, 161 f.; Pischek, *Die Vogtei in den geistlichen Stiftern des fränkischen Reiches* (1886); Hauck, II, 598 f.; Sackur, I, 29 f.; Flach, *Les Origines de l'anc France*, I, 437-44; Viollet, *Inst. pol. de la France*, 372-74; Senn, *L'institution des avoueries eccles. en France* (1903); *L'institution des vidames en France* (1907); Heilmann, *Die Klostervogtei im rechtsrheinischen Teil der Diözese Konstanz bis zur Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts* (1908); Otto Lerche, *Die Privilegierung der deutschen Kirche durch Papsturkunden bis auf Gregor VII* (Göttingen, 1910), 29-32; Blumenstock, *Der päpstliche Schutz im Mittelalter* (1890); Hüfner, "Das Rechtsinstitut der klösterlichen Exemption in der abendländischen Kirche-*Archiv für kath.*" *Kirchenrecht*, LXXXVI (1906), 302 f.; Walter Kraaz, *Die päpstliche Politik in Verfassungs- und Vermögensfragen deutscher Klöster* (Leipzig diss., 1902); Viollet, *Inst. polit. de la France*, I, 372-73; Gerdes, *Gesch. des deutschen Volkes*, I, 539-40. Much other literature in Holtzmann, *Französische Verfassungsgesch.*, 138, and Luchaire, *Manuel des institutions francaises*, secs. 153-55. For a desperate instance, Richeri, *Gesta eccles. Senon*, I, 17 (MGH, SS. XXV). Fisher, I, 319, has a vivid account of the practical working of the advocate's office.

² Luchaire, *Institutions monarchiques*, II, 87-88.

³ Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*, I, 90-91.

⁴ Fisher, II, 74-75.

to the powers they had long practiced within their ancient immunities. In the name of churches and monasteries they granted fiefs, ruled vassals, distributed tenures, and governed serfs. Side by side with the secular feudatories grew up an ecclesiastical nobility composed of archbishops and bishops, who were at the same time dukes or counts, and cathedral chapters and abbeys which as corporations controlled immense territorial possessions. From all sides the weak had recourse to the church's stronger protection, offering it their persons and their property. Its tribunals were often preferred to the secular courts of the lay lords, and the church's sway was not only exercised over all ecclesiastical matters, but extended jurisdiction over a host of civil and criminal affairs which primarily were of secular origin and incidence. Gradually the practice of infeudation penetrated the whole body of ecclesiastical offices and functions. The church's lands, offices, altars, prebends, tithes, became feudalized.¹

But neither in Germany nor in France did the king's ecclesiastical sovereignty, conveyed in the term *regale*, become so mutilated and dispersed as his political authority. Some remnants of the complete supremacy over the church, formerly enjoyed by the Carolingian monarchy, still remained in the great fiefs, which otherwise had escaped the crown's control. In these areas the vassals and revenues of the church were regarded as part of the military and fiscal resources of the crown and used by the king at his discretion. The bishop or abbot (if the abbey were "royal") was as much the choice of the king as a local priest was the creature of his lord, and the conduct of the hierarchy was assimilated to the condition, if not the status, of the secular feudatories. Bishops and abbots were held to the performance of *auxilia* in the same way and to as great—or even greater—a degree as dukes and counts.

The domain of a bishop or abbot in the Middle Ages was rarely, if ever, a compact, contiguous area. On the contrary it was composed of a vast ensemble or complex of scattered parcels which had been acquired by gift or purchase during years of time, and was

¹ Koeniger, *Burchard I von Worms*, 48-52. For France, see Viollet, I, 416-17; and Lesne, 131-42.

therefore widely located.¹ The unity of the whole was not a physical but a moral one. The bishop or abbot was the proprietor thereof, whose legal position was guaranteed by the immunity which exempted him from any lay jurisdiction or authority save that of the king. Unless feudal usurpation had canceled the theory of the law, no duke nor count could enter within this circumscription, which, in spite of the agglomerated nature of the lands, nevertheless formed a closed circle. Within and on his own lands a bishop or abbot was a royal official.²

Both in law and in practice these ecclesiastical lands were regarded as a particular kind of barony or fief which the incumbents held immediately of the king as overlord. This was the view of the church as well as of the state, and neither party looked upon the relation as either incongruous or unusual. Vacant sees and vacant abbeys were treated as knight's fees. After the analogy of lay fiefs the king attached the incomes of ecclesiastical office in the interval between two occupations; the new appointee paid what answered to a "relief" in the secular world in order to qualify for the office; the lands and offices of the church were let to farm, enfeiefed, or sold exactly as in the case of secular property.

It is important to appreciate how closely state and church were united in the Middle Ages. The church, not content with regulating faith and morals, actively mingled in politics, inspiring the kings to perform most of the legislative work which they did, and securing the kings' support and defense of their spiritual and temporal interests. As a consequence, however, of this intimate relation the church paid by loss of liberty for the influence and riches which it enjoyed.

In principle the clergy and people preserved the right of electing the bishop. But it was necessary to have the authorization of

¹ For example, Corvei had lands in Lorraine, the archbishopric of Magdeburg owned lands in Deventer (Gerdes I, 536). Outside of Metz proper the bishop had estate in Epinal, Moyon, Marsal, Vic, Habondage, Rambervillers, Conflans, Varnesberg, Radonville, St. Trond, etc. (Klipfel, *Metz, cité épiscopale et impériale* [1866], 26). The archbishop of Rheims, though a French subject, owned lands in Lorraine (Parisot, *Le royaume de Lorraine sous les Carolingiens*, 37, n. 4; 176, n. 3). For large treatment of this subject see Leane, Books 3-5.

² Koeniger, 52-53; Kurth, 16; Pirenne, I, 127-30.

the crown in order to exercise the right, and the king might refuse to permit it or might appoint the incumbent himself. Sometimes he outwardly respected the forms, permitting election, but taking care in advance to designate the candidate of his choice. When election had taken place secular confirmation still remained, and only after this formality had been complied with could the metropolitan instal the new bishop.

No bishop could qualify without the consent of the king. Formal approval was absolutely necessary unless the throne were vacant at the time of election of the bishop. Often the election was a mere formality. Usually the local church authorities and the people placidly accepted the king's choice, for it was desirable that the bishop stand well at court.

In the episcopate heredity could not obtain as in civil functions. But the influence of the feudal tendency toward heritability of offices was shown in the church also, where nepotism was a common evil. The passage of a vacated see from uncle to nephew was common. Thus, while on the one hand the sovereigns endeavored to keep the bishoprics and the bishops under their control, on the other the prelates themselves were disposed, like all the feudality, to make themselves as independent as possible of any exterior authority. This tendency was all the more pronounced because many of the bishops were of noble families. It is a fair statement that the feudality everywhere in Europe predominantly filled the offices of the hierarchy.

Abbeys no less than bishoprics were dependencies of the crown or of the feudality. Certain of them which had been founded by one of the Merovingian or Carolingian princes, and in general all those monasteries which had been taken under the king's protection, were denominated "royal" abbeys. These belonged completely to the king, who disposed of their revenues as he pleased. Theoretically the abbot was chosen by the monks, as the bishop was chosen by clergy and people. But few abbeys preserved the right of local self-government. If the king were complacent he might approve the selection of the monks. Frequently he brusquely filled the office, even riding down former privileges and immunities. Many abbeys, deprived of liberty by the kings, were united to a

bishopric¹ or another monastery; or, more unfortunate still, fell into the hands of the feudal aristocracy, who usually handled them without any reminiscence of their religious character.

Just as the laity early discovered that it was often a lucrative thing to found monasteries, so did the bishops. Many abbeys were "episcopal" abbeys, having been originally founded by a bishop who controlled them and disposed of their revenues (which arose from the enrichment of the monastery by pious benefactions) as he pleased, exactly as the king did in the case of "royal" abbeys. This condition was particularly common in Lorraine and Swabia, where ecclesiastical feudalism had progressed farther than elsewhere in Germany. Here Cornelimünster and Werden belonged to Cologne; Prüm to Trier; Remiremont to Toul; Saint Stephen, Andlau, Erstein, Honau, and Hohenburg to Strasburg; Münster and Murbach to Basel. A monastery might depend upon a bishopric whether it was within or without the diocese to which it was attached; it might depend upon another monastery; it might depend upon the king or some other lord, even a foreign sovereign or noble; and finally it might depend immediately upon the pope. Abbeys created by laymen were the hereditary property of the founders' descendants, and their revenues formed part of his estate.

Archbishops, bishops, abbots, constituted a body of government officials like the counts, for they were servants of the state as well as of the church. In virtue of immunities which may have been granted them, many bishops and abbots had the powers of a count within the domains of their church. They were constrained to some sort of personal service to the king, as to attend assemblies, to go on missions, to act as ambassadors to Rome or to a foreign court. Under the form of "gifts" they were required to make certain contributions to the king's needs, apart from the revenues proper of the bishopric or monastery.

We know more about the political and military obligations of bishops and abbots than about their financial relations to the secular government. As great landed proprietors, in a time when military service was everywhere in Europe dependent upon landed possession, the clergy naturally, as the greatest of such proprietors, were

¹ Parisot, 332, note.

called upon for service of themselves and their vassals, i.e., those who held church lands in fief.¹

Bishops and abbots had also to aid the king with their counsel like ordinary vassals. Sometimes they sat in general assemblies with the nobles, sometimes in particular ecclesiastical assemblies, as synods and councils. Here too the authority of the king over the church is manifest. For until the Gregorian reform synods could not convene without royal consent.

We have seen that the high clergy was largely recruited from the nobility. Nevertheless in spite of identical origin, rivalry and even bitter hostility existed between the nobility and the clergy, the former usually being extremely jealous of the landed wealth and exemptions which the clergy enjoyed. In consequence private war accompanied by spoliation of lands and destruction of crops, the driving away of the peasantry, etc., were common features of everyday life; even the kings sometimes despoiled rich ecclesiastics. Yet generally royalty and the hierarchy got along fairly well together. The nobles menaced both the church and the crown, and common interest forced crown and clergy to co-operate.

Ideally the relation of church and state in the Middle Ages, at least before the Gregorian formulation of the dictum of church supremacy obtained, was one of mutual accommodation. But the relation was capable of great abuse by either party. Neither party was wholly innocent or wholly guilty, and no complete determination of relative responsibility can be made. But one fact is clear: the root of the whole mediaeval controversy between church and state, the fundamental source of friction, the real bone of contention, was the church's land. If the church had been less secular and more spiritual, if it had been willing to resign, or at least largely to abridge, its temporalities and material possessions, if it had been less devoted to the "royalty of Peter" and the Petrine supremacy and more devoted to the teaching of Jesus that his kingdom was not of this world, the issue between church and state would probably never have got beyond the limits of doctrinaire discussion.

¹ The two completest documents which have to do with this subject in Germany are the *Notitia de servitio monasteriorum*, which dates from Louis the Pious, and the *Numeri loricatorum a principibus partim millendorum, partim ducendorum* [Jaffé, V, 471-72] of the reign of Otto II.

The land hunger of the church—the most pronounced form of avarice in a day when land was almost the sole source of the production of wealth, the only form of capital, the strongest basis of material power—is a fact calculated to appal and dismay one accustomed to interpret religion in spiritual terms.

Even in the eighth century the enormous monopoly of land enjoyed by the church had become a menace to the government and a prejudice to society.¹ Charlemagne complained that gifts to the church were so frequent that freemen were reduced to poverty and compelled to take to a life of crime.² "In 817 Louis the Pious was obliged to legislate to prevent clerks from taking gifts which might disinherit the children or near relations of the giver, and the enactment was re-enacted by Lewis II in 875."³

As early as 816 the standardization of ecclesiastical foundations was attempted.⁴ The council of Aachen divided the clergy into

¹ Boretius, *Leges*, MGH, I, 163.

² For estimates of the extent of clerical wealth in the Carolingian epoch see Waitz, VII, 186; Inama-Sternegg, *DWG*, I, 291, and his *Grossgrundherrschaft*, 32; Lamprecht, *DWL*, I, 703; Sommerlat, *Die wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit der Kirche in Deutschland*, I, 301-16; Werminghoff, *Verfassungsgesch. der deutschen Kirche im Mittelalter*, sec. 8 and bibliography given there.

³ Boretius, I, 163, 277. The quotation is from Fisher, II, 64.

⁴ Mansi, *Concilia*, XIV, cols. 232-33; ordo canon. 818, c. 122. Cf. Abel-Simson, *Jahrb. Ludwigs d. Fr.*, I, 93; *Cart. de N-D. de Paris*, I, Introd., sec. 14. The genesis of these wonderful surveys of church property made in the ninth century and later certainly goes back as far as the time of Pepin the Short, who instituted such an inventory as a part of the partial restoration of the church's property which Karl Martel had seized for military use after 732. The best-known example is the famous *Polyptique* of the abbot Irminon, first edited by Guérard and later by Longnon (cf. Viollet, I, 366-67, 374-75). Other French examples are Piot, *Cartulaire de l'abbaye de St. Trond* (2 vols., 1870-75); Pirenne, *Polyptique et comptes de l'abbaye de St. Trond* (1896); Hansay, *Etude sur la formation et l'organisation économique du domaine de l'abbaye de St. Trond* (1899). The archbishop of Cambrai made a survey of the abbey of Lobbes in 868-69 (Parisot, 283, n. 1). The chief examples in Germany are the *Traditiones* of Corvei (Jaffé, *Monumenta Corb* [1886]; Wigand, *Gesch. von Corvey* [Höxter, 1819]), the *Traditiones Wisentsurgenses* (Wolf, *Erwerbs und Verwaltung des Klostervermögens in der Trad. Wis.* [Berlin diss., 1883]), and the *Register of the Lands of Prüm*, which may have been modeled upon a similar survey of Ferrières-Lamprecht, *DWL*, II, 84, n. 1. See Lamprecht's map in *ibid.*, II. There is a bibliography of German *cartulaires* by Oesterly, *Wegweiser durch die Literatur der Urkundensammlungen* (2 vols.). Charlemagne's well-known *Capitulary de Villis* is the best-known secular survey. On these polyptica in general see *Polyptique d'Irminon* (ed. Longnon),

three strata according to wealth. Those possessed of from 3,000 to 8,000 manors were classified as rich; those possessed of from 1,000 to 2,000 manors were classified as medium; those with only 200 to 300 manors were denominated poor. There were a few very wealthy bishoprics whose riches soared into five figures, and it is obvious that there must have been a considerable intermediate class between the first and the second group, and between the second and the third.

Even the terrible anarchy of the ninth century, owing to civil wars within and the invasions of the Norsemen from without, was turned to advantage by the church. What I have elsewhere written may be quoted here:

It is undeniable that the distress of the monasteries was frequently deliberately misrepresented in order to prevail upon the crown to enlarge their possessions. Hardship and misery the monks doubtless often endured, but it was a misery wholly relative. They suffered less than ordinary people and were amply compensated for their discomfort. Bourgeois has pointedly said that "the clergy with aid of false charters in general got more than they lost."¹

The complete separation of the eastern and western kingdoms, i.e., Germany and France, was reached in 870 at the partition of Meersen, and we may take this date as the point of departure for a study now of the proprietary interests of the German church, having cleared the ground for an understanding thereof in the preceding pages, in which the endeavor has been made to explain how the church and feudalism became so closely identified.

The German monasteries, like the Gallican, enjoyed to a high degree the liberality of popular piety. Not infrequently they were enormously endowed at the time of foundation. The nunnery of Gandersheim, the favorite foundation of the Liudolfinger, in the

II, 363 f.; *Polyptique de Saint Remy de Reims* (ed. Guérard), 93 f.; Coulanges, *L'allen et le domaine rural*, chaps. i-iii; and Nitzsch, I, 255, 271, who makes an instructive comparison between the culture east and west of the Rhine. For the importance of these inventories of the wealth of the church in the treaties of partition in the ninth century, see Meyer von Knonau, *Ueber Nithards vier Buecher Geschichten. Der Bruderkrieg der Söhne Ludwigs d. Fr. und sein Geschichtschreiber* (Leipzig, 1866), 41, 106, n. 235; Richter, *Annalen*, I, 419-22; Mühlbacher, *Deutsche Gesch.*, I, 51.

¹ See my article on "The Commerce of France in the Ninth Century," *Journal of Political Economy* (November, 1915), 873-74.

bishopric of Hildesheim was started in 856 with an endowment of 11,000 manors²; Hersfeld in the space of thirty years accumulated 2,000 large and small estates scattered in 195 different localities;³ Tegernsee, in Bavaria, just prior to the secularization of Duke Arnulf [907-37] owned 11,866 manors; Benediktbeuren, which suffered the same fate, possessed 6,700.³ We have no record of the landed wealth of twenty-five other Bavarian monasteries whose enrichment dates from the Carolingian period. But at the termination of that epoch Fulda possessed 15,000 manors, Lorsch 2,000, St. Gall 4,000.⁴

Statistics of the extent of episcopal lands have not been preserved so fully as those pertaining to the monasteries. But there is ground to believe that the bishoprics were not as rich as the monasteries. The secular clergy did not appeal as interestingly to the imagination of men as the monks; perhaps the fact that church discipline was administered through the secular clergy, who also mingled more with the outside world, deprived the hierarchy of that bloom of romantic piety which the monks possessed in the eyes of the faithful.

The total number of recorded grants to bishoprics made by the Carolingian rulers in Germany between 814 and 911 amounts to

² Inama-Sternegg, I, 406.

³ Hauck, III, 195.

³ Sommerlad, II, 38 f.

⁴ The Swiss monasteries were notoriously rich. The rapid growth of the landed wealth of the monasteries is well illustrated by St. Gall. The *Traditiones* show that before 700 it had not more than 50 *Hufe*; in the eighth century the number rose to 110, in the ninth to 550; by the year 1000 it had about 4,000 manors. Nitzsch (I, 280) well says: "Die Zeit der ostfränkischen Karolinger ist die Zeit des Wachstums der kirchlichen Besitzungen. Der Güterbestand besonders der Klöster mehrte sich durch Schenkungen und Zinsübertragungen von Jahr zu Jahr." On the subject further see Waitz, V, 186; Sommerlad, II, c. 5; Lamprecht, *Deutsche Gesch.*, III, 59; Gerdes, I, 532-40; Roscher, *Ackerbau* (11th ed., 1885, of Stieda), sec. 105. Of course it is not possible to determine absolutely what area of land any monastery possessed, for the unit of measurement, the *mansus* or *Hufe*, was not a uniform area like an American "section."—(Guérard, *Polyptique d'Irminon*, 605; See, *Classes rurales*, 35-36). The same is also true of *Morgenland*. See my article on "East German Colonization," n. 36. Other figures are: Pruem (893), 2,000 *hubae*, 2,402 *Morgenland*; Mettlach, 305 *mansus*; St. Maximin, of Trier, 1284 *Morgenland*, 739 *hubae*; Werden an der Ruhr (880), 22 "dominical" estates, 200 *hubae*, and 400 other pieces of land; Weissenberg, properties scattered in 300 localities.

149, viz., 24 by Louis the Pious, 49 by Ludwig the German, 15 by Charles the Fat, 37 by Arnulf (significant for so short a reign), and 12 by Louis the Child, the last of the house.¹ Of the eight bishoprics in Bavaria, Augsburg and Salzburg were the richest, the former having possessed 1,507 manors in 812, the latter 1,600 manors in the time of Duke Tassilo, who was deposed by Charlemagne in 788.² Freising was credited with estates scattered in 320 localities in the year 835.³ The archbishopric of Trier, in Lorraine, received ten square miles of land from Charlemagne shortly before his death.⁴

Naturally the enormous landed wealth possessed by the church excited the envy and cupidity of the great lay feudality, especially the powerful "stem" dukes, whose policy, with the dissolution of the Frankish empire in the middle of the ninth century, was to bring the bishoprics and monasteries within their duchies under their sway.⁵ With the increasing relaxation of royal authority in Germany after the death of Ludwig the German in 870, the dukes tended more and more to repudiate the Carolingian theory of ducal subordination to kingly authority which Charlemagne had so drastically exemplified in the humiliation of Tassilo of Bavaria, and to assert that they, quite as much as the king, ruled "by the grace of God."⁶

This rise of the great "stem" duchies in Germany in the ninth century is an important and interesting phenomenon. Violent as the measures often were which the dukes practiced toward the clergy in forcibly depriving them of their lands, nevertheless it would be an error to regard their course as merely one of wanton spoliation. Popular feeling in Germany in the ninth and tenth centuries was tribal, not national. The undeveloped and unapprehended popular self-consciousness functioned through the ancient German tribal organisms, of whose complex "personality," so to speak, the feudalized tribal dukes were the most visible and concrete embodiment.

The ducal policy toward the church within the separate duchies was, on a smaller scale, that of Charlemagne before them, namely,

¹ Hauck, III, 57.

² Rietzler, *Gesch. Bayerns*, I, 327; Inama-Sternegg, *Grossgrundherrschaften*, 32.

³ Sommerlad, II, 27.

⁵ Waitz, VII, 45.

⁴ Inama-Sternegg, *DWG*, I, 284.

⁶ Hauck, III, 8.

the attempt to affiliate or assimilate the administration and resources of the church with secular government. The feudality was not interested in questions of dogma and discipline, but was very much interested in the functioning of the church in government and society within its dukedoms. While the bishops were usually treated a little more leniently than were the abbots of the great monasteries, in general it was of slight moment to the duke whether the lands which they wished to appropriate were owned by a secular or a monastic corporation, so long as the upbuilding of a strong ducal government within their fiefs was to be furthered. As a consequence a double policy of forcible secularization of church lands and the enforcement of the right of advowson by the dukes upon the church within their duchies was general in Saxony, Bavaria, and Swabia.¹ In addition to these measures the dukes drastically thrust their "protection" as *vidames* or *avoues* upon terrorized bishops and abbots. Everywhere the dukes laid a heavy hand upon the church and attempted to impose their feudal authority on the bishops and abbots.²

The deposition of Charles the Fat and the accession of Arnulf of Bavaria to the German throne in 887 may be taken as the crucial point in this epoch. For that event, though it did not unseat the Carolingian dynasty, was nevertheless a political revolution. The German church, maddened by the tyranny and the exploitation of its lands by a baronage which had riotously pillaged it under the weak rule of Charles, in self-protection engineered the deposition of Charles the Fat and the enthronement of Arnulf.³ We get some

¹ Sommerlad, II, 226 f.; Dahn, IX, 518 f.; Hauck, III, 7; Stutz, *Beneficialwesen*, chaps. xx-xxi.

² Waitz, IV, 156 f.; 163, n. 2; Hauck, III, 8-9.

³ The dethronement of Charles the Fat was chiefly the work of Liutward, arch-chancellor of the empire, who had been driven from court in June, 887 (the deposition took place in November) by a combination of the great dukes against him, and fled to Arnulf, who already in 884-85 had unmasked his claims as a pretender. The contemporary chroniclers are singularly silent as to causes and motives, which, considering that all were clerics, of itself may be taken as evidence that clerical intrigue, whereof the writers are discreetly silent, was at the bottom of the movement. The conclusion expressed in the text is arrived at by a process of inverse reasoning from the evidence afforded by Arnulf's policy as king and the course of the church toward him. Waitz contends that technically it was not a deposition but an abdication by Charles in favor

measure of the church's apprehension in the action of the synod of Metz in the following May (888), which expressed fear of general secularization of the lands of the church within the several duchies and implored Arnulf for protection.¹

By virtue of the circumstances under which he became king, Arnulf was pledged to a pro-clerical policy. In return for the moral support and material backing of the church, whose vassals aided his arms, whose resources repleted the diminished revenues of the Carolingian house, Arnulf showered exemptions and immunities upon the bishops and abbots.² At the diet of Tribur in 895 the clergy were given precedence over the feudality.³ With Arnulf's reign began that intimate alliance between the German church and the German crown which reached a climax of partnership under Otto the Great and his successors.

When the last Carolingian king expired in 911 in the person of Louis the Child, Arnulf's son, the German church lost not a minute in establishing a new dynasty. The energetic Hatto, archbishop of Mainz, promptly put up Conrad of Franconia as king, with the backing of the church, perilous as the course was of choosing one duke in preference to another, and when the Babenbergers resented it, church and crown, united, together broke their power.⁴ But

of his rival, and strives to minimize the revolutionary nature of the event (*DVG*, V, 26, n. 2), yet on page 30 he admits the ascendancy of clerical influence in Arnulf's reign. It seems to me that, looking backward into the policy of the church in the time of Louis the Pious and Charles the Bald, and forward into its policy under Conrad I, especially as expressed at the synod of Hohenaltheim, we are justified in concluding that the church was the controlling factor in the change of ruler. For further literature see Gfrörer, *Gesch. der Ost- und Westfränkischen Karolinger*, II, 293; Dümmler, *Gesch. des Ostfränkischen Reiches*, III, 302 f.; Wenck, *Erhebung Arnulfs*, 22; Maurenbrecher, *Gesch. der deutschen Königswahlen*, 25 f.; Hartung, *Die Thronfolge im deutschen Reiche*, in *Forschungen zur deutschen Gesch.*, XVIII (1874), 134 f.; Phillips, "Beiträge zur Geschichte Deutschlands von Jahre 887 bis 956," in *Abhandlungen der III Classe der Akad. der Wissenschaften*, Band III, Abth. 2 (Vienna).

¹ Nitzsch, I, 286. He well says: "Ein neues System nationaler Königtümer war im Entstehen, dessen anerkannten politischen Mittelpunkt der ostfränkische Hof bildete" (p. 287).

² Dopsch, *Wirtschaftsgesch. der Karolingerzeit*, II, 328 f. Arnulf denominated himself "ecclesiae catholicae filius et defensor" after 892.

³ Nitzsch, I, 292. The clergy again expressed fear of spoliation (Regino, *Chron.*, 895).

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 296; Hauck, III, 6-10; Lamprecht, *D.G.*, II, 115; Waitz, V, 61-63.

the danger of the church from feudal spoliation was not over. Henry, duke of Saxony, deprived Mainz of the lands situated within his duchy,¹ while in Swabia Bishop Salomon of Constance waged a long and bitter conflict with Duke Burchard,² and when the latter died continued the duel against his successor Erchanger.³ In Bavaria the whole episcopate, headed by Pilgrim of Salzburg, Tuto of Regensburg, and Drachalf of Freising, rallied around Conrad, when in July, 916, he invaded Bavaria against Duke Arnulf.⁴

The conflict between the church and the crown on the one hand and the feudal dukes on the other was furiously waged. In every duchy the bone of contention was the lands of the church which the dukes struggled to seize.⁵ In Saxony alone, where the duke was too rich and the church too poor to tempt feudal covetousness, the local clergy was friendly with the reigning feudal authority. At the synod of Hohenaltheim in 916, which was strongly imbued with pseudo-Isodorean ideas of clerical supremacy, and over which a papal legate presided, the bishops of all Germany, with the exception of those of Saxony who were restrained by Henry the Fowler from attending, boldly proclaimed their alliance with the crown.⁶ Erchanger of Swabia and Arnulf of Bavaria, who had revolted against Conrad, were condemned.⁷ The synod tripled the penalty of excommunication, declared the exemption of the clergy from secular courts, asserted the appellate supremacy of the papal curia, and demanded the restoration of the property of the church, which the dukes had seized and secularized, and the enforcement of the tithe.

It was not the fault of the bishops that Conrad's reign was not successful.⁸ Erchanger, it is true, suffered death, but Arnulf of

¹ Widukind, I, 21; Waitz, *Jahrbuch Heinr. I.*, 20; Dümmler, *Ostfränk. Reich*, III, 585.

² *Annal. Allem.*, 911, SS. I, 55; Zeller, *Bischof Salomo III. von Konstanz, Abt von St. Gallen* (Tübingen diss., 1910).

³ *Annal. Aikm.*, 913-16; *Contin. Reg.*, 914-17; Hauck, III, 12.

⁴ *Dipl. I.*, 27, No. 30; Nitzsch, I, 303.

⁵ Waitz, V, 62 f.

⁶ Hauck, III, 13; Nitzsch, I, 303. The Bavarian bishops braved the wrath of Duke Arnulf to come.

⁷ Hauck, III, 21.

⁸ Even Conrad I abused his popularity with the church in order to increase the family holdings (Hauck, III, 20; Waitz, VII, 134).

Bavaria was too strong in his position, and the Saxon clergy could not be lured away from Henry. Suddenly the whole program of the church collapsed with the death of Conrad on December 28, 918. The failure of Conrad's policy proved two things: first, that the feudal organization of Germany around the great dukes was too deeply rooted to be overthrown; the day had gone by when the crown could coerce the dukes as Charlemagne had broken Tassilo of Bavaria;¹ secondly, that the time was not yet ripe for the German church to exercise a dominant sway in political affairs.

Upon his deathbed Conrad seems to have had some intimation of this truth, in which the clergy, however reluctantly, appear also to have acquiesced. We cannot explain otherwise the dying king's action in sending the royal insignia to Henry of Saxony, and that of the archbishop of Mainz in inviting Henry, at Fritzlar, in May, 919, to become the defender of the church.² But Henry I was too wary to mortgage his freedom of action to the clergy, and with feigned humility, to the bitter chagrin of the bishops, refused to be consecrated.³

Henry I's feudal policy was to give simultaneous and due expression both to the general and the particularistic interests in Germany. The dukes were permitted to exercise their authority with almost sovereign independence within their duchies, administering justice, coining their own money, and in the case of the Bavarian duke even the right of nomination to bishoprics was abandoned to him.⁴ Almost as much latitude was given to Burchard of Swabia and Gilbert of Lorraine.⁵ Henry I's policy, in a word, was one of regulation, not suppression of feudalism.

¹ Popular feeling was tribal, not national (Thietmar, *Chron.*, II, 28). When Conrad I executed Adalbert of Babenberg much popular indignation was aroused (Regino, *anno* 906). The caliph Abd-er-Rahman told the envoys of Otto I that their sovereign made a mistake in permitting the German dukes so much liberty (*Vita Johan. Gorz*, c. 136, *MGH*, SS. IV, 376). We see the same phenomenon in feudal France, where the duke of Gascony denominated his duchy as "regnum" (Pfüster, *Robert le Pieux*, 228), and the duke of Aquitaine was styled "king" (Bouquet, XII, 451). Thietmar, VI, 30, described the duke of Burgundy as "miles est regis in nomine, et dominus in re."

² Waitz, *Jahrbuch Heinr.*, I, 40.

³ *Ibid.*, 75; Hauck, III, 20-21; Thietmar, *Chron.*, I, c. 5.

⁴ Thietmar, *Chron.*, I, c. 10; Rietzler, I, 329; Lamprecht, *D.G.*, II, 127; Hauck, III, 16-19; Waitz, *Jahrb.*, 52.

⁵ Lamprecht, *D.G.*, II, 127.

Only in the last years of his reign did Henry I relax his suspicion of the church. He was not liberal in grants to it.¹ After 933, when his reforms were well established and his power secure, and perhaps not a little influenced by the piety of his wife Matilda,² his ecclesiastical policy became more affable; he even began to abridge the control of the great dukes over the church within their fiefs.³ But as a whole church politics were at a standstill during Henry I's reign.⁴ Yet beyond any doubt Henry I in the last years of his life saw clearly that what had been a policy of wisdom at first could not be wisely adhered to permanently. In feudal Germany the permanent estrangement of church and state was as impolitic as it was impracticable.

This Otto I perceived and symbolically enunciated both his ecclesiastical and feudal (or rather anti-feudal) program in the solemn coronation in Aachen cathedral.⁵ Otto cared little for the religious significance of the episcopate, but he was in earnest about its political importance.⁶ It was clear in his mind that the German

¹ Sommerlad, II, 232 f.; Nitzsch, I, 330-32.

² On this earliest movement of German pietism see Sybel's *Hist. Zeitschrift*, XLV, 25; Lamprecht, "Das deutsche Geistesleben unter den Ottonen," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, VIII, Part 1, p. 1; Heineken, *Die Anfänge der sächsischen Frauenklöster* (Göttingen diss., 1909); Harnack, *History of Dogma*, VI, 3, note.

³ Lamprecht, *D.G.*, II, 132-33; Nitzsch, I, 324-25.

⁴ Hauck, III, 68; Nitzsch, I, 329-32: "Heinrich I erkannte am Ende seiner Regierung die Bedeutung an, welche die kirchliche Organisation noch immer für das deutsche Leben hatte."

⁵ Bryce's exposition of the significance of this ceremony is classic. See *Holy Roman Empire*, chap. viii, 2d ed. The church and the imperialistic ideal of Otto were more easily reconciled than the *imperium* and the ideas of feudal sovereignty of the stem-dukes. The issue between crown sovereignty and feudal state-rights was irreconcilable, as the great struggle of Frederick Barbarossa and Henry the Lion showed in the twelfth century. The absence of the principle of heredity in church offices afforded the crown a powerful means of control of the church which was not applicable to the duchies. Otto finally brought the dukes to acknowledge his authority, but they were always actuated by local and tribal traditions from which the clergy were much more free.

⁶ Cf. Hauck, III, 1-19, and notes. In the struggle between two rival candidates at Liège Otto compelled the archbishop of Cologne to consecrate the candidate whom he preferred. Bishop Hugo of Verdun was driven from his see for opposing the king, and Benim put in his stead. Political "availability" was the determining factor in the choice of a German bishop.

church would have to comply with his will. The German church was on the horns of a dilemma, and Otto perceived it—either to continue to be buffeted and abused by the violence of the dukes and to suffer continual spoliation of its lands,¹ or to purchase peace and protection from the Saxon house at the price of surrendering its independence and renouncing those vague ideas of supremacy which it had cherished since the ninth century. Save for a few irreconcilables like Frederick of Mainz,² the German bishops as a whole espoused the king and threw their moral influence and their material resources into the scale with the crown against the feudal dukes. The bishops and abbots not only put at Otto's service their authority and their administrative experience, but their wealth and their church vassals also.

This alliance between the German crown and the German church broke the power of the great German dukes. Otto I disposed of church offices more with an eye to the political bearing of the appointment than with any sentiment for its religious character. He deposed the recalcitrant archbishop of Mainz and gave the see to his natural brother William; he made his brother Bruno at one and the same time archbishop of Cologne

¹ Yet, strong as Otto I was, the enormous wealth of the German church still tempted some of the great dukes in his reign to brave the might of the king. Henry of Bavaria blinded and banished the bishop of Salzberg and castrated the patriarch of Aquileia and divided the episcopal estates among his vassals (Jaffé, III, 358; Waitz, VII, 204). Liudolf of Swabia seized the lands of the bishop of Augsburg (Vita Oudal., chap. xxx; MGH, SS. IV, 399). The Lorrainer dukes Gilbert and Conrad often plundered the estates of the archbishop of Trier. The frequency with which such acts are mentioned implies the wide prevalence of the practice. The bishops of Bremen, Metz, Liège, Hildesheim, Münster, Paderborn, and Cologne complain time and time again of the greed of their feudal neighbors for their lands (Waitz, VII, 206, and notes; cf. VI, 79 f.). The bishops were much more liable to be involved in this strife with the feudality than the abbots, chiefly because of their greater political ambition and intriguing, and practiced the same violence of which they accused their enemies. They maintained armed bands of bravos for defense or offense as the case might be. Many were the bishops who *praedia multa ecclesiastica pro auxilio distribuit decennium* (quoted in Waitz, VII, 206, n. 1). The anathemas of the church were ineffectual in a land where the high clergy were grossly guilty of the very practices which they reprobated (for examples of anathemas see *Forsch. z. Deutsch. Gesch.*, XIII, 497; Leane, 413-23. The sources abound: see citations in Gerdes, I, 536, notes.

² For the opposition of the German clergy to Otto I's measures, see Hauck, III, 33-34.

and duke of Lorraine; he made his cousin Henry archbishop of Trier.¹ The German church, so far as the king was concerned, was an instrument of government. There are no examples of German synods in Saxon and Franconian times discussing the general welfare of the church.² There are no Saxon capitularies like those emanating from Charlemagne, Louis the Pious, or even Charles the Bald.³

Otto I introduced no new principle when he so elevated the church to such a high place in his government, but he enormously magnified the practice of his predecessors. Theoretically the canonical right of episcopal election still continued. But irregularities of the nature of royal designation were so frequent that the rule was far more honored in the breach than in the observance.⁴ The chief principle which prevailed with the king was the politico-economic importance of the office to be filled, and the "availability" of the candidate. Expediency was superior to canonicity. The interests of the crown were the decisive factor. Thietmar, of Merseburg, the chief historian of the Saxon epoch, depicts the bishops as royal and loyal officials.⁵ The feudal ideal was complete. Otto was head of state and (secular) head of the church too. Dogma and discipline were left to the church, but not government, even of itself.

Since the defeudalization of the church in Europe, owing to the influence of the French Revolution and especially in Germany through the sweeping changes wrought by Napoleon, it requires an effort of the historical imagination and a large and intimate knowledge of the nature and operation of the feudal régime in the Middle Ages in order to understand how and why the church could

¹ Hauck, III, 31; Lamprecht, *D.G.*, II, 153.

² *Ibid.*, III, 67; Lamprecht, *D.G.*, II, 155-56.

³ *Ibid.*, III, 67 and 230; cf. Fisher, I, c. 4.

⁴ For a list of episcopal appointments by the German crown see Hinschius, *Kirchenrecht*, II, 530, n. 9.

⁵ *Chron.*, I, 15; Lambert, of Hersfeld, *Annales* (1071, ed. Holder-Egger), 132-33, has a famous tirade against these "political" churchmen of the Franconian period. The Saxon episcopate has been studied in Hinschius, II, 530-37; Hauck, III, 395-403; Gerdes, I, 566-72; Koeniger, Part II, c. 2.

become so identified with secular government, and how Otto I was able to make so large use of it.

The key to the matter is to be found in the proprietary nature of the mediaeval church, i.e., the temporal power of bishops and abbots. For at the same time these ecclesiastics were churchmen and feudal chieftains. They pertained both to the spiritual and to the feudal hierarchy. The problem was to reconcile the dual functions and obligations of bishops and abbots, and to give simultaneous and due expression to both their spiritual and their temporal duties. In practice it was impossible "to split even." Instead of the fief being regarded as the accessory of the bishopric or abbey, the bishopric or abbey became the accessory of the fief. The state applied to church lands exactly the same rules and regulations which it enforced in the case of lay lands. Clerical election, when it obtained at all, was a mere formality; in many cases ecclesiastical election wholly disappeared.¹

The king lived, in no inconsiderable degree, upon the revenues of the church² and fought his wars in large part with church vassals. To limit the power of the crown over church lands was both to diminish the royal authority and to sequester important and necessary revenues. Otto I's theory of control of the German church was that of Charlemagne before him. The difference was one of degree only. The crown's ecclesiastical authority conveyed in the term *regale*, as said before, was not so reduced as its secular authority. Considerable remnants of former Carolingian prerogative still survived in the great duchies, being least in Bavaria,³ and thus gave the crown a *point d'appui* in the very heart of the duchies. This authority was more complete in the case of the monasteries than in the case of the bishoprics.

Monasteries, from the inception of the movement, were private foundations, and of all founders of monasteries the Merovingian kings and the Austrasian mayors had been the greatest. These

¹ See Erich Laehns, *Die Bischofswahlen in Deutschland von 936-1056*, Greifswald, 1909.

² "Alles Reichskirchengut stand im Eigentum des Reiches."—Richter, *Annalen*, III, Part 2, p. 768; cf. Ficker, *loc. cit.*, 35 (87 f.).

³ Giesebrecht, *Kaiserzeit*, I, 227. For details, Waitz, VII, 138 f.

the Carolingian kings inherited and increased, so that an imposing array of cloisters was within the control of the Frankish crown. Free election disappeared in the abbeys under Charlemagne, who ecclesiastically supervised them through the bishops¹ and assimilated the administration of the monastery lands to that of the fisc in virtue of the "protection" vouchsafed by the crown to them;² *Krongut*, *Hausgut*, and *Klostergut* were all one in the Carolingian system.³

In consequence, despite the fact that during the ninth century the feudality usurped control of many foundations and plundered the crown of its revenues thereby,⁴ nevertheless the Saxon house was possessed of many monasteries throughout Germany, although Otto I complained of the spoliation of them under his predecessors and of their reduced number.⁵

With these "royal" abbeys must also be included the new bishoprics like Magdeburg, Brandenburg, Zeitz, Meissen, etc., established during the Saxon epoch in the colonial lands east of the Elbe and Saale rivers, as the Wendish territory was conquered and settled by the German people.⁶ By the end of the Saxon period the complete sway of the royal prerogative over all bishoprics and abbeys, save a few of the latter which still remained in private hands by virtue of ancient tradition, was accomplished.

This rapid extension of crown authority over the German church was materially facilitated by the peculiarly concrete conceptions of law which prevailed. It took the mediaeval, and especially the Teutonic, mind a long time to grasp the highly complex notion of a corporation. The modern legal conception of a juridical personality or of a corporation did not exist. Feudalism was an extremely personal régime. Law had to possess concrete, physical embodiment. Abstract legal conceptions did not prevail and would not have been understood. Accordingly it was universally held that

¹ Waitz, III, 433.

² *Ibid.*, III, 155, 158-60.

³ *Ibid.*, III, 140; IV, 154-60, 164. For the wealth of the monasteries under Otto I see Sommerlad, II, 39.

⁴ Waitz, IV, 156, 160, n. 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, VII, 209, n. 4; Koeniger, 101, n. 3.

⁶ *Ibid.*, IV, 157, 168, n. 4.

every bishopric and every monastery had to have a physical overlord.¹ In the case of small churches the patron was the local landed proprietor who had founded it, or whose father had founded it, and who controlled it. In the case of monasteries the overlord was the founder. But most of the great German monasteries had been founded by royal initiative and royal endowment, and the same was true, as has been said, of the new bishoprics in the conquered lands.² As the king lived in considerable part upon the resources derived from the church lands, especially the abbey lands, to limit the exercise of royal authority over these lands, or to permit them to be enfeoffed without royal consent, would not only have diminished the political power of the crown, but also have sequestered important revenues.³

¹ "Der Begriff der Kirche als einer juristischen Person war den Germanen fremd. Die kirchlichen Gebäude gehörten dem Herrn des Bodens, auf dem sie standen und wurden von Diesem den Geistlichen zur Benutzung eingeräumt." Richter, *Annalen*, III, Part 2, p. 768; cf. Ficker, 12 (64); Hinschius, II, 622; Gierke, *Deutsches Genossenschaft*, and Pollock and Maitland, *History of English Law*, I, 469-95.

² For these Slavonic bishoprics see my article on "The German Church and Conversion of Baltic Slavs," in *Amer. Jour. Theol.*, April and July, 1916.

³ Henry II, as was his way, sensibly and pithily expressed the crown's position in this matter of secular control of church property: "Oportet ut in aecclesiis multae sint facultates . . . quia cui plus committitur, plus ab eo exigitur. Multa enim debet (Fulda) dare servitia et romanae et regali curiae propetr quod scriptum est: Reddite quae sunt Caesaris Caesari et quae sunt Dei Deo." The way in which Abelard made the point is classic: see Bouquet, XIV, 290.

CRITICAL NOTES

THE LAMENT OVER JERUSALEM

The brief paragraph in the First and Third Gospels (Matt. 23:37-39; Luke 13:34, 35) containing the Lament over Jerusalem presents two serious difficulties. One is the inappropriateness of the Lament in the synoptic narrative. Whether with Matthew we place it in the last week of the ministry, or earlier with Luke, it is most improbable that the words as they have come to us could have been a direct utterance of our Lord, for, according to the synoptic account, no part of the ministry was spent in Jerusalem before the last week. It is only when the words of the Lament are employed to lend support to the historicity of the Jerusalem visits in the Fourth Gospel that this difficulty is not acutely felt. The second difficulty arises out of the obscurity of the latter part of the Lament (Matt. 23:39; Luke 13:35b) in its present context. What is the logical connection between it and the former part of the saying? Is the true connection indicated by the $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ of Matthew, or by the $\delta\epsilon$ of some authorities in Luke? Is it possible to discover any intelligible connection? And what is the point of time to which reference is made—the time at which those addressed by Jesus would hail him with the words, “Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord”?

One way of surmounting the former of these difficulties is that usually associated with the name of Harnack. He tells us on p. 168 of his *Sayings of Jesus* (English translation) that he shares Schmiedel's doubt as to whether the Lament stood in Q as a saying of our Lord. He avoids the necessity of directly attributing the words to Jesus by means of the brilliant theory that they are a continuation of the quotation from an apocryphal Jewish writing which immediately precedes them in Matthew (23:34-36). True, there is no hint in Matthew of the presence of a quotation, but in the Lucan parallel the words are expressly given as spoken by the “Wisdom of God” (Luke 11:49-51). The view that Jesus is regarded by Luke, and so presumably by Q, as quoting from some apocryphal work now lost is to us much more probable than any alternative proposal that has been made. It is most unlikely that Jesus would be spoken of by the evangelist or by Q as the “Wisdom of God,”

or that he would thus describe himself had he been reminding his hearers of words which he himself had uttered on some previous occasion. Moreover, it is highly improbable that the wisdom of God would have been personified, if the words were simply intended to mean, as Plummer contends, "God in His wisdom said." Whether any argument can be based upon the use of *εἰπὼν* in Luke 11:49 is very problematical, as may be seen from the fact that Harnack and Plummer draw diametrically opposite conclusions from the same premise. The former¹ finds support in the use of the *aorist* for the view that the words given as those of the "Wisdom of God" are a quotation, whereas the latter (*Luke*, p. 313) remarks that "written words would be introduced with λέγει rather than εἰπὼν." And, as to the genuineness of the reference to the "Wisdom of God" in the Third Gospel, Harnack is surely justified in his contention that it is inconceivable that Luke should have interpolated the reference, whereas, on the other hand, "we can easily understand that the dislike to represent our Lord as quoting from an apocryphal book, or some other motive, led St. Matthew to erase the quotation formula."²

In Matthew, then, the Lament over Jerusalem follows immediately after what is doubtless a quotation from a Jewish work no longer extant, and there is *prima facie* considerable justification for the suggestion that the Lament continues the quotation. "In Q," says Harnack, "Matt. 23:34-38 was given as a quotation used by our Lord to give force to what he was saying, to which vs. 39 was appended as a real utterance of our Lord himself. This caused some uncertainty in regard to the limits of the quotation. The result was that St. Matthew did not treat it as a quotation at all, but transformed the whole passage into an original discourse of our Lord . . . while St. Luke has broken off the quotation directly before the appeal to Jerusalem and, omitting the latter here (i.e., in chap. xi), has given it in a different place as a saying of our Lord himself."³

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 103.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 169, n. 2.

It may be well at this point (inasmuch as this theory is generally associated with the name of Harnack, as if to him belonged the honor of having first made this brilliant and ingenious suggestion regarding the source of the Lament over Jerusalem) to remark that the credit of originating the theory belongs neither to him nor to Schmiedel, whom he mentions as holding the same view. Strauss held exactly the same view long ago. It may be found on pp. 341, 342 of Vol. I of his *New Life of Jesus* (English translation). Perhaps it would not be out of place to quote a few of his words. He tells us that "we have every reason to assume that that appeal to Jerusalem . . . belongs

If this explanation of the Lament is correct, it manifestly supplies strong corroboration of Harnack's view that the order of Q is better preserved in Matthew than in Luke. For here, staring us in the face, is a clear case of the tearing asunder by Luke of passages which must have been contiguous in Q, and have been retained in their original order by Matthew. Of course the suggestion can never be more than a theory, and it rests with those who reject it to show that the objections on which their dissent is based are sufficiently serious to warrant us in depriving ourselves of the relief which the hypothesis undoubtedly affords, in view of the difficulty of directly ascribing the words of the Lament to Jesus. Now what are these objections?

Mr. Streeter, in Essay IV of the *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem*, which deals with the "Original Order of Q," argues with conspicuous cogency and clarity for the view that the order of Q is better preserved in Luke than in Matthew, basing his conclusions partly upon the treatment of Mark, their other main source, by Matthew and Luke, and partly upon the clearly observable tendency of the editor of the First Gospel to group our Lord's teaching in certain artificial compilations. Two pages of the essay (pp. 162, 163) are devoted to an examination and criticism of Harnack's theory (if we may still call it by the name of its famous exponent) regarding the Jerusalem passage. Streeter does not brush the explanation aside as fantastic or impossible. He fully appreciates the ingeniousness of the hypothesis, but remarks with justice that the acceptance of the suggestion would not invalidate his reasoning or jeopardize the conclusion to which all the other facts would seem to point. "It is of course," he says, "very unlikely that Luke invariably adhered to his general rule, and this case might quite well be the exception." He does not, however, accept the theory. He admits that "if we read the passage Matt. 23:34-39, only prefixing to it Luke's introductory words "therefore the Wisdom of God said," the first three verses (34-36) do, as various scholars have noticed, read very like a quotation," and adds that vs. 39 is, as Harnack admits, a saying

to the speech about the wisdom of God," and proceeds: "By this wisdom of God, Jesus can neither have meant himself nor the Evangelist Jesus, as neither such a designation nor such a quotation from himself appears anywhere else in the Gospels. The wisdom of God might be supposed to be the inspiration of the sacred writings of the Old Testament, but in the Old Testament no such expression is found. Some particular writing therefore appears rather to be meant by it, the words of which one Evangelist makes Jesus quote, at the same time naming the source from which they came; the other puts them immediately into his mouth as his own expression."

of Jesus. But what of the two intervening verses? "The question is"—we are quoting Streeter again—"do vs. 37-38 belong as a conclusion to the first three verses, or do they begin a fresh saying ending with vs. 39?" He gives five reasons for thinking that they start a fresh saying.

A careful and sympathetic examination of these five reasons has failed to satisfy us that any one of them is truly convincing or that the cumulative force of the whole five is at all compelling. If they represent the utmost that can be said against the theory, there is no reason, as it appears to us, why it should be rejected, however valid the grounds may be for the view that in general it is Luke and not Matthew that preserves the original order of Q. But let us glance at Streeter's five reasons *seriatim*.

1. The first we give in his own words: "Our Lord's way of speaking was so terse and pointed (at any rate those sayings of his which have reached us, i.e., those which stuck in the memory of his hearers, are all such) that as a mere quotation 34-38 (i.e., of Matt., chap. 23) seems over-long."

But surely the habitual terseness of our Lord's sayings has very little bearing upon the length of a quotation which he may have used on one occasion. Are we bound to conclude, from the usual conciseness and brevity of his sayings, that he *could* not quote words extending to five verses? What more likely than that words such as these—on the hypothesis that they are a quotation—should have impressed themselves on the mind of Jesus? And there is nothing strange in their being remembered by his hearers, for they too would be acquainted with them; the words would fall upon their ears with a familiar ring. And can we be surprised that even familiar words were recorded at some length, when they had been "inspired," so to speak, through being employed by the Master?

2. The second reason is that the change of tone at vs. 37, in which we pass from proclamation of vengeance to sorrow for the city because of its blindness, indicates that we have left the Jewish apocryphal writing and have passed into the Master's own thoughts.

But is there any difficulty whatsoever in the way of believing that the writer of the lost Jewish work could in one and the same breath represent God as threatening the city with punishment and yearning over her with tender compassion? Is not the heart of God full of sympathetic sorrow even when he announces coming doom? Strauss, speaking of the Lament and the quotation which immediately precedes it in Matthew, remarks that "the fact that in both expressions the abuse of divine

missionaries by the Jews is spoken of makes it probable that they were really originally connected."¹ And further, the editor of the First Gospel clearly makes the whole passage from vs. 34 to vs. 39 (however much or however little of it he may have regarded as a quotation) an utterance of Jesus, so that *he* at any rate did not find any insurmountable difficulty in the sudden transition from the declaration of coming doom to the expression of sympathetic sorrow. It being seen that Matthew regards the whole passage as a saying of Jesus, is not Streeter somewhat inconsistent when he speaks on p. 153 of the *Oxford Studies* of the appropriateness of the placing of the Jerusalem Lament in the First Gospel in relation to what goes before it (as well as to what comes after it), whereas here (on p. 163) he takes the sudden change of tone to be an indication that we have passed from the Jewish work to the thoughts of Jesus himself? The fact is that the connection in Matthew is most natural and easy.

We may here be allowed to remark that in the Third Gospel, as we think, the connection of the Lament with the immediately preceding passage is by no means appropriate. The very inappropriateness of the placing, however, furnishes an interesting sidelight on Luke's nature. Luke places the Lament in immediate connection with the words *οτι ουκ ενδέχεται προφήτην απολίσθαι έξω Ιερουσαλήμ*, which Jesus addressed to those Pharisees who had warned him of the hostile intentions of Antipas (Luke 13:33). Now these words are spoken with exquisite irony, illustrating that trait of the Master's character which Burkitt calls his "playfulness."² He was quite safe where he was, in spite of the Tetrarch's animosity, for Jerusalem had surely won for herself the proud distinction of being the only place that had the right to put prophets to death! And it is to these words of playful irony that Luke appends the solemn Lament! He must have failed to see the irony of the Master's reply to the Pharisees, and that would seem to indicate that he was lacking in a sense of humor.

3. Streeter's third argument is perhaps the most cogent of the five. He maintains that vs. 39 (of Matt., chap. 23) follows very awkwardly unless Jesus speaks in his own person in vss. 37 and 38. "If," he says, "Matthew is right in his context, and Harnack in his interpretation, the argument would be as follows. Our Lord remarks that the book called the 'Wisdom of God' truly foretells vengeance to fall on this generation, while it laments at the same time the frequent blindness of Jerusalem and consequent desolation of her house, and then adds as His own comment,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 341.

² *Gospel History and Its Transmission*, p. 142.

'For I say unto you, Ye shall not see *me* henceforth until ye say, Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord.' The connection of thought is not obvious."

We shall return to this argument and deal with it when we have glanced at Streeter's remaining points.

4. The fourth count of his indictment of the theory consists merely of an attempt to minimize the sense of relief which it brings. He admits that the hypothesis would solve the difficulty that the direct ascription of the words of Matt. 23:37, 38 to Jesus compels us to postulate previous visits on his part to the capital, but he then proceeds to argue that there is really no difficulty to be solved, inasmuch as, even if we do not accept as historical the Jerusalem visits of the Fourth Gospel, we cannot but think that Jesus must have visited the Holy City before the days of his public ministry, and, touched by the hollowness of her formal religion, yearned for her salvation with tender and compassionate solicitude. "Our Lord's baptism, with which Mark's story begins, was the moment when He felt His own personal call to public work, but it was not the moment when He first felt there was something wrong in the official religion of the day."

All this may well be true, but does it remove the difficulty of directly attributing the words of the Lament to Jesus? Surely the words *καὶ οὐκ ἠθελήσατε* (Matt. 23:37; Luke 13:34) imply the rejection of actual, definite, positive attempts to win over the inhabitants of the city. Would the silent yearnings of the heart of Jesus in the days before his baptism, passionate though they were, justify the charge *καὶ οὐκ ἠθελήσατε*? We think not.

5. For Streeter's final argument we are referred to a "strong reason," already given on a previous page of the *Oxford Studies*, viz., p. 153, for supposing that the placing of Matt. 23:37-39 is due to the editor. What is the reason there given? It is that the Jerusalem Lament is so appropriately placed between two prophecies regarding Jerusalem, one of which is derived from Q and the other from Mark, that "we cannot but suspect that the placing is the editor's."

But are we bound to conclude from the appropriateness of the position of the Lament in Matthew that its connection both with that which precedes and with that which follows is due to the editor? Does the suitable placing in Matthew really supply the least scrap of evidence that the editor did not find the Lament in his source attached to that which precedes it in his Gospel? Are we to suppose that in Q adjacent sayings were never in fitting connection?

Some slight corroboration of the view that the words of the Lament are a quotation from some Jewish work no longer extant and not a direct saying of Jesus may perhaps be found, not only in the style (on which see n. 1 on p. 169 of Harnack's *Sayings*), but also in the use of the simile of the hen as well as in the use of *οἶκος* for the city of Jerusalem. Of course the mere existence of parallels in Jewish literature is no proof that a particular expression or simile may not have been directly employed by Jesus, but at the same time it is worthy of note that the simile of the hen "is not found in Old Testament, but is frequent in Rabbinical literature,"¹ and that while it is possible that Jerusalem may be spoken of as "house" in the Old Testament, as, e.g., in Jer. 12:7, the word is certainly applied to the city several times in extra-canonical writings.

It may be asked by those who reject the theory how it was that Luke came to separate the Lament from the former part of the quotation, if in Q the two portions which he tears asunder thus formed one compact whole. We suggest that the reason was that he wrongly took the few words which immediately precede the Lament in Matthew (and so, as we think, in Q), and which he himself gives in 11:51b, to be a direct logion of the Master. In Matt. (23:36) the words run: *ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἥξει ταῦτα πάντα ἐπὶ τὴν γενεὰν ταύτην*, while Lk. has: *καὶ λέγω ὑμῖν, ἐκζητηθήσεται ἀπὸ τῆς γενεᾶς ταύτης*, the subject of the verb in Luke being the blood of the prophets. It would be easy and natural to take this statement as our Lord's comment on the preceding words, for it was no unusual thing for him to quote and then to comment on the quotation.

We now proceed to discuss the question of the connection of thought between the main part of the Lament, and what is usually regarded as its concluding portion. This latter portion is given by Matthew thus: *λέγω γὰρ ὑμῖν, οὐ μὴ με ἴδητε ἀπ' ἄρτι ἕως ἂν εἴπητε· εὐλογημένος ὁ ἐρχόμενος ἐν ὀνόματι κυρίου (23:39)*, and by Luke as follows: *λέγω [δὲ] ὑμῖν, οὐ μὴ ἴδητέ με ἕως [ἥξει ὅτε] εἴπητε κτλ (13:35)*.

Reference has already been made to Streeter's contention that if Harnack's view is accepted the connection of thought is by no means obvious. But, if we refuse to regard the Lament as a quotation, is the logical connection any more obvious or the meaning of these concluding words any less obscure? Whether or not we suppose that Jesus in Matt. 23:37, 38; Luke 13:34, 35a is directly addressing the inhabitants of Jerusalem in his own words, it is extremely difficult to see what satisfactory meaning may be assigned to the additional statement that they

¹ Plummer, *Luke*, p. 352.

would not see him until they should say, "Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord."

It is surely incredible that Jesus should be referring to his triumphal entry into the city. As Plummer remarks,¹ he would not have declared with such impressive solemnity the mere fact that he would be absent from Jerusalem for some little time. Of course Matthew cannot have taken the words to refer to the triumphal entry, for he places them *after* his record of that incident. Those who so understand the words must think that he has placed them in the wrong chronological context. Archdeacon Allen has doubts regarding the chronological site of the logion in the First Gospel, for he says: "The words seem to be a fragment belonging to an earlier period of the ministry, when Christ was leaving Jerusalem for the last time before His triumphal entry."²

Let us for the moment assume—and the assumption is by no means improbable—that Luke understood the words to refer to the triumphal entry. In that case he must have thought of them as being addressed to inhabitants of the city, and as he does not place in the city itself the conversation with the Pharisees who warned Jesus of the evil intentions of Antipas, as part of which the words are recorded (whether it actually took place in Galilee, as Burkitt thinks, or in Peraea is immaterial for our present purpose), the conclusion is clear that the evangelist regarded these Pharisees as from Jerusalem, although he does not expressly so describe them. And, if our Lord's interlocutors had come from Jerusalem, the presumption is justified that in acquainting him with the designs of Antipas they were actuated by the hope that the information would lead him to leave the Tetrarch's dominions and to enter Judaea and Jerusalem, where he would be more completely at their mercy.

Let us glance at another suggested interpretation of the words. They are taken by some expositors to refer to the spiritual conversion of Israel. Thus Plummer³ remarks that the view is "no doubt right" which finds here a reference to "the conversion of the Jews throughout all time." Jesus has in mind the welcome that will be accorded by converted Israel to "the spiritual presence of the Messiah." And in his comment on Matt. 23:39,⁴ he says of this warning, which concludes the Lament: "It seems to look back to 21:9. When the multitudes and the children welcomed Jesus with Hosannas as the Messiah, the hierarchy were moved with indignation, and wished Jesus to put a stop to the acclamations. He assures them here that, until they can themselves

¹ *Luke*, p. 353.

² *Matthew*, p. 251.

³ *Luke*, p. 353.

⁴ *Matthew*, p. 325.

take up this welcome to Him, they will never see Him again as their Messiah. His mission to them as their Saviour is closed. If that relation to them is ever to be renewed, the initiative must come from them." But, if Jesus was contrasting the callousness of those to whom these words were addressed with the enthusiasm shown by the multitude a few days before, or if Matthew had understood him to be drawing such a contrast, the pronoun *ὑμεῖς* would surely have been expressed with the verb *εἶπητε*. But apart from this grammatical objection, can this interpretation be regarded as satisfactory? We think we may take it as certain that, if this is what Jesus meant to say, he would have expressed his meaning more clearly. And, moreover, just as the placing of the saying in the First Gospel shows that Matthew did not take it to refer to the triumphal entry, so its position in the Third Gospel proves that Luke, at any rate, did not accept this other explanation, for the whole of the Jerusalem ministry in his Gospel comes after his report of the saying.

The plain fact is that the words are eschatological, and, if they are attached to the Jerusalem Lament and regarded as addressed to the inhabitants of the city in connection with it, we very much doubt whether any exegesis, however ingenious, can discover a satisfactory, or invent a plausible, explanation of them.

We therefore feel constrained to think that the words *λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐ μὴ ἴδῃτέ με πάλιν* are not part of the Jerusalem Lament at all. Only by sheer accident have they become associated with it. Harnack, in words already quoted, speaks of them as being "appended" to it. They were, as we venture to think, the opening words of the immediately succeeding section of Q, and have been erroneously attached to the Lament by Matthew and Luke. If it be thought incredible that both editors should have committed the same error, recourse may be had to the view that the attachment had been effected in Q before it was used as a source by Matthew and Luke. And of course there is the possibility that one evangelist was acquainted with the work of the other. But the coincidence postulated by our hypothesis is by no means as remarkable as it at first sight appears. The influences that would lead to the linking of the attached saying to the Lament in one case would be equally operative in the other, and they are such as to bring the coincidence within the bounds of the possible, if not of the probable. It is reasonable to suppose that the copies of Q employed by the evangelists were quite innocent of punctuation marks; there would be nothing to show where one section ended and the next began. Let us for a moment make the

unlikely supposition that the evangelists regarded as a quotation all that Harnack would assign to the apocryphal Jewish work. They were aware of the Master's habit of quoting and then commenting upon the quotation. Is it incredible that both might have regarded the words now under discussion, introduced as they are by the familiar λέγω ὑμῖν, as a comment upon the quotation? It is certain, however, that the evangelists regarded the Lament, not as a quotation, but as a direct utterance of Jesus, and, although the logical connection between it and the statement that his hearers should not see him until they should say, "Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord," is so very obscure, we do not think that the obscurity is a sufficient reason for thinking that the evangelists could not have been responsible for the suture. Can we for a moment imagine that the connection of thought was always clear to the evangelists? And in the present context they might easily have been led to think that there was *some* connection, inasmuch as it would not have been unnatural for them to conclude that the threat that the "house" was to be abandoned to its fate was to find its fulfilment in the refusal of Jesus to allow the inhabitants to see him.

The soundness of our contention receives some corroboration from the fact that the words λέγω ὑμῖν καὶ are attached to the Lament in different ways by Matthew and Luke. All authorities agree in reading λέγω γὰρ ὑμῖν in Matt. 23:39, but in the Lucan text (13:35) there is no such unanimity. Two MSS of the Old Latin, as well as the Peshitta, read γὰρ (which is possibly a case of assimilation to Matthew); the Sinaitic Syriac read καὶ λέγω, but the true reading in Luke would seem to be either λέγω without any connecting particle (N*L, etc.) or λέγω δέ (ABD, etc.). The variety of readings in Luke shows that the connection of thought puzzled the scribes, while the unanimity with which γὰρ is read in Matthew shows that there, at any rate, no more suitable connecting particle suggested itself. This seems to prove that γὰρ was not in Q, for, had it been, it is legitimate to think that Luke would have transcribed it. Whether the simple λέγω or λέγω δέ was the original reading in Luke we can only guess. And if the original reading could be determined, we should still be in the dark as to whether the δέ was read by Q. Although the authorities which insert the δέ in the text of the Gospel are weightier than those which omit it, still we are inclined to think that the particle was absent from the original text of Luke. For one thing, the absence of any particle from the original text better explains the subsequent variety of particles in the authorities. And further, if the suggestion is correct that the evangelists were led to con-

nect these words with the Lament because they seemed to contain a reference to the fulfilment of the threat contained in the Lament itself, it is unlikely that Luke would introduce them with a particle whose force is usually adversative.

Now, if we are right in thinking that the original text of Luke contained no connecting particle, and that the $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ of Matthew could not have been in the source, it seems natural to suppose that in the text of Q there was no connecting particle. And if our argument up to this point is sound, we are supplied with evidence that at least one fresh section of Q opened, not only without any introductory formula, but even without an introductory particle. And, if one section, why not more? If this conclusion is established it is, of course, as important as it is interesting.

These suggestions are of course highly speculative. But speculative as they are, we propose to use them as a basis for further speculation. In the remainder of our essay we assume the validity of the tentative suggestions already made, and proceed to draw a further conclusion. If our reasoning so far is cogent, we are supplied with a most exquisite criterion by which to determine whether it is Matthew or Luke who in this context preserves the original order of Q—provided, of course, that the order is preserved by one of the two. All we have to do is to see whether the words which we have separated from the Jerusalem Lament naturally and easily attach themselves to the next succeeding excerpt from Q in either Gospel. If the connection can be effected easily and without any straining in either Gospel, a strong presumption is immediately formed that the order of Q is preserved in that Gospel so far as the present context is concerned.

Let us begin with Luke. What do we find? There is not one of the first twenty-five verses of Luke, chap. 14, that is by universal consent assigned to Q. Verses 26, 27, however, are assigned to it by all scholars (we say *all* because the exceptions are so few as to be negligible). Verse 26 runs: "If any man cometh unto me, and hateth not his own father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple." Clearly there is no possible connection here. But let us suppose that the preceding twenty-five verses are from Q. Indeed, there is not one of them that has not been assigned to that source by someone. Of these twenty-five, the first twenty-four treat of the events and discourses in the house of the Pharisee, and it is hopeless to endeavor to discover any possible connection between Luke 13:35 and these verses. And the same is true

of vs. 25, which forms the introduction to the discourse on Counting the Cost.

Let us, then, transfer our quest to the First Gospel. Do we here meet with better success? Let us see. Here again vs. 26 is the first verse in the chapter immediately following the Lament, i.e., in chap. 24, that is by universal consent assigned to Q, vss. 26-28 forming the first non-Marcian section of the chapter having a Lucan parallel (i.e., Luke 17:23, 24, and 37). They are taken from the apocalyptic discourse which Q contained, and would follow naturally after Matt. 23:39, which is, as we think, nothing other than the opening words of this apocalyptic discourse. It was spoken, not to the inhabitants of Jerusalem at all, but to the Master's own disciples. He tells them that a period of separation is imminent and that when they would next see him they would welcome him in his messianic glory. It may be that the discourse thus introduced formed his parting words to the Twelve when he sent them on their mission. He then proceeds to warn them against being led astray by premature proclamations of the advent of him who should come in the name of the Lord: "If therefore they shall say unto you, Behold, he is in the wilderness, go not forth: Behold, he is in the inner chambers; believe it not" (Matt. 24:26; Luke 17:23). The glory of his coming would be such as to banish all possibility of uncertainty or error, for "as the lightning cometh forth from the east, and is seen even unto the west; so shall be the Parousia of the Son of Man" (Matt. 24:27; Luke 17:24.).

But can it be that some intervening part of Matt., chap. 24, is to be assigned to Q? Q is, of course, thought by some to have been the source of the Marcan Apocalypse, Mark 13:3 ff. (we think the Apocalypse began at the third verse of Mark, chap. 13, rather than at the first). But, although this view does not by any means commend itself to us, we cannot but be struck with the fact that Matt. 24:3 (the Matthaean parallel to Mark 13:3) follows easily and naturally on Matt. 23:39.

There is, however, one portion of Matt. 24:1-25 that may with considerable plausibility be regarded as from Q—namely, vss. 10-12. Here is described the climax of iniquity and hate that will be reached at the time of the Parousia: "And then shall many stumble, and shall deliver up one another, and shall hate one another. And many false prophets shall arise, and shall lead many astray. And because iniquity shall be multiplied, the love of the many shall wax cold." It will at once be seen that, if these words belonged to Q, they would lie easily between Matt. 23:39 and Matt. 24:26-28. In any case we think that

we have demonstrated that the words which we have detached from the Jerusalem Lament connect themselves naturally with the next succeeding extract from Q in the First Gospel.

To sum up, we think, in the first place, that no sufficiently cogent reasons have been adduced to warrant the rejection of the hypothesis that the Lament over Jerusalem is a quotation from a lost Jewish book. And further, we hold that the words which are usually regarded as the termination of the Lament form no part of it, but stood in Q, without any introductory formula, as the opening words of an apocalyptic discourse addressed to the disciples, followed immediately by Matt. 24:26-28, or possibly by Matt. 24:10-12. Speculative, we admit, is the reasoning by which the second of these conclusions has been reached, but has not the great and fascinating problem of the Synoptic Gospels reached a point beyond which it cannot be advanced except by means of reverent speculation, and by diligent groping in the region of surmise and conjecture?

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THE LATEST DISCUSSIONS ON PETER AND PAUL AT ROME¹

Was Peter really in Rome? The query is perennial among Protestants. If the apostle never visited the Eternal City, has not a solution been found that in the palmy days of polemics Defoe might have styled "The Shortest Way with the Papists"? The mere argument from silence, however, is incapable of slaying the "dragon" by a single lunge. The series of protagonists typified by Ferdinand Christian Baur, Lipsius, and Erbes have in the opinion of the majority of Protestant scholars tilted in vain. Over against the silence of the New Testament, unbroken by the ambiguous "Babylon" of I Peter (5:13), Harnack and many before and after him have set the silence of all Rome's rivals, not one of which has ever claimed to be the scene of the martyrdom or the place of burial of Peter.

In view of the ponderous superstructure of the Papacy, the tenuity of the fundamental evidence is tantalizing. It is the aim of the monograph of Professor Lietzmann of Jena to discover and evaluate additional

¹ Lietzmann, Hans. *Petrus und Paulus in Rom. Liturgische und archäologische Studien. Mit sechs Plänen.* Bonn: A. Marcus und E. Weber, 1915. xii+189 pages.

Lanciani, Rodolfo, "The *Memoria Apostolorum* on the Appian Way," *Dublin Review*, CLVIII, No. 317 (April, 1916), 220-29.

testimony, if such can be secured. He endeavors to broaden the circle of sources by including the liturgies and the excavations. The impossibility of importing copies of the book during the blockade will justify perhaps a careful exposition of his findings.

I

The first hundred pages investigate the ancient liturgies commonly reckoned to be Roman. These provide for the annual celebration of two feasts that commemorate Peter's being at Rome. *Cathedra Petri* is frequently taken to be the anniversary of his becoming the Roman bishop; the day of Peter and Paul, to reflect the authentic martyrdom.

Both the great festivals of Peter present riddles, but *Cathedra Petri* is the more involved. It is customary at present to celebrate January 18 as *Cathedra Petri qua Romae primum sedit*, and February 22 as *Cathedra Antiochena S. Petri*.¹

The oldest information we have, namely, the *Depositio martyrum* attached to the calendar of Filocalus for the year 354, shows that *Cathedra Petri* was then celebrated at Rome, not on January 18, but on the date now assigned to the Antiochian episcopate, February 22. This day was set, as Usener showed, to crowd out the pagan festival of *caristia* or *cara cognatio*, with its cult of the dead (p. 13).² From Rome it spread to other parts of the West, but ceased to be observed in Rome itself perhaps as early as the middle of the fifth century (p. 72), and certainly as early as the middle of the sixth, for the Leonine, Gelasian, and Gregorian sacramentaries do not provide for its observance. It was revived at Rome under Frankish influence in the ninth century (p. 74). Thenceforward it was celebrated on January 18, a day selected originally in Gaul³ and not in Rome, doubtless (as Duchesne thinks) in order to transfer the joyous festival of Peter from February 22, which falls in Lent in nineteen out of the thirty-five possible types of ecclesiastical year,⁴ to a day which never falls in Lent. The distinction drawn between

¹ *Missale Romanum* (Ratisbonae, 1903), pp. 480, 508. The offices are identical.

² This is admitted by the Roman Catholic authority K. A. H. Kellner, *Heortology* (London, 1908), p. 304.

³ The reviewer ventures to suggest that the choice of January 18 may have been motivated as follows: as Epiphany comes twelve days after Christmas, so *Cathedra Petri* comes twelve days after Epiphany. Moreover, there may be some connection between this date and its octave, January 25, *conversio S. Pauli*, which seems to have appeared first in the Gallic or Frankish uses (cf. pp. 54 ff.).

⁴ H. Grotefend, *Taschenbuch der Zeitrechnung*, 2. Aufl. (Hannover, 1905), p. 144.

the Roman and the Antiochian *cathedrae* is a valueless harmonistic hypothesis (p. 71) which cannot be traced back of the so-called *Martyrologium Hieronymianum*, a compilation with fluctuating text¹ which incorporates a Roman source compiled in the pontificate of Bonifatius I (418-22).²

Can the Roman celebration of *Cathedra Petri* on February 22 be followed back of the *Depositio martyrum* attached to the Filocalian calendar? Lietzmann cannot trace the custom of observing the anniversary of the accession of the reigning bishop of Rome back of 282; he infers, therefore, that its counterpart, the official celebration of Peter's becoming bishop of Rome, is not as ancient as De Waal and as Erbes³ had thought, but originated about 300. He concludes that the feast of *Cathedra Petri* arose too late to shed any fresh light on the alleged pontificate of Peter (pp. 12 f.). This argumentation would not be valid in case the original intention of the feast was to commemorate, not Peter's accession to the Roman episcopate, but the chair⁴ on which he was said to have been enthroned. Then February 22 might have been the anniversary of some translation of that venerable relic.

If *Cathedra Petri* is destitute of special significance, what can be said of the feast of June 29, the day of Peter and Paul? For centuries it has been celebrated at Rome as the anniversary of their martyrdom (p. 92). As early as 1884 Duchesne hinted that it was not the anniversary of martyrdom;⁵ and he suggested later that it was "merely the commemoration of the translation of their relics to the place called *Ad Catacumbas*, at the third milestone on the Appian Way."⁶ Lietzmann examines the evidence afresh and concludes that on June 29, 258, the remains of Peter and Paul were moved *Ad Catacumbas*; that this day was observed annually thereafter, but that it did not become a great popular success

¹ Edited by J. B. de Rossi and L. Duchesne (*Acta Sanctorum Novembris tomi ii pars prior* [Bruxellis, 1894], pp. 10, 24).

² H. Achelis, "Die Martyrologien, ihre Geschichte und ihr Wert," p. 92 (*Abhandlungen der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, Philologisch-historische Klasse, neue Folge, Band III, Nr. 3 [Berlin, 1900]).

³ *Texte und Untersuchungen*, Neue Folge, IV, 1, 37 ff.

⁴ In his article "Chair of Peter" in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, De Waal concludes that before the days of Constantine this chair was kept in Santa Prisca on the Aventine.

⁵ *Liber Pontificalis*, ed. Duchesne, I (1884), cvi.

⁶ L. Duchesne, *Christian Worship: Its Origin and Evolution*. Translated from the 3d French edition. 2d English edition. Revised with considerable additions by the author (London, 1904), p. 277. The view is accepted by J. P. Kirsch in his article "Peter" in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, XI (New York, 1911), 751d.

until after the relics had been transferred from *Ad Catacumbas* to the Constantinian basilicas of St. Peter and of St. Paul's Without the Walls. He supports this view by the fact that the ancient Oriental martyrology handed down in a Syriac manuscript dated 411, sets the feast of Peter and Paul on December 28, and that this would seem to be supported by the usages of Cappadocia, Antioch, and Armenia. Though this oriental linking up of Peter and Paul with the Christmas cycle proves to be merely a liturgical construction of the fourth century, replaced in the Western church by Holy Innocents' Day, the very fact that it was possible to ignore June 29 shows that the compilers of this martyrology must have seen in that date a celebration with significance of the local sort that attaches to a translation of relics, and not the authentic anniversary of martyrdoms of primary interest to all the world (p. 99). Like *Cathedra Petri*, the day of Peter and Paul does not yield any testimony of moment for the history of the church in the first century.¹

II

The second part of Lietzmann's monograph discusses evidence gained principally through excavations. Under the direction of Monsignor de Waal, Father Styger excavated beneath the church now called San Sebastiano, from March 16 to June, 1915.² This church was erected beside the Appian Way in the second half of the fourth century or the first half of the fifth. It was originally dedicated to the Holy Apostles, i.e., Peter and Paul. It stands above part of the ancient cemetery *Ad Catacumbas*, from which all the other catacombs have inherited their name. In the neighborhood of the crypt of the present San Sebastiano there was found long ago an inscription of Pope Damasus which begins:

HIC HABITASSE PRIVS SANCTOS COGNOSCERE DEBES
NOMINA QVISQVE PETRI PARITER PAVLIQVE REQVIRIS

¹ Lietzmann probably does not think it worth while to discuss a third day associated at present with Peter in Rome. On it the *letania maior* is sung; it coincides, moreover, with St. Mark's Day: "The date—the 25th of April—commemorates the day when, as it is believed, St. Peter entered Rome and established there the Sovereign Pontificate" (A. Fleury, S. J., *The Missal Explained* [New York, 1915], p. 812). Cf. De Waal in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, III, 554a.

² Styger's reports were printed in the second and third numbers of the *Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde* for 1915, under the titles, "Scavi a San Sebastiano. Scoperta di una memoria degli Apostoli Pietro e Paolo e del corpo di San Fabiano Papa e Martire," and "Gli Apostoli Pietro e Paolo ad Catacumbas sulla via Appia." The present blockade has cut off those libraries of New York which subscribe to the *Quartalschrift* from receiving any numbers subsequent to the first published in 1915.

Wilpert, Barnes,¹ and Lanciani² think that Damasus meant that the site is one where both Peter and Paul had resided; but Lietzmann follows De Waal in believing the epigrammatic pope of the fourth century to say that it had been the resting-place of their relics (p. 109). Lietzmann holds that the bones of Peter and Paul were brought thither on June 29, 258, for safekeeping during persecution, and that they rested there for more than half a century (cf. p. 89).

Prior to the excavations by De Waal in 1893 it was believed that the remains had been laid away in the semicircular building situated behind the apse of San Sebastiano and called the *Platonía*³ (a corruption of *platoma* or sepulchral slab); but early mediaeval travelers had reported that the graves were shown inside the church, near the resting-place of St. Sebastian. De Waal proved in 1893 that the *Platonía* had contained the tomb of Bishop Quirinus of Siscia in Pannonia, a martyr under Diocletian, and not those of Peter and Paul.

Styger has now found under the floor in the middle of the basilica itself the remains of a small building of the third century, the *Memoria Apostolorum* (p. 116-21; plans on pp. 181-83). The upper part had been destroyed when the church was built. In front of the possibly quadrilateral chamber that once contained the bones of the apostles there was an irregularly shaped forecourt or shelter. Along its walls ran a bench on which pilgrims used to sit while feasting in honor of Peter and Paul, as is evident from various plebeian scrawls. As to the uses of this room or forecourt, there is difference of opinion. Lanciani remarks: "It must be clearly understood that the place on the walls of which these legends were scratched is not the *Memoria Apostolorum* itself, but an open-air drinking garden, a *pergula*, a *trichlia*, adjoining the place of worship, where the pilgrims, fatigued by a three miles' walk, could find refreshment" (*Dublin Review*, *loc. cit.*, p. 223). Styger thought the forecourt was open to the southwest, in shed or pergola fashion, but supposed it was used for the *agape* or for other liturgical purposes. Lietzmann remarks that in that case it must have been closed, and not open, to the gaze of the curious (Lietzmann, p. 182). The forecourt was paved with square tiles; this construction, together with its walls of tufa and tile, indicates that it was built in the second half of the third century (p. 118)—a fact which goes to confirm Lietzmann's view that it was

¹ A. S. Barnes, *St. Peter in Rome* (London, 1900), p. 109.

² *Dublin Review*, April, 1916, p. 226.

³ See the good illustrations in F. Cabrol, *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie*, pp. 2487 ff., s.v. *Catacumbas*, *Cimetière ad.*

constructed in 258, when the remains of Peter and Paul were brought for safety *Ad Catacumbas* (p. 121).

III

Is it possible to find any literary tradition concerning the resting-places of the apostles prior to their removal in 258?

The apocryphal acts of the apostles yield nothing. The *Liber Pontificalis* in its sketch of Pope Cornelius (251-53) states that the matron Lucina had the body of Peter taken by night from the catacombs ("*de Catacumbas*") and handed over to Cornelius, who entombed it on the Vatican Hill. As the pious Lucina is reputed to have buried various other martyrs at widely separated epochs, Lietzmann provisionally holds all these Lucina stories to be legendary inventions of the fifth century (p. 140). Similarly unfounded is the tale, related by Gregory the Great in a letter of 594, that at the time of the martyrdom of the apostles some oriental Christians stole the bodies and hid them temporarily at a place called *Ad Catacumbas*; but that a terrible thunderstorm frightened the robbers away, so that the Romans came and brought back the relics to where they were in Gregory's time (since when they have not been disturbed). Gregory or his informants misinterpreted the above-mentioned inscription of Damasus, making *discipulos Oriens misit* equivalent to *Ex Oriente fideles venerunt*, whereas *discipulos* equals *apostolos* and means Peter and Paul, not the legendary body-snatchers (pp. 124 f.).

There remains the famous statement by Gaius of Rome, preserved by Eusebius (*HE.* ii. 25. 7): ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ τρόπαια τῶν ἀποστόλων ἔχω δεῖξαι· ἐὰν γὰρ θελήσῃς ἀπελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν Βατικανὸν ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν Ὀστιάν, εὐρήσεις τὰ τρόπαια τῶν ταύτην ἰδρυσαμένων τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. In the time of Gaius, about 200 A.D., there were shown in Rome the τρόπαια of the apostles, one on the Vatican and the other on the way to Ostia. Though τρόπαιον might designate a tablet erected at the place of execution, Lietzmann follows Erbes in insisting that the context demands the meaning "graves." Arguing against the Montanist Proclus, who had pointed with pride to the fact that Phrygia, the home of Montanism, possessed the graves of Philip and of his four prophetic daughters, Gaius emphasizes the fact that Rome can boast of the graves of Peter and Paul (pp. 155-57).

With this irrefragable statement of Gaius, the literary tradition of the graves of Peter and Paul comes to an end. Can archaeology say the decisive word?

IV

What light, if any, can be gained from the excavations under St. Peter's?

The ancient basilica, commenced under Constantine and completed under his son Constans (337-50), was gradually replaced in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the creation of Bramante and Michelangelo. The last portion to be rebuilt was the sacred grave, called the *Confessio*; it was put into its present shape in 1615 and was crowned in 1626 by the tabernacle of Bernini, borne by four huge columns of bronze. In both the years mentioned the ground disturbed was investigated according to the archaeological technique of the time. The reports have been published by de Rossi, after whom Lietzmann reproduces on p. 184 an instructive plan by Benedict Drei, originally printed in 1635. This shows a number of graves found in 1615 near the grave of Peter, including one marked on the plan as that of Pope Linus, said to be the successor of Peter as bishop of Rome. Though de Rossi decided years ago that the slab with the undecipherable inscription including the letters *LINUS* had probably borne the name *Catullinus*, *Aquillinus*, or *Anullinus*, Linus still figures extensively in some recent discussions.¹ Lietzmann suggests that the real Linus might have laid claim to an inscription in Greek (p. 143).

The second set of excavations was made in 1626. Though the drawings recording them are missing, verbal descriptions summarized by Lietzmann suffice to prove that the grave of Peter lay in a heathen burial place which was in constant use as late as the years 150, 190, 260, and even 290. Of ancient Christian burial arrangements there was discovered no trace at all, either close to, or at some distance from, the *Confessio*. Lietzmann therefore concludes that the statement of the *Liber Pontificalis*, that thirteen popes, from Linus to Victor, were buried in a *memoria* constructed by Anencletus *iuxta corpus beati Petri in Vaticanum*, is merely a legend of the sixth century. How much the *Liber Pontificalis* knows about these matters may be seen from its assertion that Pope Alexander, the seventh of the series, was buried about seven miles out on the *via Numentana*, whereas the inscription of the martyr Alexander, found on the spot indicated, is not that of a bishop (p. 152).

A further conclusion from the prevalence of pagan burials near the grave of Peter throughout the entire third century is that no church

¹ E.g., *Dublin Review*, April, 1916, p. 220.

or chapel covered the site prior to the erection of the Constantinian basilica (p. 152).

The doubt then emerges whether the precise position of the grave of Peter was known to the architect of that basilica. He started construction by utilizing three parallel walls, which formed the north side of the Neronian Amphitheater, as the foundation of the southern aisle of the new basilica. Some slip in measurements must have occurred, for the grave of Peter, as was shown by the excavations of 1626, did not come precisely in the middle of the apse, but a little to the north. Had the architect been free to guess at the position of the grave, he could easily have covered up his error; the fact that he did not do so indicates that its precise position was already fixed by tradition (p. 154). That tradition doubtless goes back to the period prior to 258, when the remains had been translated from the Vatican Hill *Ad Catacumbas*. In all probability the site shown in 258 was known to Gaius of Rome about the year 200 (p. 155).

V

Thus far the discussion has centered about Peter. It remains to give Paul his due. On the Ostian Way there stands the basilica of St. Paul's Without the Walls. The present structure reproduces with fair fidelity the ancient basilica burned in 1823. Old St. Paul's was not, however, the first church on the site. According to the *Liber Pontificalis*, the first St. Paul's was erected by Constantine. Its very modest dimensions, as revealed by excavations in the nineteenth century, made some scholars assign it to the period before Constantine; but the spade has proved that no larger basilica could have been erected on this site without closing or relocating a street that ran between the apse and the Tiber. Half a century after the death of Constantine the three emperors Valentinian, Theodosius, and Arcadius by an edict of 386 ordered the street to be relocated, so as to give room for a basilica adequate to its uses and to its dignity.

The site of St. Paul's is poor and subject to inundation. The danger of floods makes catacombs impossible. Excavations on both sides of the Ostian Way have unearthed many tombs and *columbaria*, all of them heathen. Paul, like Peter, was interred in a heathen graveyard in a locality that no architect would like to choose for a monumental basilica. Lietzmann concludes, therefore, that the site of the grave of Paul was fixed by tradition before the days of Constantine, while the relics were still *Ad Catacumbas* for safekeeping. As in the analogous case of Peter,

he infers that the tradition goes back at least to the time of Gaius of Rome (p. 164).

VI

Are the graves genuine? Gaius thought so; but is not the silence of all the literary sources from approximately 64 to 200 suspicious?

It is precisely in the second half of the second century that Irenaeus and other champions of the Roman tradition emphasize the claim that Christianity in Rome goes back to Peter and Paul. What was more natural than to inquire for their graves and ultimately to find them? In such a search hasty identifications, visions, or even the pious wish might be decisive. But I Clement V shows that Peter died for his faith; and it is unthinkable that only a generation later a leader like Clement should know the bare fact and not the locality of his martyrdom. In view of the Roman claim thereto, the silence of all rival cities is decisive (p. 170 f.). As for Paul, Lietzmann inclines to accept the journey to Spain, and refers for details to a recent study by Dubowy.¹

Over against the silence of the literary sources for the crucial years Lietzmann sets the archaeological evidence. If the graves shown about the year 200 had been fictitious, the error or fraud must have occurred by 170 at the latest. By that time, however, the customs of Christian burial in the catacombs were fully developed. One who was careless or a cheat would be likely to "find" the remains in the catacombs near those of other Christians, where Christian sentiment was dominant, where Christian worship was easy. The relics might have been "invented" lying side by side. The ancient and unanimous tradition, however, finds the graves of Peter and Paul widely separated, hard by well-traveled roads, each alone in the midst of heathen graves. The natural explanation is that the ancient sites are genuine: that beneath the Hall of the Three Emperors there actually rest the remains of Paul, and, under the mighty dome of Bramante, those of Peter (p. 177).

VII

We have penetrated the labyrinth; we have stood at the coign of vantage; but we cannot depart without recording some by-paths of our exploration.

The monograph, replete with learning, yet indexless, contains some minor contributions that should not be overlooked.

¹ E. Dubowy, "Klemens von Rom über die Reise Pauli nach Spanien," *Bardenhewers Biblische Studien*, XIX, No. 3 (1914).

1. A prayer in the *Sacramentarium Leonianum*¹ says that the anniversary of the bishop's entrance upon office (*natale episcopi*) occurred very near Maundy Thursday (*natale sacramenti*). Between 230 and 700 this juxtaposition did not occur until the first anniversary of Pope Vigilius on March 29, 538. Though it occurred also in 549 and 558, Lietzmann thinks it would be most likely to cause remark when novel. Thus he brings fresh evidence in support of Duchesne's date of 538 for certain prayers in the earliest Roman sacramentary extant (pp. 21-24).

2. On pp. 54-63 Lietzmann offers a tabulation of the fixed feasts according to all the early witnesses for the Roman, North African, Gallic, and Spanish rites. This is invaluable for the study of the church year.

3. One portion of the Mass that is practically the same every day in the year is called the Canon of the Mass. In the Roman Canon there is invoked *infra actionem* a list of twelve apostles and twelve martyrs, unchanged, as we know from manuscripts, since the seventh or eighth century. After many comparisons Lietzmann sets up the following constructive hypothesis: that about the year 300 the Roman church invoked Peter and Paul, Sixtus, Lawrence, Cornelius, and Cyprian, arranged according to the dates of their feasts. About 400 there were appended the names of Clement of Rome (by that time reckoned among the martyrs) and Chrysogonus; the names of Hippolytus and Vincentius were also added. Then there occurred a revision of the liturgy, which introduced the invocation of all twelve apostles. To balance these the list of martyrs was lengthened to twelve, and their names were arranged in order of rank: five Roman popes, Pope Cyprian of Carthage, Lawrence the deacon, and Chrysogonus the layman—eight names thus far. To complete the number twelve after 500 the two pairs of saints were included: John and Paul (martyred under Julian the Apostate in 362), and Cosmas and Damian, whose cult at Rome cannot be traced back of the pontificate of Symmachus (498-514). This gives about the early sixth century as the first possible date for the rise of the present list (pp. 65-70).

4. The feast of the Epiphany, which occurs on January 6, was according to Lietzmann observed at Rome as the birthday of our Lord prior to the introduction of the present Christmas festival, which was not officially celebrated at Rome till about 360. Then it did not crowd out the feast of the Epiphany, but led to several divergent ways of reinterpreting that festival (pp. 75-81).

¹ Ed. Feltoe (Cambridge, 1896), p. 127, ll. 6-10.

5. Last, but not least, Lietzmann compiles a revised chronology of the popes from 235 to 352. It begins with Pontianus, known since 1909 to be the first pope buried in the papal vault in the Catacombs of Calixtus (p. 11). It makes good use of the fruitful observation of A. Jülicher¹ that even as early as the third century it was the rule to consecrate the new bishop of Rome on a Sunday (p. 4). With this in mind Lietzmann checks up the figures of the *Catalogus Liberianus* and of the so-called *Index*, compiled about 500, which forms one of the sources of the *Liber Pontificalis*.

1. Pontianus abdicates	September 28, 235.....	—, —, —
2. Anteros.....	November 22* (21), 235—January 3, 236....	0, 1, 12
3. Fabianus.....	[January 10], 236—January 20, 250.....	14, 0, 10
4. Cornelius.....	251—253 (252).....	2, —, —
5. Lucius.....	253 (252)—March 5, 254 (255)†.....	1, —, —
6. Stephanus.....	254 (253)—August 2, 256? (255).....	2, —, —
7. Xystus.....	[September 14], 256—August 6, 258.....	1, 10, 23
8. Dionysius.....	July 22, 260 (259)—December 26, 267 (268).....	7, 5, 4
9. Felix.....	[January 5], 268 (269)—December 30, 273 (274).....	5, 11, 25
10. Eutychianus.....	[January 4], 274 (275)—December 7, 282 (283).....	8, 11, 3
11. Gaius.....	December 17, 282 (283)—April 22, 295 (296).....	12, 4, 5
12. Marcellinus.....	June 30, 295 (296)—January 15, 304.....	8, 6, 15
13. Marcellus.....	(308)—(309)?.....	—, —, —
14. Eusebius.....	April 18, 308—August 17, 308.....	0, 3, 29
15. Miltiades.....	July 2, 310 (311)—January 10 (11), 314.....	3, 6, 8
16. Silvester.....	January 31, 314—December 31 (January 1), 335.....	21, 11, 0
17. Marcus.....	January 18, 336—October 7, 336.....	0, 8, 19
18. Julius.....	February 6, 337—April 12, 352.....	15, 2, 6

* Dates printed in italics are corrections of the traditional dates, which follow in parentheses. Those in brackets are deductions unsupported by direct testimony. The computations are given in detail on pp. 178–80. The column at the side gives the true durations of the pontificates in years, months, and days.

† Doubtless a typographical error for 253.

Though most of the pontificates are not shifted more than a year backward or forward, the corrections are of sufficient importance to merit their repetition here for the benefit of American scholars, to most of whom they would otherwise be inaccessible until peace restores that free circulation of books which is so vital to international scholarship.²

¹ Published as an appendix to C. Mirbt, *Quellen zur Geschichte des Papsttums*, 3. Aufl. (Tübingen, 1911), pp. 482 f.

² Quite independently C. H. Turner has worked out the dates for the popes from Pontianus to Miltiades (230?–314). He has tabulated his results at the end of his careful study entitled "The Papal Chronology of the Third Century," *Journal of Theological Studies*, XVII (1916), 338–53. Turner's conclusions vary in many details from those of Lietzmann; but he agrees in stressing the antiquity of the rule that the bishop of Rome should be "ordained" on a Sunday, and carries it back (p. 343) to the document which he styles the Hippolytean Church Order (published by E. Hauler in his *Didascalie Apostolorum Fragmenta Veronensia Latina* [Leipzig, 1900], Vol. I).

VIII

All in all, the monograph of Professor Lietzmann repays detailed attention. It is replete with sound learning and fairly groans with good suggestions. The order of exposition, however, is bafflingly labyrinthine. The author forces one to plod after him from one corner of the argument to another, a zigzag which has only occasional zest. At times it is like being led blindfolded through the trenches: one burns to break loose and go straight over the top to the objective. But if one is patient, Lietzmann leads one out of the labyrinth to the commanding goal, to the veritable tomb of Peter.

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TERTULLIAN ON PLINY'S PERSECUTION OF CHRISTIANS

By the kindness of the editors of this *Journal*, I, a mere pagan classicist, am admitted for a few minutes to the high company of professed theologians and patristic scholars. It would have been well if I had earlier scouted at least within hearing distance of their learned circle, for I should not then have been forced to apologize for my ignorance till now of what one of them was long ago discussing.

Only yesterday I took up the recently published edition of the late Professor Mayor's notes on Tertullian's *Apologeticus*, to which Professor Souter has contributed, in addition to his editorial work, a very welcome English version of the text of the tractate. Tertullian says, in the well-known passage in the second chapter, that when Pliny was governor of a province, though he had dealt with certain cases of Christians brought before him (*damnatis quibusdam Christianis, quibusdam gradu pulsus*), he became so dismayed by the great number of the accused that he asked Trajan for direction about his further procedure. The phrase quoted above is translated by Professor Souter, "after condemning some Christians, and having dislodged others from the stand they had taken up"; and in a note he refers, apparently in defense of his rendering, to an article by G. A. T. Davies published in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, XIV (1913), 407-14. On referring to the article I was surprised and interested to find that Mr. Davies had taken, as apparently the immediate incitement to his argument about the meaning of *gradu pulsus*, an address I made before the *Versammlung deutscher Philologen und*

Schulmaenner, at its Graz jubilee meeting, and published in *Wiener Studien*, XXXI (1909), 250-58.

The address was not on Tertullian, but on the transmission through the Middle Ages of the text of the correspondence between Pliny and Trajan. In the course of my historical outline I incidentally pointed out that there is, so far as my knowledge goes, no extant first-hand reference to that correspondence from the days of Pliny himself to the discovery of the Codex Parisinus nearly fourteen hundred years later, save for the one well-known instance of Tertullian: no heathen writer contains either mention or reminiscence of it, and all Christian writers who cite it are later than Tertullian and have no ultimate authority other than his summary of the two letters about the Christians (x. 96, 97). I even ventured the suggestion that Tertullian himself might not have seen the original text, but might have been drawing upon an earlier and not entirely accurate account of it. Being disposed to accept the usual understanding of *gradu pulsus* as referring to degradation from civic rank, I merely took occasion in passing to suggest how the phrase might have come into Tertullian's account, though nothing like it stands in that of Pliny. This part of my article Mr. Davies summarizes accurately enough, but he seems to labor under some misapprehension as to its bearing on my theme. I hope my German style was not responsible for his confusion. But he declares that "Professor Merrill thus recognizes that the reference to Pliny in the second chapter of the *Apologeticum* is the one bar to the acceptance of his theory of the text-tradition of the Pliny-Trajan correspondence. Accordingly he seeks to convict Tertullian of two errors in his citation, and so to prove that the apologist had never seen the actual letters," etc. Now I must protest that I "recognize" no such thing. I cannot imagine what Mr. Davies supposes my "theory" aforesaid to be. What appreciable effect can it have on my historical account of the *Ueberlieferungsgeschichte* whether *gradu pulsus* means one thing or the other, or Tertullian did or did not know the *Letters* at first-hand? My point was only that there is no other independent allusion to these especial *Letters* till after the fifteenth century. If I joined in a current misapprehension of the meaning of Tertullian's words (it is as old as Eusebius), and suggested an unacceptable hypothesis to bolster it up, my sense and judgment may merit censure, but my general thesis is not involved. Again, Mr. Davies remarks that I assign the appending of the tenth book to the other nine to "about the tenth century": on the other hand, I say distinctly, "danach bin ich geneigt dessen Beifuegung in das siebente oder achte Jahrhundert

zu setzen." I also did cite Jerome. And Mr. Davies does not even quote the title of my article correctly. I am afraid that he in some respects falls under the same sort of condemnation as Tertullian and Eusebius.

But, after all, Mr. Davies is fundamentally concerned with what only incidentally concerned me at that time, the meaning of *gradu pulsus* in the passage cited. His argument appears to me somewhat convoluted and complicated with some considerations that have no immediate bearing on the point at issue, but to be capable of summarization about as follows:

1. The meaning "deposed in rank" for *gradu pulsus* originated, so far as we are concerned, in a Greek version of Tertullian used by Eusebius, and therein was a manifest blunder.

2. Tertullian has "suffered some undeserved discredit" in his "repute as a student of law and of history," and "critics have set out with a bias against him"; therefore we should be cautious in accepting an interpretation that compels us to postulate inaccurate report by him of his authority.

3. *Damnatis* and *gradu pulsus* must logically be understood as denoting two contrasted classes that taken together include the whole company; and as a fact that accurately corresponds to Pliny's words, since he speaks of some as persisting in their confession of faith, others as yielding (*alii . . . esse se Christianos dixerunt et mox negauerunt*).

4. That *gradu pulsus* refers to displacement from civic rank is antecedently improbable because "it is very questionable whether any instances of degradation on account of Christianity can be cited before, at least, the middle of the third century."

5. *Gradu pulsus* is therefore most naturally taken in the sense of "forced from their position" (i.e., "constrained to recant"), and this metaphorical use of *gradus* derived from military tactics is common in Tertullian as in other writers. [I think, if I had been coaching Mr. Davies for his argument, I should have urged him to put in the forefront of his parallels not the two passages he especially selects for that post—they merely illustrate an undisputed figurative use of *gradus*—but one passage only, and that, the one from *adu. Marc.* iv. 9 *fin.*, *dum te, Marcion, de gradu pellam*, which he relegates to a position among the reserves.]

6. To ascribe to *gradu pulsus* the other sense (of loss of civic status) is to postulate unnecessarily an intrusion by Tertullian into Pliny's account, and one which is not satisfactorily explicable; for Professor Merrill's suggested explanation is "mechanical" [whatever that may mean], and involves more difficulties than it clears away.

I am not disposed to emulate the obstinacy only of those early Christians by sticking to a position that I have once taken, if the truth is

against it. I have surrendered posts as untenable that concerned my campaign more nearly than this. Nor did I assume the Eusebian interpretation of *gradu pulsus* without knowing that another was possible, or at least defensible. I think Mr. Davies must be mistaken in supposing that the interpretation he espouses has never been considered. I am only a casual and cursory reader of Tertullian, but before I ever attacked his treatise against Marcion my attention was called to the clause therefrom quoted above by the express citation of it in some book or other as a parallel to *gradu pulsus* in the *Apologeticus*. The phrase in *adu. Marc.*, I should think, could not fail to have suggested to many others also the idea perhaps for the first time formally discussed in print by Mr. Davies. But judgment was not in danger of going entirely by default before his appearance as advocate. I did not discuss the meaning of the phrase, because neither of the two suggested meanings had any essential bearing on my theme. Perhaps I erred in taste by delaying my course under those circumstances long enough to suggest how the assumed interpolation might have been prompted. Now, however, I may take occasion first to offer briefly some considerations on Mr. Davies' courteous criticism of my *obiter dictum*, and afterward on the main question of the meaning of *gradu pulsus*, first premising that the accuracy of the Eusebian translation by no means stands or falls with the quality of my suggested explanation of the "interpolation," though Mr. Davies does me the honor of discussing my note at such length. He even says that "the orthodox theory has lately been revived in a more elaborate form" by me. I certainly had no such intention at miracle-working. I did not even know it was dead. I feel like the innocent fisherman who pulled the stopper out of a bottle, and was immediately confronted by an immense and glowering Djinn. I must reply with what fortitude I may to his observations.

In the first place, Mr. Davies opines that Tertullian, writing only nominally for Roman magistrates, but really for public effect, would not trouble himself about such *apices iuris*, which "would certainly be wasted on the ordinary man." But Tertullian was writing primarily for magistrates; and Mr. Davies himself pleads only a few pages before that Tertullian was a most learned jurist and ought not to be rashly suspected of any errors of knowledge or (inferentially) of statement on legal matters. But at the close of his article Mr. Davies argues that those who hold to the Eusebian interpretation fall into the error by treating the passage as "calm historical prose," whereas it is in reality a piece of "fervent rhetoric" of "impassioned content." That is, Tertullian did not say

what we prosy old Eusebians think he said; or, if he did say it, it was because of his emotional nature and habit of expression. It is not such argument as this that can constrain us to recant.

Mr. Davies gently reproves me for conveniently "elongating and contracting Tertullian's memory to suit my theory," because I suggested that Tertullian, or his predecessor in the statement, might be well acquainted with the law of his own time, and yet not know (or have forgotten) that a certain point of it stood otherwise seventy-five or a hundred years earlier. I cannot honestly confess that I see any act of violence or of prestidigitation in that suggestion of mine. It still sounds to me quite reasonable *per se*. I must plead incompetence to pass on the general question of Tertullian's inerrancy, but I had not supposed that competent critics were generally impressed by the uniformly strict precision of his dealings with authorities. Yet even so, I was so favorably disposed to his cause as to incline to the belief that he might be following an earlier summarizer of less knowledge, or of the half-knowledge that led to error. Mr. Davies disregards here this part of my statement.

Mr. Davies next finds difficulty in my posited belief that decurions in Pliny's time were not necessarily Roman citizens. He points out that they were definitely made so later *ex officio*, and therefore some of them may have been given this status earlier. I did not assert, and did not need to assert, that no decurion of Pliny's time was a Roman citizen; but in order to make Mr. Davies' contention on this point of value for his argument, he must suppose the possible, but by no means probable, case that all the decurions in Pliny's jurisdiction who were putatively accused of being Christians happened to be Roman citizens, and that Tertullian also knew, or inferred, this to be so, and therefore could have found no difficulty in Pliny's procedure. This requires a greater effort of the imagination than even I can make.

Mr. Davies then proceeds to remonstrate that I "apply undue pressure to the text from the Digest to make it yield proof that decurions enjoyed almost absolute exemption from the death-penalty." I cited the text indeed, with precise accuracy, but without any such deduction as Mr. Davies thus reads into my statement of the law. He, however, argues that any man—decurion, citizen, or what not—might at any time suffer death for treason. But that contention is not in point here, unless Mr. Davies is prepared to contend also that these Bithynian Christians were charged with treason, or that membership in a forbidden *hetaeria* was at that time classed as treason. I grant that it involved the same penalty, but that is quite another matter. (Incidentally, I suspect

that Mr. Davies, perhaps like Tertullian, needs to be careful about the date of certain legal enactments.)

After the consideration of all these points urged against me, I nevertheless find myself unable to concede that my suggested explanation of the origin of the supposed interpolation into, or correction of, Pliny's report is intrinsically unreasonable, or creates more difficulties than it solves. But I concede that if *gradu pulsus* does not bear here the Eusebian meaning, or rather, if it does bear that supported by Mr. Davies, my explanation is of course quite superfluous. Accordingly, to the question of the meaning of the phrase at issue I now turn.

We may start by agreeing that *gradu pelleri* may have in general the meaning of "constrain to abandon a position." Similarly, it appears patient of the meaning "degrade from civic status." Mr. Davies does not deny this, and the analogy of other expressions with *gradus*, or similar words, used by other writers, and especially by the jurists, is in its favor.

The arguments from antecedent probability ought to be dealt with first. Mr. Davies holds that *gradu pulsus* might be expected to furnish a just antithesis to *damnatus*—"some condemned, others driven to recantation." I do not so feel the case. It seems to me quite as natural to expect the thought to run something like this: "When Pliny was governor of a province, cases of Christians were brought before him. He at first administered the set penalties in the usual manner—*damnatis quibusdam Christianis, quibusdam gradu pulsus*—yet the time speedily came when he was led to adopt a different procedure."

With regard to the effect of the other alleged argument from antecedent probability, that no certain cases of punishment of Christians by degradation can be cited earlier than the middle of the third century, a half-century later than Tertullian's time, conceding the fact, I see little strength in the plea based upon it. A very considerable number of crimes on the part of a decurion appear to have been punished by degradation; and I am little affected in general by arguments that run as follows: "No case of the specified sort is surely known before such-and-such a time; therefore in the alleged case, which is considerably earlier, we are bound to believe that the text or the interpretation is at fault." There are limits to the validity of such forms of argument! I had by accident before my eyes today a word that indubitably occurs in Cicero's *Letters*; yet it "does not occur" again until Tertullian, and only once after him, if the Thesaurus collections can be trusted.

On the other hand, I should not have supposed that the skilled pleader Tertullian would emphasize, or even thus needlessly mention,

the fact that some Christians recanted, when only a few lines before he has been proudly proclaiming, as he often does later, that Christians universally welcome their condemnation with exultant gratitude. I would not wantonly suspect Tertullian of a tendency to disingenuousness; but on the assumption that he did understand Pliny's account as Mr. Davies does, all that he needed to say here for the sake of his argument was that Pliny, when governor of a province, engaged in the trial of Christians, was so impressed by the number of the accused or suspected that he suspended further proceedings until he could consult Trajan more specifically about the treatment to be accorded them. I find difficulty in believing that the shrewd and accomplished controversialist would go out of his way to quote a detail not necessary or even strictly relevant to his immediate argument, but one that would surely put into the hand of a possible antagonist a keen weapon to use against him in his claims about the fortitude of his fellow-sectaries. And I should suppose furthermore that, if he were to mention their recantation, he would use to describe it one of his ordinary phrases, saying that they were constrained "to sacrifice," or "to deny the name"; and, certainly, in consideration of the effect that his admission must have on his repeated claim that Christians were unshaken in the face of death, that he would attempt in some measure to palliate, or to apologize for, the defection of these weak brethren by some additional phrase pointing out briefly the skill and subtlety of the arguments directed against them. It cannot be supposed that the commonplace figure *gradu pulsus* does this sufficiently.

But there is no need to my mind of dallying thus with antecedent probabilities, since I am convinced that a decision may be surely reached and in the most natural way, by the unprejudiced analysis of Pliny's own narrative, and the examination of Tertullian's utterances founded upon it.

How, then, does *gradu pulsus* in Mr. Davies' sense actually fit in with the account given by Pliny? What part, if any, did recantation play in the circumstances of the Bithynian persecutions, and in Tertullian's comment on Pliny's letter?

According to Pliny's narrative the course of the prosecutions exhibits two chronologically distinct phases. At first various people were brought before him, apparently charged in the ordinary form by a known complainant. All of these apparently (there is no intimation of exceptions and the denials of the second phase appear to be contrasted with these confessions) at once acknowledged their adherence to the prohibited

hetaeria, and, despite the governor's humane warnings, persisted in their mad obstinacy.

It is of the utmost importance to know and to keep in mind what I suspect has been very commonly overlooked or not understood, that at the moment under consideration there was no possibility in Roman law of an escape from penalty by simple recantation at the trial, any more than for a murderer to secure acquittal by saying, "I will not act so again." If the defendants have retained their membership in a proscribed *hetaeria*, the crime has been committed, and condign punishment must follow. The repeated questioning has only one object in view, to determine the simple fact whether the accused have been actually guilty; to impress upon them the serious consequences of their confession; and to urge them rather to assert and prove their innocence, if they can. It proceeded from a similar motive to that underlying the procedure in certain of our courts, when the person indicted for a crime for which the penalty is death is not permitted to enter a plea of guilty; he must not be sent to execution on merely his own confession, for men have sometimes confessed even most serious crimes of which they were entirely innocent.

No other interpretation of Pliny's account is justifiable. To be sure, he did afterward ask Trajan if there could not be what we might call a relaxation of the law in four particulars: (1) in regard to the general duty laid upon governors to search out offenders; (2) by permitting discrimination according to the age of the culprits; (3) by taking into consideration the moral character of the associations, and requiring proof of something more culpable than the primary fact of membership; (4) by ruling that present abjuration in the case of Christians might work indemnity for past offenses. But at the time of the first batch of trials no hesitation had been aroused in his mind about the moral justification of the current procedure. The only question to be determined was the plain one whether the accused were in fact Christians or had been so since the publication of his edict forbidding the existence of such organizations as theirs; and his ultimate judgment was rendered much easier by their persistence in confession, since no evidence in their favor or against them needed to be examined and weighed. There could have been in these cases no question of the possibility of the mitigation of sentence by confession, for the one penalty prescribed by the law was death. His natural kindness had, to be sure, made him unwilling to accept their prompt plea of guilty, but their invincible stubbornness in thus rushing upon certain death finally wore out his patience. They probably were

guilty, or they surely would have yielded to his well-meant urgency and have adduced some evidence of innocence, were it only by changing their plea and challenging the production of proof against them. Or, if they were possibly not guilty, they were indubitably mad, and such madness is sometimes contagious; madmen at any rate cannot be turned loose upon the community.

Evidently up to this time Pliny was administering the law on the well-understood existent legal principles. He had not the slightest concern with procuring recantation, though he had much humane concern about procuring evidence that the accused were not guilty. I more than suspect that much confusion has arisen in recent times by carrying back to the setting of this first series of Bithynian trials, scenes that were familiar enough after Trajan's rescript. Perhaps also judgment has sometimes been obscured by our very understanding of and sympathy with the emotional and religious feeling of the Christian about abjuration.

To return to Pliny's narrative: as the inevitable issue of the court proceedings, the culprits who could plead Roman citizenship were sent to stand trial at Rome; the rest were put to death. Then followed the second phase of the prosecutions, marked by *plures species*, and especially by the submission of an anonymous accusation against many persons. Of these defendants two classes are particularly distinguished by Pliny as really not Christians, but falsely accused, or at least erroneously accused. Each proved its case to Pliny's entire satisfaction by taking the proffered tests (of prayer and sacrifice to the Roman gods—including the emperor—and of reviling Christ), tests which Pliny believed infallible in the determination of the fact. The former group declared they never had been Christians, and convinced the governor of the truth of this additional assertion about their past conduct. These he thought himself justified in releasing. The latter group was in a different case. They at first had said they were Christians, and then said they were not, and proved the after assertion by (readily, we must assume) taking the tests. Presumably on being asked why, then, they had at first said they were Christians, they answered that it was because they had once been so. Of the fact that they are not Christians, Pliny is convinced. To the temporary contradiction in their declarations he attributes no importance. Possibly he thought there was a misapprehension in the interrogatory; but whether that was so or not, the discrepancy could make no certain difference in their status before the law, and therefore he does not dwell upon it. He mentions it simply to

explain the source of his added information about the association. If these persons had not confessed that they were once Christians, and if they had not proved that they were so no longer, Pliny would not have found out so much about the mysterious club. That is all there is to the matter. He expresses no judgment on the truthfulness of the declarations made by certain of them as to the long time that had elapsed since they abandoned the Christian communion—some specifying three years, some more, some few even twenty years. That seems to have interested him only as an assurance that they had been out of it long enough to have lost all possible attachment to former ties and might perhaps be trusted to tell him the truth about its practices. But in spite of his conviction that they certainly are not Christians, Pliny does not treat them as he did the former group of those who took the tests. He does not at once discharge them from custody, even after learning all that they could tell him about the Christian customs. He is not sure about the element of time in their cases; some of them certainly, more of them possibly, have incurred the penalty by retaining their membership since the edict. The utmost possible extent of his discretion, even after the examination of the deaconesses, is to suspend proceedings until he can submit certain suggestions to the emperor. He will ask Trajan *detur paenitentiae uenia an ei qui omnino Christianus fuit desisse non prosit.*

Trajan's answer to this and the other questions of Pliny summarized above is definite and decidedly lenient. Anonymous accusations are contrary to the spirit of his reign and should be disregarded; the governor is relieved in the case of Christians of the general duty laid upon him to search out criminals *proprio motu*; an obstinate Christian, if duly charged and convicted (and the risk of counter-action run by an unsuccessful private prosecutor should be remembered), must of course be punished, for *hetaeriae* remain forbidden in Bithynia; but if he will take the test, he is to be granted immunity for the past offense, if any has been committed; no question is to be raised about his conduct up to that minute; he is to be acquitted *ipso facto*.

Up to the date of Trajan's rescript, what is later known as recantation or abjuration could have no legal effect whatever on the status of the accused; after that time it was all that was required to insure acquittal. Pliny (I repeat and insist) evidently thoroughly understood the state of the case at the time of his appeal to Trajan and had administered under it. There is not the slightest scintilla of indication otherwise. There is no intimation that he pressed the accused to anything

like simple recantation;¹ that could make no difference with their fate, if they had been Christians since the publication of the fateful edict. Doubtless Pliny greeted with joy Trajan's relaxation or benevolent interpretation of the law, and of course he must have changed his procedure accordingly. From that time onward governors commonly urged and even tried to force Christians to recant, simply in order to have a legal excuse for acquitting them; but it is a manifest anachronism to estimate Pliny's earlier procedure in the light of these later conditions.

Tertullian also clearly understands the whole tenor and importance of Trajan's rescript. He is perfectly aware of the change produced by it. He has no especial comment to pass on Pliny, but on Trajan's action in regard to the recantation-test he bases that whole perverse forensic outcry against the cruel inconsistency that gives and withholds, condemns and acquits, in the same breath; and it is the ill-used text for all the overwhelming flood of vehement and extravagant oratory with which he boisterously taunts and jeers, flouts and reproaches, governors for pressing Christians by argument, by threat, and even by torture, just to deny the name, that their judges may have the legal pretext for letting loose upon the world again men whom they logically must believe guilty of all the horrible and nameless enormities charged against Christians by popular hate and pruriency.

Gradu pulsus in *adu. Marc.* iv. 9, and in the sense attributed to it by Mr. Davies in *Apol.* 2, refers to refutation or defeat by force of argument. But of this there is not a shadow of a suggestion in Pliny's letter. There could not be. It is quite impossible that Pliny made any attempt to constrain recantation, or that Tertullian could have supposed that he did. *Gradu pulsus* in the *Apol.* passage cannot possibly have meant on Tertullian's pen "'forced from their position,' i.e., constrained to recant." If it did, he would also certainly have joined Pliny with Trajan and the later provincial governors in the same sweeping condemnation. As it is, he leaves him out, and logically so.

If anyone is still influenced by the thought that *gradu pulsus* is used in *adu. Marc.* in the sense of driving a man to withdraw from an adopted argumentative position, let him ask himself whether it is unreasonable to suppose that a writer might in one treatise use a natural figure in one sense, and many years later in another treatise use it in a different but equally natural sense, or that he might say *gradu* in one place and *de gradu* in the other.

¹ I must retract what I myself said fifteen years ago at variance with this on pp. 438, 442 of my *Selected Letters of the Younger Pliny* (Macmillan's Classical Series).

The only other easy alternative to the meaning proposed by Mr. Davies, which I have tried to prove that we must reject, is the one that seized the commanding position so long ago. It at any rate is not an indefensible blunder of Eusebius, or of his translator of Tertullian, nor is it of those who still follow his understanding.

But the apparent Eusebian interpretation requires an explanation of the manner in which the phrase could have come into Tertullian's text. I have defended my suggestion on this matter against the specific objections brought forward by Mr. Davies. But I have no unshakable attachment to it, and would gladly accept a better or simpler hypothesis. Though I find it impossible to go along with Mr. Davies, I also have great sympathy with his evident feeling that no assigned meaning of *gradu pulsus* is really satisfactory which leaves us with a great deal of subsidiary explaining to do. I also would like to believe that Tertullian was justified by fact in saying what he did, however rhetorically he put it. He seems to have understood Pliny most precisely in other details and principles. Why not also in this? That is just why I rather wanted to shift the responsibility for *quibusdam gradu pulsus* over upon the shoulders of some unknown reporter. Possibly the solution will yet come through a different interpretation of *gradu pulsus*. I will even confess that I have sometimes wondered whether Tertullian could have used the metaphor with "just antithesis" of that other class of the first sufferers, the Roman citizens, who were to be sure not *damnati* by Pliny, but were "driven from their station" by being violently uprooted from all their connections and activities, charged as common criminals, and shipped off to Rome for ultimate trial and probable conviction. If this could have been his meaning, there would be at any rate no interpolation to need explaining, and that would suit me and the general case better.

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

THE NOTEBOOKS OF THE STUDENTS OF AN OLD BABYLONIAN "CATHEDRAL-SCHOOL"

In these days of public schools and state universities, when the parochial school is looked upon by many as an insidious attempt on the part of the church to encroach upon the domain of the state, it is becoming increasingly difficult for us to realize that state schools are a recent innovation and that during most of the centuries of the Christian era education has been almost exclusively in the hands of ecclesiastics. The parochial school is the lineal descendant of the bishops' schools and the monastic schools of mediaeval Europe. Only during the last few decades has it become a not unusual thing to find at the head of our colleges and universities men who are not D.D.'s. Having had his memory jogged as to matters of such recent date, my reader will be the better prepared for an introduction to the Temple School of Nippur as it flourished in its palmiest days in the third millennium B.C.

Through its excavations at Nippur the University of Pennsylvania came into possession of a large number of documents which were the work of the priest-professors and pupils of a school attached to one of the oldest temples in Babylonia. The reader will naturally jump to the conclusion that this school was the theological seminary where candidates for the priesthood received their training. But let me call his attention to a fact which will at once dispel this idea, but will also keep him from suspecting that the documents we are going to tell about must have come, not from a temple school, but from a business college. The Babylonian temple was not only the place of worship, but also the law-court and the largest, often the only, banking institution of the city in which it was located.

Recently Dr. Chiera published two parts of a volume on lists of personal names which were compiled by the teachers and pupils of the Temple School at Nippur.¹ In preparing these lists for publication,

¹ *Lists of Personal Names from the Temple School of Nippur.* By Edward Chiera. (Vol. XI of Publications of the Babylonian Section, the University Museum, University of Pennsylvania. No. 1, *A Syllabary of Personal Names.* No. 2, *Lists of Akkadian Personal Names.*) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1916. 175 pages+70 plates.

Dr. Chiera had occasion to make a careful study of the school texts as a whole. As far as possible I shall give his results in his own words.

Besides the lists of personal names, there have come into the possession of the University Museum a very large number of lists of trees and wooden instruments, plants, stones, vessels, names of gods, officials, etc. All of these lists are Sumerian, and some of them contain also the Akkadian [Semitic] equivalent of the names; besides these lists, students copied models of legal documents, syllabaries [dictionaries], historical and grammatical texts, mathematical and metrological tablets, and much more of a miscellaneous character.

The school texts are divided by Dr. Chiera into four groups: (I) "The Typical School Exercises"; (II) "The Round Tablets"; (III) "The Model Texts"; (IV) "The Irregular Texts."

I. The typical school exercises were written on large, unbaked tablets.

In this group the obverse of the tablet is always divided into two columns, of which the first is the work of the teacher. The characters are large and beautifully formed. . . . Immediately opposite to this column, we have the work of the pupil, who, not as yet able to write without having a model immediately by the side, endeavors to reproduce as well as he can what has been written by the teacher in the first column. . . . In most of the tablets of this class this column has been either cut off, or has been so thoroughly erased, by pressing the stylus upwards and downwards on the writing, that all we can see of the pupil's work are a few wedges here and there. . . . The reverse of the tablet is always divided into four columns and inscribed by another pupil who, being more advanced, knows how to write without having the model immediately by the side. . . . His work, though still imperfect, both in accuracy and writing, is almost readable and, with the help of duplicates, would permit us to gather a more or less exact knowledge of the contents of the tablet; unfortunately, also in the case of the reverse, the pupils or their teachers have decided that their work was not worthy of being preserved, so that it was often destroyed, not through erasure, but by cutting off from the tablet as much as was possible, without destroying the teacher's model. . . .

II. On the obverse of the round tablets we generally find four lines of inscription, lines 1 and 3 the work of the teacher, lines 2 and 4 the work of the pupil. The work of the pupil is often almost as good as that of his teacher.

But the most striking characteristic of this group of tablets lies in the fact that we find here the nearest approach to a "palimpsest" to be discovered in the Babylonian and Assyrian literature. . . . In making the tablets, the soft clay was rolled into a ball, which was afterwards flattened against a level surface. On the flattened side the inscription was made. In some instances

the scribe, after having completed his exercise, instead of throwing it away, would use the clay for another tablet. He would roll it again into another ball, and flatten it a second time. The result was that the first inscription was not completely effaced and appeared again, in a more or less distorted form, either on the obverse or on the reverse of the new tablet. . . . The reverse is not inscribed.

III. Dr. Chiera includes in his "model texts"

those tablets from which even the teacher's models were copied. In other words, the original document which furnished the text for the school exercises. . . . These model texts, of which unfortunately we have not very many, are easily to be distinguished from the school exercises above discussed, because they always possess all of these special characteristics: (1) The tablets are well inscribed, with characters well spaced and uniform, since otherwise they could and would not be used as models. (2) They are always baked, being especially designated for continuous reference. (3) Each tablet deals with the same subject on both the obverse and the reverse. . . . (4) The tablets are generally large, having been made of the size required to contain the complete inscription.

IV. The irregular texts

depart from the other school texts and follow the accepted rules of tablet making. . . . In some instances they are shown to be exercises by the fact that they do not include the whole text, but only a portion of it; the pupil's work is also betrayed by the poor handwriting. . . . Some other school exercises are easily to be recognized as such, because they contain the same portion of text repeated over and over again.

Of the syllabary and lists of personal names, the class of these school texts which Dr. Chiera has published, he says:

Both the Syllabary and the lists represent the priestly effort to classify and bring into order the mass of different names which we find in existence in old Babylonian times. We may even go farther and suppose that such compositions as these may have been actually used as a guide in giving names to children, thus serving the purpose for which the calendar of saints of the Catholic Church is now employed.

For its scientific qualities Dr. Chiera's work merits high praise. It is marred at times by infelicities of diction. The proofreading might have been more carefully done.

Another volume of these school texts, just published,¹ is by Dr. Langdon, the new curator of the Babylonian Section of the University Museum. I should like to add here, parenthetically, that the Uni-

¹ *Sumerian Grammatical Texts*. By Stephen Langdon. (Vol. XII, No. 1, of Publications of the Babylonian Section, etc.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1917. 44 pages+72 plates.

versity Museum is to be congratulated on having procured the services of so energetic a scholar as Dr. Langdon. The volume includes the grammatical texts which had not already been published by Dr. Poebel. The more important texts are translated and discussed by the author in the introduction to the volume. It is therefore possible here also to let the author speak for himself.

Numbers 16 and 18 are particularly interesting and important, since they contain the Sumerian original of part of the standard Babylonian and Assyrian bilingual lexicographical work known as *ana itti-su*. This series of lexicographical and grammatical textbooks seems to have been written by the Sumerian schoolmen to instruct the learner in business formulae, legal terms, and about words employed in practical life. The Semitic teachers then edited the series with a translation into their vernacular. The bilingual edition has been found in use in all parts of Babylonia and Assyria. . . . Number 17 reveals a Sumerian textbook which was known in later Babylonia and Assyria as *garra-hubullu*, i.e., Sumerian *garra* means *hubullu*, "money loaned at interest." This series was equally important, forming a huge text book on words connected with various sciences or crafts, such as geology, zoölogy, botany, the crafts of the carpenter, cabinet maker, etc.

Of interest is "the phonetic syllabary" aiming to reproduce each consonant with the three vowels *u-a-i*. One thinks of the *a-b ab* lessons, which initiated our grandparents into the mysteries of written language. I shall give only a few lines: *tu-ta-ti, nu-na-ni, bu-ba-bi, zu-za-si, su-sa-si*, etc. A similar tablet published some years ago by Thureau-Dangin also introduced biconsonantal syllables like *dub-dab-dib, bur-bar-bir*, etc.

Dr. Langdon has done us a great service in putting these valuable texts into our hands. But when the reviewer came to his discussion of some of the texts, he began to wonder whether there was not a lot of truth in the opinion expressed so often these days that university professors lack plain common sense. Instead of putting down the number of the text as found on the autographed plates, Dr. Langdon uses the museum number. Those who use his volume are therefore compelled to look up an index of tablets to find out which of the texts is being discussed. Of what use or interest is the museum number 4506 to me when I am reading on page 9 Langdon's discussion of a text found in Plates 7 f. where it appears as number 7? This is the kind of thing one still finds and execrates in the books of some of the older German Assyriologists, but who would have thought that a younger scholar would have the audacity to perpetrate such an outrage upon his colleagues? Dr. Langdon, our time is worth something.

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THE BABYLONIAN CALENDAR

The astrology of the Chaldeans was proverbial among the Hebrews and in the classical world. That Hipparchus was acquainted with, and made use of, the results of the investigations of the Babylonian astronomers was known from the *Almagest* of Ptolemy, but we had no idea of the accuracy of the Babylonians' knowledge of the movements of the sun, moon, and stars until the patient labors of Strassmaier, Epping, Kugler, and others unriddled the enigmas of the astronomical tablets which have come down to us. Quite an extensive literature on the subject has sprung up, but for those who have had no special training in astronomy this literature is often more obscure than the original texts. However, one is usually able to follow the author when he comes to the summary. It is the purpose of this review to give the gist of the *résumé et conclusions* of a recent study of one phase of Babylonian astronomy.¹

Documents going as far back as *ca.* 2800 B.C. show that already in this early period the Babylonian year was a lunisolar year and that the inhabitants of the Euphrates Valley had hit upon the principle of inserting an intercalary month from time to time to restore the coincidence between the lunar and solar years. Up to the twenty-second century B.C. the intercalary month was always a second Adar (twelfth month); about 2100 B.C. Hammurabi introduced a second Ulul (sixth month). The Babylonian month had twenty-nine or thirty days. There was no regular alternation of these months. The official commencement of the month always coincided with the first appearance of the new moon. This phenomenon was regularly observed by the Babylonian astronomers, and by the second century B.C. they were able to compute in advance the time of the new moon. Before the eighth century B.C. the intercalation of a thirteenth month did not follow any recognized astronomical principle, but beginning with the era of Nabonassar (February 26, 747 B.C.) the year was so arranged that the first of Nisan always followed the equinox (vernal). By the sixth century we find the cycle of nineteen years of 235 months. Of these, twelve were common years and seven embolismic years. The nineteen-year cycle was perfected little by little, and beginning with 367 B.C. the order of the embolismic years in the cycle was definitely fixed. The years 3, 6, 8, 11, 14, and 19 had a second Adar, the year 17 a second Ulul. The length of the Babylonian year varied within very narrow limits. The common year had 353, 354,

¹ *Étude sur la chronologie assyro-babylonienne.* (Extrait des mémoires présentés par divers savants à l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, tome XIII.) By M. D. Sidersky. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1916. 94 pages. Fr. 4.

or 355 days; the embolismic year, 383, 384, or 385 days—that is, thirty days more than the common year. These are exactly the limits of the year in the Jewish calendar which has been in use from 359 A.D. to the present day. The peoples of the ancient Orient modeled their calendars upon that of the Babylonians—this is seen particularly in the calendars of the Greeks, Syrians, and Jews.

The writer gives an occasional footnote to the refutation of the claims of the pan-Babylonists, who try to prove that the earliest Babylonians of whom we have any record were already in possession of an exact astronomical science. As we have seen, the Babylonians' astronomical science was the result of a slow evolution within historical times; the culmination comes in the latest days of their history.

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STUDIES IN MEDIAEVAL CHURCH HISTORY

In a recent treatise by Fournier¹ the comparative method is applied for the first time to several collections of canons compiled in Italy between the years 900 and about 1020. They are of importance as showing legal ideals and enactments in some parts of Italy in periods of decadence such as the Pornocracy prior to the Hildebrandine Reform.

A Neapolitan or Beneventan canonist of the early tenth century made a collection which incorporates among other material the longest text of the *Collectio Hibernensis* (Vallicellana, tome XVIII). This was soon revised and augmented in the same general locality by one who put together a *Collection in Nine Books* (Codex Vaticanus 1349). Between 1014 and 1023 a canonist who probably lived in the region between Naples and Umbria put forth the *Collection in Five Books*. It was based chiefly on the *Collection in Nine Books*, but also on many other laws and on fragments of penitentials, often apocryphal. It does not, however, reflect to any considerable degree the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals. The *Collection in Five Books* was widely used, as its immediate predecessors, now preserved in unique manuscripts, had probably not been. Like his famous contemporary, Burchard of Worms, its compiler was in sympathy with the early stage of the reform movement as it existed under the emperor Henry II. Like Burchard, he also stressed the systematic

¹ *Un Groupe de recueils canoniques italiens des X^e et XI^e siècles.* (Extrait des Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, tome XI.) Par Paul Fournier. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1915. 123 pages.

presentation of the current rules that then constituted the canon law. Though his work is found by Fournier to be reflected in no less than twelve other Italian collections of the eleventh century, it was despised by the canonists of the age of Hildebrand, such as the author of the *Collection in Seventy-four Titles*, Anselm of Lucca, Cardinal Deusdedit, Bonizo of Sutri, and the compiler of the *Polycarpus*. These writers emphasized papal authority, which by their time had come into the hands of the reform party; and they abandoned the Irish traditions in favor of tendencies which too often reek of pseudo-Isidore.

The work of Fournier is masterly, both in its control of the manuscript evidence and in its abundant use of French, German, and Italian secondary literature. English titles fail altogether, probably because the scholars who employ our language have paid very little attention to the earlier history of the canon law.

Poole has produced a pioneer work in English on the technical aspects of the bulls and kindred documents issued by the mediaeval Papacy,¹ and on the chancery in which they were drawn up. The author, who lectured about these subjects for years at the University of Oxford, was invited to deliver there the Birkbeck Lectures on ecclesiastical history in 1913 and chose this topic. He hoped to work the Birkbeck Lectures over into a systematic manual of papal diplomatic, but, because of an infirmity of eyesight, was able merely to revise and expand the matter without rearranging the order of topics.

The book is interesting from many points of view, which the mere title does not indicate. It shows how the popes handled their correspondence and kept their records, particularly their registers. It describes the various and changing functions that officers like the notaries, the librarian, and the *judices palatini* had to perform. It discusses the clash of opinion concerning those shifty entities the "regions" of Rome. It also tells about the marks of genuineness, such as seals, signatures, and the more elusive technicalities of form and language, in particular the distinctive rhythm of prose, the so-called *Cursus Curiae Romanae*. The careful index furnishes a quick way of getting at the meaning of terms on which the ordinary books of reference are not much help. The footnotes are replete with references to French, German, and Italian literature, but they impress one as being a little weak on the constitutional side, whereas a book like Werminghoff's *Verfassungsgeschichte*

¹ *Lectures on the History of the Papal Chancery down to the Time of Innocent III.* By Reginald L. Poole. Cambridge: University Press; New York: Putnam, 1915. xvi+211 pages. \$2.75.

der deutschen Kirche im Mittelalter (2d ed., 1913), or Sägmüller's *Lehrbuch des katholischen Kirchenrechts* (3d ed., 1914), or various learned articles in the *Catholic Encyclopedia* would have opened up the subject a little more, either directly or through references to literature.

With its admitted shortcomings, the book is a stimulating introduction to its subject. It usually has the effervescence and tang of a good set of lectures. While it lacks that clarity of structure which appeals to a retentive mind, this is to some extent compensated for by the author's contagious enthusiasm for a field not without fascination for any student of mediaeval history and of vital importance to one who desires to study the Papacy from the sources. It should stimulate the study of papal diplomatic in England and America, particularly in view of the author's remark (p. 134): "Every English Cathedral muniment room which I have examined contains large numbers of papal rescripts, in originals or copies, which are not to be found in the Registers."

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CHURCH AND SACRAMENTS

"I believe in the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church. That, I often say, is to me like a great line of poetry, a great musical phrase." The phrase has more than beauty to Dr. Forsyth.¹ It is poetry believed in. This beauty is truth, and he is advocating the august reality of the One Catholic Church. It is spiritual reality, and he will not allow Roman, Anglican, Presbyterian, or any other instituted body a monopoly of expression of the one reality. The unity of the church is not to be identified with any single polity. In Oxford or Cambridge we see various colleges; the university is the one spiritual reality in which these visible colleges inhere. So the true church is "the university of the churches."

Dr. Forsyth is pleading with the Free Churches of England to revive the dormant sense of the Church Catholic. Christianity has to struggle with its great antithesis, which is civilization. Civilization moves toward the Kingdom of God through successive phases of despotism, monarchy, aristocracy, and now democracy, but even democracy is not the Kingdom and must be dominated. To cope with the adversary in any of its

¹ *Lectures on The Church and The Sacraments*. By P. T. Forsyth. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1917. xiv+289 pages. \$2.00.

forms, Christianity must act in unity, but that unity cannot be attained by reabsorption in one historic form of Catholicism, Roman or Anglican. The ideal and the practically possible is, not a church empire, but the "United States of the church."

What then can federate the churches, since it may not be a common polity? It must be a common gospel, a renovated theology uttering that holy supernatural reality which is the dynamic, generative principle of the church. It must be the theology which exhibits the crisis of the divine conquest of the world. It is therefore the gospel of the Cross of Christ. Christ builds the church, not by his character or teaching, but by his atoning death, which redeems men from moral death. "We have no guarantee for the supreme thing, *the* divine thing, the eternal thing in God, namely His holiness, except the Cross, which alone enables us not only to love His love but to trust it absolutely and forever."

There are few who will not welcome this insistence on the idea of the Church Catholic which is a unity in the diversities of polity, but not all are ready to identify the word of God, which is the essence of Christianity, with the theological idea which has been the special characteristic of Dr. Forsyth's preaching. Men hesitate to reduce the rich wealth of music to Wagner's somber and tragic rhythms; many will decline to reduce the constraining holiness experienced in religion to the one historic event on which Dr. Forsyth insists. Is it in accord with the preaching of Jesus? Does it not collide with the Twenty-third Psalm? Does it not limit a confident faith to a class theologically competent? When Dr. Forsyth dramatically declares, "No Cross, no Christ, only a saint," has he not conceded a manifestation of divine holiness apart from the atoning death?

This plea for the Church Catholic embraces an acute and interesting discussion of the sacraments as necessary for the life of the church, though not for the salvation of the individual. The gospel evokes worship, and worship culminates in sacramental acts. By baptism the church incorporates the believer into the body of Christ—a formal statement which is revitalized by translation into psychological terms, the psychology of the recipient's experience and the social psychology of the group which acts. Through the breaking of the bread and the pouring of the wine—through the actions, not the material elements—Christ acts in real presence, consigning to the church the act of his death, presenting to men his finished sacrifice.

This presentation is fortified by historical knowledge and shows a penetrating comprehension of recent thought. The defect of

Dr. Forsyth's literary quality is his incessant brilliancy or cleverness, his pungent epigrams, his telling phrases. They are striking but often they are irritating, because incongruous with the mood of the theme.

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ANGLICAN DISCUSSIONS ON DOCTRINE AND CHURCH UNION

Two books written by three clergymen of the Church of England will be of most direct interest to members of that communion, but of much interest, too, to all Christian thinkers, for the problems they consider are common to all Christians and pressing upon all who are called Protestant, evangelical or reformed. One of these books¹ consists of a written debate between Dr. W. Sanday, the famous New Testament professor of Oxford, and Mr. N. P. Williams, chaplain-fellow of Exeter College of the same university. The thesis of Dr. Sanday is that the content of Christian tradition—that is, the substance of the great historic creeds—is continuous, permanent, and true, while the form—that is, not only the words but the concepts which they express—are to some extent temporary and must be superseded. Mr. Williams affirms the unchangeable character of both form and content. The discussion is opened by a paper setting forth Dr. Sanday's views. This is followed by Mr. Williams' answer, and so the discussion continues until each has written three papers.

Dr. Sanday's statement of the principle of the modernist is interesting and probably as good as could be made by the many men who feel bound to accept the truths revealed in modern science and thought and at the same time are required by the rules of their church to assent to ancient and fixed symbols. He says on page 13:

The principle which enables our young men to accept the Creeds is that which I have had in view throughout this paper, the principle of the *relativity of expression*. They believe that the creeds are true, not so much in the minute technical detail which was in men's minds at the time when they were composed, as on broad spiritual lines. They would not deny the technical details; they believe that they all had a certain relative rightness in the periods

¹ *Form and Content in the Christian Tradition*. A Friendly Discussion between W. Sanday and N. P. Williams. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1916. xv+167 pages. \$2.00 net.

that understood and could assimilate them; they are perfectly ready to believe that the good Providence of God presided over the whole evolution. But they none the less believe that God has "provided some better thing for us, that they without us should not be made perfect."

The usefulness of such a formula is so great at the present time that one can overlook the absurdity of saying, "I believe *a* and *b* and *c*, etc. (only some of these things I don't *really* believe, although I wouldn't on any account deny them)," since the conditions which the formula meets are as absurd as the formula.

Dr. Sanday holds (p. 42) that the questions relating to the meta-physical nature of the Godhead "are rightly answered in the words of the Creeds." The sharpest conflict between his position and that of Mr. Williams, so far as the *matter* of the creeds is concerned, is with regard to historical or supposed historical events. "The Virgin Birth, the physical Resurrection and physical Ascension are all realistic expressions," he says on p. xiii, "adapted to the thought of the time, of ineffable truths which the thought of the time could not express in any other way." The truths, then, which these expressions were intended to set forth are for Dr. Sanday "ineffable," and he would not affirm them as historical facts in this form, or deny them, since they still stand for *truths*. But Mr. Williams insists that they are either historical facts just as they stand, or they are not; they are either true or false with no possible third position, and for him they are absolutely and literally true.

The interest of this discussion would warrant a much longer account than our space will permit. But reference must be made to the distinctive feature of Mr. Williams' argument in which he begs the whole question by claiming an "intuition" that these creeds are true in every detail on account of the supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit in their formation. He affirms (p. 32) his belief "in the immanent personal presence of God the Holy Ghost in the Catholic Church . . . inspiring the whole nexus of dogmatic development so intimately and pervasively that each doctrine, as it took shape, assumed precisely that *form* which the Holy Spirit foresaw would most perfectly preserve the essential *content* till the end of time." The assumption of this belief, he says (p. 38 and elsewhere), "rests upon an intuition," and (p. 162), he says: "Of course, I quite admit that this 'intuition' or 'categorical imperative' constitutes a valid argument only for me and others who are conscious of it. I cannot really argue with anyone who altogether repudiates possessing it, nor do I pretend to be able to prove to such a one that he

ought to possess it." This position, amazing as it is pitiful in one who manifests otherwise a remarkably clear and frank power of thought, expression, and logical analysis, would consistently preclude his argument with Dr. Sanday or anyone else who differed with him on just the points under discussion, since he claims an immediate intuition that the traditional position which he defends is absolutely correct, and renounces any power or ambition to prove the correctness of this intuition. There is this advantage in his assertion, that it makes explicit what probably underlies the faith or supposed faith of a multitude of his brethren in the Anglican as well as in the Catholic churches. The obvious answer to his position is that his assumption bears none of the marks of an intuition and has all of the characteristics of an induction made from insufficient premises. The intuition which Mr. Williams thinks he has of the "infallibility of the church" has no meaning or value except as carefully *defined*. The *details* involved in such a definition are evidently justified, if at all, by *history*, and are inconceivable as the products of intuition. His "intuition" then, that a certain body, defined in terms and by data furnished by history, is in certain historical actions infallible, i.e., absolutely correct and unable to be otherwise than correct, is the most astonishing compound that an intelligent man could think of calling by that name. And if there be any conceivable tests of the truth of the various details of the creeds, which Mr. Williams' "intuition" perceives to be divinely formulated, other than the "intuition" itself—and this Mr. Williams explicitly acknowledges, at least in the matter of the assertion of events in human history, such as the virgin birth—we have the anomalous situation of an "intuition" (equivalent in value and self-evident character to an axiom) which would be instantly disproved by certain very *conceivable* facts of history, if they should be discovered. Such an intuition is indeed a very unsubstantial foundation for such a heavy superstructure.

Mr. Williams feels, as a result of his careful analysis of Dr. Sanday's *words*, that they are not far apart in their views at the close of the discussion. This optimistic conclusion seems explicable only through his failure to comprehend the immense difference in *ideas* which the words expressed. Dr. Sanday admits "we have not yet succeeded in reaching very much common ground" (p. x). Nevertheless the discussion may be very valuable indeed if it will help Anglican clergymen or others to indulge in the distasteful occupation of thinking.

An opponent, less gentle than Dr. Sanday to the extremes of "high church" doctrine and principle, is found in William Leighton Grane,

prebendary of Chichester. He has written a strong book¹ on the evils of the present condition of disunion among the fragments of the Christian church and the urgent necessity and proper methods of bringing about reunion. Mr. Grane finds a vital relation between "the disunion in the Christian Church and the fierce fighting in the nominally Christian world," the latter to furnish a new and great motive for the changing of the former condition. "The Church's Founder" he says (p. 6), "made fundamental the principle of putting first things first. Early Christendom adhered to that principle and remained one. Later Christendom did not, and became divided." The remedy, then, is to return to the earlier condition or spirit of putting first things first, of valuing the unseen more than the seen, the spiritual more than the material or formal.

Mr. Grane writes in the first place for Anglicans. They have long been lamenting the sin of schism—on the part of *other* Christians. They have generally, in recent years, stood out *against* any movement or tendency which would help to bring them into closer accord with other *Protestant* churches, on the principle that that would separate them the more from the Roman and Greek Catholic churches, which were at the same time *larger* bodies of Christians than any of the Protestant groups, and also were parts of the true, original, historic Catholic church, as the Church of England itself was, whereas nonconforming Protestants were mere schismatics, to whose organizations the very name of "church" should be denied. That this interpretation of the situation, although perhaps largely true from the standpoint of outward historical organization, is false when one considers the vital and spiritual elements involved, the author makes clear in a careful argument, based both on undeniable historical facts and on spiritual principles.

There is at present no hope for reunion of the Anglican church with either the Greek or the Roman Catholic bodies, on account of the doctrines and principles of the latter two organizations. The doctrine of the infallibility of the pope, promulgated in the Vatican Council of 1870, put the finishing touch upon the barriers which the Roman church has for many centuries been building against all other organizations. The *authorities* of this body have never shown the slightest sympathy with any movements toward the reunion of Christendom other than complete submission to their own claims and sway. In 1849, Emperor Nicholas, speaking for the *Eastern* church, said: "The true Faith survives in

¹ *Church Divisions and Christianity*. By William Leighton Grane. New York: Macmillan, 1916. xii+293 pages. \$2.00.

Russia only; in the West it is utterly lost," and in the *Constructive Quarterly* for March, 1913, Archbishop Platon, of the Greek Orthodox church in America, wrote: "Though it might seem that no church is closer to the Orthodox than is the Roman Catholic, yet the distance between them . . . is almost immeasurable."

If Anglicans would accept this abundantly proved fact that at present reunion with either of these two "Catholic" bodies on any other terms than submission and absorption is impossible, they would take a long step toward the possibility of a reunion of reformed Christendom, which itself might be the strongest force to bring about a change of attitude on the part of the "Catholic" bodies. That a union of Protestant Christians is not only the *first* step, but would be of immense significance even from the standpoint of numbers, is proved by the figures given by Mr. Grane in his chapter on "Anglican Opportunity." Comparing available statistics for 1700 with those for 1900, we find that Greek church adherents had grown from 33 to 128 millions; Roman, from 90 to 242 millions, but adherents of the reformed churches (Protestants) from 32 to 520 millions. These figures certainly indicate a far greater vitality on the part of the Protestant communions—which should have some *spiritual* significance—and show that a united Protestant church, if it should be realized, would include the large majority of Christians and thus have at least *some* better claim to the name "Catholic" than the Greek or Roman bodies.

The only thing for the Anglican church to *do*, then, to promote unity is to use all available means for the reunion of *Protestant* Christendom. The current ideas most hostile to the growth of spiritual fellowship, and hence unity, between members of the Anglican church and other reformed churches, Mr. Grane finds to be, (1) "the idea that Anglican discipline requires the banning of adult Christians from participation in the Eucharist except they be confirmed; and (2) the idea that Episcopacy was in such manner instituted at the first as to preclude Churches without Bishops in one of the recognized successions from being accounted Churches at all." (p. 154). The author gives a careful and convincing argument that both these ideas are historically false and spiritually un-Christian. He is too much of an Anglican to admit the conceivability that the episcopal system itself may be one of the causes of the bigotry and narrowness in the Episcopal church which has encouraged, when it has not forced, true Christians to found and maintain other and non-Episcopal organizations. But he powerfully insists that the fruits of the spirit, to be found as well in nonconforming as in Episcopal communions,

are ample proofs of the presence in them of the Spirit of Christ; and hence of the existence of his body, the church.

The primary means for the reunion of Protestant (and indeed *all*) bodies of Christians is suggested in the principle of "putting first things first," the inner before the outer, the spirit before the form of organization. The central doctrine and foundation of Christianity is belief that God is love. The author quotes from the *Episcopal Charge* of the Bishop of Carlisle in 1916, wherein the Bishop speaks of the glorious ideal of true catholicity—the catholicity of Christ: "The primary facts in Christianity are the Fatherhood of God, redemption through Christ, goodness through the Holy Ghost, and the universal brotherhood of men. Let us teach these things, preach these truths, live these realities."

Mr. Grane's book is splendid in literary style and overwhelmingly convincing in argument. Much of it has its principal interest for the Episcopal churches in England and English-speaking countries, but its central appeal is fitted to move all Christians, and to move them toward the true unity of the spirit which will sooner or later show itself in the outward forms of federation or corporate union.

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A NEW BOOK ON NIETZSCHE

The author of a new book on Nietzsche¹ is a Cambridge (England) scholar, with a dozen books to his credit. He lectured at Harvard in 1911 and at the General Theological Seminary, New York, in 1913. This volume comprises lectures delivered in May, 1915, at Lake Forest College (Illinois) on the Bross Foundation.

America needs all the Nietzsche books it will read, provided they truly set forth the philosophical forerunner of the atrocious war and sound the counter-charge; provided they *lay* the Nietzschean devils they raise. One regrets that it was thought advisable, in a then neutral country, to say almost nothing of Nietzsche's relation to the war, which mainly drew attention to him—a relation Dr. Figgis at once recognizes and veils under the familiar Sir Christopher Wren epitaph, "Circum-spice."

The book is poorly named; one reaches page 288 before learning that the title is meant to describe Christ's gospel rather than Nietzsche's.

¹ *The Will to Freedom; or the Gospel of Nietzsche and the Gospel of Christ*. By John Neville Figgis. New York: Scribner, 1917. xiii+320 pages. \$1.25.

Yet the antithesis is not between power and freedom, but between power and love. The book is scholarly, interesting, profitable, with chapters, however (those on "Originality" and "Charm"), which do little to expound or counteract the doctrines whose fruitage in world-war proves that, in Germany at least, philosophy does bake bread.

Dr. Figgis is essentially aristocratic in social theory and thinks almost as little of democracy as Nietzsche himself. An effort appears throughout to reduce the distance between Nietzsche and Christ. As a result of his habit of balancing text against interpretation, his criticism is seldom forthright. Nietzsche's cardinal doctrines are so violently anti-Christian that a task of sophistical jugglery faces a writer who undertakes to make him out a near-Christian. He rejects the common opinion that Nietzsche's ethic is one of pure selfishness, apparently on the ground that the unescapable inconveniences of the selfish life become "sacrificial" when endured for still more selfish supermen! He ascribes to the self-styled anti-Christ remedial criticisms of Christianity to which Nietzsche would never have condescended. He seems anxious to absolve him from "unintentional" consequences. Nietzsche's relation to Kant or to Max Stirner, moreover, is of interest mainly to foot-on-the-fender philosophy-tasters. The public needs plain statement of the fiercest charge the Nietzscheans can make against Christianity and democracy, and then a thoroughgoing demolition of their trenches.

"Nietzsche is a good tonic, but a bad food," rightly declares Dr. Figgis. But his book contains more testimony to the tonic than caution against the food. Wilkes Booth's pistol and Zuloaga's "Nude Courtesan" need less apologetic appreciation and more convincing damnation. Against Nietzsche a criticism is demanded that will go "smashing across the footlights" to savingly reach prospective victims. Shades of literary excellence among his fallacies, *nuances* of the poetic temperament, remote springs of the doctrine in this or that prognostic—these imponderables, charitably discussed, tend rather to multiply the captives chained to his chariot, and to send the sword of Nietzsche into the heart of still other Belgians.

The writer is often a victim of the understatement, as when he blandly remarks, "Certain dangers attach to the doctrine of Nietzsche." One asks, Is the man himself morally awake? There is not sufficient evidence that he has stood in full view of the cult's supreme hope: a Christianity annihilated, its morality reversed, a world for coming centuries culturally deflected from Christian ideals to those of early

Grecian and Norse-Teutonic paganism. One feels at times that the author is a better critic of Christianity than of Nietzsche.

Many passages, the last chapter especially, show genuine depth of thought. There is evidence of soul-anguish over the clash between despotism and democracy. One wishes for the sake of the larger public that the ample note citations were translated. There is a good index.

W. C. A. WALLAR

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WAR-TIME SERMONS¹

The three volumes of sermons from well-known English and Scotch scholars and preachers, though published the third year of the war, can hardly be called war sermons. The first volume, by the late Professor Gwatkin of Cambridge, is made up of sermons all preached just previous to the war, and the only immediate reference to the war is in a striking letter in the brief but interesting memoir with which the book opens.

Dr. Garvie's sermons, while all preached before the war from notes, have been written for publication since the war began and have a few unmistakable references and lessons.

Professor Paterson's book alone has sermons preached directly in view of the religious problems awakened by the world-contest.

All three preachers are marked by a wonderful reserve, the quietness and strength of spiritual elevation of men who see beyond the cloud-rack to the shining of the sun, and would help men into that fellowship with God that no earthly trial and struggle can shake.

It is said that a pastor at an English university during the first year of the war made every sermon into a battle call and every service into a recruiting station; but, after he had spent six months among the troops and also felt the losses of his people, his sermons took a new tone and dealt more fully with central religious truths.

Dr. Gwatkin had the distinction of being at home in two worlds. For forty years he worked upon snails and the history of the church, "Sandwiching his beasts amongst his Fathers." His preaching was only occasional, but he has a singularly fresh and personal manner. He

¹ *The Sacrifice of Thankfulness.* By Henry Melvill Gwatkin. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1917. xxiv+166 pages. 4s. 6d.

The Master's Comfort and Hope. By Alfred E. Garvie. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1917. xiv+239 pages. 4s. 6d.

In the Day of the Ordeal. By W. P. Paterson. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1917. 262 pages. 4s. 6d.

said in an address to candidates for holy orders: "Don't tell lies, and don't have a dusty Bible." And to one of his students he wrote: "If you are not yourself a sermon, you will never make one. There is always one text in your power, and it will do to begin upon—unvarying tenderness to the wayward little ones, who are only a little lower than the angels." It was this humanness that made him a historian and an interpreter. "The sacrifice of thankfulness," the theme of the first sermon, is the spirit of them all. He has the freedom of sonship and therefore rejoices in life. The sermons have great directness and simplicity, like one talking to another on the highest themes. The author has a fearless social message: he gives the Spirit's word to modern England. And now and then he breaks out into prophecy. "The old landmarks are vanishing which our fathers have set in church and state; and no mere power of the sword can check any longer the divisions of nation set against nation, and class against class, and man against his fellowman. From east and west we hear the multitudinous voice of expectation as the sound of many waters; yet men's hearts are trembling in half-unconscious waiting for some great message from the gathering darkness of the whirlwind and the storm in which the Lord our God reveals himself." And after the war he writes: "Some there are who doubt of love, now that hell is loosed on earth as it never was loosed before. But there is nothing new: it is only Job's old question, and in Christ we know more than Job. He that spared not His own son, how shall he not be guiding us all in love?"

Dr. Garvie, principal of New College, London, a theological school of the Congregationalists, is an expository and extemporaneous preacher. Though a teacher of theology, he is especially interested in preaching and has written a most suggestive and practical book for lay preachers. *The Master's Comfort and Hope* has twenty sermons in exposition of the words of Jesus given in John 13:31—14:31. The sermons are closely thought out, every word and clause made to yield its suggestion, dealing fearlessly yet reverently with the mysteries of faith, not hesitating to give the results of the scholar's investigation, yet having in view the strengthening of the religious life.

The sermons are full of fine examples of explanation, deep analyses of life, and the effort to get back of the form of words and creeds to spiritual principles. The sermons are entirely free from undue stress and all rhetorical exaggeration.

There are many discussions that touch the thought of the church as well as its practical life—such questions as progress and reverence, the

relation between the objective and subjective elements in religion, the differences between the religion of law and that of ideal, and the use of critical questions in the pulpit. The book is food for mind and spirit, and one wishes to read the whole. Still they are the scholars' work far more than the preachers'. One can hardly imagine an American audience listening to them, they are so minutely drawn—without the few bold lines of the etcher. Few of our people have the biblical knowledge and religious experience to feed on such preaching. They were written out evidently in part to comfort his own lonely heart. There are repeated references to private sorrow, but not a touch of the autobiographical sermon in them.

There is no new doctrine in the sermons, but the method is certainly modern.

There can be no doubt as to what is the order of faith for most men to-day. There may be some thinkers who are led to Christianity by way of theism; but most men whose faith is not an inheritance, but an achievement, have come to God because they were first drawn to Christ. Not a few men to-day must begin with the Synoptic Gospels and the human Jesus. As a man studies, meditates on, becomes absorbed in, and comes under, the influence of this literary testimony, the historical reality of Jesus as truest teacher, best example, most loving friend, lays hold upon him. . . . Slowly yet surely he comes to feel that he needs, and that Jesus is, more than teacher, example, friend; and only one word can express what that is, even Saviour [pp. 45-46].

The volume of Dr. Paterson's has this dedication: "To my wife and in memory of our sons, R. S. Paterson, Second Lieutenant, Royal Field Artillery, Neuve Chapelle, 11th March, 1915, W. P. Paterson, Captain, King's Own Scottish Borderers, Delville Wood, 31st July, 1916." That tells the story of heroism and sacrifice, of sorrowful loss and proud memory. And it is not hard to read between the lines of these strong and noble utterances. There is the characteristic reserve of the Scotch pulpit, silence about the most sacred and personal events, but still more the loss of personal grief in the contemplation of God's ways and the attempt to mediate his help to other wounded and broken hearts. Dr. Paterson is a theologian, the worthy successor of Dr. Flint, and does not hesitate to attempt the justification of God's ways and to interpret sorrows and trials as ways to new life. Keenly sensitive to the difficulties of faith, his own faith is unshaken. He has the social conscience and speaks strong and wise words concerning the social mission of the church. Particularly timely and fearless is the discussion of the present problems of the family in "Spots on the Love Feasts." "In the

Day of the Ordeal," "The Way of God with the Nation," and "The Way of God with the Individual" interpret the spiritual meaning of war. Why the war? "It is because Europe, while Christian in name, has remained essentially pagan in its public policy—its nations on the whole following the natural lusts, and only playing with the principle of human brotherhood, that the Continent which was the chosen home of civilization has been transformed into a chaos and an Inferno." He is no blinded patriot, but sets forth the struggle in the light of history and God's purpose of good. "If analogy may be trusted, the unexampled conflict should bring a harvest of spiritual results. The great struggles of the past have often been followed by a remarkable stimulation of the higher life of humanity, and by the subsequent appearance of a generation of great men. We already see the beginnings of a moral conversion. The mark of the children of the new age will surely be that self will be less central in their thinking than it was in ours. We may also confidently look forward to a fresh outpouring of the Holy Spirit" (p. 262).

ARTHUR S. HOYT

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INDIAN AND IRANIAN MYTHS

There are no satisfactory scholarly works which treat the development of Indian or Iranian mythology in a historical way. Keith and Carnoy are to be congratulated on the success of these first attempts at a synthesis.¹ Both accounts well fulfil their purpose as popular summaries; both will also prove valuable to specialists. Keith and Carnoy have both contributed much in the past to the solution of special problems of detail, but both have also been interested in the general development of ideas and have tried to trace the bearing of details on the more general problems involved. The judgment of the former is sober and keeps very close to facts; the latter is more speculative and venturesome in the projection of facts into theories.

Keith devotes two chapters to the Rig-Veda, one to the Brāhmaṇas, two to the Epic, one to the Purāṇas, one to Buddhism, one to Jainism, one to Modern Hinduism. Carnoy divides his treatment of Iranian myths into discussions of the wars of gods and demons, of myths of

¹ *The Mythology of All Races*. Vol. VI: *Indian* by A. B. Keith; *Iranian* by A. J. Carnoy. Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1917. ix+404 pages, 5 figs., 44 pls. \$6.00.

creation, of the primeval heroes, of legends of Yima, of traditions of the kings and Zoroaster, and of the life to come. Fourteen pages of notes refer to passages in the sources or give references on disputed points. Thirty-four pages are devoted to a carefully chosen bibliography, including a digest of all the articles in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia* which bear on Indian and Iranian mythology.

Keith keeps strictly to the main line of mythology and offers little on the development of myth to legend, folklore, and traditional history. Carnoy devotes much space to this latter development in the Persian epic. In India the material is so vast and the historical background so obscure that no treatment of the subject could be satisfactory at present. Much of the material of the so-called Indian mythology is Dravidian or Munda rather than Aryan, but it is impossible, as yet, to distinguish Aryan from Dravidian with any certainty.

The most satisfactory chapters of Keith are those on the Rig-Veda, the Brāhmaṇas, and the Epic. The mythology of the Purāṇas, of modern Hinduism, and of Jainism is sketched cursorily in only the broadest and most general outlines. The chapter on Buddhism, the most difficult one to write, is the least satisfactory of all. Here Keith's touch is much less firm and sure than in the earlier chapters. Keith feels assured (p. 188) that no Buddhist text can be proved to be as early as two hundred years after Buddha's death. So much can be granted, but, if this assumption is made, it is impossible to argue, as Keith does, that we have in the Pāli canon "the authority of Buddha himself" for several important mythological details. In India myth and legend develop with amazing rapidity, and two hundred years are not to be dismissed lightly. If no text can be assigned positively to the period within two hundred years after Buddha's death, there is no certainty that the important mythological matters assigned in the texts to Buddha himself can be earlier than two hundred years after the death of Buddha. It is becoming more and more certain that the Pāli texts represent the ideas of only one sect. Different groups of monks interpreted the enigmatical teachings of Buddha according to their own thoughts and feelings. The Pāli canon does not give us the unified tradition of Buddhism before the early split into sects. Much that is represented as the utterance of Buddha himself may be due to speculative accretion generations after his death. The "thus I have heard" is no more proof of originality than the corresponding formula in the Mahāyāna texts. Further, many elements in the life of Buddha himself, if the traditions are based on any real memories of the Master, show that he himself lived a life

of ministry nearer in many ways to the Bodhisattva ideal of the Mahāyāna than to the Arhat ideal of the Hinayāna.

Both Keith and Carnoy (pp. 5, 25, 30, 263-65) refer to the names found in the Hittite tablets at Boghaz-keui as Indo-Iranian and draw from them important conclusions concerning the relation of Indo-Iranian to Babylonian mythology. The reviewer has tried to show in an article in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures* (1917, pp. 261-82) that the matters involved are, as yet, purely linguistic ones on which no historical conclusions should be based.

Keith argues here, as elsewhere, that Krishna was originally a vegetation-god become anthropomorphic. He is over-skeptical of the possibility of men becoming gods in India. The classical prejudice against euhemerism is invalid in Hindu mythology. In the case of Krishna it is much easier to explain the mythology as a later accretion (as in the cases of Buddha and Mahāvīra) than as fundamental. The reviewer can interpret the figure of Krishna in the epic only as a man deified. Thae Krishna (son of Devakī) of the Chāndogya Upanishad 3, 17, 6 cannot be lightly dismissed as not identical with Krishna (son of Devakī) of the Epic just because the identification invalidates a theory that Krishna must be a sun-god or a vegetation-god. The passage in Patanjali (150-140 B.C.), which Keith (p. 126) interprets as proving the performance of a vegetation rite in connection with Krishna, does not disprove the theory that Krishna was originally a human figure. Where among the vaguely anthropomorphic figures of early Hindu mythology is there one which has become so human, so concrete in outline, as the Krishna of the epic? Rāma, perhaps? But it is by no means certain that Rāma is a purely mythical figure.

On page 177 Keith follows Garbe in interpreting the Çvetadvīpa story as having reference to contact of the Hindus with a Nestorian community, settled on an island in Lake Balkash. The recent evidence concerning the Nestorians collected by Pelliot in *T'oung Pao* (1914, pp. 623-44) conclusively disproves Garbe's theory, at least so far as present evidence goes. Garbe's arguments against Weber's identification of Çvetadvīpa with Alexandria are conclusive. The story seems to be purely mythological. It may belong to the same development which resulted in the descriptions of Sukhāvati in the Buddhist texts. There is no need of interpreting dvīpa as referring to any actual island. It may be connected with the dvīpas of Hindu and Jain cosmology.

Carnoy has done well to call attention to the many curious coincidences between Iranian myths on the one hand and Indian and

Babylonian myths on the other. Little can be deduced from such coincidences at present, but some day, when more historical evidence is available, comparisons such as these will be of the greatest value.

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BRIEF MENTION

BROWN, WILLIAM ADAMS. *Modern Missions in the Far East*. A Report Prepared by Professor Brown, as Union Seminary Lecturer on Religion in the Far East, for the Board of Directors of the Union Theological Seminary, New York. 1917. 76 pages. Circulation private.

The importance of this report greatly outweighs its size. It gives us the reflections of a scholar and a theologian who is keenly alive to the innumerable problems and demands of the modern missionary movement and who writes from first-hand evidence. Some of his suggestions are worthy of especial cognizance, as, e.g.: (1) the need for a readjustment of missionary administration by more frequent visits to the fields on the part of executive officials of the boards, or, failing that, placing greater responsibility on the resident missionaries; (2) the ever-increasing demand for co-operation among the various Christian bodies on the field; (3) the moral demand that institutions for higher education on the field must be efficient; (4) the conviction that, as theology needs restatement in the light of actual experience, the mission field will make a real contribution to this restatement; (5) the unique opportunity for Christian forces to play a creative rôle in the work of social and economic reform by applying Christian ideals to the regeneration of the social order; (6) the opening for an organization modeled after the Young Men's Christian Association to operate on the family as a unit; (7) the economic and spiritual waste involved in the time of missionaries being so occupied with clerical duties that they have no leisure for research work which they are peculiarly fitted to do; (8) the supreme need of the discovery and training of strong personalities who shall become Christian leaders among their own peoples; (9) the contribution which the theological seminary can make (a) by furnishing facilities for the training of missionaries, the advanced training of missionaries on furlough and of selected leaders of the native church, (b) by setting apart one or more representatives of the faculty for at least part-time service on the field, and (c) by promoting a healthy public sentiment in the church at home.

A. S. W.

HARTMAN, L. O. *Popular Aspects of Oriental Religions*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1917. 255 pages. \$1.35.

The title of this volume expresses its precise nature. It is composed of six studies in the great oriental religions, viz., Korean animism, Chinese Taoism and Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Zoroastrianism. In so short a volume it would be impossible to give a comprehensive treatment of so vast a field, and the author

recognizes that all that he can present are some conspicuous *aspects*. There is no attempt to deal with any of the critical problems involved in a scientific study. The book is designed to be a *popular* treatment. The method is comparative with the aim of showing the superiority of Christianity, and the author leans toward the supernaturalistic theory of the origin of religion. Remembering the method and purpose, it should be said that the book is written in an attractive literary style and is splendidly illustrated. It should inspire the beginner to delve deeper into the lore of the history of religions.

A. S. W.

HORSCH, JOHN. *Menno Simons: His Life, Labors, and Teachings*. Scottdale, Pa.: Mennonite Publishing House, 1916. 324 pages. \$1.25.

Alive to the singular neglect with which Menno Simons has been treated by biographers and translators, the writer has undertaken to tell the story of the reformer's life, and to elucidate the principles which he maintained, in a style educative and attractive to the young people of America. His purpose does not seem to have been to minister in any way to scholars, but rather to give a popular presentation that may be of service to the more thoughtful young people. The author is to be commended for the dispassion with which he sets forth events and issues which have been storm centers of controversy. As much may be said for the dignified manner in which he represses all hero-worship. In the space of two brief pages he interprets the significance of Simons. He was not the founder of a church, but the most noteworthy religious leader of the Netherlands in the Reformation period. His writings are an indispensable source of information concerning the principles, aims, and life of one of the strongest religious parties of Reformation times. While in the affairs of the world he was by no means so prominent as the Reformers who represented the state-church Reformation, he was as an advocate of pure evangelical principles more than the equal of these men. The principle that the Scriptures are the only foundation for the doctrine and practices of the church he upheld more steadfastly than the leading Reformers. He understood the great missionary commission of the Lord to be valid for all time. He insisted on strict church discipline. In contrast to Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin, he advocated the voluntary principle, rejecting the thought of a national church.

The foregoing represents the author's interpretation of Menno's significance. Chapters that deviate somewhat from the course of biography are "The Anabaptists" (iii), "Menno Simons' Relation to the State Church Reformation" (ix), "Menno's Attitude to Rationalism" (x), "Menno on Church Discipline" (xi), "Simons' Attitude toward the Munsterites" (xiii), and "The Battenburgers and the Davidites" (xiv). About one-third of the volume is devoted to excerpts from Menno's teachings. The selection has been made so wisely that the student possesses in this brief compass a representative body of Menno's principles. One section catalogues Menno's writings. An exhaustive bibliography is attached. The documentation is thorough.

One could wish that such a fine-spirited, well-balanced, and informing biography had found expression in style a little more polished and animated.

P. G. M.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

- Arnold, William R. *Ephod and Ark* (Harvard Theological Studies—III). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917. 170 pages.
- Lutz, Henry Frederick. *Early Babylonian Letters from Larsa*. (Yale Oriental Series. Babylonian Texts. Vol. II.) New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917. xii+41 pages+lvii plates. \$5.00.
- Wild, Laura H. *The Evolution of the Hebrew People*. New York: Scribner, 1917. xi+311 pages. \$1.50.

NEW TESTAMENT

- Arabic New Testament. New York: American Bible Society, 1917.
- Glover, T. R. *The Jesus of History*. New York: Doran, 1917. xiv+225 pages. \$1.00.
- Landrieux, S. G. *Courtes gloses sur les évangiles du dimanche*. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1917. 429 pages. Fr. 4.50.
- Levesque, E. *Nos quatre Évangiles*. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1917. viii+352 pages. Fr. 3.50.
- Sharman, Henry Burton. *Records of the Life of Jesus*. New York: Doran, 1917. xix+319 pages. \$2.50.
- Stix, Henry S. *The Three Men of Judea*. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1917. 101 pages. \$1.00.
- Ubbink, J. Th. *Het Eeuwige Leven bij Paulus*. Groningen, Hague: Wolters, 1917. 174+lxix pages. Fl. 2.50.

CHURCH HISTORY

- Denifle, Heinrich. *Luther and Lutherdom*. Vol. I, Part I. (Translated by Raymond Volz.) Somerset, Ohio: Torch Press, 1917. li+465 pages.
- Reu, J. M. *Thirty-five Years of Luther Research*. Chicago: Wartburg Pub-

lishing House, 1917. 155 pages. \$1.25.

DOCTRINAL

- Brandenburg, Walter E. *The Philosophy of Christian Being*. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1917. 148 pages. \$1.20.
- Butler, Samuel. *God the Known and God the Unknown*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1917. 91 pages. \$1.00.
- Mullins, Edgar Young. *The Christian Religion in Its Doctrinal Expression*. Philadelphia: Roger Williams Press, 1917. xxiv+514 pages. \$2.50.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

- Baldaeus, Philippus. *Afgoderye der Oost-Indische Heydenen*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1917. lxxxv+236 pages.
- Carus, Paul. *The Gospel of Buddha*. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1917. xxiv+311 pages. \$1.00.
- Rogerius, Abraham. *De Open-Deure tot het Verborgene Heydendom* (Werken Uitgegeven door de Luischoten-Vereeniging). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1917. xliiv+220 pages.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

- Blauvelt, Mary Taylor. *Ultimate Ideals*. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1917. 110 pages. \$1.00.
- Edwards, Loren M. *Every Church Its Own Evangelist*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1917. 162 pages. \$0.50.
- Hoyt, Arthur S. *The Work of Preaching*. New York: Macmillan, 1917. xiii+389 pages. \$1.50.
- Miller, Ray Oakley. *Modernist Studies in the Life of Jesus*. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1917. 52 pages. \$0.80.

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THE ECCLESIASTICAL INFLUENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES (1565-1850)

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The institution of *the church* in the Philippines as well as in the other Spanish colonies consisted of the regular and secular clergy and the episcopal organization. The regulars were missionaries and members of orders. Of these the chief were the Dominicans, Augustinians, Franciscans, Recollects, and Jesuits. These orders were assigned territory in various parts of the Islands, in accordance with the regulations of the royal patronage. Each order was subject to the dominion of its provincial, who usually resided in Manila and who inspected the friars in his charge from time to time. Ordinarily the regular clergy was independent of any local ecclesiastical influence except the provincial, but when the friars held parishes they were subordinated and subject to the visitation of the ordinary prelates.¹ The

¹ It was with reluctance, and only because of the scarcity of secular priests, that the government was obliged to introduce regulars into the parishes of the Philippines. Here, as in Mexico, the missionaries, acting in the capacity of parish priests, were called upon to hear confessions, to give absolutions and dispensations, to administer the sacrament, to perform marriages and conduct funeral ceremonies—in fact, to perform all the functions of parish priests. In 1750, out of a total of 569 parishes in the Philippines only 142 were occupied by seculars, leaving three-quarters of the curacies in the possession of missionaries. Pardo de Tavera, writing in 1898, stated that out of a total of 870 municipalities in the Islands at that time 670 were in the

secular clergy comprised the parish priests who were not allied to orders, but who were under the direct supervision and administration of the prelates and subject to their visitation and inspection. The episcopal organization above alluded to consisted of the Archbishop of Manila, whose post was created on August 14, 1595, and three bishops, one of Nueva Segovia in Northern Luzón, one of Nueva Cáceres in Southern Luzón, and one of Cebú, in the Visayas.

The policy which Spain pursued in regard to the union of church and state, both at home and in her colonies, is so well known that it is hardly necessary to state that the church enjoyed a large share of representation in the Philippine government. This influence extended over a wide and varied sphere, from the services of the priests as the advisers of the provincial governors to the complete assumption of the duties and prerogatives of governor by the archbishop and the surrender of the entire administration of the Islands at different times to the direction and management of the churchmen. Authorities writing on the subject have differed as to the exact value and character of this ecclesiastical influence in the Philippines. Professor Bourne has painted an impressive picture of the "mild despotism of the friar as the shepherd of the flock." He has quoted Tomás de Comyn¹ in showing that it was only through the monk and friar that Spain was enabled to retain her hold in the Islands.² The opposite view is taken by the modern Philippine writer, Pardo de Tavera, who evidently feels that

hands of the monks, leaving 180 under the administration of the seculars and the Jesuits.—See "The Power of the Monastic Orders," in *The Philippine Census*, I, 340-346; see also Cunningham, "The Question of Ecclesiastical Visitation in the Philippines," in Bolton and Stephens, *The Pacific Ocean in History* (1917), pp. 223-37.

¹ *Estado de las Islas Filipinas en 1810* (Madrid, 1820), chap. vii. Comyn lived in Manila for eight years in the employ of the Compañía de Filipinas. He was an authority on financial and economic subjects.

² Professor Bourne writes: "A corrupt civil service and a futile and decrepit commercial system were through their efforts rendered relatively harmless because circumscribed in their effect. The continuous fatherly interest of the clergy more than counterbalanced the burden of tribute. They supervised the tilling of the soil, as well as the religious life of the people, and it was through them that the work of education and charity was administered" ("Historical Introduction," in Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, I, 57).

all the good done by the church in the Islands was offset by the viciousness and immorality of the friars, their imposition on the helpless, ignorant natives, and their selfish appropriation of all that was best in the Islands for their own personal ends and the welfare of their orders.¹

The abuses of the friars seem to have been the subject of complaint on the part of the civil officials of the Islands throughout their history. Antonio de Morga, lieutenant-governor of the Philippines from 1595 to 1603, wrote a memorial in which he set forth "the vices and ill-behavior of the priests," showing the debasing effect on the natives of the laxity and immorality of their lives. He charged the religious with usurpation of the royal jurisdiction in attempting to try cases among the Indians. He described their enslavement of the Indians, their cruelty to them, their lack of education, and their consequent incompetence as teachers. Their sole effort and desire, he said, was to gain wealth and return with it to Spain.² In the same manner Governor Fajardo, in a report dated December 10, 1621, called attention to the hardships imposed upon the Indians by the friars. He said that the latter inflicted floggings and other cruel punishments for minor offenses and, moreover, incited the natives to rebellion against the civil government. He showed that the churchmen had built up a powerful feudal system wherein they controlled not only the bodies but also the souls of the ignorant natives.³ One hundred and fifty years later we find the *fiscal* (prosecuting attorney) of the audiencia at Manila, Francisco Leandro de Viana, making these same charges against the friars. "Among the Indians the ministers possess an absolute power and dominion

¹ Pardo de Tavera, "The Power of the Monastic Orders," in *The Philippine Census*, I, 340-46.

² "Report on Conditions in the Philippines, June 8, 1598," by Antonio de Morga, in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, X, 75-102, *passim*.

³ "The friars serve as protectors to them and inspire them to boldness," he wrote; "the Indians are all being brought to recognize them as powerful lords in both temporal and spiritual matters. So far has this gone that if the *alcalde mayor* (provincial governor) orders anything, even though it is just and necessary for the service of Your Majesty, if the friar orders something else, it must be as the latter desires."—"Fajardo to King, December 10, 1621," in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, XX, 152.

which compel them to endure whatever the fathers command,"¹ he wrote in his celebrated memorial of May 1, 1767; "however strict may be the orders which have been issued, not only by your governors, but by this audiencia, the *curas* have many means for rendering them ineffective." He accounted for the inefficacy of the audiencia as a check upon their abuses with a statement that the *oidores* (judges) were at that time new, and that it always required some interval for them to get acquainted with the dishonesty and evil methods of the friars. When new magistrates came to the Islands, he said, and found the civil authorities continually opposing the friars, they were shocked and had to be brought to a realization of the true character of the ecclesiastical influence before they would champion the royal prerogative as vigorously as they should.²

Among the complaints made by Viana occurs one commonly brought against the friars, namely, that they did all they could to prevent the natives from learning Spanish.³ The purpose of this was alleged to be to keep them in ignorance so that their own work among the Indians could not be investigated. Thus the friars were said to be able to evade the enforcement of the laws and to continue their despotism. Viana complained that "they mock at the zeal of the governor, of the archbishop, of the fiscal, . . . and as these officials and the ministers of the audiencia are seldom united . . . because the religious orders do not neglect to mislead some of them, the latter are always sure of a victory."⁴ Viana declared that the despotism and corruption of the friars would never be remedied until the governor and audiencia learned to deal firmly with them and refused to yield to their sinister influence. He testified to the utter inefficacy of all laws that had been made as yet for their regulation, and he expressed his disbelief

¹ "Viana to Carlos III, May 1, 1767," in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, L, 131.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 124 f.

³ Pardo de Tavera (Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, L, 169, n. 97) writes in this connection: "From the earliest days of the conquest [of the Philippines] the monarchs displayed decided earnestness that the knowledge of the Castilian language be diffused among their peoples; while the friars opposed to this a resistance as tenacious as it was hostile, not only to the interests of the civilization, . . . but to the sovereignty of Spain."

⁴ "Viana to Carlos III, May 1, 1767," in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, L, 121-22.

that any authority, whether the king, governor, or audiencia, would ever be able to check the abuses of the clergy or exercise any adequate control over them.

Governor Anda, on April 12, 1768, addressed a lengthy memorial to the throne in which he described the excesses of the clergy, and told of his efforts as vice-patron to restrict them. This memorial was written when the storm over episcopal visitation was at its height. Anda stated that the regulars had kept the seculars in a condition of abject and perpetual servitude,¹ that they had discouraged education, and had sought to become the virtual landlords of the Philippines. Even certain *oidores*, he declared, had permitted themselves to fall under the corrupt monastic influence. The title of this memorial, which is an argument in itself, eloquently indicates its contents and makes it possible to judge of its character.²

Anda's charge concerning the corruption of certain *oidores* subsequently proved to be well founded. The clergy and the audiencia seemed to be especially united for evil during the administration of Governor Marquina. In a memorial written in 1790 this governor made the charge that "between the audiencia and the religious is divided the rule of public opinion in these Islands, and to the government there remains little but the hated *recurso de fuerza*³ and violence—weapons as useless as despised and

¹ Pardo de Tavera makes this same statement. He says that the Spanish regulars used the Filipino clergy as slaves and as house-servants to perform their menial tasks ("Memoria de Anda y Salazar," in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, L, 142-46).

² The title referred to is as follows: "Abuses or disorders which have been fostered in the Philippine Islands under the shelter of religion, and at the cost of the royal treasury, which ought to be cut down at the root, . . . so that the governors who may be sent to those parts . . . may be better informed . . . that religion may be established on its sure principles of purity" (Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, L, 137).

³ *Fuerza (recurso de)*: "Apelación para ante el juez secular contra el abuso o violencia que consta un juez eclesiástico" (Alcubilla, *Diccionario de Administración*, V, 807). A more simple definition is that furnished by A. P. Cushing, in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, V, 292: "Fuerza is injury committed by an ecclesiastical judge, (1) in hearing a case which does not come within his jurisdiction, (2) in non-observance of rules of procedure, (3) in unjust refusal to allow an appeal. In such cases the aid of the secular courts may be invoked by the *recurso de fuerza*, and thus cases were brought before the audiencia." It came about that, through association, the encroachment of the civil authority upon the ecclesiastical jurisdiction was also termed *fuerza*. It was so designated in this case.

incapable; the religious use a more powerful weapon—one that is based upon the fear and the superstition of the people over whom their power is great.” Marquina was optimistic, however, and may be said almost to have been gifted with prophetic vision when he made the prediction that “their power [that of the religious] will continue as it is until the coming of another class of Europeans who will bring other ideas and will not permit . . . the continuance of the practices of the church. The development of the natives, coming in contact with outside ideas, will do much to cause the overthrow of the superstitions of the clergy.”¹

The French scientist, Le Gentil, who spent two years in the Islands (1766-68), returned with the same hostile criticism of “the power and influence enjoyed by the religious in the Philippines; . . . masters of the provinces, they govern there, one might say, as sovereigns,” he wrote; “they are so absolute that no Spaniard dares to establish himself there, . . . they are more absolute than the King himself.” He also accused them of refusing to enforce the royal decrees which ordered that Indian children must be taught the Castilian language, thus keeping the Indians in bondage and preventing the court from ascertaining the true state of affairs in the provinces. They were guilty of extreme cruelty in flogging and punishing Indians, both men and women, for failure to attend mass. He also commented on the friars’ resistance to episcopal visitation.² The observations of Le Gentil, while they add nothing new to this subject, confirm emphatically and conclusively the testimonies of Morga, Fajardo, Anda, Marquina, and other officials who bitterly denounced the friars. Le Gentil corroborates their official statements, which might otherwise be characterized as prejudiced.

The work and influence of the friars were regarded in a more favorable light by Manuel Bernáldez Pizarro, a Spanish official living in Manila in 1827. In a political and economic study of the Islands which he made at that time he praised their work, both as parish priests and as missionaries. Especially did he value the restraining influence which they placed upon the provincial governors (*alcaldes mayores*), who, as a rule, he said, cared for nothing except their own profit and advancement. So highly did

¹ “Marquina to King, June 26, 1790,” *Archive of the Indies*, 105-2-10.

² Le Gentil, *Voyage dans la mer de l'Inde*, II, 183-91.

he estimate the work of the friars that he recommended that five hundred more should be sent at once to the Philippines, and that a law should be promulgated whereby the *alcaldes mayores* would be obliged to consult with the parish priests in their provinces on all governmental and administrative matters.

By way of contrast to Pizarro's good opinion of the friars may be noted his unfavorable attitude toward the native clergy. He alleged that their influence was bad morally as well as politically; they continually incited their countrymen to revolt against Spain and against the peaceful administration of the missionaries. He dwelt upon the immorality and profligacy of the lives of the native priests and the evil example of their conduct upon their simple-minded parishioners, stating that these clerics lacked the inherent capacity to understand and appreciate the real meaning of religion. "As simple farmers and artisans they would have been useful to their families and to the government," he wrote, "but [they have been] mistakenly raised to the dignity of priests; . . . the Indians receive through the priesthood a standing which they do not know how to sustain." Pizarro stated that the desire on the part of the Indian and *mestizo* families to ennoble their sons by giving them careers in the church had caused an excessive ordination of native priests. He recommended that the government should interfere and restrain the bishops from qualifying so many of these and that European seculars should be appointed to vacant curacies instead.¹

Aside from the influence which the church as an organization exercised over the lives and conduct of the people, the extent of its power over the government was considerable. The counsels of the prelates, for example, were sought and accepted by the civil officials throughout the history of the Philippines. Their influence in this regard was perhaps more extensive, however, before the establishment of the Audiencia of Manila in 1584.² At that time the governors had practically no other advisers than

¹ "Reforms in Filipinas, April 26, 1827," by Manuel Bernáldez Pizarro, in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, LI, 203-5.

² The Audiencia of Manila was created by the *cédula* of May 3, 1583. This tribunal was inaugurated in 1584. It was removed in 1590 in compliance with the *cédula* of August 9, 1589, and returned again in 1598, the *cédula* of restoration being dated May 25, 1595.

the prelates,¹ and, owing to the inadequacy of the organs of judicial administration, the ecclesiastical authorities and tribunals had extensive jurisdiction even in civil matters. Besides administering canon law, they tried petty and criminal cases involving the Indians, although legally these latter should have been tried by the *alcaldes mayores* and the governor. The introduction of the *audiencia* placed several limitations on these activities. Not only did the tribunal provide the proper machinery for the trial of all civil and criminal cases, but it had the power to decide on appeal whether suits should be tried in the civil or in the ecclesiastical courts. It could decide cases of *fuera*, render decisions as to the competency of jurisdiction, take cases from the ecclesiastical courts, if jurisdiction had been usurped, and restore them to the proper tribunal.

Characteristic of this period which preceded the establishment of the *audiencia* we note the advent of an exceptionally able prelate who exercised considerable influence in governmental affairs. This was Bishop Juan de Salazar, at that time sole prelate of the Philippine Archipelago. As counselor of the governor, head of the church, and intermediary between the governor and the *audiencia* in the quarrels which followed between that tribunal and the executive, he occupied an influential, and in fact predominating, influence in the colony. He was both spiritual and temporal protector of the Indians. In the latter capacity he was authorized to shield the natives against the oppression of the *encomenderos*, friars, or provincial officials. He was charged with the prosecution in the courts of all offenders against the natives. Typical of his activities in this particular may be noted his efforts in restraint of the abuses of the *alcaldes mayores* in 1582.² Salazar's

¹ As early as 1574 Guido de Lavezares, the acting governor, asked the friars for their opinions on the advisability of levying tribute on the Indians, and Fray Martín de Brada replied that "for the present, and until the Indians have other opportunities and other and better tools with which to cultivate the land, and until the land is more fertile, all that is taken from each Indian, in general, above the value of one *maez* in food and raiment, is cruelty and oppresses them too heavily" (Blair and Roberston, *op. cit.*, III, 253).

² The principal complaint against the *alcaldes mayores* on this occasion had been that of buying up rice at extremely low rates, or taking it as tribute thus, and forcing it back upon the improvident natives in time of famine at prohibitive prices,

activity in behalf of the natives was only one of the many non-ecclesiastical services accomplished by him as prelate of the Islands.¹ The reforms which he suggested and his far-reaching influence in administrative matters made him, though only a bishop, more powerful and influential than any archbishop that succeeded him. Acting in co-operation with Fray Antonio Sánchez, the Jesuit procurator of the Islands in Madrid, Salazar brought about the suppression of the Audiencia of Manila in 1589. Salazar went to Spain in 1591, and the counsels of these two churchmen, given at court during this critical period, practically determined the character of the future government of the colony.² These churchmen also brought about far-reaching ecclesiastical reforms at this time in the elevation of the Philippines to the status of an archbishopric, and three bishops were sent to the Islands as a result of the efforts of Salazar. These ecclesiastical reforms had an important political bearing, in that they brought about the permanent establishment in Manila of a well-organized ecclesiastical hierarchy, with prelates of sufficient rank, standing, and attainments, both political and episcopal, to equal, at least, if not to surpass, the civil

thereby making large profits ("Salazar to King, June 20, 1582," *A.I.*, 68-1-32). The *encomenderos* were also said to have been guilty of forcing the natives to pay tribute in both kind and gold, which was contrary to the laws of the Indies. These laws made optional the payment of tribute, either in kind or money, though the natives could not be forced to pay in money (see Bancroft, *History of Central America*, I, 263, note). Salazar made the following serious charges against the *encomenderos*: "They assess tribute on old men and seize their money, . . . they throw the natives into jail if they are unable to pay, and if the latter complain to the *alcaldes mayores*, . . . the oppressed Indians are seized and imprisoned until they ask to be allowed to leave the localities in which they live, because they cannot endure the measures of the *alcaldes* ("Salazar to King," in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*).

¹ The office of protector of the Indians was regularly exercised by the prelates in America during this period. Las Casas was the first to serve in that capacity, being designated in 1516 by Charles V (Helps, *Spanish Conquest*, I, 515; Fiske, *Discovery of America*, II, 453).

² These two ecclesiastics fought out the battle which in reality determined whether the royal jurisdiction should continue, represented by a governor, as Sánchez desired, or whether the ecclesiastical power should be left in absolute control of the government of the Philippines. The former sentiment prevailed, and the government continued as it was inaugurated at first, with a governor exercising absolute power over administrative and judicial matters and a prelate in control of the spiritual. The audiencia, as above noted, was suppressed.

authorities of the Islands in dignity, power, and impressiveness.¹ An archbishop, resident in Manila, supported by three bishops, each at the head of his particular diocese, and further assisted by a number of provincials, each of whom was at the head of an order, effected a combination which, when it presented a solid front to the civil authorities, constituted an opponent worthy of consideration. This organization was able, during the greater part of the history of the Islands, to maintain a successful struggle for authority against the civil government.

The removal of the *audiencia* in 1589 resulted in an increase in the power of the church. No sooner had the tribunal been taken away than need of it was felt, and especially its aid in checking the usurpations of the prelates. Governor Dasmariñas wrote that the government had fallen "under the tyranny of the bishop and the priests, . . . the natives are reduced to a state of bondage to them, . . . they continually interfere with the governor's prerogatives, claiming the right to be consulted in this or that."² Antonio de Morga, chief-justice of the Islands in 1596, urged that the re-establishment of the tribunal was needed to aid in combating the tendency toward retrogression which was manifest under the ecclesiastical influence. "There should be someone to oppose the ecclesiastics in a land so far away from the *Audiencia* of Mexico,"³ he recommended. That the restoration of the tribunal on May 25, 1595, brought relief from the abuses of the churchmen is attested by the statement of Governor Diego Ronquillo de Peñalosa that "before the royal *audiencia* was established the church and ecclesiastics usurped the royal jurisdiction, and I have been excommunicated many times for defending it against their aggression, . . . but after the return of the royal *audiencia* they have been kept in restraint, the *audiencia* having dispatched decrees which they have had to obey and fulfil."⁴

That the influence of the prelates in their own field was not disregarded is shown by the instructions which Governor Tello

¹ Concepción, *Historia General de Philipinas*, III, 366-68.

² "Dasmariñas to the King, June 20, 1591," *A.J.*, 67-6-18.

³ "Morga to Felipe III, June 6, 1596," in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, IX, 271.

⁴ "Ronquillo to the King, July 12, 1599," *A.J.*, 67-6-6.

received to confer with the archbishop and audiencia in all matters relating to the church.¹ As vice-patron, of course, the governor represented the king and exercised authority superior to that of the prelate in all non-spiritual matters: questions of conflicts and limits of jurisdiction, the enforcement of law and order within the church, disputes between orders and between the religious and the seculars, the filling of benefices—in fact, in all matters over which the civil government had been conceded jurisdiction by the laws of the royal ecclesiastical patronage.² The various special questions involved in the relations between the civil government and the clergy, including the conflicts between the ecclesiastical and civil jurisdictions, the power of the Inquisition, excommunication, friar lands, episcopal visitation, and other matters that came up between the civil and ecclesiastical governments, show that in spiritual matters the church was supreme, but in questions involving the temporalities of the church itself and in those bordering between the temporal and the spiritual the civil government was pre-eminent.

The establishment of the audiencia, however, did not confine the church to a purely ecclesiastical sphere of activity. Not only did the prelates exercise an important influence as advisers of the governors, but they actually assumed the government on repeated occasions in the history of the Islands. It may be

¹ "Instructions to Tello, May 25, 1595," in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, IX, 228. The *cédula* of this date which re-established the audiencia authorized that tribunal to restrain the abuse of the power of excommunication by the prelates ("Tello to King," in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, IX, 258). The audiencia was empowered to limit the offensive denunciation of the civil government and its officials from the pulpit, which had been practiced by Salazar and the priests under him. The priests were also forbidden the right to interfere in governmental or commercial affairs (*Recopilación de Leyes de Indias*, Lib. 1, tit. 12, ley 19 [1-12-19]; 1-14-66).

² The *Patronato Real* was based on the famous bulls of May 4, 1493, and of November 16, 1501, issued by Pope Alexander VI, and of July 28, 1508, by Julius II. The first bull conceded the temporal and spiritual jurisdiction of the Indies to the Spanish monarch, and by the others such arrangements of temporal administration were made that general supervision and control over the secular and regular clergy were given to the Spanish government (Altamira, *Historia de la Civilización Española*, III, 418; Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, III, 681-731; Hernández, *Colección de Bulas*, I, 12-28; Gómez Zamora, *El Regio Patronato*, *passim*; Parrás, *El Gobierno de los Regulares en América*, I, 2-16).

asserted without qualification that subsequently to 1600 the counsels of the church were heeded by the authorities of the civil government, and that the prelates, when acting in an advisory capacity alone, exerted a far-reaching influence. This may be noted, for example, in the relations between Archbishop Benavides and the civil government in 1603. During his incumbency this prelate successfully maintained his claims that he should be consulted by the *acuerdo*¹ of the audiencia and governor in matters relating to the general welfare of the Islands. He gave his opinion in regard to the appointment of officials and protested in particular against the tendency of governors and *oidores* to neglect those who, by virtue of faithful and efficient service, were entitled to rewards, favoring their friends and relatives instead. When his intervention was resisted by the civil government Benavides successfully maintained his right on the basis of a former royal decree which had ordered the audiencia and governor to consult with the archbishop on governmental affairs. He even went so far as to interfere when the governor and *oidores* abused their authority and failed to comply with the royal instructions relative to the expulsion of the Chinese from the colony.² Benavides, in fact, protested against the admission of the Chinese to the colony, at the same time accusing the civil officials of being unduly favorable to the Chinese on account of the profits which the former derived from trading with them. He wrote a memorial to the king showing that their addiction to the crime of sodomy, and their other immoral practices, rendered them unfit to live in the colony, where their influence was harmful to the Filipinos and the Christian Chinese.³

¹ The *acuerdo* session was the joint meeting of the audiencia and governor for consultative purposes, usually on administrative matters.

² "Another thing needful," he wrote to the king on July 27, 1603, "is for the governor and audiencia to realize that when the bishop and archbishop write to the governor and audiencia, giving advice, they are not meddling or interfering with the government, but are only doing their duty, giving the opinions which they have as moral leaders, in behalf of the welfare of the natives and of the commonwealth." ("Letter of Archbishop of Manila to King, July 27, 1603," *A.I.*, 68-1-34).

³ *Excursus on the Church and the Chinese.* From time to time protestations on the part of the churchmen were made against the presence and continual coming of Chinese. These objections were usually based on the moral grounds that the secretive habits and customs of the Chinese constituted a real danger to the community, that their immor-

There can be no question that when harmonious relations existed between the civil and ecclesiastical powers the support of the archbishop and the spiritual authorities was of great value to the government. This is shown, for example, by a letter written by Bishop Arce of Cebú, who was the acting archbishop, to the king, on June 1, 1619. This prelate stated that the governor, "Don Alonso Fajardo attends with peculiar care to whatever concerns the service of your Majesty, as has been seen in the construction of the ships that he has built from the time of his arrival in these Islands. Had he not been so assiduous in that,

ality and debasing practices were dangerous, and that their influence on the natives was bad. In 1711 an archbishop protested against their gambling propensities ("Fiscal Casa Alvarado to King, July 12, 1711," *A.I.*, 68-4-16).

The chief objections which the churchmen presented against the Chinese, however, were their religion, or lack of religion, and what was termed their "heathenish, immoral practices." On the other hand, the charge was repeatedly brought by governors, *oidores*, and enemies of the church that the priests and friars participated extensively in the Chinese trade. Early in the history of the Islands we find them opposed to the *pancada*, or the governmental control, including purchase and distribution of the Chinese goods brought to Manila, because it prevented them from obtaining the best part of the Chinese cargoes for themselves. In order to aid in the support of the church, the archbishop, bishops, and the orders were assigned cargo space on the galleons, which they were expected to fill through their agents on condition that they themselves did not indulge actively in trade. On July 1, 1598, the king wrote to the audiencia for advice on the question of allowing the bishop of Nueva Segovia cargo space for two hundred tons on the galleon (*A.I.*, 105-2-1).

Repeated decrees, issued during the latter part of the eighteenth century, ordered the expulsion from the Islands of all non-Christian Chinese, and limited the number of Christians of that race remaining. The *cédula* of September 25, 1785, limited them to 4,000; they were to stay at night in the *Parídn*, within the range of the cannon on the walls (*A.I.*, 105-2-19). Anda, who was a bitter opponent of the Chinese and not an admirer of the church, in a memorial dated July 7, 1768, charged the archbishop and the entire ecclesiastical organization in Manila with opposing an earlier *cédula* which sought to restrict the number of Chinese and with scheming to keep a large number within the country in order that the churchmen might derive profits in trade thereby. He described Governor Arandía's attempt to enforce the law, and alleged that the churchmen had falsely affirmed that heathen Chinese were Christian converts in order to keep them from being expelled. "Arandía had confronted the archbishop with these facts," Anda wrote, "and had proved that the Chinese in question were not Christians and could not be, and that they were good for nothing except commerce, usury, and unspeakable vileness, . . . but all this was in vain and they baptised as many as they desired, admitting idolaters as Christians." The churchmen appealed this question to the audiencia on the grounds that the governor was interfering with the ecclesiastical and spiritual jurisdiction, and his object

the enemy would have committed great depredations."¹ The bishop gave assurance that if the governor were aided with a fleet, "some very good results would follow." This communication not only reveals a spirit of harmonious and co-operative good feeling, but it shows an intelligent non-ecclesiastical interest in the realm of things practical and governmental, proving that not all the churchmen who came to the Islands were absorbed in impractical doctrine or warped by ecclesiastical bigotry.

Archbishop Serrano, who succeeded Arce in Manila, was also a man of considerable breadth of vision and capacity. His recommendations and interests extended over a wide field. He concerned himself with the relations between the Philippines and Japan and made valuable suggestions as to the best manner of preserving peace with the emperor of the latter country. He did not believe it advisable to continue the sending of missionaries to Japan in the face of the prohibition of the government, thus provoking the hostility of the Japanese. The saneness of his point of view contrasts favorably with the impractical ambitions of some of his predecessors, who wanted to send missionaries in all directions, converting Cambodia, China, Cochin China, Japan, and India at once. Serrano regarded the missionary propaganda as having another aspect than the purely spiritual. Laying aside all questions of international relations and religion, the influence of missionaries in adjacent countries would increase Spanish trade to the exclusion of the Portuguese and the Dutch. The king returned a copy of Serrano's memorial to the governor and audiencia with instructions to act thereon.² Serrano also made various recommenda-

was said to be to prevent Christian Chinese from drawing spiritual sustenance from the church. Anda was the only *oidor* who had dared to oppose the demands of the religious (quoting his words) "that idolatrous Chinese should be admitted as Christians in order that priests might trade more easily." Although the church did have jurisdiction over spiritual affairs, "it [was] the duty of the governor, as vice-patron, to prevent that institution from the sacrilegious act of applying the name of Christians to idolaters, polygamists, and sodomists" ("Memorial of Don Simón de Anda y Salazar, July 7, 1768," *A.I.*, 108-3-17).

¹ "Arce to Philip III, June 1, 1619," in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, XVIII, 235-36.

² "King to Audiencia, August 4, 1626," *A.I.*, 105-2-1.

tions for the betterment of the internal administration of the Islands. He suggested the reform or the abolishment of the *audiencia*, which had been continually disregarded by the governor and which had suffered such degradation that it was no longer regarded seriously by the natives. Serrano also protested against the abuses of the appointing power by the governor, alleging that the latter had given positions to friends and relatives instead of to those entitled to reward for meritorious services.¹ In these various ways this prelate exercised an important influence in governmental affairs.

Another churchman whose administration as prelate was notable in many particulars was Archbishop Poblete. When he arrived at Manila in July, 1653, he succeeded to a see which had been vacant for twelve years, and accordingly found everything in a chaotic condition. The peaceful relations between him and Governor Lara during the earlier years of his administration were sufficiently notable to be deserving of special comment. They offer a striking contrast to the discord which led up to his exile at the hands of Lara's successor, Governor Salcedo. Poblete's term is also worthy of mention, in that this prelate may be said to have brought to an end the period of harmonious relations between church and state in the Philippines. From Salazar to Poblete the archbishops, although many of them were strong men, did not, as a rule, seek personal aggrandizement or the triumph of the ecclesiastical organization at the expense of the state, as did their successors through a period of more than a hundred years. With the exception of a few minor misunderstandings, the greater number lived and worked in harmony with the civil government. After Poblete, the tendency was in the other direction; the church sought its own aggrandizement at the expense of the civil government, till the ecclesiastical power reached its climax in such prelates as Pardo, De la Cuesta, Santos y Rufina, Camacho, and Rojo.

The episcopal power in the Philippines, at no time puerile or contemptible, may be said to have reached the zenith of its power when, in 1668, through the agency of the Inquisition, it unseated

¹ "Serrano to King, August 15, 1624," in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, XXI, 95-97.

Governor Salcedo and sent him in chains to Mexico. The exact charge against this governor has never been ascertained, but there is little doubt that his most serious offense lay in the check which he had placed on the commercial abuses of the ecclesiastics and of some of the merchants of Manila. The commissioner of the Holy Office dictated his will to a subservient audiencia, which permitted the usurper, Bónifaz, to assume the government. This man, who was virtually a dictator, owed his position to the influence of the church, and during his rule the ecclesiastical element practically controlled the government.¹

Ten years later the Pardo controversy further contributed to the power of the church in things governmental. In 1684 Archbishop Pardo refused to permit the intervention of Governor Vargas-Hurtado in matters of appointment within the church, which right the latter claimed as vice-patron. A struggle ensued which resulted in the exile of the prelate by the governor and audiencia. Soon after, Governor Curuzaelegui arrived to take over the administration. Pardo was recalled, Hurtado and the *oidores* were ruined by *residencia*, a new audiencia was constituted by Pardo and the governor, and the royal visitor, Valdivia, completed the degradation of the civil authority and emphasized its subjection to the prelate. Vast quantities of Chinese merchandise were said to have been sent out of the Islands by the ecclesiastics at this time, and it took several years for the colony to regain its normal status after the events of this rule.²

Possibly in recognition of the superior power of the church during his day, Governor Bustamante, in 1718, required the written opinion and advice of Archbishop de la Cuesta and the Dominican and Jesuit universities relative to the advisability of

¹ Correspondence relative to the Salcedo Affair exists in *A.I.*, 67-6-10. See Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, XXXII, 23-63, 273-75; Montero y Vidal, *Historia de Filipinas*, I, 336-61; Zúñiga, *History* (English ed.), I, 307-8; Concepción, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-200; Lea, *The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies*, pp. 229-318; Cunningham, "The Inquisition in the Philippines, The Salcedo Affair," in *The Catholic Historical Review*, III, 417-445.

² Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, XXXIX, 149-302. Correspondence relative to the Pardo controversy, *A.I.*, 68-1-44; Barrows, *History of the Philippines*, p. 217; Montero y Vidal, in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, I, 365-75.

certain reformatory measures which he proposed to inaugurate. These reforms were largely concerned with the removal of unworthy *oidores* and the reorganization of the *audiencia* without special royal authorization. As the advice of these respective religious authorities differed, and as the governor could not follow the advice of them all, he acted in accord with that of the Jesuits, whose counsel suited him best, disregarding that of the others.¹

The position of supremacy which the church had occupied in the colony during the years immediately preceding this had accustomed the archbishop to expect obedience to his commands. He accordingly employed excommunication against Bustamante, and resorted to violence, which the governor and *audiencia* met by defying and imprisoning the prelate and some of his followers, notwithstanding their ecclesiastical responsibilities and alleged immunities. The isolated character of Bustamante's position led to his violent downfall, however, and finally to his murder. Archbishop de la Cuesta profited sufficiently by the assassination of the governor to merit the charge that he had planned the *coup*. Certain it is that the act was carried out by the friars. Cuesta immediately succeeded to the government, and so completely did the ecclesiastical authorities dominate the situation that not so much as a formal report of the causes underlying Bustamante's death was made to the Council of the Indies until twenty years after the occurrence.² Even then the real causes were not set forth.

The triumphant rule of the church during the period from 1668 to 1762 was materially furthered by the selection of mild and pious governors, such as De León, Curuzaelegui, Zabalburú, and La Torre, who allowed themselves and their administrations to be dominated by the prelates. It was only occasionally that a man of the character of Bustamante appeared to sacrifice himself vainly in the defense of the royal prerogative, or men like Obando

¹ "Cuesta to King, November 19, 1719," *A.I.*, 108-3-1; see also Montero y Vidal, in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, I, 410, 421 f.

² Investigations were ordered by repeated royal *cédulas*. An inquiry was finally and formally accomplished on July 30, 1736, by Governor Váldez y Tamón (*A.I.*, 105-5-23).

and Arandía¹ came to struggle against the odds of the united ecclesiastical and judicial authorities, retiring at last, embittered by their failure, ruined by merciless *residencias*, or murdered through the instigation of their frocked enemies. These governors had to fight single-handed battles against the combined ecclesiastical, judicial, and commercial elements of the colony. This was during the period of the dominance of the church.

These ecclesiastical triumphs prepared the way for the entire control of the government by the churchmen. Four prelates occupied the governorship during the periods of vacancy from 1720 to 1763. The first of these was Archbishop de la Cuesta, who succeeded Bustamante on October 11, 1719, and ruled until August 6, 1721. His administration was preferred by the residents to that of the audiencia, which was legally entitled to succeed to the government.² The rule of Cuesta was exceedingly rigorous, and many of his acts as governor were disapproved by the Council of the Indies.³ The rule of this prelate inaugurated a

¹ Governor Anda, in his memorial of July 7, 1768, already cited, fittingly characterizes the efforts of Governor Arandía to maintain his position against the friars. He says, "he [Arandía] defended the royal authority with all his power; it was beaten down and trampled upon by the regulars, and his opposition to them caused them to declare on him the most violent war of opposition; he did not allow the regulars to meddle in his government, or to give orders to the *corregidores*, *alcaldes*, or Indians; . . . he defended as no one else did the liberty of those beaten down by the rich and the religious" (*A.I.*, 108-3-17).

² The audiencia had assumed the government during vacancies from 1608 to 1717. The striking defect of the *ad interim* rule of the audiencia was the certainty of a dictatorship on the part of the strongest magistrate. Immediately prior to the accession of Bustamante the colony had been forced to endure the rule of the audiencia. José Torralba, the senior *oidor*, assumed all the powers of government and controlled affairs from 1715 to 1717. He imprisoned his fellow-magistrates and disrupted the administration of justice. He made war on the clergy and accepted bribes from the Chinese. He reserved for himself the best of the Chinese merchandise that came to the colony and monopolized most of the space on the galleon, practically ruining the mercantile interests of the city. He was said to have sent his wife to Macao with large sums of money, intending to follow her. In his *residencia* he was charged with the embezzlement of 700,000 pesos. He was ruined in that trial, and he died a beggar in Cavite in 1736. Original correspondence on the rule of Torralba exists in *A.I.*, 68-4-18.

³ Two years later Cuesta was removed from his post at Manila, where he had incurred the hostility of both the ecclesiastical and civil elements. He was demoted to the post of Bishop of Mechoacán.

practice in the Philippines which had been followed in New Spain and elsewhere on numerous occasions.¹ The *cédula* of September 8, 1720, legalized this method of filling vacancies in the Philippines.² According to that law the succession was to be provided for by three consecutively numbered sealed envelopes (*pliegos de providencia*) which were to be kept in the archives of the audiencia. On the death of the governor the first envelope was to be opened and the directions contained therein were to be followed. The first envelope was opened in accordance with this regulation in 1745, on the death of Governor Obando, and it was found that the archbishop was designated as governor. The post being vacant, the second seal was broken and therein were directions providing for the accession of Fr. Juan Archedera, Bishop of Nueva Segovia. He ruled until 1750, notwithstanding the arrival of Archbishop Trinidad in 1747, who was not ambitious for political power³ and who declined to serve as governor. Archedera's rule was efficient from an administrative point of view. It was characterized especially by various measures taken for the defense and fortification of the Islands. He suppressed several insurrections in Ilocos and Cagayán, dispatching military forces under the command of *alcaldes mayores* against the revolting natives. He repulsed several Moro raids and made treaties of peace with the Sultan of Sulu.⁴ He was accused, however, of accepting bribes from the Chinese in return for the suspension of the royal mandate which had ordered their expulsion from the Islands.⁵

The third time the government was taken over by a prelate was in 1759, on the death of Governor Arandía. The metropolitan see of Manila and the diocese of Nueva Segovia being vacant, the government was assumed by Bishop Espeleta of Cebú. This prelate ruled until 1761, when he was succeeded by Archbishop Rojo. Espeleta did very effective work in repelling the raids of

¹ Seven archbishops had already succeeded to the government in New Spain (Bolton, *Guide to the Mexican Archives*, pp. 469-70).

² "Cédula of September 8, 1720," *A.I.*, 106-4-16.

³ Trinidad had been a member of the Audiencia of Peru and was an honorary member of the Council of the Indies. (Zúñiga, *op. cit.*, II, 89; Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, XLVIII, 145-46.)

⁴ Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.*, I, 480-95.

⁵ Zúñiga, *op. cit.*, II, 89-90.

the Moros, who had been ravaging the provinces with impunity for some time. His rule was administratively efficient, and devoid of any great scandal except the vindictive prosecution of Dr. Santiago Orendáin, who had been the adviser of the preceding governor. Orendáin was held accountable for all of Arandía's repressive acts against the friars, and Espeleta utilized his advantage as governor to take revenge. He obtained little satisfaction, however, for when Rojo succeeded to the government he restored Orendáin to his former post as adviser of the governor.¹

The rule of Archbishop Rojo was notable in the history of the Islands. The principal event during his administration was the capture of Manila by the British. This furnished the occasion for the resistance of *Oidor* (later Governor) Simón de Anda y Salazar to the surrender of the Islands to the British and to the archbishop, who, co-operating with the enemy, had ordered his capitulation. This series of events revealed the unfitness of an ecclesiastic to fill the military requirements of the governor's position in time of stress. In the operations of Anda we note how a man of decisive action, energy, courage, and loyalty was able to force the issue and deprive an ecclesiastical governor of the executive functions which he exercised legally, but which, because of the nature of his profession and training, he was unable to dispense. This episode illustrates, furthermore, the deliberate disregard by the subjects of Spain in a distant colony of the laws which conferred the governorship upon a decrepit ecclesiastic, making it clear that in the selection of a person to carry out the duties of governor the military side of the situation could not be disregarded. Rojo's administration was subsequently discredited by the home government.²

The more important causes, however, of the failure of the ecclesiastical power to successfully administer the government must be sought elsewhere than in the Philippines. Conditions in Europe were no longer favorable to the pre-eminence of the

¹ "Report of Viana, March 8, 1763," *A.I.*, 107-3-2; Montero y Vidal, in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, II, 9; Zúñiga, *op. cit.*, I, 138-40.

² Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.*, I, 70-75; Zúñiga, *op. cit.*, I, 241 f. Anda was personally thanked by the king and was given a membership in the Council of Castile with a pension for life.

church. The clergy in Spain had become unpopular with the masses and with the government. The irresistible wave of liberalism which swept over that country in the latter part of the eighteenth century detracted from the support which the church might have had and influenced matters even in the far-away Philippines. On no subsequent occasion did an ecclesiastic take over the rule of the Islands,¹ and this diminution of the prerogatives of the church was general throughout the Spanish colonial empire. There is no instance in which the rule of a prelate ever resulted quite so disastrously as in the Philippines from 1762 to 1764. The accession of Francisco Xavier de la Torre as civil governor *ad interim* in 1764 not only marks the discontinuance of the practice of allowing archbishops to take charge of the government during vacancies, but it emphasizes the end of the dominating influence of the church in the political affairs of the Philippines.

Apart from what has been set forth in the preceding paragraphs, but worthy of notice, nevertheless, are a few of the miscellaneous influences which the church exercised on the government. Up to July, 1606, the episcopal head of the Islands was also protector of the Indians. We have already noted that this duty devolved on Bishop Salazar as prelate of the Islands, but in 1606 the exercise of this special function was taken from the churchman and conferred upon the *fiscal* of the audiencia. The reason for this change was that the latter, by virtue of his legal position, could more easily prosecute offenders and defend the natives in the civil tribunals.² The prelates of the Philippines, moreover, unlike those of New Spain and Peru, were frequently commissioners of the Inquisition. The exercise of this function gave a tremendous advantage to these ecclesiastics at all times, and enabled them to utilize the secret procedure of this powerful institution against all offenders. The concentration of this power in the archbishop gave him added prestige among the civil and ecclesiastical elements of the colony. Notable instances of the abuse of this authority may be noted in the arrest and exile of Governor Salcedo in

¹ In New Spain two prelates governed temporarily after this time, Peralta in 1787 and Beaumont in 1809 (Bolton, *Guide*, 469-70).

² *Recopilación*, 6-6-13; 2-18-34.

1668, in the Pardo controversy in 1684 and in the succeeding administrations which were affected by it, and finally in the protection of the frocked murderers of Governor Bustamante in 1719. These events have already been referred to in this paper.¹

There were occasions, too, on which the talent of the church was called upon to exercise functions of a purely legal character. Departing from the usual practice of sending judicial inspectors from New Spain, the king, on November 9, 1623, designated the Bishop of Nueva Segovia to examine all the papers, documents, and letters of the audiencia, to take note of all suits pending therein, and to report minutely on the effectiveness and zeal of that tribunal for the royal service.² The practice of delegating this duty to churchmen was seldom followed in the Philippines, although it was frequently done in New Spain, in the West Indies, and in South America. When acting in this capacity, churchmen were required to lay aside their ecclesiastical prerogatives and officiate as functionaries of the civil government.

A task similar to the above was intrusted to a churchman in 1684, when a member of the ecclesiastical *cabildo* of Manila was delegated to conduct the *residencia* of Governor Vargas-Hurtado. Neither was this duty required of ecclesiastics as a rule. It was the consequence on this occasion of the recent triumph of the church over the civil government and coincident with the high-handed measures of Archbishop Pardo. Moreover, all the judges of the audiencia were incapacitated from service by the excommunication inflicted upon them by the archbishop, and they were themselves also obliged to undergo investigation on the same

¹ The Inquisition was represented in the Philippines by a commissioner and three alternates, established March 1, 1583, and subject to the jurisdiction of the tribunal of the Inquisition in Mexico (see Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, V, 256-73). Henry Charles Lea, in commenting on the power of the Inquisition in the Philippines, says, "while this branch of the Inquisition did little for the faith, it was eminently successful in the function of contributing to the disorder and confusion which so disastrously affected colonial administration" (*The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies*, p. 308). Governor León, writing on June 16, 1671, described the ways of the Inquisition as "dark and secret, . . . a danger and a fearful power . . . a monster, feared by all, working, not in the light of day, but insidiously, a sinister power whose strength cannot be estimated" (*A.I.*, 67-7-10).

² "King to Conde de Priego, November 9, 1623," *A.I.*, 105-2-1.

charges as the governor; hence they could not act as judges of *residencia* in accordance with the law.¹

An influence of an entirely different character was that exercised by the Augustinians through their control of the governor's favorite, Venegas, from 1644 to 1651. Venegas was a scheming, ambitious individual who seems to have had some mysterious connection with the Augustinian order. He has been accused of being an Augustinian in the guise of a private subject. At any event, he served for several years as secretary to Governor Fajardo, and during that period he practically dictated the policies of the administration, while all persons, political and ecclesiastical, who remained outside the scope of his friendship were powerless and in positive danger. He managed the *residencia* of Governor Corcuera, and, in revenge for that governor's assistance to the prelates in the enforcement of the principle of ecclesiastical visitation upon the Augustinians and Dominicans, Venegas loosed the full force of his malevolence. He also hated Corcuera because the latter had favored the Jesuits in various conflicts which the latter order had had with the Augustinians. Venegas influenced Fajardo to deprive Corcuera of his property and to fine him heavily. The ex-governor was imprisoned and exiled to the provinces for five years.² In this manner Venegas exercised practically all the powers of governor and vice-patron for seven years. He made and unmade prelates, divided the ecclesiastical provinces among the provincials whose orders he favored, and brought about the triumph of his own particular friends, the Augustinians, while the governor and audiencia were mere instruments in his hands. This state of affairs continued until 1651, when, through the influence of the Recollects, Venegas was removed, disgraced, and imprisoned. The ineffectiveness of the civil administration of Governor Diego Fajardo proceeded largely from his own pliable

¹ "Testimonio de la residencia del señor don Juan de Vargas-Hurtado, 7 de Dicre., 1686," *A.I.*, 68-1-27.

² Corcuera was subsequently exonerated by royal decree and was appointed to the governorship of the Canaries (Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.*, I, 266-67; Zúñiga, in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, I, 277; XXXVI, 206; XXXVII, 72, 158, 291; XVII, 291).

character, subjected as it was to the scheming influences of Venegas and his cloaked friends.

The Jesuit order in the Philippines has been charged with the exertion of an influence similar to that just described. This imputation, indeed, has been brought against the society in all the countries wherein it has operated. While the Dominicans have furnished the greater number of prelates and have controlled the Inquisition more completely than any other order in the Philippines, they have never manifested the same degree of subtlety and diplomatic suavity that has always characterized the Jesuits. The manipulations of the latter went much more deeply and were more effective by far than the open brusqueness and forcefulness of the Dominicans. It may be noted that in practically all questions which arose, and in all conflicts between church and state in which the other orders were involved, the adroitness of the Jesuits was manifested always by their alignment on the side of the civil government. This is true of the Pardo controversy, the Bustamante affair, and the struggle between Anda and Rojo. The Jesuits were notoriously on the side of the government in the visitation controversies in the Islands. When the relations between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities were peaceful and harmonious the Jesuits were always on better terms than any other order with the civil authorities, and particularly with the governor. They exerted tact and diplomacy in their dealings with the vice-patron, and as a result they were assigned the most favorable localities for their work prior to their exclusion from the Islands. Their educational institutions, which were of the best, and their missionary propaganda, which was always effective, enjoyed the favor, support, and patronage of the home government.¹

The Jesuits were, to all intents and purposes, law-abiding. They did nothing openly to incur the resentment and hostility of

¹ These reflections are in accord with the observations of Le Gentil. This traveler states that the Jesuits and the governor were especially good friends at the time of his visit to the Islands; indeed, they were on such intimate terms that the brothers of the society made calls on the governor during the *siesta* hour, a liberty which no other person dared to take ("Ecclesiastical Survey," in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, XXVIII, 216-19).

the civil or royal authorities. It is said that they indulged with profit in commercial ventures, and certain it is that they owned large estates and *haciendas*.¹ In that regard they were no different from other orders. The chief distinction between them and the contemporary societies was to be found in the organization of a well-trained and carefully selected constituency whose membership and composition were far superior in morale, education, and general ability to that of any other order in the Philippines. By the employment of superior mental acumen, skill, and industry they were able to gain for themselves, often at the expense and always to the disgust and envy of the other orders, prosperity, wealth, and the favor of the government.²

It seems hardly necessary to state in the abstract whether the general influence of the church in the Philippines was beneficial or not. As in all the colonies of Spain the church exercised a powerful influence in political and administrative as well as ecclesiastical

¹ The fact that they were among the most extensive land-owners in the Islands prompted them to resist the claims of the government of the right to inspect their titles to lands from 1687 to 1753. It is said that the excesses of the Jesuits, Dominicans, and Augustinians on the Island of Luzón, from 1740 to 1750, caused several revolts, which had to be put down by armed force. See my article on "The Origin of the Friar Lands Question in the Philippines," *American Political Science Review*, X (August, 1916), 465-80.

² "The Jesuits," wrote Montero y Vidal (in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, I, 306), "enjoyed so great a predominance, and realized such enormous gains throughout the Archipelago (with their well-equipped industrial enterprises, their lucrative trade, and the produce of their vast estates), and they kept the natives so thoroughly exploited and so subjected to their domineering influence, . . . cajolling the vanity of some with their hypocritical deference with which the fathers treated them, and favoring the notions of independence in others, giving them to understand that they were not Spaniards, but citizens of the world," that no other order rivaled them in power and importance. While it is not the concern of this treatise to account for the expulsion of the society, it may be justly observed that the causes were not local to the Philippines. With its suppression, property to the value of more than 2,000,000 pesos fell to the government and the secular church of the Philippines. This consisted of money, lands, merchandise, houses, livestock, chattels, and other property. Churches, colleges, monasteries, and colleges went to the secular church. The suppression of the society had the advantage also of removing a stumbling-block from the pathway of the rival orders.

The supreme climax of intrigue and corruption is said to have been reached by the Jesuits during their last hours in the Philippines. With an extensive bribe they are said to have secured from Governor Raón secret information of their impending

affairs. It is to the former that most of our attention has been directed in this brief summary. It must be said, however, in behalf of the labors of the church through three centuries of Philippine history, that up to the time of the American occupation of the Islands practically all the progress in civilization there, and notably the spiritual and cultural advancement of the Malays of the archipelago over their Mohammedan brothers of Java, Sumatra, and the Straits Settlements, were entirely the result of the educational efforts and the pastoral care of the Spanish clergy.

doom, and they were given five days by this executive in which to secrete and later make away with the greater part of their movable wealth. In these machinations *Oidor* Villacorta was said to have played an extensive part. Neither the governor nor the *audiencia* seem to have exerted themselves unduly to bring about the prompt and effective execution of the royal *cédula* of February 27, 1767, which commanded the suppression of the order (the various *cédulas*, decrees, *bandos*, correspondence, and *testimonios* relating to the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Philippines are to be found in *A.I.*, 105-4-1 to 4).

RECENT PROGRESS OF THE FREE CHURCHES IN ENGLAND

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I

Despite Shakespeare's lines,

What's in a name? that which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet

(an opinion which, dramatically appropriate on the lips of the speaker, we need not suppose to spring from the wisdom of Shakespeare), names carry not only a significant content but many precious memories and valuable associations. It meant much both for themselves and the world when "the disciples were called Christians first in Antioch." It is a sign of the recent progress of nonconformity or dissent in England that these names are not often heard, but that the term "Free Churches" has gained current use.

1. This change of name signifies first of all that a more distinct church consciousness has emerged. There are still many who are proud of calling themselves nonconformists or dissenters, and who in their antagonism to *the Church* are rather suspicious of these new developments as an ecclesiasticism which they distrust. But among the younger men especially, although men of a former generation, like Dr. Dale, had shown the way, there is a growing number who refuse to sacrifice to the idol of hostility to *the Church*, which has arrogated to itself that name, the New Testament conception and estimate of the Christian community as the body of Christ, the temple of the Holy Ghost, a building "fitly framed together by that which every joint supplieth, and so making increase of the body unto the building up of itself in love." The convictions of the early Independents regarding the presence of the Lord in the midst of believers gathered in his name is being

anew appreciated as for some time it was not. One of the barriers to the reunion of Christendom is slowly being laid low.

2. This change of name signifies secondly that a positive purpose is displacing a negative. The older terms nonconformity or dissent assume the controversies of the past and define the position in relation to the Church of England. While, as we shall see, there is a growing appreciation of that church as a Christian community, its peculiarity, as by state established, is being allowed to fall into the background as a reason for discord. The contrast is implied in the more positive purpose indicated in the term now preferred; the aim of these churches is to realize in their church thought, life, and work the freedom wherewith the Son maketh free. It cannot be pretended that in all these churches what such freedom implies is fully recognized. In all it means self-government and independence of the control of the state; in some it means, however, less freedom for the individual minister or member than in others. The legal position of the Christian churches cannot be said to be entirely unambiguous and satisfactory. The decision with regard to the property of the United Free Church of Scotland given by the House of Lords was generally felt to be nothing short of an outrage, an invasion by the state of the realm that properly belongs to the self-government of the church. What is necessary is that on ministers and members of churches alike there shall be imposed the obligation to accept as final the decision of the properly constituted authority in the church, without any appeal to the state. Even if an appeal to the state be made in disregard of such obligation the function of the law courts should be strictly limited to determine whether the decision has been reached in accordance with the constitution which the church concerned has adopted for itself. Until even as regards the terms on which property is held the churches have secured self-government without any interference from the courts of law, their ideal of freedom will not be fully realized.

II

The Church of England has been chafing under its bonds. In order that it may adapt itself in its manifold ministry to the varied and varying needs of the country, for the religious condition of

which it claims the primary responsibility, it must change its now, in many points, antiquated organization. It has no power to legislate for itself, and parliament has neither the time nor the inclination to pass the necessary legislation for it. Ecclesiastical questions arouse so much partisanship in those who are interested in them, and are regarded with so much indifference, if not aversion, by the other members of the legislature, that governments readily yield to the temptation, for which they can easily find a plausible excuse in the already too great pressure on the legislature, to leave them alone altogether despite the injury thus inflicted on the church. The report of the Archbishops' Committee on the Relation of Church and State makes a number of recommendations in order to secure for the church the right to legislate for itself, subject to a veto on its legislations by parliament. Into the details of these proposals it would be beyond the present purpose to go; but the subject is relevant here, as not only does the confession by the church of the impotence which the state connection imposes upon it confirm the convictions of the Free Churches regarding the evil of subordinating church to state, but these churches are called on to decide what attitude they should assume to this endeavor of a sister-church to gain some measure of freedom. It is far too complex a question on which to give a summary decision; but a few considerations bearing on it may be offered for the judgment of the reader.

1. The Free Churches cannot be other than appreciative of the recognition by the church of the need of freedom from the control of the state in order that Christ may be more fully obeyed, and sympathetic toward aspirations and efforts to secure that freedom. They cannot avoid, however, a feeling of surprise at the surviving Erastianism of their Christian brethren, at the small measure of freedom claimed for the church, and the large measure of control still accorded to the state; and they can but wish that the venture for self-government had been less cautious and more courageous. The greatly improved relations among the Christian churches make criticism or opposition a very ungrateful task. Nevertheless the Free Churches, the present members of which have been free born, but cannot forget the price at which their fathers bought this freedom, must ask the church to consider whether the price of

complete freedom is not worth paying and must not be paid. There are nonconformists who still glory in that name who put the position very bluntly: without disestablishment no loosening of the bonds of the state connection.

2. In so far as jealousy of, or hostility to, the Church of England as established is the reason of this attitude, the majority of Free Churchmen, I am confident, do not share it, and do not want to keep the Church of England in bondage. There is, however, a principle involved, not ecclesiastical, but political, that with all generosity of sentiment to the church they cannot abandon, viz., the state must control what the state supports. The immense privileges that are the gift of the nation to the church as established cannot be handed over to what is after all only a section of the nation, however considerable and important it may be; for while the proposed constitution reserves in theory a far greater measure of control to the state than a Free Churchman can regard as even tolerable, yet in practice, owing to the aversion of both governments and parliaments to meddle with ecclesiastical matters, that control would probably not be exercised to any adequate extent to secure that the will of the nation should determine the use to be made of the privileges conferred by the nation. Personally I should be very sorry if this subject involved any renewal of the controversy and the conflict between the Free Churches and the Established Church. Surely there should be conference as Christian brethren before any political action that may inevitably provoke antagonism is taken by either side. My own conviction is that not only would the Established Church incalculably improve its relation with the Free Churches by voluntarily abandoning the state connection as the ransom for its freedom in Christ, but that it would be in a far better position, as both self-supporting and self-governing, to render to the nation the ministry that it is fitted to give. In a democracy becoming always more conscious of its meaning and aim, a privileged institution must be, and will be, at a disadvantage.

III

Not only this reason, but others also are a challenge to the Free Churches to reconsider the negative attitude to the state, which the action of the state in compelling them to become nonconformist has

in the past imposed upon them. So long as the state was claiming the right to control the belief and worship of its citizens, the inevitable and proper cry was, "Hands off." Caesar is a usurper where Christ alone has the right to reign. But having won for themselves freedom, and now finding themselves in a state that does not desire to meddle in the things of the soul, the churches must ask themselves whether suspicion and antagonism may not yield to mutual confidence and co-operation. On the one hand many functions once discharged by the church have passed over to the state, such as education and the care of the poor. On the other the state is being moralized and Christianized in the sense that it is recognizing a wider and fuller responsibility for the whole welfare of all its citizens. The private philanthropy which the church directed is being replaced by the corporate action, legislative and administrative, of the society controlled by the state. For its own vitality and vigor the church must not abandon its interest in all these forms of public service; for the sake of the state the church must lend its instruction and influence to support state efforts.

1. Not all the Free Churches went equally far in their refusal to co-operate with the state. The Wesleyan Methodist and the Presbyterian churches felt no scruples about accepting payment out of taxes or rates of the salaries of Army and Navy chaplains and for services rendered in public institutions, such as workhouses, asylums, prisons; but many belonging to the Baptist and the Congregational churches regarded the acceptance of any such payments as a compromise of their principles. But before many of these stalwarts were aware of it, a breach in their wall of defense had been made soon after the war began. A joint board representing the Baptist, Congregationalist, and Primitive and United Methodist churches was appointed to supply the Army with a certain proportion of its chaplains. The desire to share in the ministry offered to the men from the membership of all the Free Churches who had so freely offered themselves for the service of king and country in the hour of peril swept away the objection; and if it is again urged it is not likely that it will find so general support. If the principle is once conceded, however, further applications of it cannot be refused. Why should Christian churches continue their refusal to share in the ministry to the aged

and sick, the diseased in mind, and the prisoners? About unpaid service of this kind there is no question; but there are practical difficulties, sometimes imposed by the public authorities concerned, which are leading many Free Churchmen to the conviction that it can be done efficiently only by a paid agency. Whether they are right or wrong in this assumption it is not our concern now to inquire: suffice it to cite this extension of the principle.

2. The same principle, the acceptance by nonconformists of any payments from the state, is in dispute with regard to education: there are a number of secondary boarding-schools, mainly supported by, although not altogether limited to, nonconformists; hitherto the general policy has been to refuse all state grants. The raising of the standard of education and the greater cost of it combine in so increasing the strain on the voluntary support which can be secured that the breaking-point is being reached; and the question has to be faced whether acceptance of grants involves an abandonment of nonconformist principles. There are other considerations that complicate the issue, but these meanwhile must be left out of account. That the Christian churches should not stand out of the national system of education, of which so great an improvement is in contemplation, but should try to discover how fully they can take their share in its progress, is a very weighty reason for fully facing the whole question. A legitimate tradition of the past may become an illegitimate prejudice in the present; and an appeal to what nonconformist fathers would have said or done is trifling with the responsibility of their sons to think and act for themselves as seems best in the actual situation.

3. As long as there is an Established Church, and as long as in connection with education denominational advantages, involving often the sacrifice of educational efficiency, are being snatched, the question will remain difficult to answer. Were no church privileged or controlled by the state, then the solution of the problem of the relation of church and state in mutual service in the interests of the community could be more hopefully attempted. Meanwhile, however, the Free Churches are confronted with practical difficulties, which a "rule of thumb" application of abstract principles will not relieve. That the need for reconsider-

ation of all these questions is being recognized in the Free Churches I claim as a sign that they do not want to be hindered by the traditions of the past in the service that they are called to render to the present.

IV

That the Council of the Free Churches of England calls itself *National* is an indication of an advance from the only too common position when each denomination, and even in many cases each congregation, lived for itself and worked by itself.

1. That the National Free Church Council has rendered and is still rendering invaluable service to the nation through the Free Churches should be fully acknowledged. In public affairs it is generally recognized as focusing the general opinion of the Free Churches. It is often made a complaint that nonconformity has not the political influence which it once had; and the explanation is offered that there has been a deterioration in the quality of the men that the churches are producing. I do not believe this to be the true reason. Till Liberalism was divided on the question of home rule nonconformity presented a compact mass of Liberal opinion. When many, especially of the wealthier nonconformists, became Unionists, they not only abandoned their Liberalism upon that one point, but accepted on many other public questions a position contrary to the staunch tradition of civic as well as religious liberty which prevailed in nonconformity. This division of opinion in the Free Churches silenced its testimony and decreased its influence in public affairs. It is certain that the National Free Church Council has not felt free to act as courageously and effectively as otherwise it might have done, because it knew that on not a few of the questions nonconformity was speaking with a divided voice. One thing it has accomplished: it has brought together in personal friendship and cordial co-operation many of the leaders of the Free Churches, and so has prepared the way for the closer federation of the Free Churches now under consideration.

2. The National Council was representative of local councils, adhesion to which in any place was altogether voluntary, and thus it could not claim directly to represent the denominations. It could

only advise common action; it could not use any authority to make its advice effective. The result has been that while many of the most influential men in the denominations have worked most devotedly for the Free Church Council, yet the denominations in carrying out their policy have paid no regard to the aims or efforts of the Council. The men of wider sympathies have found it easy and pleasant to work together. The keen denominationalists, who often carry very much more weight in the inner councils of the church they belong to than do men who are much better known to the religious world outside, have been able to delay and thwart the united action of the Free Churches. What Mr. Shakespeare, the secretary of the Baptist Union of England, proposed when he was chairman of the National Council, was the formation of the *Free Church of England*, in which each of the denominations would preserve its autonomy in matters concerning itself, but which would be capable of corporate action in many ways now not open to the Free Church Council. The negotiations are still going on. What will be secured probably is an organization which might be best described by the title the *Federated Free Churches of England*. It has been most gratifying to find to how large an extent agreement has been found practicable. The waste and scandal of overlapping in some places, where there are more Free Churches, all weak and struggling, than there is any need for, may be ended. Opportunities for extension in newly populated districts will be embraced, not sporadically by this or that denomination, but by a united effort. It will be possible for the Free Churches so to pool their resources that unitedly they will be able to provide for the religious needs of the country as they have never been able to do before. The motive of the movement is not hostility to the Church of England, but solicitude for the religious condition of England, the aspiration to make it, not in conflict, but in co-operation, with the church, a truly Christian country. It is already seen from the results of the conferences that have been held that such a union involves no sacrifice of principles that should be held fast, but only the discovery of how much more real is the unity of faith and life in Christ than are the differences in doctrine or practice. A change of conviction regarding the things that matter in the Chris-

tian church has made smooth a path that would have been very rough to tread had the old denominational rigidity and exclusiveness still prevailed. Let not this movement be suspected as the device of wily ecclesiastics, but be welcomed as the purpose of genuinely Christian men to make as visible to the world as they can the unity which they are discovering in Christ as common Savior and supreme Lord. A great stride forward will have been made by the Free Churches when they secure this federation.

V

This movement toward the Federated Free Churches of England is not the only approach toward Christian unity.

1. The relation of the Church of England and the Free Churches is becoming very much more cordial. The war has brought the citizens of this country very much nearer to one another; the common danger and the common duty have made the churches more conscious of their unity in Christ than of their differences from one another. While there is the conviction generally held in the Christian churches that the nation was right in entering the war in defense of Belgian neutrality and in resistance to German tyranny, yet the fact that Christendom is at war on such a scale and with such methods is compelling Christian men to ask themselves whether the churches of Christ have been as faithful to their trust as they might have been, especially whether their testimony and influence have not been weakened by their unhappy divisions. Reports of Army chaplains and other Christian workers have brought home to the churches a fact that they had not as fully realized as they might have done had their discernment been keener and their solicitude for the souls of men deeper, namely, that the great majority of the nation is indifferent to the Christian church, though not hostile to Christ. The Church of England Mission of Repentance and Hope has rather confirmed than dispelled this humbling discovery. Desiring to do better the work of Christ all the Christian churches are being drawn closer together. There is no room for competition; there is no excuse for conflict; the duty of the hour is co-operation.

2. Another reason for this drawing together is to be found, I believe, in the Student Christian movement, which has brought Churchmen and Free Churchmen into intimate relations with one another, the result of which is mutual understanding and respect. Those who have been chums at college are not likely in after-life to distrust one another. The common interest in theological inquiry, social reform, and missionary enterprise which the movement is developing is a strong, and there is good ground for believing an enduring, bond of unity. When the direction of the affairs of the churches falls into the hands of these younger men we may believe that the unity will find adequate expression.

3. To the United States is due another impulse toward unity. While the war has delayed the proposed Conference on Faith and Order, the preparation for it in Great Britain has been going on without clamor or display. Anglicans and nonconformists have been conferring together and have been discovering how near they are to one another as they come near to Christ. A declaration has been made public regarding the agreement reached on matters of faith. While some "liberals" in both camps have objected to the positive tone of the statements about doctrine, to most Christians it has been a joy to find how close is the accord with regard to the central verities of the Christian gospel. As might be expected, on questions of order it has been found much more difficult to discover and to define agreement. As the second declaration in which these matters will be discussed has not yet been made public, I am not at liberty to indicate its contents. I am justified in saying, however, that the Spirit of God has guided those who have conferred together to a measure of agreement that would have seemed humanly impossible. Those who have thus conferred together are quite aware that they have realized their unity in Christ as the churches they represent have not yet done in equal degree; but their own experience is to them a promise and a pledge that when the Christian churches will come together under the guidance of the Spirit to seek those things that make for peace they will also discover how much more precious are their agreements than formidable their differences. What has so far been done is no attempt to anticipate what may be done at the

conference when it is held. No articles of union have been drawn up; for the statements of agreement only those who have added their signatures are responsible. But it is hoped that the conference is being prepared for in putting before the churches the questions for discussion in such a way as not to provoke controversy, but to evoke concord of spirit, if not always agreement of opinion. It has been one of the deepest satisfactions I have ever had to have shared in these endeavors.

VI

In a previous article¹ I felt it my unwelcome duty to call attention to the dangers of reaction, theological and ethical, that the war has brought. It is a welcome pleasure now to express the conviction that on the whole the position in these respects is one of promise. The doctrine of the atonement, the center of evangelical theology, is receiving a respectful attention such as was not given to it before. Men are asking themselves the ultimate questions to which the Christian gospel alone gives adequate answers. Not a few Christian ministers are bewildered about the answers that they should give, as they feel that a traditional orthodoxy does not meet the need. But they are seeking for guidance; and steps are being taken by lectures to, and conferences with, ministers to help them out of their difficulties. The pulpit should be more closely in touch with reality after the war than it was before. While there is no distinct evidence of religious revival, and even the anxieties, difficulties, and miseries of war have led in some cases to a loss of interest in the worship and work of the churches, yet the churches are alive to their opportunity and obligation as they have not been for many years. More strenuous efforts than have ever been made before are being planned to lay hold on the manhood of the nation when it returns from the fields of battle. It is hoped that for a time at least, until the old routine recovers its captives, there will be greater responsiveness to religious and moral appeal of the right kind. The churches are also hearing the call to social service, to participation in the reconstruction that must begin as soon as peace is secured. One anxiety presses sorely on many serious and

¹ *American Journal of Theology*, XXI (July, 1917), 325-38.

earnest men, although the churches as a whole have not yet been made to feel it; and it is this, lest the terms of peace should be such that the Christian conscience could not unreservedly approve them. One aspiration possesses these men, that the peace shall by its nature start mankind on a new stage of progress toward the reconciliation of all peoples. Many in England are looking to President Wilson to give decisive assistance to all who here or in other lands are resolved to have a peace that will make an end of war in the world, and so will allow all the resources of culture and civilization, under the inspiration of Christianity, to be employed, not in mutual destruction, but for the upbuilding of the City of God in earth. In the discharge of that task the largest opportunity and so the heaviest obligation rests on the English-speaking peoples. Into this sacred partnership the Free Churches of England, with gratitude to God, welcome their Christian brethren in America.

CHURCH AND STATE IN MEDIAEVAL GERMANY. II

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Otto I was the first mediaeval ruler who attempted clearly and thoroughly to make the church an ally of the government. The problem and the policy have been admirably formulated by Sohm:

The royal power, upon which, nevertheless, the imperial authority rested, fell far short of the position formerly assumed by the Frankish kings. The feudal system had arisen in the meanwhile, and had changed the constitution of the state. The count was no longer, as before, the official organ of the royal will, but a vassal whose county belonged to him as a fief in his own right. Moreover, above the count, the great duchies had arisen, the Swabian, the Bavarian, the Frankish, the Lotharingian, and the Saxon, which possessed a power altogether equal to that of the king. The royal power was in danger of being turned from a real supremacy into a mere feudal overlordship. Otho the Great saved it from this danger by two measures. First he attached the duchies as much as possible to his own family, and thus turned the resources of the duchy into resources of the kingdom. This measure was only partially successful; since his own brother, the Duke of Bavaria, and his own son, the Duke of Swabia, were far more inclined to rebel against the royal power than to be obedient to it.

The decisive measure which Otho the Great employed was to build the new kingdom on the power of the church. Under him it became an express principle of the royal policy to raise the power of the church, especially of the bishops, by enriching them with gifts, bestowing on them public privileges, and even making them counts. And wherefore? In order that the power of the spiritual princes might counterbalance that of the arrogant temporal princes. The king was surer of the spiritual lords than he was of the temporal. The king himself nominated the bishop and abbot of the imperial monasteries by means of the investiture with ring and crosier. He was more free to nominate the bishop and abbot than the count and duke, because spiritual offices were not hereditary, neither could be hereditary. The spiritual dignities in every case fell again into the king's hands at his disposal, and could always be filled by the persons most agreeable to the king.

Even property belonging to the spiritual foundations passed as in some measure the property of the empire. What the spiritual foundation gained

was not therefore lost to the empire. On the contrary, it became rather the more certain possession of the empire, by being withdrawn from the hands of the great temporal vassals. The king received subsidies, under the name of gifts, from the church lands, and from church lands the greater part of his troops was supplied in case of war. So over church lands the king set up the bishop or abbot most agreeable to him. Thus the German kingdom and the German empire of the Middle Ages became possible. Its supremacy found a material substratum in the power of the church; and the royal investiture represented the means by which the church was bound to the king.¹

Otto I, even more than Charlemagne, made the church a political and economic ingredient of the government.² He found the German church in a condition of terror and material collapse owing to the violence of the feudality; the office of advocate of church property converted into a huge device by the baronage for the purpose of levying blackmail upon the monasteries; church endowments almost everywhere except in Saxony, where the church was too poor and his own ducal power too strong to permit practices which elsewhere obtained, divided among families and private persons.³ To all this spoliation and local "secularization"—to give the practice a euphemistic term—Otto I put an end. In 951 all "royal" abbeys were declared exempt from all and any secular authority save that of the crown, and forbidden to enfeef their lands without the consent of the king.⁴

¹ *Outlines of Church History* (Eng. trans., London, 1895), 97-99. Cf. Paul Merkert, *Kirche und Staat im Zeitalter der Ottonen* (Breslau diss., 1905), and Sommerlad, II, 238 f.

² Willigis of Mainz broke two coalitions of the dukes in the time of Otto III and Henry II.—Lamprecht, II, 170.

³ The tendency toward aggrandizement of the temporal power of the clergy, even down to simple priests, appears in *Vita Oudalrici*, c. 7: "Horum autem, qui in suo episcopatu proprietates habebant, quisquis religiosorum propter amorem Christi ecclesiam componere cupiebat, et cum concessa licentia ab eodem sancto episcopo eam aedificaverat consecrationemque habili tempore ab eo fieri flagitavit, aptissima uniuscujusque petitioni praebeuit assensum, si confestim ille consecratae ecclesiae legitimam dotem in terris et mancipiis in manum ejus celsitudinis dare non differet . . . ea etiam ratione, ut aliis circumjacentibus ecclesiis jura earum in nullis rebus propter illam novam minuerentur."

⁴ Gebhardt, *Handbuch der deutschen Gesch.* (1st ed.), I, 258; Nitzsch, I, 348-49; Waitz, VII, 93, n. 3; 209, n. 2; Feierabend, 1. At the end of the rule of the Saxon house there were 85 royal abbeys in Germany (Matthäi, 96-101; Koeniger, 105, n. 1). For discussion of the condition described in the text see Waitz, VII, 209-11; Sommerlad, II, 239 f.; Hauck, III, 30 f.; Lamprecht, II, 154 f.; Nitzsch, I, 340 f.; Dümmler, *Otto der Gr.*, 514 f.

From Otto the Great's time onward till the spoliations of the war of investiture the so-called royal bishoprics and abbeys were a rich source of revenue to the kings. Under Conrad II their lands were assimilated with the fisc and administered as it was.¹ The right to appoint bishops and abbots to church vacancies was a lucrative means of income for the crown. In Italy this prerogative was exercised even more extensively than in Germany, and was more zealously guarded because the Italian sees were richer.²

The economic advantage derived by the crown from this close articulation between state and church was no less important than the political. Ecclesiastical economy was much ahead of feudal, and even the royal domains, in spite of the precedent of Charlemagne's capitulary *de villis*, could not rival those of the church in intelligent and efficient administration, especially in the Rhinelands.³

Until the accession of Otto I in 936 no attempt had been made by the German crown to mobilize the resources of the church in the interests of the government, nor had the kings been distinguished for special generosity to the church. Conrad I, that *Schüttling* of the church, gave proof of his piety by a gift of fifteen estates to the church, located in Franconia, Bavaria, and Swabia. The less devout Henry I had made only five donations, chiefly of lands in Saxony. But Otto I, perceiving that the church possessed the most efficient economic régime of the time, gave the church a large share in the administration of the crown lands, and definitely mobilized the church's resources for the benefit of the state. The Ottonian period was the golden age of the "royal" monasteries, whose abbots

¹ On the distinction of the property of the royal abbeys for monastery and for crown purposes see Waitz, VII, 189-91; VIII, 244; Bresslau, *Jahrbuch Konrads II*, II, 364 f.

² Bresslau, *ibid.*, II, 365-67. The Italian cities began to prosper long before the crusades from the increase of trade through the Alpine passes. "Wenn sich damals in Deutschland selbst in den rheinischen Bischofssitzen noch immer Bauernhof an Bauernhof reihte, so verfügte dieser lombardische Prälat bereits über die Mittel einer wirklich grosstädtischen Bevölkerung und einen Komplex fester Adelshäuser in den Ringmauern seiner Hauptstadt."—Nitzsch, II, 31.

³ *Vita Joh. Goss.*, c. 89, SS. IV, 362. On the richness of the Saxon church, Waitz, VII, 183-84; Nitzsch, I, 374-79, and a notable description of the prosperity of Worms in the episcopate of Burchard II (1000-1025), at pp. 388-89.

everywhere, in imitation of the ancient Frankish practice, were used as mayors of the fisc (*villici*).¹

An examination of Otto I's land policy is evidence of this. The lavish favor of this great Saxon king toward the church far exceeded that of his Carolingian predecessors. Of the 435 charters which have been preserved pertaining to the reign of Otto I, 122 are records of donations of land to the church—almost three times as many as all the gifts combined made to the church by the Carolingian kings from Louis the Pious to Ludwig the Child. In other words, Otto I in the space of thirty-seven years gave as much to the church as his predecessors had done in ninety-seven years. Of these grants, 42 were made to Otto's favorite see of Magdeburg, which he created; 13 to Hamburg-Bremen; the rest are scattered among various bishoprics and monasteries. In a much briefer reign Otto II disposed of 50 large and 21 small estates, many of them to the bishopric of Prague.²

Under Otto I the military service of the German bishops, whose prowess had been severely tested in the strife with the great dukes and the Hungarians during the reigns of Arnulf and his son,³ was systematized, and the long line of fighting bishops in the Saxon epoch shows how manfully they responded to the call. Late in Otto I's reign the monasteries were similarly mobilized, though not quite so fully. For example, Fulda was exempt from military service until 972. The church had known fighting bishops and fighting abbots in former times, as witness the case of Leodegar of Autun in Merovingian times, and that of Abbot Fulrad under Charlemagne. But in the tenth century the art of war became an

¹ Inama-Sternegg, II, 129; *Vita Oudalrici*, c. 3, *MGH*, SS. IV, 389; Lamprecht, *DWL*, I, 826. For proof of the golden age of the royal abbeys see Jaffé, V, 471—a document of Otto II; for use of abbots as *villici*, Waitz, VII, 194, n. 2; 198, nn. 1-2; Lambert, 1063. Even Lothar, in spite of his leniency toward the church, so used them (Waitz, VII, 198, n. 3).

² "Immer mehr wachsenden Besitzungen der Bischöfe" (Koeniger, 74). Cf. Willigis of Mainz, *Libell. I in honor. Willig.*, c. 3, SS. XV, 745, l. 25; Hauck, III, 58; Eggers, *Der königl. Grundbesitz im 10. und 11. Jahr.* (Weimar, 1909), 58 f.

³ Between the years 886 and 908 ten German bishops fell in battle. For this "Kriegshandwerk" of the bishops see Hauck, II, 709; Sommerlad, II, 249-50; Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen* (5th ed.), II, 27. The abbey of Fulda alone possessed fiefs bound to furnish 6,000 fighting men in the eleventh century.

important episcopal accomplishment. Three-quarters of the contingents enumerated in the muster-roll of 981 (1,482 out of a total of 1,990) were drawn from church lands. The church furnished 74 per cent of the forces for that Italian campaign of Otto II.¹ The German kings gave lands to the church in order to increase its military effectiveness, and the grants were made subject to this stipulation. This is the reason why the kings so resolutely held fast to the right of ecclesiastical appointments, for it was the surest way of controlling the church's resources, both of men and of money.

¹ Hauck, *Fulda and Hersfeld*, 8. Service *à cheval* was especially imposed upon church vassals (Waitz, V, 325-27; Guilhiermoz, 174, n. 10, 182, 187).

An analysis of the roster, in Jaffé, V, 471-72, follows:

BISHOPS	
Mainz, Cologne, Strasburg, Augsburg, each 100.....	400
Trier, Salzburg, Regensburg, each 70.....	210
Verdun, Liège, Würzburg, each 60.....	180
Seben [Waitz, VIII, 134, erroneously gives 20].....	50
Constance, Chur, Worms, Freising, each 40.....	160
Speyer, Eichstätt, Toul, each 20.....	60
Cambrai.....	12
ABBES	
Fulda, Reichenau, each 60.....	120
Lorsch, Weissenburg, each 50.....	100
Prüm, Hersfeld, Ellwangen, each 40.....	120
Kempten.....	30
St. Gall, Murbach, each 20.....	40
Total.....	1,482
All lay vassals.....	508
Grand total.....	1,990

See the detailed analysis of this roster in Sommerlad, II, 250, and literature there given, to which may be added Lehmann, *Forschungen*, IX, 437, and Richter, III, 2, pp. 760-61, who, however, is wrong in his figures. On the infeudation practiced by bishops and abbots, Waitz, VI, 105-7. Examples may be seen in *Vita Meinwerki*, c. 70, and Dronke, *Codex diplom. Fuld.*, 359, No. 749. In estimating the number of those summoned it must be remembered that such vassals were *vollehen*, i.e., they held *fiefs du haubert*, which implied the service of at least 12 vassals by each, i.e., 1,990 must be multiplied by at least 12, which would give an army of at least 6,096 lay and 17,784 church vassals. This fact does not directly appear, but constructively may be argued from two passages in the *Chronicle of Lorsch*, of the years 1066 and 1107, SS. XXI, 415, 434-35, and other evidence. Cf. Guilhiermoz, 174 and 182. The Italian expeditions of the German sovereigns increased the number and importance of the contingents of the church. For these distant campaigns the emperors needed more reliable troops than the lay vassals usually furnished, and troops more contractually liable than the *Heerban*, which survived until the end of the eleventh century in Saxony, and the intimate relation between the crown and the church made this usage easy and safe. For a case of an abbot complaining of the burden of military service see that of Meginward of Reichenau in Lambert of Hersfeld, *Annales* (ed. Holder-Egger), 127 [anno 1071]. When Henry III went to Italy in 1046 he was accompanied by 3 archbishops, 10 bishops, and 2 royal abbots, with their vassals.

Prior to the middle of the eleventh century, when the Gregorian reform began its attack upon the German monarchy, few contested the right of the crown so to do.¹

The enormous growth of the church's landed proprietorship, however, and the military use made of it by the German kings were not the only ways in which bishops and abbots reflected the influences of feudalism, mirroring in their historical condition the dominant political and social ideas of a feudal age. Otto I distributed new immunities, especially to the bishops, with a lavish hand,² and confirmed many which had formerly been conferred. After 973 the privilege of immunity was so generally assumed that mention of it was frequently omitted in the charters.³ Otto III, in a blanket decree, conferred the right of full justice upon all bishops within their domains.⁴ The sole judicial officer henceforth within ecclesiastical territories was the *Vogt*, to whom the king yielded his ban.⁵ Thus the power of the counts was diminished.⁶ The prerogatives of the count and his proprietorship were largely combined in the hands of the hierarchy. Out of this condition sprang the great German "prince-bishops" of the high feudal age.

Yet immunities, despite the advantages derived from their possession, were negative rather than positive in their application. A more substantial means adopted by the Saxon kings in order to strengthen the church and make it a grateful and willing instrument of the crown was the practice of directly investing bishops and abbots with the powers of counts. This policy was not entirely novel with the Ottos, for as far back as 887 Charles the Fat had

¹ Hauck, III, 397, 402, 404. Ficker, 90, contends that the crown had legally as full control over bishops as over abbots. Waitz (VII, 199) contests the point, but admits that it has not been sufficiently studied. Cf. also Waitz's article in *Göttinger Anzeiger* (1873), 821 f.

² Nitzsch, I, 339; Sommerlad, II, 242-43. Until late Merovingian time the *mundium* was more common than the immunity, which developed with the growth of feudalism in the seventh and eighth centuries (Waitz, VII, 219 f.). In general, episcopal immunities were broader than those of the monasteries (*ibid.*, VII, 228). Otto I was cautious in disposing of the latter (Hauck, III, 60; Seliger, 118).

³ Hauck, III, 60. For an example see case of Hamburg, in *Diplom.*, II, No. 61.

⁴ *Diplom.*, II, No. 48, p. 449; Lacomblet, *Urkundenbuch*, I, No. 228.

⁵ *Diplom.*, II, No. 16, p. 71.

⁶ Waitz, VII, 230.

given the rights of the local count to the bishop of Langres,¹ and in 927 Henry I did the same at Toul.²

But until the time of the Saxon kings the bishops were not the equal of the counts in public authority. To be sure, within the circumscription of their immunities, as we have seen, they were independent of the local counts, and exercised powers analogous to those of the count within the *Gau*, having high and low justice over the population dwelling upon the church lands. There was a certain inconvenience, however, in this arrangement, for the lands of the bishops were usually widely scattered, while the jurisdiction of the count was coextensive with a compact, contiguous territory, and over all the population living therein. Now the bishops had whole counties bestowed upon them, with all the rights and powers of the former counts reigning there. At a stroke they became the heads of politico-ecclesiastical principalities. Instead of a lordship over dispersed holdings with no binding tie save their episcopal authority, the bishops now became spiritual and temporal lords of vast and compact dominions, all the more enduring because the power thus newly constituted had that perpetuity and indivisibility peculiar to the patrimonies of the church. In a word, the Ottos were the creators of the great ecclesiastical princes of mediaeval Germany.³

The future danger arising for the German monarchy owing to this arrangement will be seen later on, but there is no denying the immediate benefit of the practice in increased law and order

¹ Bouquet, VIII, 643.

² Sickel, *Diplom.*, I, No. 16, p. 52.

³ Grants of the powers of the count, either in whole or in part to bishops, made by Otto I are as follows: archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, Magdeburg; bishoprics of Speyer, Chur, Worms, and Minden. Otto II gave the county of Cadore to the bishop of Freising-Rietzler, *Gesch. Bayerns*, I, 390. Otto III gave the counties of Waldsazin and Rangau to the bishop of Würzburg; those of Padergo, Aga, Treveresga, Auga, Sorethfeld, to the bishop of Paderborn; the county of Huy to the bishop of Liège. Under Henry II the counties of the old duchy of Franconia were partitioned between Würzburg and the king's new bishopric of Bamberg, and the bishoprics of Cambrai, Paderborn, Utrecht, Worms, and Hildesheim were further enriched by grant to them of the rights and privileges of the regional counts. For fuller details and references to sources see Hauck, III, 63-64; Waitz, VII, 208-18, 255-64; Hegel, *Die Entstehung des deutschen Städtewesens*, 73-74; Kurth, *Notger de Liège*, 113-17; Oppermann, *Westdeutsch. Zeitschrift*, XIX (1900), 202 ff.

throughout Germany, which is especially manifested in the growth of town life and the development of trade. By Henry II's time (1002-24) the wooden palisades of the Fowler's time were giving way to stone walls around the towns, as at Magdeburg, Verden, Paderborn, and Worms.¹ The ecclesiastical capitals became centers of a rapidly expanding commerce, owing to greater security on the roads and the multiplication of market rights in the hands of the bishops and abbots. For the Ottos were lavish in distributing favors of this nature, together with the right to coin money, among the faithful episcopate.²

The bishops profited more largely than the abbots from this course of the Saxon kings. The reasons are not hard to find. The secular branch of the clergy had an organic unity which the monastic half did not possess. The monasteries were individual, separate houses, not a closely knit organization like the episcopate, and except for the "royal" abbeys almost outside the pale of the crown's control. Most of them were of private foundation and identified with local and feudal interests. Then, too, the abbots

¹ Hauck, III, 410, note; Sommerlad, II, 234-35, 265-67; Wattenbach (5th ed.), II, 34.

² Hauck, III, 61; Waitz, VII, 5-6, 24-33. For the increase of trade and commerce in Saxon Germany see Giesebrecht, II, 11 f.; Gerdes, I, 388-99.

The German episcopate seems to have been more negligent in keeping registers and statistics of its resources than the monastic clergy, and we are consequently driven to the use of indirect evidence and inverse reasoning to ascertain its wealth. While in the nature of things the conclusions are only approximate, it is nevertheless clear that by the year 1000 the German church was exceedingly wealthy. The growing luxury and material self-indulgence of the high clergy and the great abbots shocked the rigid moralists of the age (Richer, *Hist.*, III, 39). Bishops and abbots maintained imposing retinues of servants. This appears even in the time of Arnulf. Salomon of Constance showed some visitors a vase of gold set with precious stones (Ekkehard, *Casus S. Galli*, I, c. 22). Even Bruno of Cologne dressed his household servants in purple (Ruotger, *Vita Brunonis*, c. 30). Purple silk and beaver and marten fur were the usual attire of the bishops on grand occasions (Thietmar, *Chron.*, VII, c. 35; Gerbert, *Epp.*, 33 and 188). Baldric of Liège staggered even Rather of Verona, who was used to the luxury of Italy, with his splendor. Arnold of Halberstadt wrote to his friend Henry of Würzburg: "Prædecessores nostri totam operam suam animabus lucrando insumebant, nos, quomodo corpora foveamus præcipue satagimus; illi pro coelo, nos pro terra disceptamus."—Jaffé, *Mon. Bamb.*, 477. For modern literature on the luxury of the Saxon period see Specht, *Gastmähler und Trinkgelage bei den Deutschen*, 8; Gerdes, I, 428 f.; Sass, *Deutsches Leben zur Zeit der sächs. Kaiser.*, 7 f.; Hauck, III, 410-11; Koeniger, 76-77; Vogel, *Ratherius von Verona*, I, 44.

had nothing approaching the spiritual and disciplinary authority of the bishops. Finally the wealth of the monasteries already was so great by the close of Otto III's reign [1002] that it would have been inexpedient, not to say dangerous, as the policy of Henry II showed, to have increased their power.¹

But there is no gain without some loss. While the German church was an enormous gainer from the royal protection and the royal bounty, on the other hand its close political relation with the government resulted in a certain decline of local and personal interest in it on the part of the feudality, which resented the Ottos' appropriation of revenues to which they believed themselves rightfully entitled, and the political and military use of the church made by the Saxon kings in order to coerce them. To the great German dukes and the half-feudal counts and the big proprietors in general the church was an object of envy and hate on account of its growing wealth and vast political power. Accordingly the bishops and older monasteries got few benefactions from a sullen feudality. These experienced a distinct and alarming falling off of gifts. Instead, as will be shown shortly, the benefactions of the German nobles went to enrich the newer foundations of French or quasi-French origin, like those of Cluny and Hirschau, with the result that a new and formidable problem for the German monarchy was created thereby.

Naturally the church endeavored to adjust itself to this new condition,² and sought to compensate for the decline in private endowments by reorganizing its properties. In addition to introducing greater efficiency in the management of its lands, the church also strove to consolidate its scattered buildings into large complexes, and thus to gain by more scientific management and reduced

¹ Giesebrecht, II, 86; Gerdes, I, 576. Henry II was the first German king who gave countships to abbots, and this in only two instances, Fulda and Gandersheim (*Diplom.*, Nos. 444 and 509). His actual policy toward the monasteries was one of great restraint, even of suppression. See *infra*.

² The *Traditiones Sangallenses* show that between 900-920 St. Gall received 60 benefactions, between 920-1000 only 40, and in the whole of the eleventh century only 5. Before 900 the total grants to Fulda aggregated 646, for the tenth century they were only 80, and for the eleventh 40. Lorsch shows similar depreciation (Waitz, VII, 184, note; Inama-Sternegg, II, 129).

cost of administration what it lost from the failure of private munificence.¹ The last half of the tenth century and the early part of the eleventh witnessed many sales or exchanges of scattered or remote parcels of land owned by the church for other holdings lying nearer to the bishopric or monastery. Judging from the data preserved, the success of the experiment was considerable.²

Episcopal pride and the customary tradition of the church required that a bishop leave his diocese richer than when he found it.³ The *Miracula S. Balderici* says that it was an exceptional bishop who did not spend his days in annexing lands and increasing the number of his vassals.⁴ At his death he left an inventory of the acquisitions made during his incumbency.⁵ The *Lives* of Meinwerk of Paderborn, of Bernward of Hildesheim, of Udalric of Augsburg, of Adalbero of Metz, of Burchard of Worms, and the *Chronicon* of Thietmar of Merseburg abound with interesting details as to the administrative duties and manner of life of these active German bishops of Saxon times.⁶

The double political edifice erected by the Ottos, half state and half church, reached its most complete point of development with Henry II (1002-24), the last of the Saxon house. There is no king of mediaeval Germany whose political course is more interesting to analyze for the light which it casts upon problems of feudal government and the relations of church and state in the Middle Ages.

Henry II converted the traditional policy of the Saxon house into a systematic practice, every element of which was carefully planned.

¹ For details see Sommerlad, II, 27 f.; Hauck, III, 57-59. Yet even as late as the end of the eleventh century the German monasteries did not equal the French in intelligent and effective management (Lambert of Hersfeld [ed. Holder-Egger], 84). Expert monastery management came in especially with the Cistercians.

² Inama-Sternegg, II, 27 f.

³ Thietmar, *Chron.*, VI, c. 26; VII, c. 22, where it is related that Bernhard (994-1014), bishop of Verden, in the space of twenty years increased the episcopal domain by 380 manors. A book containing names of donors was regularly kept in every church (Gerdes, I, 535, and notes). Lambert of Hersfeld (1075), 243, eulogizes Anno of Cologne for his material enrichment of the see during his incumbency.

⁴ *Miracula S. Balderici*, c. 2. Cf. *Vita Meinwerki*, cc. 96, 98, 99, 150, 152, 166, 217, etc.; Waitz, VII, 206.

⁵ Thietmar, *Chron.*, VI, c. 26; and Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsq.* (5th ed.), II, 33-34.

⁶ For the "day" of a mediaeval bishop, *Vita Oudalr.*, c. 3, SS. IV, 390; c. 28; *ibid.*, 418; *Vita Adalber.*, c. 10, SS. IV, 485; *Libell. I, in honor. Willig.*, c. 2, SS. XV, 744. Cf. Gerdes, I, 549-54.

He established at court what might be called a "school" for the education of clerics, who were imbued with his ideas and trained in efficiency, and from whom he selected the bishops whom he appointed;¹ he personally invested forty-nine of the fifty episcopal appointees of his reign.² In order to magnify the dignity and authority of the episcopal office the emperor surrounded the ceremony of investiture with a pomp and majesty which it had not possessed before.³ The "ring" ceremony became almost a ritual.⁴ It was as Rupert of Dietz wrote: "*Convenerunt canonici ad imperatorem . . . adhuc enim non electione, sed dono regis episcopus fiebat.*"⁵ In vain might the chapters of the cathedrals, which had acquired a larger liberty of election under the weak rule of Otto III, complain that their rights were infringed.⁶

It is one of the eccentricities of history that Henry II should have become known as the "pious," for his ecclesiastical policy had absolutely nothing of the cringing quality of subservience to the church which won the appellation "pious" for Louis Debonair and Robert of France. Henry II was calculating, far-sighted, determined, just, but without an ounce of emotionalism in his composition. He looked at things with level eyes, in a practical, not a theoretical, way; he was neither a mystic nor a doctrinaire.⁷

The functioning of the church in government and society was of more importance to him than its spiritual authority. Religion, *qua* religion, Henry II believed to be the peculiar province of monks. They might be in the world, but their life was not to be of the world. The bishops, on the other hand, were chiefly governmental and military officers. There is no doubt of the sincerity of Henry II's convictions in so thinking. Monks were meant for prayer and worship and religious contemplation, and theirs was a cloistered life; but the duty of the secular clergy was to regulate morals, to

¹ Hauck, III, 405. ² *Ibid.*, III, 400. ³ *Ibid.*, III, 397; Lamprecht, II, 292.

⁴ Thietmar, *Chron.*, IV, c. 27; VII, cc. 6-7; Waitz, VII, 268 f.

⁵ SS. VIII, 267; Hauck, III, 404. ⁶ Hauck, III, 397 f.

⁷ "So kirchlich Heinrich II gesinnt war, so wenig war er der Mann, irgend einer kirchlichen Theorie zu liebe seine Stellung als König zu schädigen [e.g., in the strife at Gandersheim, by the restoration of Merseburg, by the founding of Bamberg]. Das Recht der Bischofsernennung hielt er aufs zäheste fest, über ungetreue Bischöfe sass er zu Gericht, über Abteien verfügte er wie über Reichsgüter, in die Organisation der Kirche griff er direkt ein, er berief viele Synoden und welche Sprache er auf denselben führte, lassen uns überkommene Nachrichten deutlich erkennen."—Koeniger, 16.

govern the land, and to perform the military service exacted of them.¹ What Sir William Ramsay has said of the church in the Roman Empire is just as true of the mediaeval church:

The administrative forms in which the church gradually came to be organized were determined by the state of society and the spirit of the age. . . . These forms were, in a sense, forced on it; [but] . . . they were accepted actively, not passively. The church gradually became conscious of the real character of the task which it had undertaken. It came gradually to realize that it was a world-wide institution, and must organize a world-wide system of administration. It grew as a vigorous and healthy organism, which worked out its own purposes, and maintained itself against the disintegrating influence of surrounding forces; but the line of its growth was determined by its environment.

One cannot dogmatize when considering the part played by the church in the feudal age. Institutions, social structure, ideals were very different then from what they are today. Feudalism was the rock whence the church was hewn, the pit whence was digged the clay out of which the outward material church was built. It is not always easy to distinguish the line of division between the use and the abuse of the church's institutions in the history of mediaeval Germany—or elsewhere in mediaeval Europe, for that matter—but it is an unjust assumption to assert broadly that the German kings wilfully abused the German church patronage. The church was a historical institution, the product of long historical development, and the kings used it as such.²

A few instances may be cited here from the history of Henry II's reign which serve to make this point clear. The empress Kunigunde had a brother named Adalberon, who was a typical robber baron, a headstrong, quarrelsome Lorrainer. His depredations in the archdiocese of Trier were so great that he nearly reduced the country to a desert³ and drove the archbishop to seek refuge in Coblenz. The situation required a man of war, not a man of

¹ Hauck, III, 395; Waitz, VIII, 417.

² Fisher (II, 78-84) has some good words on this head.

³ Following is an account of the depredations of Adalberon: "Urbes certe depopulate, vici et villae incensae omnes, viri omnes et feminae et totum promiscuum vulgus ferro, fame, igne pestilentiaque consumptum. Multi etiam nobiles in paupertatem et magnam miseriam devoluti. Multi gladio perumpti."—*MGH*, SS. IV, 668. For modern accounts, Giesebrecht, II, 112-16; Pfister, *Robert le Pieux*, 364.

peace. "I will send a man," wrote the emperor, "who will put a stop to your wild deeds." He was as good as his word. For he chose as the new incumbent of the see not a pious churchman, but a hard-headed, hard-fisted young Franconian baron by the name of Poppo of Bamberg, whom he rushed through the various grades of the hierarchy until he emerged as archbishop of Trier. Poppo distributed sixty prebends of the see to as many knights, and with this miniature standing army besieged Adalberon's castles and finally brought peace and order into the land again.

Henry II's practical handling of the problem of the eastern frontier is of a piece with this. The weakest point of the Slavonic border was in eastern Franconia, where the apex of Bohemia projected like a salient between the Sorben Reichsland and the Bavarian Nordgau. The emperor bridged the gap here between Magdeburg and the Danube by re-establishing the bishopric of Merseburg and founding the new see of Bamberg. Here he built that exquisite Romanesque cathedral which still stands in perpetuation of his memory, and here was his favorite seat of residence.¹

The superstructure of the Saxon government was built upon and around the hierarchy, as a modern skyscraper is hung upon the steel skeleton within it. The monasteries and the duchies were merely lesser pillars and traverses in the huge edifice of government. Probably if Henry II could have had his way elsewhere in Germany as he had it in Franconia he would have eliminated the duchies from the map. For he gave half of the ducal lands in Franconia to the bishopric of Würzburg and half to that of Bamberg, leaving the duchy little more than a geographical expression with the titular ducal title attached to it.

¹ On the founding of Bamberg see Hauck, III, 418-20; Lamprecht, II, 293; Waitz, VII, 187; Hirsch, *Heinrich II*, Band II, 42-43. The emperor enriched the new bishopric with much of the wealth of his own house, to the anger of his brother Bruno, who was bishop of Augsburg, the last survivor of the Saxon line, who coveted the inheritance for his own bishopric. It received 143 separate parcels of land and 6 monasteries (see *Mon. Boica*, XXVIII, 335-407). For the scandalous circumstances under which Merseburg had formerly been abolished for the aggrandizement of Magdeburg and Halberstadt see my article on "The German Church and Conversion of Baltic Slavs" in the *American Journal of Theology*, XX, 217, and Schmidt's Halle diss., *Giselher, Bischof von Merseburg, Erzbischof von Magdeburg* (1886), c. 3.

Henry II made the whole organization and functioning of the church subject to his control. He convoked synods and presided over their debates; he regulated discipline, ritual, and teaching; but he sensibly distinguished between the spiritual and the political functions of the church¹ and was not disposed to abuse his authority. At the same time he was firmly determined not to permit the church to shirk its duties to civil society and the state. The spiritual duties of the high prelates were largely intrusted to coadjutors. The place of the bishops was at court, where they sat in the council of the king, labored in his chancellery, traveled on circuit through their dioceses, much like English sheriffs,² and led their vassals to the field of arms, if recourse were had to war upon the border or within the realm in order to crush feudal revolt. The military burden on the church was an exacting one,³ owing partly to the suspicion attending the service of the lay feudality, partly to the steady decline in the free warrior class, even in Saxony, due to the extension of feudal conditions. The church also had to bear out of its revenues the largest share of the burden of supporting the court, which, owing to the primitive economic régime obtaining, necessarily had to be a wandering one with no fixed capital.⁴ Episcopal responsibility, in both ecclesiastical and civil capacity, was a watchword with Henry II. He well rewarded the bishops for their services; but when he intrusted the administration of the crown lands in Saxony to the archbishop of Mainz he expected service.⁵

It was Henry II too who devised a way to tap the resources of the reluctant feudal families who had closed their purses to the church under his predecessors by appointing members of these rich families to Saxon sees. Thus Thietmar was made bishop of Merse-

¹ See Henry's remark quoted in *Journal of Theology*, XXII, 100, n. 3. According to Thietmar, *Chron.*, VI, c. 8, the emperor was "vicar of God"; according to Wipo, *Vita Chuonradi*, II, c. 3, he was "vicar of Christ." An abbot called Henry III "caput ecclesiae" (Giesebrecht, II, 599).

² Waitz, V, 82-83; Hauck, III, 33; Gebhardt, I, 258.

³ Hirsch, I, 211; Waitz, VIII, 130-31, has nearly two pages filled with references on this subject.

⁴ Nitzsch, I, 325, 358-59.

⁵ Nitzsch, I, 388. Cf. Bresslau, II, 354-56; Waitz, VII, 187.

burg,¹ Meinwerk bishop of Paderborn,² Unwan archbishop of Bremen,³ all of whom were sons of rich and noble Saxon families who gave out of their substance to their bishoprics.

In respect to the monasteries Henry II pursued the most drastic course of any mediaeval sovereign. Their vows and manner of life alienated the monks from secular activities. The abbots could not be used as freely as the bishops in secular administration or in military affairs owing to the greater isolation and less compact form of government which prevailed in monastic organization. The monks had neither the moral nor the political influence of the hierarchic clergy in Germany. But the material wealth of the monasteries was even greater than that of the secular clergy. In Otto III's reign the monasteries were not only relatively, but absolutely, richer than the bishoprics. For in the first place they owned a greater proportion of land, and secondly they had withdrawn a greater amount of it from the taxing power of the state through privileges and immunities.⁴ Neither the military nor the financial burden upon the monasteries was so heavy as upon the episcopate.

Under these conditions the monasteries were of little practical benefit to either the state or society. Their wealth was out of all proportion to their material needs, such as the daily support of the inmates, the maintenance of schools and hospitals, and poor relief. The "dead hand" kept much of their surplus wealth from free circulation in society for the advantage of society, and it was not forced out into the open, as was the case with the church's wealth, through government use of the church.

Henry II saw the incongruities obtaining in monasticism and made a heroic attempt to rectify them. The cloistered life supposedly was a life of poverty and prayer and spiritual ministry.

¹ Thietmar, *Chron.*, VI, 40.

² *Vita Meinwerki*, SS. XI, 111-12.

³ *Adam of Bremen*, II, cc. 45-48, 58. Bernward of Hildesheim gave Michaeliskloster 466 manors and 13 churches (Waitz, VII, 186). The disastrous defeat of Otto II in Italy in 982, and his death in the next year, to be succeeded by his infant son Otto III, was the turning-point in the history of the fisc. For then began a general spoliation of it by the bishops and the feudality, which the empress-mother as regent was unable to stop (Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsq.* [5th ed.], II, 75).

⁴ Sackur, II, 156-57; Matthäi, 84; Nitzsch, I, 390-91.

It had become a life of material ease and irresponsibility so far as public interest was concerned. As individuals the monks might be "unsocial" (their fundamental ideals were such), but as an institution monasticism could not be suffered to continue its antisocial exclusiveness without detriment to society and corruption of itself.¹

Contrary to what is usually thought, at this early stage in the history of mediaeval monastic reform Cluny was not yet at all interested in the reformation of the secular part of the church. Her aims and interests were still wholly confined to the reform of monasticism, and when Henry II spilled the wind out of the sails of the monks who accused him of flagrantly practicing "simony" by promoting the Gorzean reform movement with dismaying thoroughness, Cluny approved of the emperor's action. "For following the tradition of monasticism she looked upon the monk as alone fulfilling literally the words of the gospel, and thus following a higher ideal than that of the secular clergy."²

The monasteries throughout all Europe had appallingly degenerated during the dark days of the ninth century, and in Germany had not recovered in the same degree as the episcopate, which the energy of the Saxon kings had so rehabilitated. Ruined by the invasions of the Northmen in Gaul and the lower Rhinlands, by the inroads of the Hungarians in Germany and North Italy, by those of the Saracens along the whole Mediterranean coast and far up into the Alpine passes,³ by the trespass of the feudality upon their lands and the seizure of the property and even usurpation of the abbot's title; demoralized by everything which they had themselves originated through abuse of the ideals of Bene-

¹ In *Vita Meinwerki*, c. 182, Henry II complains: "Qui me bonis concessis cum detrimento regni spoliare non cessas." Cf. also cc. 184 and 186.

² L. M. Smith, "Cluny and Gregory VII," *Eng. Hist. Review*, XXVI, 21. "Die cluniacensische Reform hat im 10. Jahrhundert keine hierarchischen Tendenzen."—Schultze, *Forschungen zur Gesch. der Klosterreform im 10. Jahrhundert* (Halle diss., 1883), 81.

³ Poupardin, *Le royaume de Provence sous les Carolingiens*, 248-73; Renaud, *Les invasions des Sarrasins en France*, 1836; Devic et Vaisette, *Histoire du Languedoc*, II, 549 f.; Pfister, 351-52; Dümmler, I, 191-94. See the curious story of the capture of Abbot Majolus of Cluny by the Saracens in Rod. Glaber, I, c. 4, sec. 9, ed. Prou.

dictinism, or become the victims of violence from without, the monasteries everywhere in Europe had sunk into debauchery, worldliness, and ignorance.¹

Many of their inmates had fled the cloister and resorted to a life of pillage like that of the baronage.² The serfs upon the monastery lands had run away or perished in the anarchy, and those that were left were often numerically so reduced that the monks themselves were compelled to till the glebe farms.³ In the tenth century complaints are common against the monks, who are accused of licentiousness,⁴ of neglecting their vows,⁵ of eating meat on fast days,⁶ of drunkenness,⁷ and of refusing hospitality.⁸

The plight of the monasteries was so bad that they seemed incapable of reforming themselves. The initiative came from the piety of the nobility, many of whose members, for the repose of their souls, founded new monasteries, the life of whose inmates was

¹ Ruinés par les invasions des Normands, Hongrois et Sarrazins, par l'installation forcée des vassaux seigneuriaux dans ses domaines, l'usurpation du titre et des biens de l'abbé par les favoris du roi ou les dynastes provinciaux, dégradés par l'intrusion à la place des moines de clercs séculiers ignorants, paresseux et débauchés, les monastères étaient tombés au XI^e siècle dans la plus profonde abjection morale et matérielle" (Lot, *Hugues Capet*, 34). For the effect of the Norse invasions upon the monasteries in Lorraine see Parisot, *Le royaume de Lorraine sous les Carolingiens*, 546-61, 498-99, 722-24.

² Richeri, *Gesta eccles. Senon.*, I, c. 17, SS. XXV, 264. In the tenth century the miserable *abbatiote* of Ste. Celine in the diocese of Meaux, and that of St. Sixtus near Rheims, had only one monk (Lot, *op. cit.*, 226, note). In the life of Odo of Cluny it is related how his friend Adhegrinus sought in vain for a decent monastery, and in despair started on a pilgrimage to Rome, when he hit upon Berno, future first abbot of Cluny, in the little monastery of Baume (*Vita Odonis*, I, c. 22).

³ Richeri, *Gesta eccles. Senon.*, II, c. 18. For evidence as to the monasteries of Lorraine see Parisot, 723, n. 4.

⁴ Richeri, *Gesta eccles. Senon.*, II, c. 17; *Mirac. S. Ghisl.*, c. 10, SS. XV, 583; *Vita Gerardi*, SS. XV, 665. As early as 836 the Council of Aachen, c. 12, declared, "Quae [monasteria] in quibusdam locis lupinaria potius videntur esse quam monasteria."—Mansi, XIV, col. 682.

⁵ *Mirac. S. Maxim.*, c. 23; *Mirac. S. Basoli*, c. 11; *Mirac. S. Burcharii*, c. 8; *Concil. Trosi.* (909); Mansi, XV, col. 583.

⁶ *Cap. regum Francorum*, I, 229.

⁷ Mabillon, *Annal. Benedict.*, III, 305; Richeri, *Hist.*, III, c. 37, 39, 41.

⁸ *Synod. Vern.*, MGH, *Leges*, I, 383-88.

intended to be a reproach to those of older foundation.¹ For it seemed impossible to put new wine into old bottles. Yet, as was the case in the early history of the church when the rural proprietors discovered that it "paid" to establish rural churches, so now there was a considerable measure of self-interest in the movement for restoration of the monasteries, which was not done away with until 996, when the Cluny reform, under the captaincy of the great abbot Odilon, began to be effective. Frequently when a great noble or a bishop, before this term, refounded or reformed a monastery, it was because he controlled the foundation and profited from its revenues, much of which he appropriated for himself.²

The movement for monastic reform appeared in France in the last half of the ninth century and gathered force during the two following centuries.³ In its completest form it was really the fusion of three separate and independent movements and radiated from three particular foci—Burgundy, Aquitaine, and Brabant. The first two movements soon became identical and culminated in the Cluny reform. The history of the monastic reform movement

¹ Ord. Vitalis, *Hist. Eccles.*, Book VII, c. 15. This practice was a familiar one in the high Middle Age. William the Conqueror, on his deathbed, took greatest gratification in the large number of monasteries which he had founded, and which he had encouraged his vassal to establish (*op. cit.*, III, 241, ed. Le Prevost).

² "Quand un grand laïque ou un eveque restaure ou réformé un établissement, c'est qu'il possède cet établissement et qu'il profite de ses revenus qu'il a confisqués."—Lot, *op. cit.*, 225, n. 8.

³ In 845 Raymond of Limoges founded Ruffec; in 860 Count Badilon founded St. Martin d'Autun; Gerard of Rouissillon founded the monasteries of Poutières and Vézelay; in 910 William of Aquitaine founded Cluny, Gerald that of Aurillac, 914. The Cluniac movement was materially aided by Letald of Macon, Gaufrey of Nevers, and his successor, Adhemar, and Adelaide of Burgundy. Tulle was reformed by Adhemar of Turenne, Sarlat by the counts of Angoulême, Lezat by the viscount of Béziers, Jumièges by William of Normandy, Chanteuge by the counts of Auvergne, St. Pons by Raymond Pons of Toulouse, Fleury-sur-Loire by Count Elisierne. The aristocratic origin of this agitation for reform of the monasteries is to be noticed. The ablest abbots of Cluny, as Odo, Maieul, Odilon, and Hugh the Great, were of noble family. William of Dijon belonged to an illustrious family of Piedmont; Poppo of Stavelot was a Walloon noble. La Chaise-Dieu was established by Robert of Aurillac in 1047 in the forest of Velay near Puy, and spread till it had 297 priories in France and Spain (*Vita Roberti*, AASS., *Ord. Bened.*, IX). La Grande Sauve was founded by Gerard, a Picard noble, in 1079, in Guyenne; it had 70 priories in France, England, and Spain (*ibid.*, IX, 857). On all this subject see Sackur, *Die Cluniacenser*, I, 34 ff.

which began in Brabant, whence it soon spread to the famous Lorraine monasteries of Gorze and Stavelot, must, however, first be traced at this point, because of its immediate influence upon the *Klosterpolitik* of Henry II and Conrad II.¹

The founder of Brogne (diocese of Liège, duchy of Brabant) was a nobleman of Wallonia, named Gerard, who in 914 established a chapter of canons in one of his allods at Brogne.² Wholly inspired by French monastic ideals, in the next year he was sent to Paris by his suzerain, Count Berenger of Namur, in order to visit the celebrated abbey at St. Denis. There he spent some time in study.³ In 919 he returned to Brogne and transformed the chapter into a Benedictine monastery.⁴ Five years later Gerard was made abbot of Brogne by the Bishop of Liège, and in 927 was ordained a priest at Paris—for Brogne was always regarded as a dependency of St. Denis. It so happened at this time that Count Arnulf of Flanders was in good relation with the church of Rheims, and in 937, through the recommendation of the Bishop of Noyon, Gerard undertook the reformation of the great abbeys of St. Bavon and St. Blandin, in Ghent, and St. Bertin, St. Amand, St. Omer, and St. Vaast, in Flanders. From these points the Brabantine reform movement ran down the channel coast into Normandy, and down the valley of the Oise into the Ile-de-France, where it soon became fused with the Cluny reform.⁵

At the same time the movement also flowed over the Flemish frontier into Lorraine, where St. Ghiselain was reformed in 931.⁶ In 933 it took possession of Gorze, near Metz, whence it rapidly spread to the cloisters of St. Maximin, in Trier; Senones, near Metz; St. Die, Stavelot, St. Viton, near Verdun; St. Evre in Toul, etc.⁷ In the "fifties" of the ninth century the Gorzean reform—for so it

¹ Schultze, *Forschungen zur Gesch. der Klosterreform im 10. Jahrhundert* (Halle diss., 1883).

² *Vita Gerardi*, c. 1, SS. XV, 2. Of course the institution of collegiate canons was not so radical a reform as the establishment of regular monasticism would have been.

³ *Ibid.*, c. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, c. 13.

⁵ Bouquet, IX, 615.

⁶ Sackur, I, 126 f.; Lamprecht, II, 210.

⁷ Sackur, I, 146 f., 156 f., 163 f., 174 f.; Schultze, 33-58. For the violent opposition of the monks of St. Maximin, *Contin. Regino*, 934.

may henceforth be called—made headway slowly up the valley of the Moselle. In 951 Metlach joined it; by 973 most of the monasteries in the diocese of Trier, as Echternach, St. Martin, Ste. Marie, Ste. Eucharia, had embraced it. St. Maximin founded two new houses under Gorzean rule at Taben and Appola. From the valley of the Moselle the movement penetrated into the Rhinelands.

Otto I's brother Bruno, archbishop of Cologne, who had been educated at Utrecht, and who therefore must have had immediate knowledge of the reform, introduced the Gorzean reform in Wissemburg, in Lorsch, and probably elsewhere, and founded Soest in Westphalia and St. Pantaleon in Cologne, all of which were put under the new rule.¹ Gradually the movement extended along the middle and upper Rhine. In Alsace two clerks of Strasburg, the canon Benno and a prior named Eberhard, between 929 and 934 founded the monastery of Ste. Marioe-Einsiedeln, which soon reached a high degree of prosperity.² In Swabia Udalric of Augsburg became a supporter of Gorze; Gebhard of Constance founded Petershausen.³ In Bavaria its propagation was rapid. By the year 1000 the monasteries of St. Emmeran, St. Peter, Tegernsee, Altaich, Ebersberg, and nunneries of St. Paul and Upper and Lower Moutier had been reorganized and three new Gorzean foundations, Michaelsbeuren, Seeon, and Pruel, had been established.⁴

The chief person in propagating the Gorzean reform was John of Gorze, who in his time had a reputation wider than the Christian world, for it was he whom Otto sent on a mission to Mohammedan Spain to the caliph Abd-er Rahman. His *Life* is one of the most

¹ *Contin. Regino*, anno 957; *Diplom.*, I, No. 121, p. 203; Ruotger, *Vita Brunonis*, 10; Thietmar, IV, 15; *Chron. reg. Colon.*, anno 964. Bruno's successor, Gero, founded München (Gladbach, *Chron. Gladb.*, MGH, SS. IV, 75) and Thankmarsfeld in Saxony (Jaffé, 3754). Later still another archbishop of Cologne, Everger, reformed St. Martin, MGH, SS. IV, 77, and V, 555. Willigis of Mainz reformed Disibodenburg (Hauck, III, 414 f.); Adalberon of Metz, Epinal (*Vita*, II, c. 14, SS. IV, 662).

² Hauck, III, 376; *Annal. Hersf.*, 925; *Annal. Meginr.*, 934; *Othl. Vita Wolfgangi*, c. 10.

³ *Vita Gebh.*, cc. 10-13, SS. X, 586 f.; *Cas. Mon. Petrih.*, I, c. 9, XX, 630 f.

⁴ Hauck, III, 378-79; *Annal. S. Emmeran.*, anno 975, MGH, SS. I, 94 f.; *Vita Wulg.*, 17; *Botae Tegerns.*, MGH, SS. XV, 1067; *Chron. Ebersp.*, MGH, SS. XX, 11 f.; XXV, 868 f.; XVII, 363.

interesting and valuable sources of the epoch. And yet, in spite of his close attachment to Otto I, the Gorzean reform met languid support from the Saxon kings, and of course was violently resisted by the monks themselves.¹ Bruno of Cologne is the only member of the Saxon house who markedly encouraged it. Queen Adelheid, who was a Burgundian princess, seems to have been personally interested in reforming Wissemburg. But as for Otto I, he seems chiefly to have been interested in observing how this new religious emotionalism might increase the wealth of the German church through new gifts and endowments. Otto I's piety was ever practical. Neither Otto II nor Otto III seems to have taken cognizance of the reform.² Thus, indifferently regarded by the Saxon kings³ and bitterly opposed by the monks themselves, the Gorzean reform in course of time lost its force, till it was energetically revived by Henry II and Conrad II, by which time it had begun to be obscured by the far greater reform out of Cluny.

During the reign of Robert the Pious of France, William of St. Benigne, and perhaps Odilo, who had already labored long and earnestly in France in favor of monastic reform, carried the ideas of Cluny across the boundary into Lorraine, where he stirred up the ashes of the earlier Gorzean reform into newness of life.⁴ In the

¹ Mathieu, *De Johannis abbatis Gorziensis vita*, Nancy, 1878. For evidence of resistance see Ekkehard, *Casus S. Galli*, Prolog. and IX, cc. 75-80, 104, 105, 112; Thietmar, *Chron.*, VI, c. 5; Gerhards, *Vita Oudalr.*, c. 6; Widukind, II, c. 37; *Annal. Qued.*, 1013. Cf. Hauck, III, 343-44; Gerdes, I, 599-607; Wattenbach, *Deutsch. Geschichtsquellen*, I, 186; Vogel, *Rather von Verona*, 218-24.

² Koeniger, 108. This fact comes out in the letter of Arnulf of Halberstadt to Henry of Würzburg. Burchard of Worms, in his famous compilation of canon law, does not even allude to the reform; Jaffé, *Ep. Bamb.*, II, 474-76; Migne, *Patrol. Lat.*, CXL, 707, 712, 804, 899, 902, 907; Hauck, III, 440 f.; and *Sitzungsber. der sächs. Ges. d. Wiss.* (1894), 65; Koeniger, *Burchard von Worms* (Munich, 1905).

³ The indifference of the Saxon kings is readily explained by the fact that, like the Cluny reform later, the Gorzean reform soon became a political movement which was a danger to the crown. The great German feudatories like Gilbert of Lorraine, Eberhard of Swabia, and Henry the Wrangler of Bavaria were not slow to perceive the political possibilities implicit in it, and advocated the reform in order to break the grip of the Saxon kings on the church (Sigeh. *Mirac. S. Maxim.*, c. 12, SS. IV, 232; *Chron. Bened.*, 9, SS. IX, 218; *Contin. Regino*, 159; Hauck, III, 364). For the same reason Frederick of Mainz, the leader of the ecclesiastical opposition to Otto I, ardently supported it (Hauck, III, 375 f.; Widukind, II, 37; *Episc. Mogunt.*, 14).

⁴ On William of St. Benigne see Pfister, *Robert le Pieux*, 312.

monastery of Stavelot in Lorraine William came in contact with Richard of St. Vannes and Poppo of Stavelot, destined to be shortly Henry II's and Conrad II's ecclesiastical statesman.¹

Like Gerard of Brogne, the founder of the Gorzean reform, Poppo was born in the Walloon lands of the German kingdom, and was of noble birth. It was undoubtedly through his persuasion that late in his life Conrad II and his wife were induced to establish the monastery of Limburg in Poppo's native country.² When a young man he had made a pilgrimage to Palestine, and later had been to Rome with Count Theodoric of Holland. Although betrothed, he abandoned marriage for the cowl, having been converted, it is said, by a dream.³ He first entered the monastery of St. Thierry, whence he passed to that of St. Vannes. Then he became abbot of St. Vaast and Beaulieu successively. It was in the last post that Henry II discovered him and took him into his service in spite of the united protest of the abbots of Flanders.⁴ In 1020 he was made abbot of Stavelot and Malmedy. Two years afterward he made, under Henry II's direction, that famous reformation of St. Maximin of Trier, the details of which we shall shortly see.

The Lorrainer monasteries, which had formerly yielded to the Gorzean reform, were now in a condition of relapse, and much as they had been before. The Benedictine monasteries, on the other hand, had scarcely yet been touched. As they had resisted the earlier reform, so now they even more violently resisted its revived application, in particular Hersfeld and St. Gall, where Norbert of Stavelot, Poppo's agent, failed dismally, as Immo of Gorze also failed at Reichenau. Almost everywhere the monks ridiculed the reform and held to their old self-indulgent, loose way of living.⁵

¹ On Poppo, Hirsch, and Bresslau see *Jahrbücher Heinrich II.*, III, 235 f.; Bresslau, *Conrad II.*, II, 405 f.; Ladewig, *Poppo von Stablo und die Klosterreform unter den ersten Saliern* (Berlin diss., 1883).

² *Vita Popponis*, c. 19.

³ *Vita Popponis*, SS. XI, 291; Hauck, III, 499; Sackur, II, 177, 264.

⁴ Hugo Flav., *Chron.*, II, 15, p. 391; Adhemar, *Hist.*, III, 37, p. 133; Jotsald, *Vita Odil.*, I, 7; Migne, *Patrol. Lat.*, CXLII, 902; Rodulf. Glaber, *Hist.*, I, 5.

⁵ "Postquam luxur ac superfluitas accessit, morum insolentia subintravit, oboedientia torpuit, repulsa est episcoporum reverentia" *Vita Bernwardi*, c. 14. Cf. *Vita Hathumodae*, cc. 5-6, SS. IV, 168; Hermann Contract. *Chron.*, 1006; *Chron. Suev.*, 1006; *Catalog. abbat. Aug.*, SS. XIII, 333. Of modern writers, Sackur, II, 252 f.; Gerdes, I, 599 f.; Hattmer, *Denkmale des Mittelalters*, II, 221, nn. 4-5.

But unlike the other kings of the Saxon house Henry II took a keen interest in the cause of monastic reform, as the monks soon learned to their sorrow. It may be that the intractability of the monks had its influence in hardening Henry II's heart toward them. But his *Klosterpolitik* was undertaken neither in whim nor in spleen. It was an act of real statesmanship.

Henry II was undoubtedly sincere in his cloister policy,¹ though it was perhaps not without some cynical satisfaction that he proceeded to a wholesale reorganization of the German monasteries, in many cases completely disendowing them. He stripped them of the right of free election² and of most of their property.³ He held (and here Cluny agreed with him) that monks were *par excellence* meant for a life of poverty and religious contemplation.⁴ He forbade plurality of abbots and insisted upon episcopal visitation of the monasteries.⁵ In the case of all the abbeys which survived the reorganization he strengthened the control of the bishops over them, in some instances giving the monastery outright to the bishop.⁶ But the last Saxon emperor was not a fanatic. He did not reduce the monasteries to utter poverty,⁷ and sometimes he

¹ Koeniger, *Burchard I. von Worms*, 108. Cf. Sackur, II, 156-58; Hauck, III, 445, 459; Nitzsch, I, 390-91, 395.

² Feierabend, 3. ³ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴ Hauck, III, 450. The Register of the lands of Prüm was made at Henry's command, and he must have made many others which have perished (Waitz, VIII, 229, n. 1).

⁵ Matthäi, 84; Hauck, III, 450-57; Koeniger, 108.

⁶ According to Henry II episcopal inspection of monasteries was divinely ordained in virtue of the bishop's authority: "Canonum statuta non ore hominum, sed spiritu Dei condita praecipiant" (*Diplom.*, III, No. 371). In order to understand the legal authority which Henry II possessed to institute this reorganization it must be remembered that the control of the crown over monasteries was much more complete than over bishoprics. The king could legally dispose of monastic property much as he wished, employing their revenues, alienating estates or giving them in fief as he might parcels of the royal domain. See Ficker, *Eigentum*, 72-73, 88 f.; Waitz, VII, 189-227; VIII, 244 f.; Fisher, I, 256 f.

⁷ St. Maximin of Trier, after the sharp excision in 1023, was left 209 manors scattered in 40 separate localities, and by the year 1030 had increased its possessions again to one thousand or more manors. St. Emmeran, in Bavaria, in 1031 still owned 850 manors, and Benediktbeuren possessed 60 *villae* of the total area of 1350 *Hufen* (Stumpf, Nos. 1815, 1817; Inama-Sternegg, II, 136; *MGH*, SS. IX, 223). By the twelfth century Fulda had so far picked up again that it had 3,000 manors in Saxony, 3,000 in Thuringia, 3,000 in the Rhinelands around Worms, and 3,000 in Bavaria and Swabia (*Gesta Marcuardi, Fuld. Fontes*, III, 171 f.).

made grants to them in the interest of compacting their estates. In one particular he made a distinct departure from the course of his predecessors, for he conferred the local countship upon the abbots of Fulda and Gandersheim,¹ whereas the Ottos had never given such powers to any churchmen except bishops.

In this great "leveling" process some foundations were leveled up, more were leveled down. The oldest and richest abbeys naturally suffered most. Fulda, Hersfeld, Corvei, Reichenau, Murbach, St. Gall, Benediktbeuren, Tegernsee, Altaich, Gandersheim, had huge blocks of their domains taken away from them. St. Maximin in Trier lost 6,656 manors in 1023, equal to nine square German miles.² Some of the confiscated lands were given to smaller and more struggling monasteries like Lorsch, which, in spite of its ancient foundation, was poor. For this once favorite abbey of Charlemagne seems to have missed the popular interest of later generations, and fell away when the Carolingian house expired.³

Naturally the German bishops, who profited much from this policy, eagerly seconded Henry II's course. For there was intense rivalry between the two bodies of the clergy. The feud was an ancient one. Hatto of Mainz, as far back as the time of Louis the Child, had collected the revenues of four abbeys;⁴ Tagino of

¹ *DD*, III, Nos. 444, 509. The grant to the monastery of Niedenburg of a tract of land nine miles long and three to five miles wide, however, was not as generous as it seems, for the abbey belonged to the bishop of Passau.

² Koeniger, 108, n. 6.

³ The important sources for this policy of Henry II toward the monasteries are *Vita Godeh.*, I, 7, 14; II, 7; *Chron. mon. Tegerns.*, 3; *Herim. Aug.*, anno 1106; *Annal. Quedlinb.*, annos 1014-16; Thietmar, VIII, 13; *Annal. Corb.*, 1014; Jaffé, I, 37; *Vita Popponis*, especially cc. 18-19.

⁴ Waitz, VII, 212; Ficker, 87; Nitzsch, I, 292. Henry II gave the monastery of Seligenstadt to the bishop of Würzburg, St. Stephen and Schwarzach to Strasburg, Helmwardshausen and Schildesche to Paderborn (Hauck, III, 449-50). It was rare that a prelate founded a monastery out of his own revenues. Bernward of Hildesheim and Meinwerk of Paderborn did so, but it "paid" them (Lamprecht, *DWL*, I, 826). There was bitter rivalry and even feud between the bishops for control of monasteries. For cases see Nitzsch, I, 384. Koeniger, 69, says: "Sie kämpften aber nicht um blosse Rechte ohne reale Grundlage, sondern um Land und Besitz; im Hintergrunde eines solchen Kampfes stand nichts anderes als ihre fürstbischöfliche Macht und Stellung."

Magdeburg reformed Kloster Bergen; Gebhard of Regensburg that of St. Emmeran; Meinwerk of Paderborn made a 50 per cent reduction in the monasteries in his diocese.¹ In the issue only the older and more important abbeys were left, and all with a reduced number of inmates.² All were reduced to a mean average of possession; fourteen were legislated out of existence.³ What monastery lands did not go to the enrichment of the bishops were reannexed to the fisc, whence many of them had originally come, which sorely needed repletion, owing to the lavish grants of the Ottos.

The monastic writers of Henry II's reign naturally inveigh bitterly against the emperor, while episcopal authors like Thietmar of Merseburg and the biographer of Meinwerk of Paderborn exult in the ascendancy of the secular over the regular clergy.⁴ But Henry II's ecclesiastical policy was neither one of bigotry toward the monks nor one of favoritism toward the bishops. Each group was made to function in the best possible way according to the mediaeval ideal of the relation of the church to state and society. Monks were intended for prayer and spiritual contemplation apart. Bishops were meant for service in the outside world. The emperor would have heartily indorsed the Pauline differentiation of functions and duties in the ministry.⁵ But the monks were human, and violently resisted the Henrician reform.⁶ Their spiritual professions, which they shrilly advertised, were belied by the desperate way in which they tried to cling to their material possessions. They denounced the bishops, not without some justification, for avarice; but they themselves were quite as avaricious. In high dudgeon many of them forsook their houses. At Hersfeld all the inmates abandoned the monastery; at Corvei only nine remained.

To sum up as to Henry II's ecclesiastical policy: He was a stern, honest ruler, on fundamental issues of the relation of church

¹ *Vita Meinwerki*, c. 17; Gerdes, I, 576.

² The average number of monks varied from 100 to 200; that in the nunneries was much less, perhaps from 30 to 50. When Henry II reformed Hersfeld he eliminated over 50 monks, leaving only old men and boys (Hirsch, I, 364).

³ Matthäi, 81; Feierabend, 4-5.

⁴ *Chron.*, VI, c. 5; *Vita Meinwerki*, c. 17. ⁵ Romans 12:6-8.

⁶ Some of them were so intractable that Henry put them in irons. See references in n. 5, p. 220, cf. p. 225, n. 4.

and state standing with his predecessors and not disposed to abate an inch of royal supremacy over the church. Yet he was more progressive than the Ottos and more in harmony with the new spirit of the age, as when he instructed the synods of Pavia and Goslar to forbid the marriage of priests, and even ruled that the children of priests should be classed as unfree.¹

The feud between the German bishops and the German monks, when Henry II died in 1024, was the principal issue in the election of Conrad II, the founder of the Franconian house. The two rival candidates were cousins and of the same name. Conrad the Old was supported by the episcopal party, which stood for diminishing the prerogatives of Rome and had triumphed two years before at the council of Seligenstadt. Conrad the Young, on the other hand, was backed by the monastic party, by a few of the bishops who were already imbued with the ideas of the radical wing of the Cluny movement, and by the dukes of Upper and Lower Lorraine, whose zeal for the "reform" was strongly tinged with feudal particularism.² The former was elected on September 8, 1024, and was crowned by the archbishop of Mainz. His rival gamely accepted the situation. But his partisans at first obstinately refused to recognize the new king. Headed by Gozelo, duke of Lower Lorraine, a league of opposition was formed in which were Theodoric and Frederick of Upper Lorraine, Renier, Count of Hainaut, the archbishop of Cologne, and the bishops of Trier, Verdun, and Nimwegen. The feudal and centrifugal implications of the Cluny reform were already clearly manifest.³

But the opposition to the German crown, although shortly to become formidable, was as yet unorganized. Pilgrim of Cologne's

¹ "Henry II had had genuine ideas of reform, albeit they were often mingled with political interest, as when, at the end of his reign, he instructed the synods of Goslar and Pavia to forbid the marriage of priests and declared that their children should be classed as unfree (Hauck, III, 528 f.; Sackur, II, 258; Mansi, XIX, 323). The affair of Hammerstein, where the court, if not the emperor, energetically sustained Aribio of Mainz, the champion of episcopal rights against the papacy, and friend of Ekkehard of St. Gall, the bitter opponent of reform, shows that on a fundamental issue Henry II stood with his predecessors and would not abate one inch of royal supremacy over the German church."—Gregorovius, *Rome in the Middle Ages*, IV, Part 1, 31.

² Cf. n. 3, p. 219; Bresslau, I, 12-13.

³ *Gesta episcoporum Cameracensium*, III, 50; Pabst, *Forschungen*, V, 339 f.—an extension of his dissertation *De Ariberto II Mediolanensi primisque modis aevi motibus popularibus* (Berlin, 1864); Pfister, *op. cit.*, 373-74.

participation was due to pique and the ancient jealousy existing between Mainz and Cologne.¹ Conrad II adroitly secured his defection by permitting him to have the honor of crowning Queen Gisela.² At the same time he turned to Odilon of Cluny, who was known to disapprove of the political program of the radical Cluniacs, and who believed in still confining the reformation movement begun by Cluny to the reform of monasticism and in keeping it out of politics.³

Conrad II (1024-39) made no change in the fundamental policy of the German crown toward the church. But he was less considerate in the use of church patronage than Henry II had been. He was friendly with Poppo of Stavelot, the leader of the reform party, and did not actively oppose the movement, but he never let it compromise the political obligations of the church to the government. In the Conradiner theory of church government the bishops were equally vassals and bishops, to be handled precisely as were dukes and counts.⁴ The chief office of the church had developed into a feudal institution bearing all the characteristics of a dukedom except hereditary.⁵ The bishops ruled the land in place of the former counts; they performed traditional feudal services at court; they led their vassals to the host. They were as much a part of the feudal hierarchy as they were of the clergy, being required to give the oath of fealty and do homage like ordinary vassals. A century was yet to elapse before these princely bishops, territorialized within their dioceses like dukes within their duchies, were formally to assume the rôle of prince-bishops, and haughtily to call their ecclesiastical domains *terra nostra*,⁶ but they acted on that theory by early Franconian times.

¹ Nitzsch, II, 17.

² Wipo, *Vita Chuonradus*, c. 2, p. 15 (ed. Bresslau). ³ Bresslau, I, 34.

⁴ For Conrad II's ecclesiastical policy see Hauck, III, 544 f.; Nitzsch, II, 18; Lamprecht, II, 301; Bresslau, *Jahrb.*, II, 389 f.; Feierabend, 5 f.; Voigt, 3 f.; Waitz, VIII, 420-21; Pfenninger, *Die kirchlichen Politik Kaiser Konrads II* (Halle diss., 1889). Conrad dragged the intriguing Italian bishops over the Alps and put the archbishop of Lyons in chains (Wipo, 35; *Herim.*, 1036).

⁵ See Waitz, VII, 195. The notes are illuminating on the point.

⁶ The earliest instance of this practice is the bishop of Münster in 1134 (Werminghoff, 78; Hauck, *Entstehung der geistlichen Territorien*, 28).

The statement in the text does not mean to say that every possession of a bishopric was regarded as a fief, for a considerable part of the episcopal domains were allods. This is especially true of older holdings. But the donations of the Saxon and Franconian emperors were almost invariably fiefs. Ficker (*Vom Heerschild*, 62 f.) thinks

Conrad II used church offices with complete indifference to their religious nature, and wholly for political ends. The "school of the palace," established by Henry II for the training of bishops, was abandoned, and bishops and abbots were no longer prevailingly drawn from those of the clergy who were well educated and technically proficient in ecclesiastical duties. They were appointed and ordered about like ordinary feudal officials.¹ While meaning to be "practical" in his handling of church offices, Conrad's almost cynical method offended even those who thoroughly believed in the Saxon ecclesiastical policy, and enraged the ardent reform party. The watchword of this group, "Simony," did not necessarily imply corrupt practice with reference to church offices, although the radical advocates of the cause so used the term, and if Conrad II had had more imagination and tact he perhaps might have neutralized their opposition in some degree.²

Henry II had frowned upon the frank sale of church benefices,³ but Conrad II trafficked in them like a *Realpolitiker*, as Feierabend aptly says,⁴ invariably exacting a fee from a newly installed bishop.⁵ He did not have the vision to see the inadvisability and inexpediency of such practices in view of the growing sensitiveness of the church to secular control over it. The protest of the Cluny reform as yet was little larger than a man's hand in Germany, but Conrad II could not read the sign in the sky. He inadvertently furthered the Cluny reform by failing to distinguish between the *use* and the *abuse* of his prerogative.⁶

that the title of prince-bishop may not properly be applied before the reign of Frederick Barbarossa. Cf. Waitz, *Göth. Gel. Anzeig.* (1862), 170. Conrad's ordinance of 1037 [*Leges*, II, 38] shows that the performance of military service by clerical vassals was subject to the same conditions that governed the service of lay vassals. A bishop who failed to do so was liable to lose his office just as a lay vassal forfeited his lands for the same offense.

¹ Nitzsch, II, 20; Waitz, VII, 210-11. ² Hauck, III, 552. ³ *Ibid.*, III, 544.

⁴ Feierabend, 5. Cf. Waitz, VIII, 408; Bresslau, II, 366 f.; Sommerlad, II, 228-29.

⁵ Theodoric, bishop of Basel, paid "immensa pecunia" for the see (Wipo, c. 8).

⁶ Hefele, IV, 703; Giesebrecht, *Kaiserzeit*, II, 292. Conrad II continued the Saxon practice of conferring countships upon bishops, making six such grants, the most important of which were to Trier, Mainz, Utrecht, Brixen, and Paderborn (Bresslau, II, 506), so that the degree of power which the German bishops came to exercise was unparalleled (Gerdes, I, 354 f.).

Yet it is easy to misunderstand Conrad II's policy toward the church. While it may have been more drastic than that of Henry II and more recklessly applied, it was of a piece with that of his predecessor, and as statesmanlike. It must be remembered that by Conrad's time the radicals in Cluny had come out into the open and violently inveighed against *all* secular control of the church as simony, and that, though still a minority, the time was not far off when this radical element was to gain ascendancy over the curia and to claim from Rome domination for a world-church over all the Christian nations of Europe.

Conrad II's treatment of the monasteries was more rigorous than that of Henry II had been. He personally founded only one new abbey, Limburg.¹ In 1026 he gave the monastery of Kempten outright to the Duke of Swabia in order to purchase his allegiance,² and when this intention failed of effect, in 1030 he gave some of the lands of Reichenau to Count Mangold in order to strengthen him in his conflict with the stubborn Swabian duke.³ Lorsch, which Henry II had spared, was so reduced, owing to the diminution of its estates, that the monks had barely enough *naturalia* for their livelihood. In Tegernsee the monks dwelt in constant terror of losing the small remainder of their property. Lands of Corvei, Hersfeld, St. Maximin, and Echternach were largely distributed among vassals of the crown and even given to *ministeriales*.⁴ Schwarzach was given in whole to the bishop of Speyer.⁵ But Conrad II did not utterly disestablish any monastery as Henry II had done.⁶

Conrad II had a thrifty German *Haushalter's* dislike of extravagance and inefficiency, and the waste attending the administration of so many monasteries annoyed him. In this sentiment he had the sympathy of Poppo of Stavelot, who clung tenaciously to the austere monastic ideals of poverty and asceticism. Accordingly Conrad II simplified and reduced the cost of administration of the monasteries by combining no less than ten of the most famous abbeys in Germany, among them Hersfeld, St. Gall, and St.

¹ *Vita Popponis*, c. 16.

² Hauck, III, 547; Nitzsch, II, 23.

³ Bresslau, II, 366.

⁴ Hauck, III, 548.

⁵ Voigt, *Klosterpolitik*, 7.

⁶ Feierabend, 6.

Maximin, in Poppo's hand. It is said that the king contemplated putting all the royal abbeys in his hand. What this change accomplished for economy alone, to say nothing of increased efficiency in monastic administration, must be evident. The mere elimination of ten separate abbots' courts and abbots' retinues was a great measure of economy.¹

Public economy was a watchword with Conrad II. He was niggardly in making grants to either branch of the clergy.² Owing to his own slender estates and the generous largesses made by the Saxon kings out of the royal domain, the crown lands by Conrad II's time had become reduced to limits less than in the time of the last Carolingians.³ In the "colonial lands" along the eastern border there was no imperial property at all. The Ottos had bestowed everything upon the new sees created in these regions, or else upon the Billunger and the Babenberger. It was absolutely necessary for the crown to husband its resources, and the greatest of these were the lands of the monasteries.⁴

It is Conrad II's special claim to distinction that he perceived the economic side of the problem of government, and intelligently labored for its solution. He was the first German king (and, save

¹ Hauck, III, 483-89, 544; Nitzsch, II, 23-24; *Vita Popponis*, SS. XI, 305.

² According to the records which have survived twelve monasteries received grants of land from Conrad II, the two most liberally treated having been Eichstätt, 30 manors, and Einsiedeln, 12 manors (Bresslau, II, 506). Limburg, which he and the empress founded, received but one grant after the initial endowment (*DD*, IV, No. 216). Fulda and Quedlinburg were the only large monasteries which received grants, for usually Conrad confined his gifts to small monasteries. The same indifference—or economy?—characterized Conrad's attitude toward the bishops. Of 25 grants made to them, 18 were among 5 bishops, the remainder among 7 (Bresslau, II, 506). The gifts made to Meinwerk of Paderborn and Nithard of Freising were not "grants," but rewards for distinguished military service. The bishoprics of Meissen and Speyer were most generously treated (8 and 12 estates respectively) (Stumpf, Nos. 2193, 2295-98; *ibid.*, 2216, 2305-06). The bishop of Naumburg received his reward in the chancellorship of Italy; beyond this he only received one grant of a hundred manors (*ibid.*, Nos. 2249, 2242). Magdeburg got 40 manors in a single grant; Hildesheim, Eichstätt, Brixen, Salzburg, and Passau each one grant (*ibid.*, Nos. 2444, 2416, 2493, 2465, 2330).

³ Eggers, 97; Gerdes, I, 447-51.

⁴ "Konrads Klosterpolitik ist solidarisch mit dem Festhalten an Reich und Reichsinteressen."—Voigt, 7.

Henry IV and Lothar II, the only one) who had a constructive economic program.¹ It is under the first Franconian emperors that the distinction first was made between the imperial fisc and the private property of the emperor, and between secular and church property.² Conrad's great program for the revindication of the fisc (a policy continued by Henry III and Henry IV) was as statesmanlike as it was unpopular. For it aimed to recover for the crown the huge number of manors and the huge tracts of forest land which legally appertained to the crown, but which had been appropriated without royal consent, or for which the church was not

¹ Inama-Sternegg, II, 112; Waitz, VIII, 244, 388; Nitzsch, II, 20-33.

² Schröder (*Rechtsgesch.*, 517) thinks that the *Nürnberger Salzbuch*, edited by Kuster, is probably part of a greater inventory of royal property. The distinction between the private property of the ruler and the fisc was first made by Conrad II when he initiated the revindication of the fisc. He clearly made the point in Italy in 1024, when he went thither to punish Pavia for revolt under Henry II, in the course of which the imperial castle was destroyed. The Pavians pleaded that they were not guilty. "Dicebant Papienses: 'Quem offendimus? Imperatori nostro fidem et honorem usque ad terminum vitae suae servavimus; quo defuncto cum nullum regem haberemus, regis nostri domum destruxisse non jure accusabimur.' E contrario rex: 'Scio,' inquit, 'quod domum regis vestri non destruxistis, cum eo tempore nullum haberetis; sed domum regalem scidisse, non valetis inficiari. Si rex periit, regnum remansit, sicut navis remanet cujus gubernator cadit. Aedes publicae fuerant, non privatae'" (Wipo, *Vita Chuonradi*, c. 7). A century later Lothar II, at the diet of Regensburg in 1125, made a similar pronouncement: "Rege apud Radisponam in conventu principum inquirente praedia judicio proscriptorum a rege, si juste forifactoribus abjudicata fuerint vel pro his quae regno attinent commutata, utrum cedant . . . vel proprietati regis. Judicatum, potius regiminis subjacere ditioni quam regis proprietati" (*Annal. S. Disibod.*, 1125, in *MGH*, SS. XVII, 23). Cf. *Annal. Sax.*, 1127; *ibid.*, VI, 765. At the same time the distinction between secular and ecclesiastical property was developed by the publicists, particularly Gerhoh of Reichersberg, in the pamphlet entitled: *De aedificio Dei*. See Ribbeck, *Gerhoh von Reichersberg und seine Ideen über das Verhältnis von Kirche und Staat*, "Forschungen zur deutschen Gesch.," XXIV, 35 f. Cf. Waitz, VII, 195-203, and especially Wattenbach (5th ed.), II, 277-82. Potthast's *Bibliotheca* has a good bibliography upon Gerhoh. Gerhoh, though German born, belonged to the most austere of monastic brotherhoods, that of the Camaldoli, to which Petrus Damiani had also belonged. He was the intellectual heir of Damiani, and loyal to the ideal of the Holy Roman Empire. He was by far the greatest publicist of the twelfth century, and attacked with all his might the policy of the popes of the time. He arraigned the political ambition and worldliness of the curia, its tyranny over the clergy, the abusive power of the legates, its mercenary spirit, the church's hunger for land, the pope's abusive practice of appeals and exemptions, the papal alliance with the revolted Lombard cities and with the Normans.

performing efficient service, and to put the administration of them in the hands of royal *ministeriales* instead, men quite as well trained as the farm bailiffs and stewards of the bishops and abbots, and far more amenable to control by the crown.¹

In addition to his endeavor to revindicate the fisc, and to his rigorous insistence upon economy and retrenchment in the monasteries, and strict accountability for intelligent exploitation of their property by the abbots, Conrad II was also keenly appreciative of the growing trade of Germany, which the internal peace and order established by the Saxon kings had promoted, and which was stimulated by the political connection with Italy. He was generous in distributing market grants and coinage rights among the monasteries.² The crown was a large contributor to the prosperity of the German church in this way under the Saxon and first Franconian kings, in order that the church might be of material assistance to both government and society. We have few secure data to determine what the incomes of the church were from these sources, independently of its wealth in lands, but the aggregate was large.³

The gain to both state and church from this arrangement was mutual. The feudal structure and organization of the German church made it an inseparable ingredient of the state. It was impossible to think of a church independent of the state unless the church were willing to resign temporalities which represented nearly half the state, and which the church itself had accepted in times past with a clear understanding of the secular obligations which possession of them entailed. But what if the church became eager not only to be independent of the state, but to subordinate the state to the church? The bishops of Germany—abbots less so—were lords of territorial principalities which equaled the duchies in size and power. They were ecclesiastical princes, often from the same class as the lay feudality, actuated by much the same spirit

¹ On Conrad II's revindication of the fisc see Nitzsch, II, 22-24; Bresslau, II, 356-66, 507-10; Gerdes, II, 50-57; Hauck, III, 544; Waitz, VIII, 244. Conrad's legislation in 1029 for the Weissenburger *ministeriales* marks an epoch in the history of the evolution of this class (Giesebrecht, II, 686 f.; Nitzsch, *Ministerialität und Bürgerthum*, 1859).

² Bresslau, II, 389-90; Nitzsch, II, 24.

³ Lamprecht, *DWL*, I, 685 f.

and subject to similar obligations. The emperor could not renounce control of the great preferments of the church; he could not forego the almost immemorial right of advowson without abdicating his power, if not his office.

The Cluny reform was unveiling its world-wide pretensions.¹ Four years after the death of Conrad II in 1039, Siegfried of Gorze declared that the only law recognizable by the church was that of the canons, and that whoever violated them defied God.² William of Benigne wrote to the same effect to the pope.³ Gerard of Cambrai asserted the supremacy of the canons also.⁴ Wazo, archbishop of Liège, a former protégé of Poppo of Stavelot, broke away from his master's teaching of the dependence of the church upon the state and repeated the assertion.⁵ In Italy Peter Damien published his famous tract entitled *Gomorrhah*.⁶ The guns of Cluny could by this time be heard in the distance. It was merely a question of time now, and that not long, before the attack of the Cluny reform upon the citadel of the German monarchy would begin. All the earlier local or sporadic movements for monastic reform, like that of Gerard of Brogne and of Gorze, all the accumulated resentment of the monks everywhere in Germany who had writhed under Henry II's and Conrad II's reorganization of the monasteries; all the feudal particularism abroad in Germany, especially in the Lorraines and in Italy, which perverted a genuine moral force to spurious intent; the ambition of many of the German bishops for greater power, which tempted them to turn against the hand which had so long fed them; and finally the enormous ambition of a new and rehabilitated papacy, by the middle of the eleventh century were organized and compacted together into one formidable whole under the name of the Cluny reform. Some account, therefore, of the origin of this famous abbey and the movement which it generated becomes necessary at this point.

¹ Gerdes, II, 102.

² Migne, *Patrol. Lat.*, CXLI, 82.

³ Giesebrecht, II, 82.

⁴ *Gesta pontif. Camer.*, III, 51.

⁵ On Wazo see Cauchie, *La Querelle des investitures dans les diocèses de Liège et de Cambrai*.

⁶ Migne, *Patrol. Lat.*, CXLIV, 159 f.

The history of Gerard of Brogne (who died in 959) and the Gorzean movement throughout Flanders, Picardy, and the two Lorraines showed that the church, even in its darkest hours, yet retained some portion of spiritual leaven. But its success had been limited. In striving to revive Benedictine monasticism they had made the mistake of endeavoring to put new wine into old bottles. The Gorzean reform had been too conservative to succeed, and in the course of a century, after the passing of its early leaders, it fell under the yoke of local feudal powers. What was needed was a new and radical monasticism, and this the Cluny reform was.

THE PRIMARY PROBLEM FOR AN EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY

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Common sense and science present a vast mass of facts, of brute actualities. In the light of common day this world of our multifarious experience is not at all "divine," just a world of men and things. But in the past many sensitive souls have found in this everyday world the tokens of a divine presence; in the stirring struggles for human rights they have conceived the conviction that "the voice of the people is the voice of God"; in studying the stars with all the machinery of mathematics and telescopes they have had to exclaim at last, "O God, I am reading thy thoughts after thee!" But those were less critical days, we think; men were then less conscious of the psychology of their own emotional reactions; is it possible for us to look squarely and steadily into this world of fact and discern in it God? In other words, for the empiricist the question of the existence of God is the question whether there is any intellectually honest way of accepting the emotional reactions of our whole nature at anything like their face value, if we find that the envisaged world of fact has *some* aspect which, in *some* of our moods, elicits from deep within us the religious response. For that, from many thoughtful people, in spite of all the concessions which must be made to the scientific or mechanistic interpretation of nature, the world does irresistibly elicit such religious response is unquestionably true.

This is not the first time that men have faced their world, denuded of meanings put upon it by religious tradition, and have tried to give an unbiased answer to the question of what, all in all, they find this world to be. Doubtless, therefore, it would be a salutary thing to review the outstanding examples, in previous

times, of the very same sort of empirical¹ investigation which this crucial problem of religion forces upon us today. Not that we should be primarily interested in their results, so far as content goes, but it may well be that the very orientation of the task upon a broad and simple historical background will save us useless repetition of fruitless efforts and perchance point the direction in which the problem as a whole seems to tend. In the review which follows, of the way in which this primary problem of religion has presented itself to the empirical mind, I shall try to illustrate rather than demonstrate, and must trust that the statements I make dogmatically may commend themselves as interpretations which the generally accepted facts of the history of philosophy will easily bear. I do not claim to have discovered any novel facts, but only to have seen the old facts, after some little effort to see them in a broad and vital way, in a perspective that may clothe them with a new interest. If I can show a certain rhythm and a certain simplicity in the way thought has moved back and forth upon a rather definite pathway, it is not because I have begun with any Hegelian presuppositions, any assumptions as to the way in which reflection ought to move. Far from it. My sole desire has been to read the history of philosophy as one interested primarily in the psychology of the great movements, not in their minute details, but in their broad outlines. If the reader is suspicious of the simplicity of the parallels which I point out, I can only say that it is a simplicity that, so far as I am aware, I have discovered and not previously assumed.

To state the whole matter very briefly, I wish to trace in sharp and simple outlines the history of what I shall call the *mechanistic-mystical dilemma*. And by mysticism, in this connection, I mean a particular kind of mysticism, what perhaps I might name *classical mysticism* or *nature mysticism*. Let me proceed first of all to make the meaning of this term clear.

Elsewhere² I have defined religion as *a social attitude toward the non-human environment*. This definition was meant to include

¹ Empiricism is of course always a relative. Though Descartes, for instance, was a "rationalist," he was empirically minded as compared with the Schoolmen. By "empirical" then I mean the open-minded investigative attitude rather than the traditionalist. To investigate without *any* assumptions is obviously impossible.

² See the *American Journal of Theology*, XX (January, 1916), 95 ff.

both nature religion and supra-nature religion. In the latter, where the religious environment is a more or less definitely conceived divine society, the social attitude toward this environment is psychologically simple. But in the case of nature religion the maintenance of a social attitude toward the non-human environment is not simple, for the spontaneous social responses of the human agent are continually checked and in a way frustrated by the fact that this same nature appears under other circumstances as anything but a *socius*. The emotional social attitudes are continually dogged by sophistication, and instinctive or spontaneous responses are pushed into personifications and sublimations of the original experience, wherein imaginative thought may roam unhampered by continuous reference to facts, or into abstractions, in which reflection seeks some sort of reconciliation between the physical and the quasi-personal complexion which the world of fact seems to bear. The easier thing to do, the popular thing, is to allow the imagination to transfer the social qualities of the world to some supramundane or extra-natural sphere. This, of course, has been accomplished in a very complete way only by the great religions, the gods of primitive peoples lingering in a dim borderland not far removed from the actual physical environment. But in those circumstances where a naïve imagination is checked by a critical intelligence, the mind is forced to maintain toward nature an attitude to some degree social. This attitude I shall call mysticism in the special sense referred to. It is, as I said above, continually checked and modified by the facts of unemotional experience, and thus two tendencies, two typical interpretations of the world, two mutually opposed and radically inconsistent sorts of response to nature, are found in a continually shifting balance. This is what I mean by the *mechanistic-mystical dilemma*.

It is important that "mysticism," as used in this essay, should always be clearly understood as having the meaning specified above. Mysticism in this sense is particularly characteristic of the great reconstructive periods of thought. In all such situations, when the empirically minded religionist is thrown back upon the world of fact, it is the unavoidable expression of the religious disposition. There is, of course, another type of mysticism, the mysticism of the contemplative monk, the mysticism which is directed, not toward

nature, but toward the supernatural, toward the divine beings of the "other" world. This is the mysticism of Thomas à Kempis. It is the mysticism of Christian orthodoxy. The first type, with which alone I shall deal in this essay, is the mysticism of Eckhart and Boehme. Its search is for the living or divine element in the natural world, whereas the other is a search for a more immediate experience of the divine reality of the supernatural or "other" world. While, of course, the two types will tend sometimes to fuse in the experience of individuals, they are logically distinct and will be regarded as such in this discussion.

The history of this mechanistic-mystical dilemma may for the purpose of this essay be divided into three main periods:

I. From Thales to Aristotle

II. From Bruno to Leibniz

III. From Rousseau to Bergson

There are several outstanding characteristics which these three periods have in common. Each one is ushered in by a period of disintegration. In the first case there is the discrediting of Olympianism; in the second, that of ecclesiastical supernaturalism; in the third, that of rationalism. Each is at first marked by an earlier stage of uncritical mysticism, and by a later stage of more critical mysticism, in which a special effort is made to reconcile the mechanistic and the mystical elements. The uncritical mysticism of the first period is the hylozoism of the Ionians; of the second, the "cosmical poetry" of Bruno and Boehme; of the third, the feeling-philosophy of Rousseau. The critical mysticism of the first period is the teleology of Aristotle; of the second, the monadology of Leibniz; of the third, the "creative evolution" of Bergson. In each period, urging thought on toward the final effort of critical mysticism, there are two phases of great importance, (1) an extreme formulation of the mechanistic tendency and (2) a characteristic dualism, the mechanistic and the mystical tendencies threatening to become entirely irreconcilable. The former of these, in the first period, is the atomism of Democritus; in the second, the Galilean mechanics; in the third, the "natural-selection" theory of Darwinism. The latter, in the first period, is Platonism; in the second, Cartesianism; in the third, Kantianism.

On the other hand, the three periods are significantly different in this, that whereas the dilemma of the first period is quite objective, in the second it is most characteristically objective-subjective, in the third subjective. In other words, if we compare the uncritical mysticism of the three periods, we see that in hylozoism the contrast and the attempted union are between the world-stuff and the world-life, both quite objectively conceived; that in the case of Bruno or Boehme the two elements whose contrast is emphasized while their fusion is attempted are the macrocosm and microcosm, nature and man; that in the case of Rousseau the contrast-fusion is between the inner and the outer, the true nature and the tangible form of human experience. This difference between the three periods is still more obvious if we compare the critical mysticisms: the contrast-fusion of Aristotle's system is matter-form; of Leibniz, the lower monads (physical) and the higher monads (spirit, mind); of Bergson, intelligence and intuition. The effort of each of these is, of course, to emphasize and explain the fusion, reducing the contrast to the level of mere appearance, of superficiality. It is, however, in the dualisms of the three periods that this point is most clearly to be seen, the point, namely, that the dilemma is in the first objective, in the second objective-subjective, in the third subjective. In Plato the gulf yawns between concrete thing or act and eternal type; in Descartes, between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*; in Kant, between pure reason and practical reason. The importance of this sequence, objective, objective-subjective, subjective, I shall refer to later in my discussion.

I. THE FIRST PERIOD: FROM THALES TO ARISTOTLE

1. *From Olympianism to hylozoism.*—I have suggested above (p. 236) the psychological principle which goes farthest to explain the rise of hylozoistic philosophy in Ionia. The historical facts which brought this principle into action were, very briefly, these: (a) The Olympian religion had, because of general prosperity and changed conditions of life, got out of touch with practical interests. Originally nature deities, the gods had, through a long, imaginative process, been elevated to the remote grandeur of Olympus. Furthermore, the ethical conceptions of the thoughtful

had radically outgrown the moral standards imbedded in the Olympian theology. Olympianism had simply become irrelevant to practical life. (b) All the stimulations of intellectual curiosity and of a practical interest in the processes of nature which influenced the Ionians of the sixth century, such as the contact with other civilizations and the many novel experiences of the colonists, drove thought back upon the world of fact, a world denuded by the development and the resultant irrelevance of Olympianism of its original (animistic) religious significance.

The result, psychologically, was inevitable. Many aspects of this world, now contemplated with some considerable degree of religiously unprejudiced curiosity, immediately elicited an interpretation of the social type. "All things," said Thales, "are full of gods," by which he meant that the world of the senses was somehow "divine," in some sense alive, however dead the gods of Olympus might be. And the mysterious power of the magnet was a suggestive illustration.¹ Many other aspects of the world, however, elicited, as in all everyday life, only the non-social, the mechanical, adjustments, the physical interpretation. And the Ionian thinker tried to conceive this world, physical yet somehow alive, in terms adequate to both aspects at once, without recourse to mythology. This mechanistic-mystical attitude is *hylo-zoism* (living-substance-ism).

2. *The dualistic tendency of the dilemma.*—But in *hylo-zoism* the strain upon the hyphen is great. Greek speculation at once, quite unconsciously, broke the problem up into that of the world-stuff and that of the world-process. Later, when metaphysics grew up afresh out of the soil of ethics, the dualism was first practical, the Socratic contrast between action and goal; then later the logical distinction between particular and universal; then finally the metaphysical distinction between concrete-temporal and the ideal-eternal, the content and the form, the material and the immaterial. Even as the social dispositions of primitive men had instinctively separated a living something from out the matrix of

¹ The reader can easily get at the psychology of the *hylozoists* by playing for a few minutes with a good strong magnet, allowing himself to feel vividly the kinaesthetic sensations as the magnet pulls upon the bit of steel held between the fingers, and by giving just a little rein to the imagination.

common experience, the living something expressed in "manaism" or what not, only that finally it should be domiciled as the gods upon Olympus; so again the social disposition of the Athenian intellectual separated out the moral goal from the matrix of everyday actions, only to see it finally, via logic and metaphysics, settled as the Idea of the Good, in the heaven beyond the heavens, while the earth and the things that are earthy "participate," inexplicably enough, in the reality of which they are but shadows!

3. *The mechanistic tendency.*—The non-mystical temperament of the Greeks set the pace for all generations. A brief and simple outline of the conceptions which they formulated, in the attempt to understand the world of fact, will perhaps prove suggestive.

The greatest progress toward simplifying and so understanding nature was achieved, through many modifications, by the treatment of substance. (a) The beginning was made by Milesianism, the quest for the one stuff of which the many things are formed. In Thales and Anaximenes this is an empirical substance. In Anaximander it is conceived of as a transempirical substance. (b) The problem of substance soon is seen to be the problem of qualities. The riot of changing and mingling qualities is vastly simplified when Empedocles and Anaxagoras conceive of qualitatively distinct and changeless elements, whose mixture produces our sensuous world. (c) The greatest step was that of atomism, whereby qualitative differences are understood in terms of quantitative differences. There are no real changes in the elements. There are no qualitative differences, save those of size and shape. Combination, due to whirling motions and resultant vortices, accounts for all objects and events, while effluxes, due also to the motions, account for sense-impressions and thoughts. This is the acme of the Greek mechanization of nature.

The treatment of the world-process was more difficult. After the first great step is made of conceiving all changes as merely parts of a world-change, three questions concerning this all-inclusive process inevitably present themselves, namely, What? Why? How?

To the first question there are several answers:

- a) Anaximander: Separation of opposites.
- b) Anaximenes: Condensation and rarefaction.

c) Empedocles and Anaxagoras: Mixing of qualitatively simple elements.

d) Democritus: Mere motion of non-qualitative elements. Thus far the net result of the simplifying efforts is twofold: the world is basically merely quantitative; all change is basically motion.

To the second question, *Why?* a mechanistic answer seems impossible. It is a distinctly anthropopathic question. And so we find such conceptions as the generalization of Anaximander that the world-process is injustice requiring compensatory reaction, and that of Heraclitus that the world-strife is justice. But the thoroughgoing mechanist will attempt to make the question *Why?* meaningless when asked concerning the nature-process, by showing its meaninglessness when asked concerning human actions. Democritus' psychology is a theory of atoms-in-motion. But if the atomistic mind still persists in asking *Why?* concerning the vortices of which it is itself but a sample, the answer is, necessity, mathematical necessity.

How? is, as it were, midway between *What?* and *Why?* It seeks a more inward interpretation than *What?* It is less anthropopathic than *Why?* It is the question which becomes crucial only when, after the problem of substance and the problem of process have each received definitive answers, the problem of the relation between substance and process becomes dominant.

It should be noted that while Democritus in Abdera was content to discuss the *What?* of the world-substance and world-process, events in Athens had produced a shift of the philosophic center of gravity, and Socrates had initiated the search for the norm of action and of ethical judgment. As a result the whole metaphysical horizon is tinged with the problem of the normative; the substance-process enigma passes through the alembic of ethical experience and comes out as the content-form enigma. (The means by which the ethical problem is transformed into a metaphysical problem is the logical discussion of the relation between the particular and the universal.) Thus the *How?* of the world-process is a profounder question than the *What?* or the *Why?* inasmuch as the motive of the scientific development from Thales to Democritus is now

imbued with the moral earnestness engendered in Socrates and Plato by the tragic social situation in Athenian life. It is deeper, also, because of the influence of mathematical insight, and because of the new rigor imposed upon thought by the development of logic.

This greater profundity may be most clearly seen by noting a relation which, though perhaps not due to a direct connection, is yet actually existent between the Platonic-Aristotelian statement of the world-problem and the Democritean solution. Democritus succeeded in stripping the elemental substance, the atom, of all qualities save form. For Aristotle the substance and the form are separable in thought. Indeed there seemed no way of allowing form to adhere inseparably to substance without being driven to atomistic materialism. So much at least the preceding three centuries had demonstrated. On the other hand, if separable, how could form and substance be conceived of as being actually related? Plato's failure to answer this question is notorious. The doctrine of participation was not satisfactory. The situation is relieved by recourse to mythology. The notion of the demiurge and of the world-soul is anthropopathism revived. If for Plato the word was "fundamentally mathematical," it was nevertheless ultimately not intelligible as such. Without the demiurge and the world-soul the mathematical world cannot be understood. Thus Plato was "in some things a reactionary."¹ Only, according to the thesis of this paper, being "reactionary" was simply being a mystic. Mechanism reacts inevitably against mysticism, and mysticism reacts as inevitably against mechanism. The lion and the lamb do not for long lie down together.

This, then, is the How-problem of the world-process in the peculiarly difficult form as it presented itself to Aristotle. How does matter take on form? How does the essence realize itself in the concrete particular reality? The doctrine of development is Aristotle's answer to the What-problem. But within this notion there lurks the subtler question of how the development takes place.

4. *Critical mysticism.*—The teleology which Plato had suggested in figurative or mythical form Aristotle embodied in his doctrine

¹ Marvin, *History of European Philosophy*, p. 147.

of entelechy, the thought that cosmic processes are the realization of the essence in the phenomenon. The cue for this system was the development of growing organisms and the constructive activities of man. It is evident, however, that the teleology of growth and that of artistic construction are not at all the same, and since these two applications of the teleological principle run through the whole system sometimes quite confused, we have here, in the use of the latter at least, a further illustration of my thesis that the Greek mind was continually forced back upon anthropopathic or social conceptions to eke out its otherwise abstract and mechanical interpretations of reality. Although it is true that the application of this artistic principle is mostly by way of analogy, nevertheless it is just this inability of the greatest mind of the ancient period to dispense entirely with the personal or quasi-personal feeling in his explanation of cosmic processes that is so significant.

It is illuminating to note the several ways in which Aristotle seeks on the one hand to save his teleology from becoming a merely anthropopathic teleology, and on the other to preserve any real significance for the human comprehension of it. In the first place, vitalistic finalism and artistic finalism offset each other, the former getting its actual intelligibility by means of the artistic or constructive analogy, the latter being corrected in its inherent anthropopathic tendency by constant reference to the biological process. In the second place, the artistic finalism is broken up into four elements, namely, material cause, efficient cause, formal cause, and final cause. The last of these is shown to be the most important. Formal cause and efficient cause would inevitably tend toward anthropopathism, if indeed not toward anthropomorphism. Hence this danger is averted by stressing final cause. Again, the artistic analogy is rendered innocuous by the entelechial psychology, wherein, even as vegetative soul and animal soul are progressively *aufgehoben* in the rational soul, so the rational soul, which would be responsible for the existence of final cause (in the artistic analogy), is in turn *aufgehoben* by the cosmic progression toward pure form. And then, in the fourth place, by the subtle correlation of form and matter, the one being drawn on by the attraction of form, the other being effectively attractive only

because of the longing of matter for form, by this subtle correlation the pure passivity of the perfection of God is yet dynamic, while the "longing" of matter is yet not a merely hylozoistic longing.

Thus does the subtle anthropoteleism of the culminating system of antiquity save itself from a cruder anthropopathism. But thus, also, does the mystical motif vindicate itself as an inevitable supplementation of the mechanistic motif. From first to last the systems of antiquity illustrate my contention that the mechanical and mystical interpretations of the world are complementary and at the same time mutually contradictory. Each tends to force the other from the field, yet each in itself is inadequate. The various conceptions which seek to combine the two are always in unstable equilibrium. They tend to break down either in one direction or in the other.

II. THE SECOND PERIOD: FROM BRUNO TO LEIBNIZ

1. *From ecclesiastical supernaturalism to Bruno's philosophy.*—

It should be obvious that when the metaphysical dualism, beginning in the system of Plato, culminated in the system of Christianity, by which reality falls apart into two utterly distinct spheres, the temporal and the eternal, the sensuous and the supramundane, thought should find much less difficulty in apprehending it in the opposed categories of the mechanical and mystical attitudes. The problem is not now that of interpreting a world that seems inadequately explained by either mechanical or mystical concepts exclusively, but of explaining the possibility and method of contact between the two worlds which are regarded as metaphysically distinct. For the practical needs of Christianity this problem is readily enough solved by the conception of revelation and miracle, and in an age that was hard pressed by practical religious and moral rather than philosophical needs the mystical attitude attached itself inevitably to the supramundane, divine world, and the mechanical to the earthly, temporal world. Consequently the patristic and mediaeval periods are comparatively poor in illustrations of the thesis I am advancing. But when once the movement which began with Duns Scotus at the culmination of mediaeval thought, namely, the separation of philosophy from theology,

reached its consummation, and the thinker was free to look again with untrammelled curiosity at the world about him and to seek expressions for the responses that it evoked within him, this antagonism and necessary mutual supplementation of mechanical and mystical interpretations which I have noted in the Greek period become again remarkably apparent.

The psychology of this return to the world of fact from a pre-occupation with a world of faith is hardly less simple than that of the Ionians. The growing irrelevance of the established view of life, a quickening of the intellect by great discoveries, the discovery of classical culture, of a wide, wide world, of a solar system—all this is a familiar story. And thrown back upon this world of fact, aided by the recently discovered neo-Platonic and neo-Pythagorean philosophies, Bruno and Boehme at once reacted mystically to this great world of fact. The transcendency of God is not so much denied as ignored. It is the immanence of God which the natural philosophy of the Renaissance is concerned with. The essence of God and that of the world are identified. He is the "inexhaustible infinite world-force; the *natura naturans* which in eternal change forms and 'unfolds' itself purposefully and in conformity with law into the *natura naturata*."¹ While the cosmology of Bruno bears a striking resemblance to that of Democritus and Epicurus, "a system of countless worlds, each of which . . . grows from chaotic conditions to clear and definite formation and again yields to the destiny of dissolution," yet Bruno "regarded the plurality of solar systems not as a mechanical juxtaposition, but as an organic living whole, and regarded the process of the growth and decay of worlds as maintained by the *pulse-beat of the one divine all-life*."²

2. *The dualistic tendency*.—While it is obvious enough that in Bruno's *natura naturans* and *natura naturata* the passive and active participles are the counterpart of the hylo-zoism of the Ionians, the dilemma is, in this second period, not so characteristically objective as it is objective-subjective. This is suggested by the importance of the conception of macrocosm and microcosm, which played so important a part in the philosophy of the Renais-

¹ Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 367.

² Italics are mine.

sance, and makes self-realization the key to the riddles of the universe. The self-consciousness of this period is one thing that makes it profoundly different from the classic period.

This aspect of the situation becomes clearly dominant in the work of Descartes, whose *cogito* is the starting-point of his philosophy, and whose division of reality into *res cogitans* and *res extensa* is the subjective-objective counterpart of the substance-process, or matter-form, dualism of the Greeks. (The latter produced a brood of ontological perplexities and puzzles, taxing to the limit the brain of an Aristotle; the former has produced a still greater horde of puzzles, the problems and perplexities of epistemology. Perhaps men will at last learn that the only way to answer the problems created by a dualism, whether ontological or epistemological, is to find the origin of the dualism and understand the conditions which produced it. Otherwise we are treating symptoms and not causes.)

In a word, the significance of Descartes' *res cogitans* for our present discussion is simply this: It provided an asylum for all those emotional and quasi-ethical values which the new science had just banished from the objective world. Mechanics had reduced the world to a mechanism, robbed of those vague quasi-personal qualities which it has always had except when, as I have said, they had been banished, by Olympianism, Platonism, or Christianity, to some "other" world. Cartesianism finds also an "other" world for them, but it is now not a supramundane world, but the world of man's inner experience, his subjective being. So it is that Descartes' dualism seems at first to afford relief from the mechanizing of the objective world.

3. *The mechanistic development.*—

a) In the objective sphere: Probably the most stimulating thing in nature is movement. The evolution of humanity has, physiologically considered, depended predominantly upon the development of the distant receptors, ears and eyes, especially eyes, whose function it is, in large part, to notify the organism of movement in its environment. Even in civilized man the vague perception of something moving, caught by the tail of the eye, often can stir the whole organism more violently than the most

gorgeous panorama of motionless landscape or the most splendid prospect of massed stone and brick. An unexpected movement in some supposedly inanimate object can, in spite of us, banish, momentarily at least, our deepest sophistication. The human organism can soon make itself master of motionless objects. Movement is the incalculable element of our experience, in response to which our instinctive and emotional nature is always ready to assert itself. It was then, to put it mildly, an epoch-making event when man learned to apply the laws of the motionless to motion. That was, in a word, the inestimable feat of Galileo. He "created mechanics as the mathematical theory of motion." This achievement was pregnant with incalculable changes in man's attitude toward the forces of the world. Arithmetic and geometry had been long in preparation, but had been applicable, in any successful way, only to motionless objects, as motionless. When Kepler established the principle that all changes in the universe are to be considered primarily as motion, and Galileo immediately found how to apply to motion the principles of the motionless, the foundation was laid for that wonderful development known as modern science, the secret of which is, so far as our present discussion is concerned, the substitution of effective, non-emotional, mechanistic, purely intellectual conceptions and manipulations of natural objects and forces, for the spontaneous but ineffective, emotional, instinctive, anthropopathic attitudes.

b) In the subjective sphere: The inspiring success of the new mechanics and the need of a more exact science of social experience made it inevitable that the application of the same mechanical method should be attempted with reference to the subjective realm. Hobbes is the great innovator in this departure; if emotion is simply a kind of motion, a mechanics of morality would seem feasible enough. Locke's sensationalism, the "association" psychology and the whole rationalistic development in its application to mental and spiritual experience, is the result of this ambition to work out a mechanics of inner experience.

4. *Critical mysticism.*—The significance of Leibniz in this period is similar to that of Aristotle in the first. To the intellect a dualism between *res extensa* and *res cogitans* is as unsatisfactory

as that between matter and form; and to the spiritual interests of man an extreme and unmodified mechanistic view of life, whether objective or subjective, is even more unacceptable. The chief motive in the work of Leibniz was the desire to reduce this dualism and to restore the meaning, the purposefulness, of the world, which mechanism seemed to have destroyed.

The reconciliation of the mechanical and teleological views of the world was the leading motive in the thought of Leibniz. He wished to get the mechanical explanation of nature carried through to its fullest extent, and at the same time he cast about for thoughts by the aid of which the purposeful living character of the universe might nevertheless remain comprehensible. The attempt must therefore be made to see whether the whole mechanical course of events could not be ultimately traced back to efficient causes, whose purposeful nature should afford an import and meaning to their working taken as a whole. The ultimate goal of this philosophy is to understand the mechanism of the cosmic processes as the means and phenomenal form by which the living content or import of the world realizes itself.¹

How then does Leibniz reconcile mechanism and mysticism? In other words, how, in the first place, does he modify mechanism so as to relieve it of its cold and cheerless purposelessness, and how, in the second place, does he guard mysticism against its inherent tendency toward crude anthropopathism? Space forbids anything more than a compact and dogmatic statement.

In the first place, let us recall the net result of the achievements in the mechanistic tendency up to this time. Democritus had completed the Greek mechanization of substance by reducing all qualitative differences to purely quantitative differences, as in the doctrine of the atom, and had also reduced all changes to motion. But motion remains as an unexplained datum, inseparably connected with substance, for the atoms are eternally in motion. In the second period the Galilean mechanics has logically eliminated motion (the path of a cannon ball, for instance, being definable in a mathematical formula, consisting of "variables," which variables, when assigned any particular values, give, as their actual meaning, a point, a motionless point, in two- or three-dimensional space); so that, in the objective sphere, Descartes finds only *res extensa*, or substance whose nature is extension. Now Leibniz

¹ Windelband, *op. cit.*, p. 421.

meets this entire situation by a startling innovation, which has linked his fame with modern physical theory. This innovation is the denial that the ultimate nature of substance is extension, and the affirmation that it is force. There is nothing, he claims, in extension which can explain force or motion, but force can explain both extension and motion. The method by which he arrived at this conclusion was in part an examination of the problem of inertia,¹ and in part (and this is no less significant, as recalling the subjective-objective point of view of this whole humanistic period) by an analysis of the logical judgment, the discovery that a true substance is "that which is the subject of all the various predicates, but is itself the predicate of no subject," and the assumption that the self is the only subject which meets this condition, and is therefore the type of true substance. "The essential feature of substance, as represented by the Ego, is its self-originating and self-determining nature. This dynamical quality . . . [is] an *entelechy* . . . 'a sufficiency which makes it the source of its internal activities.'"² This force, further, which is the ultimate nature of all substance, of every "monad," is *appétition*, a striving to fulfil its own potency by a progressively clear *représentation* of the nature of the whole universe.

On the surface this would seem to be mysticism with a vengeance. The whole previous development seems quite reversed, for whereas Democritus, Galileo, and Descartes have reduced all objective reality to extension, Leibniz pushes it all onto the other horn of the dilemma, and reduces everything, bodies and motions alike, to *appétition*, which confessedly is akin, at least in its higher manifestations, to desire. How then does he safeguard his mysticism from becoming a sort of animistic atomism?

There are three factors in this part of his task: In the first place, all change is restricted to an inherent development within each monad, for it is explicitly denied that the monads influence each other. They "have no windows." What is implicit simply becomes explicit. What is potential becomes actual. Thus real change is, so to speak, denatured. In the second place, there is a

¹ Cf. Windelband, *op. cit.*, p. 421.

² See Hibben, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, pp. 168, 169.

pervasive equivocation in the use of the term "representation." The fallacy of figure of speech could be traced in the suggestions of the phrase, "a *living mirror* of the universe."ⁱ Representing means sometimes symbolizing, sometimes perceiving, a curious fusion of the mathematical and the psychological. An algebraic equation represents a circle; the conscious purpose of the supreme monad represents the whole cosmic process. The concepts of the mathematician's consciousness and the mathematical truth of his consciousness are melted into an equivocal notion pregnant with a superficial success for the solution of the dilemma under discussion.² In the third place, the doctrine of "pre-established harmony" emerges from this mathematical type of representation. If $4x^2 + 9y^2 = 36$ represents an ellipse and $4x^2 - 9y^2 = 36$ represents a hyperbola, the change from plus to minus sign does not cause the change from ellipse to hyperbola; the two changes simply reveal an inherent and necessary co-ordination. In some such sense is there a "pre-established harmony" between thoughts of the soul and movements of the body, between the divine purpose and the events of history, between the "windowless" development of every monad and that of every other.³ Thus real cause, in the dynamic sense, is, in large part, supplanted by cause in the mathematical sense, a "function of variables." In short, the mechanistic world of *res extensa* is replaced by a mystical world of *force-monads*. But this dynamic reality is rendered static, its harmony is pre-established, its "appetition" is congealed into formal logic. To be sure, in the last resort, the whole scheme resolves itself into and solves itself by an appeal to theology. But so did Plato fall back on mythology, making "participation" intelligible by invoking the "демиург" — the philosophical *deus ex machina*!

To a friend Leibniz writes: "I flatter myself that I have discovered the harmony of the different systems, and have seen that both sides are right, provided they do not clash with one another; that in the phenomena of nature everything happens mechanically,

ⁱ Italics mine. See *Monadology*, secs. 56, 83.

² Compare Windelband's statement in another connection, "Leibniz is here served a very good turn by the ambiguity in the word 'representation,'" *op. cit.*, p. 422, n. 6.

³ Compare Hibben, *op. cit.*, pp. 179 ff.

and at the same time metaphysically.”² “Provided they do not clash with one another!” What a *petitio principii*! This age-old puzzle is not solved by a little mathematics, and the philosopher is doomed to tread many more weary rounds. From Aristotle to Leibniz, from Leibniz to Bergson, the problem passes. But in the meantime Kant has, by his “Copernican revolution,” enabled men to envisage the whole situation in an entirely new way. Perhaps in this third period we shall come nearer to the heart of the trouble in this mechanistic-mystical dilemma.

III. THE THIRD PERIOD: FROM ROUSSEAU TO BERGSON

1. *The reaction from rationalism: Rousseau's philosophy of feeling.*—As the Greeks had reacted from Olympianism and discovered a hylo-zoistic world, the Renaissance had reacted from supernaturalism and discovered a self-and-nature reality, a humanistic-naturalistic world. But, as before, the strain upon the hyphen steadily increased. The microcosm and macrocosm of Bruno becomes the *res cogitans* and *res extensa* of Descartes. The simplifying work goes on, and Descartes' *res cogitans* becomes, for Locke, a *tabula rasa*, still further impoverished, “innate ideas” being denied. The Cartesian dualism was not so intolerable, because innate ideas provided some sort of connection, through the demonstration of the existence of God, by means of “occasionalisms,” “pre-established harmonies,” etc. But Locke was harder pressed to find the connection between the *tabula rasa* mind and the world. The embarrassment is relieved somewhat by Berkeley's startling innovation, but that is soon overthrown by Hume. There is a chasm now between even the surface and the body of the *tabula*, and the impressions on the once *rasa* surface give absolutely no clue to the existence of the reality for which they seem to stand. Real connections between God and the world, between self and nature, have utterly disappeared. The two partial dichotomies of Descartes have produced an absolutely complete trichotomy. Rationalism and deism have reduced reality to utter barrenness. Such is the result of the progressive impoverishment of the erstwhile meaningful human microcosm

² *Schriften*, II, 607. Quoted by Hibben, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

by the assiduous application to it of the ideal of mathematics and mechanics.

The great significance of Rousseau is, in a word, his effectual affirmation of the truth that there is much in the human microcosm besides a mathematical intellect. As Descartes had begun by shutting out the "animal spirits" from the confines of the soul (the real *res cogitans*), Rousseau reversed the whole matter by submerging the mind in the feelings.

To re-enrich the self was inevitably to close up the fatal dualisms of the past two centuries, and before long Herder was showing that the individual and the nation are mystically one, Schelling that the self and nature are mystically one, Schleiermacher that man and God are mystically one, Fichte that moral will and knowledge process are mystically one—in a word, the whole new age is rejoicing in the rediscovered unity of life. It finds its great intellectual statement in Hegel.

2. But in this rich and rapid development the basic difficulties of the mechanistic-mystical dilemma have been somewhat obscured. The passion for unity has outstripped Kant's cautious dualism of the pure reason and the practical reason. The novelty of his "Copernican revolution," his putting of the whole question on the new level of constructive idealism, quite overshadowed the enigma of how the same ego can find both necessity and freedom, irreconcilables as they are, in its experience. The world is mechanical, said Kant, because of the inexorable workings of the pure reason; life is mystical because of the no less inexorable workings of the practical reason; can these two expressions of the ego be reconciled? The *Critique of the Judgment* was an attempt to solve the old dilemma, stated now, not in objective terms, nor in objective-subjective terms, but in the strictly subjective terms of "pure reason" and "practical reason." But whatever force there was in the solution offered in the *Critique of the Judgment* was rendered obsolete on the advent of Darwinism.

3. But advancing science has forced upon religion once more the ancient perplexity. The significance of "natural selection" and "conservation of energy," about the middle of the century, and the whole subsequent development, particularly in psychology,

are too obvious to be more than mentioned. In reaction against materialism (mechanism) absolute idealism has been revived, with many modifications and refinements. (Logically, from the standpoint of this paper, absolute idealism belongs to the level of the second period, where the two terms are self and nature, ego and world. During the enlightenment the influence of mechanics enabled the mechanism of nature to swallow up the self, the laws of the physical world to reduce the ego to an unreality. In absolute idealism the influence of Berkeley and Kant enabled the mystical creativeness of the self to swallow up nature, the laws of the thinking ego to reduce the physical world to an unreality. For rationalism, the world-machine, including the cogs of "association," the levers of "pleasure-and-pain," is all, and, except as a piece of it, of a piece with it, the ego is nothing. For idealism the absolute ego is all, and the world of events and things and men, except as a piece of it, of a piece with it, is nothing, a "mere appearance.") For the rest, the religious spirit has fallen back on Kant's cleavage between the moral nature and the intellect. Such is the logic of the whole Ritschlian movement. We are shown a realm of values and a realm of existences. These are incommensurables; science and religion are mutually immune.

4. But now finally the task of Aristotle in the first, of Leibniz in the second, has been attempted in this third period by Bergson. In a word, he takes up the problem where Kant left it, and with the new concept of evolution strives to show the underlying unity between the intellect, the organ of mechanism, which reveals a world determined at every point, and intuition, the organ of mysticism, which reveals a world of spontaneity and freedom.

Of Bergson's treatment of the problem and of the lesson which the whole story of the problem teaches as to the future method of approach I hope to speak in my next paper.

JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE AND ANGLO-CATHOLICISM

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In his *Life of Gladstone* Lord Morley speaks of the good fortune which gave to the Tractarian movement three such historians as Cardinal Newman, Dean Church, and James Anthony Froude. But while he quotes with evident approval Mr. Gladstone's eulogy upon the tone and spirit of the two former writers, he contents himself with a reference to the "most winning, graphic, and melodious prose" which characterized the last. This may be only an accident, or again it may not. That Lord Morley was far nearer in theological opinion to Froude than to either Newman or Church does not need to be said. But perhaps the author of *Compromise*, however close he stood in some things to the author of *Letters on the Oxford Counter-Reformation*, could not bring himself to praise more than the form of a work in which the compromise he so hated finds such an unblushing advocate. Froude's account has, it appears to me, never received the attention which it calls for. It casts a light of permanent value—although very different indeed from the light which the historian intended to throw—upon the whole Anglo-Catholic party.

I

Kingsley's famous charge against Newman was to the effect that he was a deceiver, that he with his disciples had held office in a church which they were secretly undermining, and that he justified himself by an ecclesiastical morality which made little of the obligation to speak the truth. The same point had been driven home in *Yeast*, where the Tractarian curate is made to declaim against superstitious reverence for mere verbal veracity. According to that young casuist the soul's eye of the ordinary man has ceased to be a crystalline lens, and has become a sort of Labrador spar. Hence the only way to give "a true image of the fact" is to

allow for this quality in the recipient, to present "the fact" altered, adapted to the obliquity of the common vision, so that the very refractive power of the common faculties may be made to correct their own distortions.¹ Of this somewhat sinister doctrine Newman was presented as the living embodiment. One is tempted to feel glad that Kingsley's attack was delivered, for without it we might never have had the *Apologia*. Some fifteen years after this memorable reply came Froude's contribution to the debate. With all the consequence of a man whose brother had been a chief among the Tractarians, and who had himself been resident at Oxford when the storm was at its fiercest, he undertook to interpret for coming generations the meaning of the great upheaval. The importance of the *Letters* does not lie in the trustworthiness of Froude as an eyewitness—a point which, rightly or wrongly, many critics of his work on Carlyle would warn us not to emphasize. Nor does it lie in the sagacity with which he divined, and the vividness with which he depicts, the inner purposes of the churchmen he knew so well, though in both these respects he has shown his accustomed power. It lies in what he discloses unawares, in the self-revelation he gives as to what manner of man it was who viewed the Tractarians so, in the assumptions about spiritual truth and religious duty which led a man like Froude to speak as he did about a man like Newman. The present writer is far indeed in his whole outlook from the position of *Tract XC*. But nothing that he ever read in its defense has pleaded for it to him so persuasively as this singular document in which it is assailed.

There is nothing of the usual charges against the *honesty* of the Oxford movement. On the contrary, Froude gives up Kingsley's case as not merely unprovable, but wholly unjustified and untrue. He lends all the weight of his own authority as a historian—a weight of special importance for matters of the Elizabethan period—to the view that *Tract XC* was a fair construction of the written Anglican standards. Newman had argued, and Froude agrees, that the framers of the Articles meant to countenance just those doctrines which the Tractarians were asking leave to hold and to teach. And our critic adds that, so far from playing fast and loose with the

¹ *Yeast*, chap. x.

obligation of truthfulness, "Newman's whole life had been a struggle for truth." So far as this issue was concerned he finds the Cardinal unstained, and his opponent covered with confusion. But, marvelous to relate, it was just this unbending veracity that Froude stigmatized as a fault, or at least as a trait of very unfortunate consequence. The gravamen of *his* charge is that the Tractarians were honest men when they should have been ecclesiastical strategists, that they disrupted the Church of England by uncovering an incoherence which wiser persons would have glossed over, that they were indiscreet enough to think the issue of truth versus falsehood a more important one than that of peace and popularity for the church versus sharp controversies and broken repose. His compliments to Newman's straightforwardness are, in short, those of an experienced man of the world to one who had no *savoir faire*, but whose too-scrupulous conscience deserves in a patronizing way to be respected, whilst its embarrassing activities are deplored. And in all this Froude was judging, not the efficiency of a political wirepuller in elections, but the character of a man who held leadership in the Church of God!

His case may be paraphrased as follows: In the early years of the century the Church of England was in a condition of unexampled healthiness. A church is to be called healthy when she exerts a powerful influence over the great mass of the people, and when she uses this for their moral safeguarding and uplifting. Anglicanism answered these tests in the pre-Tractarian years as it had probably never answered them before, and as it has certainly not answered them since. A large proportion of the clergy were, like Wordsworth's vicar in *The Excursion*, men of unworldly aims, earnest in the cure of souls, dwelling habitually in thought upon the responsibilities of their high calling and the realities that are unseen. Others of them, without being intensely spiritual, were at all events thoroughly reputable; and their presence produced on the whole a good effect in the district. It was something to have in each parish a man of superior manners and cultivation looked up to by the peasantry, associating on equal terms with the squire, one who could be trusted to frown upon vice in those beneath him, and to set an example of propriety to those in his own rank. The

social prestige of the clergyman was an important element in his moral force. He would have lost much of his power for good if he had talked like a Methodist about a sharp distinction between the church and the world. It was very much better that he should mingle freely as he did in the life of his own class, act as a magistrate at sessions, indulge in wholesome field sports, organize local charities, show in his person that the religious man need not be either unrefined or unpractical, and thus serve as an unconscious, but all the more effective, rebuke to narrow selfishness and *blasé* intemperance. When his wife and daughters managed penny clubs and taught in the Sunday school, the poor had it brought home to them that great folk found in religion a motive to be kind. The squire felt genuinely ashamed if the parson had been present when he was carried to bed the previous night after dinner. And on the whole there was no rampant unbelief which threatened to make this church influence weaker. Infidelity was thought a horrible thing, and disregard of public worship was a reproach. Thus, at least in the country districts, the state church was morally invaluable.

But if anyone asks how either clergy or laity regarded the perplexing *mysteries* of the faith, the answer, according to Froude, is that, generally speaking, they did not regard them at all. Articles and Creeds were indeed signed by every candidate for ordination. If these had been closely scrutinized they would have been seen to contain tremendous propositions about the cosmic order and statements of a very startling kind about historic occurrences in Galilee and Judaea. But no one scrutinized them with any minuteness. Having been signed, they were looked upon as something to be repeated on the prescribed occasions, to be spoken of at all times with respect, but by no means to be brooded upon or to have their difficulties pointed out. That way danger lay, and in the good providence of God a veil of stupidity had so far prevented almost everyone in England from seeing, much less following, it. Froude selects his own father's household as in this matter a pattern, and apparently his own upbringing as abundantly justified by its fruits. "About doctrine, Evangelical or Catholic," he writes, "I do not think that in my early boyhood I ever heard a single word in church or out of it." "About the power of the keys, the real

presence, or the metaphysics of doctrine, no one was anxious, for no one thought about them. It was not worth while to waste time over questions which had no bearing on conduct, and could be satisfactorily disposed of only by sensible indifference."

However, he goes on to explain, the intellectual climate began to change as the first quarter of the century closed. The struggle over the Reform Bill called forth a type of ideas which would not confine itself to politics. The "philosophic Radicals" were at work. All the old things of the country were to be reboiled in the Benthamite caldron that they might take on immortal youth. A little circle of men who abhorred Bentham and all his party, but who were themselves just one phase of the same spirit of change, demanded a new reformation of the church. They thought that they were ultra-Conservatives, a bulwark against Radicalism. They were in truth apostles of a very violent movement, but it was a movement backward. They would un-protestantize the church. As Hurrell Froude liked to put it, they would treat the Reformers as unskilful surgeons who had set a broken limb, but set it very badly. The limb must be broken over again and readjusted to its proper place. In a word, these men were restless, like the other agitators of the time, but alas! their particular type of restlessness was the most dangerous of all.

For it was by such a policy that the most sinister forces of the time were sure to be exasperated. The air was full of talk about emancipation, rights of man, progress of the species, and there was latent in this the beginning of all the anarchy, both political and religious, which afterward showed itself. It was clear that any pretensions of an authoritative kind to control the individual reason would not be kindly received. Yet this was the moment which the maladroit Tractarians selected for issuing a Hildebrandic challenge in the name of the church! Might they not have let sleeping dogs lie? The Protestant faith had enough difficulties in it, which someone here and there might suspect, but which few were speaking of openly, without extending the line which had to be held by taking on Roman incredibilities as well. What was said on Sundays, without giving offense to anyone, about the divine founding of the church, about the incarnation, and the resurrection, and the Trinity,

and miracles, and prophecies, would be placed in a different light once it proclaimed itself in aggressive and combatant pamphlets before victorious modern science and fearless historical criticism. The whole *dossier* must then be turned inside out, and what might be expected to come of that? Why not keep these embarrassing theological inquiries at arm's length? To court conflict was to court defeat and to spoil the church's efficiency for that moral work which is her real vocation, a work quite independent of the truth of her dogmas, yet none the less bound up with them in the popular eye. Her wisdom would have been to lie low till the storm was overpassed.

And, after all, Froude goes on in his sagacious way, Anglicanism had so much on her side, if she had only known how to avail herself of it. She exaggerated her perils. "The *Edinburgh Review*, and Brougham and Mackintosh, and Low Church philosophy and the London University were not so very terrible." England loved tradition and precedent. Methodism had so stirred the Establishment that the old reproach of slothfulness could no longer be brought. The French Revolution had so scared people out of their wits that an unprovoked attack upon the church would suggest the cult of Reason, and decent men would rally to the defense. Only the attack must *be* unprovoked.

Moreover, the moral responsibility which Newman took was very grave. He preached in Froude's hearing a sermon on miracles, in which he said that from the standpoint of reason Hume's objection was perfectly sound. Was it not most injudicious to put a view so extremely agitating before undergraduates hardly one of whom had till then entertained a doubt? "It is a very serious thing when a man is brought to recognize that truths which he has been taught to look upon as indisputable are not regarded as truths at all by persons competent to form an independent opinion. Such questions need not have been raised in this country."

The challenge so inopportunistly thrown down was, of course, taken up. Looking back over forty years Froude bids us observe the Nemesis that had been brought on. The men who set out to claim higher ground for the Church of England had produced two results, an immense reinforcement of Romanism on the one hand

and the stimulation of militant unbelief on the other. The call that men should either go back or go forward had elicited both kinds of response. But those who went back returned to superstition, and those who went forward plunged into atheism. The Anglican *via media* was abandoned with a vengeance. Half the clergy began to preach again the old delusions from which Europe had been rescued by the Reformers. Monasteries and convents sprang up everywhere. Father confessors were once again breeding division in English homes. But at the same time, with a license previously unheard of, science and criticism were repudiating the Bible, the very existence of God was being lectured on as an open question. Possibly the development of this clear-cut antagonism was always a matter of time. Yet it need not have come nearly so soon if rash zeal had not precipitated it. Of the two alternatives, "The church or nothing," some had said, "Let it be the church," but not a few others had said, and would continue to say, "Let it be nothing."

II

I trust that I have not here misrepresented Froude in any way, although I am conscious that I have selected from the *Letters* just those passages which are germane to the point I wish to argue. Quite possibly I have here and there turned his phrases with a sharpness which he would have repudiated, for he was a diplomatist in controversy just as he would have had the church be a diplomatist in action. With a great deal that he has said of the narrowness of the Tractarians, of their unfairness toward Evangelicism, of their somewhat self-conscious assumption of superiority, most of us will agree. And I urge those who may trouble to read this article to turn for themselves to the text and judge how far I have been faithful to it. My endeavor has been to set in strong relief what the *Letters* seem to presuppose, to bring out that tone of strategy as distinct from simple devotion to truth which seems to underlie them. The strategy, indeed, has no selfish purpose. It aims to keep England loyal to the Christian rule of life, and to use for this object whatever adventitious aids are available. The whole point of my own contention is that so laudable an achievement will be furthered far less by the religious tactician than by the sincere man

who speaks his mind; that, in short, the wisdom of the church no less than her duty is to say with the monk in *Hypatia* when he was asked, "Don't you see where your argument leads?"—"If it be true let it lead where it will, for it leads where God wills."

There are those to whom Froude's analysis will appear quite penetrating. There are those who look upon it as the freshest common sense that was ever put forward about Newman and his school. But such critics are not, I think, to be found among either the deeply religious or the deeply reflective of the present age. Take, in the first place, the astounding statement that the pre-Tractarian years saw the Church of England in a condition of unexampled healthiness, and that her only need was to be left alone. Mozley declared that she was then folding her robes to die with what dignity she could. If Mozley's evidence be objected to as that of a special pleader for the Tractarians, let us turn to the words of men who were more like special pleaders on the other side. Arnold wrote in 1832 that "no power can save the church as it now stands."¹ He thought that the last forlorn hope must be an attempt to unite with the Dissenters. Whately wrote to Lord Grey in the same year that it would be a great and glorious feat for the ministry if it could prevent the overthrow of the Establishment from being "utter." The *Edinburgh Review* poured out scathing articles about unbelieving bishops and idle clergy and the tables of the money changers that had been set up in the holy place. How shall we even begin to reconcile estimates so divergent? They were, all of them, presumably honest observers. Can it be that their standards of judgment were at complete variance? What seems to one man the symptom of an imminent spiritual extinction another may take to be the token of a robust and self-justifying life. It all depends upon what each means by a church being alive.

We have indeed no reason to doubt, but ample reason to agree, that our historian has drawn with faithfulness the decent rural church and the refined rural vicarage in the first decades of the century. Coleridge used to go into similar raptures, much as Blackstone gave thanks for the immaculate splendor of English legal machinery. He would point out how the scholar and the

¹ In a letter to Tyler. *Life*, I, 326.

philosopher found in the church a career in which "the widest schemes of literary ability" might be combined with "the strictest performance of professional duties"¹—a judgment which will perhaps surprise the hard-worked clergyman of today. He would call upon "the lower and middling classes" to be grateful for that germ of civilization which had been transplanted to every parish, the parsonage which formed "a nucleus round which the capabilities of the place might crystallize and brighten, a model sufficiently superior to excite, yet sufficiently near to encourage and facilitate, imitation."² The early Victorian novelists, and those who in the next generation depicted the days of George IV, are full of such sketches of the clerical household. Sometimes they are sympathetic and rightly so. At other times what Froude held up to admiration is presented with a touch of satire. We know the clergymen in Jane Austen's books. We recall Mr. Gascoigne in *Daniel Deronda*, whose tone had become ecclesiastical rather than theological, what he would himself have called "sound English, free from nonsense, such as became a man who looked at a national religion by daylight, and saw it in relation to other things."³ *Felix Holt* introduces us to "one of those rectories which are among the bulwarks of our venerable institutions, which arrest disintegrating doubt, serve as a double embankment against Popery and Dissent, and rally feminine instinct and affection to reinforce the decisions of masculine thought."⁴ No one can mistake the mood in which George Eliot wrote like this. Anthony Trollope was much less disposed to be ironical. He was among those who looked back upon the pre-Reform days with wistfulness, upon the old symbols of a cathedral town that are still lovely and fit to be loved. Moreover, his animosity was almost equal against the Puseyites who intoned, and against the Evangelicals who spoke of "Sabbath Day." But Trollope knew the past generation too well to keep back the figure of the Hon. and Rev. Dr. Vesey Stanhope, vicar of Crabtree Canonorum ("a very nice thing"), who also filled the prebendal stall of Goosegorge in Barchester Chapter, with the united rectory of Eiderdown and Stoppingum, showed the hospitality enjoined by St. Paul both in

¹ *Biog. Lit.*, chap. xi.

² *Daniel Deronda*, Book I, chap. iii.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Felix Holt*, chap. xxiii.

his London house and in his villa on Lake Como, and had a unique collection of Lombard butterflies.¹ Charlotte Brontë's curate, who found Yorkshire a beastly place because it had "hardly a house where a reg'lar butler is kep'," was perhaps drawn with a less friendly hand.² And if the bubble of English legal perfection was pricked with savageness by Bentham, is it not significant that a like service had to be rendered to the church by—of all men in the world—the gentle Cowper? Who can forget the horrible outlines of the clerical dandy, reading from the pulpit a fifteen-minute essay that he never wrote, sitting down at the close to take out a pocket mirror, stroke his eyebrows, or arrange his hair, and putting up an eyeglass to ogle the ladies as they retire from the pews?³ In discounting such a caricature it is worth while to bear in mind that Arthur Young had actually, about the same time, heard of this advertisement in an English newspaper: "Wanted, a curacy in a good sporting county, where the duty is light and the company convivial."⁴ Froude's highly reputable squire, whose great house was kept, by mildly religious influence, an example to the peasants around, reminds one irresistibly of a remark of Major Pendennis. He explained that a country gentleman need not go to church when in town, but that when *sur ses terres* he owes this to his tenants. "If I could turn a tune," said the Major, "I even think I would sing. The Duke of St. David's, whom I have the honour of knowing, always sings in the country, and let me tell you it has a doosid fine effect from the family pew."⁵

But the most damning evidence of all is in those cold statistics collected in the famous *Black Book*, published in 1820 by the party of Church Reform. It reveals to us at a glance the spirit which governed preferment at the time, and is in consequence a key to the direction of clerical effort. Of the twenty-seven bishoprics, eleven were held in that year by members of noble families. Fourteen had been bestowed on men who had been connected in some way—as a rule through the tenure of tutorships—with royal or noble houses. Of the remaining two, one was held by a sturdy pam-

¹ *The Warden*, chap. xiii.

² *Shirley*.

³ *The Task*, Book II (published 1785).

⁴ *Travels in France*, p. 327.

⁵ *Pendennis*, chap. ix.

phleteer for Pitt's administration, the other by the favorite of a great city company. The conclusion is obvious. Such was the pathway to success, and no one thinks that the ecclesiastical ambition of the day was of the sort that would disdain it. Even the old régime of the controversial eighteenth century, when a see was the reward for the adroit dissection of a deist, shines by comparison with such a period of nepotism and sycophancy. The bishop whose title to his place was the learned editing of a Greek play seems to us to have been curiously selected. But such a recommendation for rulership in the church was relatively respectable. And this was what Froude called healthiness! We may well believe that in such surroundings any trouble that arose had little to do with "metaphysics of doctrine." The appropriate motto was neither *Dominus illuminatio mea*, nor *Nec tamen consumebatur*. It was rather *Surtout point de zèle*. One recalls the famous consecration charge, "Preach the gospel, and keep down enthusiasm."

It is probable that by making dexterous use of all the worldly auxiliaries which such a situation offered the Establishment might have reinforced itself. The fox-hunting parson had a pretty secure seat in county society. The bogey of French secularism might, as Froude suggests, have been turned to advantage, although the idea savors just a little of the quest by Messrs. Taper and Tadpole for an "election cry." Great play could still have been made for spiritual interests out of the mammon of unrighteousness. The Dissenters, indeed, were getting up their heads. But the Evangelicals among the clergy were in some degree a counterattraction. The Catholic Revival was in full swing on the Continent. The persecuted remnant of English "Papists" were being encouraged by news of notable conversions. Lammenais and Lacordaire were becoming known to English Catholic families as men doing a great and successful work for ancient truth, even as Calvin and Luther had once become known to the first English Protestants. But both Romanism and Dissent had still mountains of difficulty before them. The *beau monde* was amused when Sydney Smith wrote in the *Edinburgh* on the best schemes of ecclesiastical sanitation to check the growth of Methodism. The timorous were

reassured when he ridiculed the apprehensions of the "No Popery" men, as if what they feared was as impossible as the return of witchcraft. Bishop Lavington made merry comparisons between the two brands of enthusiasm, the Nonconformist and the Romanist. De Quincey made a butt of those who preached about "short-comings" and "backsliding"—"words horribly tabernacular, and such as no gentleman could allow himself to touch without gloves." These writers knew their audience and were in sympathy with it. Most of England was ready to laugh. On the ground of mere tactics Froude was perfectly justified in maintaining that the church had vast reserves on her side in a nation like his own. She held excellent cards if she would only play them discreetly.

But the men who formed the Tractarian group, the little circle that met in the Hadleigh Rectory to launch an epoch-making movement, were not concerned to play such a game at all, or to exploit that sort of reserves which a critic like Froude could point out. Nor was it to exercise a mildly beneficial influence upon English life that they conceived themselves set apart. Neither as a sinecure for the pursuit of polite learning and the emendation of Greek text nor as a vantage ground of social prestige from which they might keep the "lower and middling classes" law-abiding and decorous, had they taken upon themselves the cure of souls. Far otherwise did they read their ordination vow, far otherwise did they envisage their vocation. They had been told that they held a divine warrant, and they believed it. Supernatural authority was theirs. The Articles did not say that the church is a refined co-worker with civilization. They said that she is the unique channel of God's grace, that she holds the keys of the world to come, that she has the power to bind and to loose. This paper is not in the least concerned with the question whether Newman's idea of the church was pitched too high, whether it was superstitious, whether the notion of a mediating priesthood is not obsolete. On this issue the writer would not hesitate a single moment to take the Liberal side. But by the same Articles and the same Creeds both Tractarian and anti-Tractarian were professedly bound. The question between them was whether these formulae were to be taken in earnest.

The notable thing about Newman was that he was resolved to mean what he said.

The standards of the Establishment had been constructed at a time when the church was but a name for the whole people religiously considered, even as the state was its name politically considered. National Christianity was as much a part of the social fabric as was monarchy, or were parliamentary institutions. To use a present-day illustration, just as the German army is defined as the German *Volk in Waffen*, so the English church was the English people considered as worshipers. For very long a secession from the church was treated as an offense against citizenship. The very lines of territorial division were by sees and parishes, thus acknowledging that the whole country was mapped out on the basis of ecclesiastical rule. The bishops and clergy were thought of as God's appointed ministers to be heard and revered in all things spiritual. They were not a branch of the civil service. They were priests.

At first silently, and then more openly, this principle was being repudiated. The repeal of the Test acts was an admission that English citizenship did not involve English churchmanship. Municipal boundaries were obliterating the old parochial landmarks. Catholic emancipation had given political power not merely to men who were separate from the church, but to those who were avowedly hoping for her overthrow. Lord Grey had suppressed ten Irish sees, and had bidden the English bishops set their house in order. And all this was being done while the nation, so far as its verbal profession went, remained as it had been when the Articles and Prayer Book were compiled.

The change might be right or it might be wrong. We can understand what Keble meant when he called it "National Apostasy." But on any view it was a change which, if made at all, should not be blundered into, should not be tacitly carried out, while the old formulae were left untouched; should not be found afterward to have taken place without a clear-eyed consciousness that it was a new Reformation. Perhaps *tactically* such a silent movement had much to recommend it—from the standpoint, that is, of public peace and mutual good-will. But Newman and Hurrell Froude

were not thinking of tactics. They were thinking of truth and of responsibility before God.

Hence the ringing appeals to pause and reflect. The Tractarians saw more truly and declared more sincerely than anyone else just what was going forward. If the church was an oracle established in England by the Most High, was she behaving as such? How dare she compromise that which was not hers to tamper with? How could she acquiesce while Methodists and Romanists were given a share in controlling her future? Was she to look on without a protest while her holy things were made a wrangling-ground for the party politician and national religion was readjusted at the behest of lay commissioners, men of all creeds and of no creed? The first of the *Tracts* was a summons to rally in defense of the Ark of God. The dilemma was put again and again—a dilemma that was evaded, misunderstood, postponed, by those who preferred to “muddle through”: Either the church has a divine authentication, or she has no *raison d'être* of any sort. If the witness of her Articles is true, she is shamefully unfaithful to them. If it is not true, she is a living lie. Let her go back or go forward. The awful mysteries which Froude thought it wise to treat with “sensible indifference” lay at the very root of what she declared to the world. Honest men might perhaps view these differently. But what sort of man was he who could treat them as unimportant?

It was in this spirit that Newman preached his sensational sermon in support of “bigotry,” expressing the hope that the Church of England might become more bigoted a hundred fold than she had ever been. This too was the idea that he had in mind when he spoke of the need for “something deeper and truer than had satisfied the previous century.” For that century had been beyond all others a period of genteel compromise. The phrase he used was one in which Froude, characteristically, could see nothing more than self-conceit. Newman, I think, would not have been abashed by his critic’s scornful reminder that the previous century had seen both Swift and Sterne. He would have replied that the Church of God has need of divines very different from either. When Mark Pattison said that the sermons of that epoch were not exactly like those of Baxter—messages about the other world delivered in the

tone of a man who had been there and had come back to report—but rather like the solid wisdom enjoined by a man of *this* world upon others like himself, we recognize at once to which spiritual kinship Froude belonged, and to which Newman.

There is a great passage in the *Apologia* which brings home to us the precise point. It is worth quoting in full:

Whether the ideas of the coming age upon religion are true or false, at least they will be real. In the present day mistiness is the mother of wisdom. A man who can set down a half-a-dozen general propositions, which escape from destroying one another only by being diluted into truisms, who can hold the balance between opposites so skilfully as to do without fulcrum or beam, who never enunciates a truth without guarding himself against being supposed to exclude the contradictory—who holds that Scripture is the only authority, yet that the church is to be deferred to, that faith only justifies, yet that it does not justify without works, that grace does not depend on the sacraments yet is not given without them, that bishops are a divine ordinance yet those who have them not are in the same religious condition as those who have—this is your safe man, and the hope of the church; this is what the church is said to want, not party men, but sensible, temperate, sober, well-judging persons, to guide it through the channel of no-meaning, between the Scylla and Charybdis of aye and no.

Here is the reverse side of the latitudinarian picture. The Tractarians were not “safe” nor “the hope of the church” in any diplomatic sense. Alas, safe men, and hopes of the church, are a class that is always with us. The other class not always.

III

If charges of equivocation were to be brought against the Tractarians it was clear that Froude at least could not be the accuser. Most of what has been alleged about ecclesiastical finesse, about *arrières pensées*, about living on tactics, about the resolve to let the end justify the means, may be illustrated from the program which he would have commended to the church in 1833. But his plan may be looked upon from another side as well as that of its intellectual insincerity. Upon what spiritual timorousness, upon what shallow postulates about human nature, upon how short-sighted an estimate of events did Froude ground his view of what those strange times required!

His own religious convictions are, perhaps, hard to define, but it is simple to reconstruct imaginatively his religious attitude. For he belongs to one of our most familiar types. He was such as Carlyle had in mind when he used that piercing phrase, "An age destitute of faith, yet terrified of scepticism." We know the man in whom the old sustaining creed has been dissolved, but who has not the courage to say even to himself just where he stands, far less to attempt to consolidate a new spiritual foundation. The religion of his fathers has gone from him as a certainty, even as what Matthew Arnold would have called a "low degree of probability," but it lingers as a superstition or a charm. Wistful glances are thrown backward, and the tenacity of old ritual operates as a sort of quasi-belief. He is in his pew at church, and he has his children baptized, and he turns the subject when some impiety is ventured by a friend in conversation, all for reasons which he would hate to have to produce, but which act upon him steadily. Whether Froude held in any real sense a single distinctive principle of the Christian view of the world—of man's origin and his destiny—may be doubted. But he was very sure as a historian—and he kept repeating to himself with pathetic emphasis—how much the Faith had meant to morals and to progress. He trembled at the thought of the human collapse which might ensue if the sober truth were spoken about it to mankind. At times he appeared to be arguing with himself that such wonderful results must have sprung from a deep reality, and to be building up a historical apologetic against his own negations. He would launch fierce diatribes against the secularism of natural science, and call for a recognition of the Unseen in a way which made men think that he must be a Christian still. He would talk so fervidly about what the world owed to Calvinism that naïve Scottish Presbyterians have been known to quote him as a Calvinist! He would exploit the laws of scientific necessity in such devout language that one might have mistaken him for a preacher of election. And yet in another mood he would write about the disappearance of Great Pan from the cult of the villagers, how the nature gods had been superseded by the God of the saints, how the Conqueror in turn had become decrepit, how the new faith like the old stayed longest among the country folk, how

the ruined rural abbey is but a symbol that "the new faith is dying as the old faith died, in the scenes where that faith first died, and lingering where it lingered." He would wonder whether the Christian creed is already dead in the thoughts of mankind, whether one must cease to believe in the eternity of any creed at all, learning that "whatever grows in time is a child of time, and is born and lives and dies at its appointed day like ourselves."¹

Amid all his changes, however, he remained faithful to what one may call a rule of religious utility, and he has no more characteristic utterance than this: "As you do not ask of a tree, is it *true*, but is it *alive*, so with an established church or system of belief you look to the work which it is doing. . . . So long as religion is a principle of conduct, the common sense of mankind refuses to allow it to be meddled with."

Far be it from us to mock at such vacillation. Especially in these baffling days most of us vacillate more or less in the same way. But there are some who do not, and it is not for him who has lost his spiritual nerve to reproach him who goes straight forward, knowing no loyalty save loyalty to truth. For however human it may be to keep casting up the consequences of our conviction and altering it when those consequences seem dangerous, we know well that it is not thus that the world is led forward. At bottom Froude thoroughly disbelieved in the salutariness of making known what is true. That such knowledge would set men free, or that to obstruct it was to retard their freedom, he never really held. That everyone should speak fearlessly the thing that he believed was no intellectual or moral ideal for him. It was "healthiness," he says, in pre-Tractarian England, to punish by social excommunication all doubts regarding what is essential in the Christian faith. The natural-science secularism he felt sure was unsound, but he would not have bid it come out in the open to have its inadequacy exposed in fair spiritual conflict. It ought rather, we learn, to have been cunningly circumvented, and the men should be blamed who allowed it a chance to lift up its voice.² Why had its advocates

¹ *Nemesis of Faith*, p. 40.

² And yet compare for his other word the "Plea for a freer discussion of the theological difficulties"! *Short Studies*, Vol. I.

been given provocation, given an excuse to make themselves aggressive? Why were not measures taken at least to retard the day when the issue would have to be joined? This is not the heroic note of the church militant; rather we might call it the diplomatic note of the church insidious. If Froude had detected such an attitude, let us say in Cardinal Wiseman, would anyone have been more trenchant than our historian in characterizing it? Would anyone have coined more biting epigrams about the reptilian self-adjustments of a creed that feared the light?

Again, how quaint was the notion that the anti-religious developments of natural science were due to High Church claims of authority and might have been delayed, if not prevented, by keeping the latitudinarian or the Evangelical tradition! If nothing that had any vital force in it had been put forward by the preachers of the church, quite possibly their antagonists might not have been stirred to activity. Huxley and Tyndall would have been less easily irritated into debate by divines like Thirlwall on the one hand and Newton or Thomas Scott on the other, than by Newman and Pusey. In a measure this might have delayed the time when religious issues were to be tried in the court of the man in the street. Hyde Park secularists might not so soon have appeared to puzzle the wits and not improve the character of the London artisan. But if the mid-Victorian skeptic would have left Thirlwall in peace, this would have been because he saw little difference between their respective standpoints, except that the Bishop of St. David's was considerably the less honest of the two, and if Newton or Scott had given no provocation it would have been because his intellectual grasp did not make it worth while for an unbeliever to come to issue with him. No one supposes that Evangelicalism was any more consonant to the "modern spirit" than Anglo-Catholicism, or that justification by faith would have seemed to W. K. Clifford a whit less absurd than the immaculate conception. The seeds of revolt against all positive supernatural belief were already in rapid growth long before the issue of the first *Tract*. It was part of the essential temper of the age that inquiry on this and all other subjects should become more and more widely diffused. And it seems at least highly doubtful if respect would have been conciliated or opposition

deferred by showing to the world that the church was ashamed of her creed, or that she was afraid to have it impartially investigated, or that she was content to dilute it into rules of worldly prudence, or that she had no sense of the depth of those implications that her own formulae contained. The eighteenth century had tried this sort of thing, with the results that we know, until Methodism had brought again the touch of reality. It was time to try again, on a larger scale, how mankind would respond to the voice of conviction.

But quite apart from the expediency of thus challenging the outside critic, how singular was that mental habit which Froude thought it possible for churchmen themselves to maintain! In a word, he saw no reason why theology should be pursued at all. He thought men might go on almost indefinitely, satisfied that what they called their creed was having a good moral influence, and resolved, lest that influence should become weaker, to leave the whole doctrinal content unexplored and unexamined. This in the nineteenth century! Mark his words: "Discussion about it is out of place, for only bad men wish to question the rule of life which religion commands; and a creed or ritual is not a series of propositions or a set of outward observances of which the truth or fitness may be properly argued. . . . Idle persons may properly be prohibited from raising unprofitable questions about it." In what way, one may ask, shall they be prohibited? Is not the asking of such questions a necessity of man's intellectual nature? Did not Froude ask them himself when he wrote *The Nemesis of Faith* (a suggestive title, by the way)—a book which amid all its literary charm shows how crudely those problems which every boy of fifteen has heard discussed in a Scottish manse were desolating the soul of this university teacher upon whom, apparently, they were breaking for the first time? Perhaps he shows some consciousness of the defects of his own upbringing when he says that he might have escaped some trials and some misfortunes if theology had not been quite so much taboo in his boyhood, and if his "spiritual imagination had been allowed food which would have agreed with it."

It is an old delusion this, about the salutary effect of shutting out inquiry. It may be in the night time that the owl of Minerva

flies, but the night must come, and the only alternative is to arrange for it beforehand or to let it come on by chance. He who would forbid investigation belongs to one or other of two types, the intolerant dogmatist, against whom no one has railed more vehemently than Froude, or the unbeliever, who looks upon religion as but a social instrument, to have its scope marked out by the state, and who anticipates that its utility would be destroyed by the inevitable exposure. The average English churchman is neither of these. He thinks that the more his faith is scrutinized the stronger it will show itself. And, whether it stand or fall, to reflect upon it in some degree ought to be a task which he could not refuse if he would. Notoriously the Scotsman has never been able to refuse it. The long record of his doctrinal wars is likely to move his southern neighbors to mirth, but it is the mirth of the shallow at the expense of the more profound. Old Scottish divinity is often an arid ground indeed. It produced a strife of tongues whose very language has now become uncouth, but the Scotsman who is not proud of it does not know his country's spiritual glory. Those who in relatively vacuous days give thanks for the calmer time when free will has ceased from troubling and predestination is at rest are unaware both of the character of that which has passed away and of the character of that which has taken its place. If men do not now emphasize differences of dogma, this need not be because they have reached the larger vision. If they dislike a sermon on the decrees it is at least as probable that they have not seen the difficulty as that they have seen beyond it. And if what Froude really means is that a man knowing, or strongly suspecting, the hollowness of the whole theoretic basis on which he stands should go on preaching for the sake of an anticipated "moral" effect, what can we say of one who thus looks for anything moral to emerge from such systematized deceitfulness? Is it for him to cast stones at Loyola? Might not such a "healthy" divine say in those terrible words of the vicar in *Yeast*: "Here I stand, sure of nothing whatsoever in heaven or earth, except my own untruth"?

A final question seems suggestive. In all their intimate discussions on theology did our historian ever propound his remarkable view of Tractarianism to Thomas Carlyle? The sage of Chelsea

had no love for "Puseyites," but his attitude toward them was not Froude's. It was rather a scorn which declined to inquire or to understand what such unintelligent persons meant. Carlyle never got it out of his mind that the Anglo-Catholics were concerned in the main about vestments and church millinery—"black and white surplice controversies"—and he inferred, not without reason from such a premise, that they were intellectually contemptible. Newman, he said, had not the brains of a rabbit, Keble was a little ape, and so on. Miss Julia Wedgwood's remark is probably the best here, that these judgments cast no light on the subject, and little even on Carlyle, except to tell us that he could sometimes express opinions that were valueless. But what outbursts might have been expected from the apostle of veracity once he had got an inkling of what his curious disciple had in mind! Once he had appreciated the suggestion that the church should try to live otherwise than by proclaiming what she took to be the whole counsel of God, and challenging for herself that place which she believed had been appointed her by the Eternal! To feign in her creeds a supernatural sanction, but to keep this out of sight in her dealings with the world, lest Brougham and Lord John Russell and the London University should take umbrage! To save her funds and her moral influence and her social prestige by a series of adroit twists and turnings, affirm truth or compromise it as the needs of the moment might indicate! Most ironical of all, to do this that she might keep her children within her fold lest perchance they might lapse to the dishonesties of Rome! A dozen Carlylean objurgations leap to our lips at the thought of the hardihood which should have stated such a case in Cheyne Row. "Plastering together the True and the False, and therefrom manufacturing the Plausible." "The first of all gospels is this that a Lie cannot endure for ever." "If the thing is true, I say in God's name take thy stand upon it. Front thereupon the Eternities and the Immensities."

SOME THEISTIC IMPLICATIONS OF BERGSON'S PHILOSOPHY

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The appearance in 1908 of Bergson's *Creative Evolution*—the greatest book since *The Origin of Species*—was a marked event in the history of philosophy. Not since Schelling had a philosophic theme been handled with so much eloquence. The logical structure of the argument, continuously progressing to its goal, the wealth of illustration, the evidence of prolonged and profound study of the theme, and the startling nature of many of its leading conceptions set it apart from all other philosophical works in a category almost of its own. In literary charm only one contemporary rivaled Bergson, William James. Naturally philosophic circles were profoundly moved, and the discussion of Bergson's work within them was quick and elaborate. And his doctrine of "flux," in particular, received careful attention.

One would have thought that equal attention would be given to it in theological circles. For although Bergson himself has not yet developed the theistic aspect of his philosophy, he has made suggestions and let fall hints that are most startling if not disconcerting. He seems already to have said much as to the nature of God; and utterances so new from a man of such eminence would seem to demand the attention of any theologian eager to learn, or anxious to defend, the truth. But up to the present day none of our great English theological reviews have given adequate discussion to Bergson's doctrine of God; not the *Hibbert*,¹ nor the *Ameri-*

¹ Articles in this *Review* approaching the topic are: Overstreet's, XIII, 155, "God as the Common Will"; Corrance's, XII, 375, "Bergson's Philosophy and the Idea of God," which is expository and does not grapple with difficulties nor attempt proofs; Overstreet's, XI, 394, "The Democratic Conception of God," favoring the idea of "a God . . . growing with the growth of the world, . . . suffering, sinning (*sic*) and conquering with it"; Balfour's, X, 1, "Creative Evolution and Philosophic Doubt"; O. Lodge's, IX, 14, "The Christian Idea of God," affirming that "true and not imaginary progress is possible."

can Journal,¹ nor the *Bibliotheca Sacra*², nor such reviews, occasionally handling fundamental theological themes, as the *Westminster* and the *Nineteenth Century*; not even the *Princeton*, which, with its predecessors, has ordinarily been swift to detect the new, though scarcely capable of sympathetic treatment of anything inconsistent with Presbyterian orthodoxy. The *Catholic World*³ has, however, discussed it, but from the platform of an unwavering attachment to St. Thomas. A large number of articles and volumes of exposition of Bergson's philosophy in general have been written; but they uniformly omit the theological question—excusedly, no doubt, because of Bergson's silence still scarcely broken. That the church should not have waked to the importance of the suggestion or, possibly, should have deemed it one that could be silently dismissed as too evidently untenable and even preposterous to require discussion is a marvel.⁴ That rumors should come that theologians are really busy with it and are “eliminating the consequences of a static view of God from their theologies” is scarcely reassuring. They would do better to perform such work in co-operation with one another.

For the objections to the static view of God are exceedingly weighty and altogether unrefuted by our historic theologies. Has it thoroughly maintained itself? Has it always helped and never hindered thought? Have the results in theology of the traditional view invariably commended themselves, or have they, on the contrary, been among the chief reasons for questioning this conception and proposing another? We shall see, I think, that every attempt to carry out the idea of the unchangeability of God to its legitimate consequences has provoked revolt.

¹ Articles of like nature here are: Kawaguchi, XIX, 551, “Doctrine of Evolution and the Conception of God”; Wright, XI, 128, “An Immutable Absolute, or a God Who Strives,” who writes, “This conception of an eternally perfect and complete reality, takes all meaning out of the moral struggle”—“suffering and self-sacrifice enter into the life and being of God”; Youtz, XI, 428, “Three Conceptions of God.”

² Huizinga, LXVI, 78, “The American Philosophy of Pragmatism,” does not mention Bergson.

³ “Bergson's Philosophy of Change,” XCVI, 433; and “Bergson and the Divine Fecundity,” XCVII, 361.

⁴ See L. H. Miller, *Bergson and Religion*, for a rather halting and undecided discussion.

For example, let us take supralapsarian Calvinism. God is viewed by this theory as existing by himself in eternity before the world was created. The object of the creation is his own glory, that is, the expression of his own nature. Among his perfections are two, mutually exclusive but complementary and together exhausting his nature in one aspect, mercy and justice. Since he is unchangeable both of these attributes must be displayed. Hence of the beings to be created some must be made happy in heaven forever and so glorify his mercy, and some must be punished forever in hell and so glorify his justice. This is, therefore, the first decree, separating mankind from all eternity into the saved and the lost. The second is the decree of creation; and as a means of preparing for both salvation and punishment sin must be introduced, and so the third decree is that of the fall. Thus God's unchangeability is maintained; but entirely indifferent to human needs, as it is, and contemplating and disposing of human beings as if they were mere arithmetical units, it is an unchangeability of ice.

Supralapsarianism is, however, generally repudiated, although illogically, by the Calvinism of our day. But what awkward and impossible work the same conception of unchangeability has made in many doctrines not peculiar to Calvinism! The incarnation, for example, is defined by Chalcedon as the union in one person of two natures, divine and human, each still subsisting perfect and entire.¹ That formula, directly inspired by the conception of the divine unchangeability, is absolutely meaningless. In fact most of its defenders take refuge in mystery and incomprehensibility in their attempts to defend it, for see what it involves. God is unchangeably all-wise, all-powerful, and everywhere present. Man is ignorant, weak, and localized. But by this doctrine the same person is both all-wise and ignorant, almighty and weak, omnipresent and present at some definite spot exclusively, and all at the same time and in the same respect. What more utter abnegation of reason is conceivable? To take another example, the atonement is still viewed by the great mass of the Christian church as the rendering by Christ of an equivalent for the punishment of sinners.

¹ The precise formula is: "The property of each nature being preserved and concurring in one Person." See Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*.

Unchangeable justice demands the punishment of the sinner; wherefore he is *not* punished, but his punishment is borne by another! And to fit this contradictory position the terms "punishment," "justice," "equivalent," "infinite," are all juggled with till their meaning disappears in the process. And with the idea of freedom the case is, if possible, worse; for freedom involves something new, as a possibility at least, but in the universe of an unchangeable God everything apparently new is really old and actually, by involution, *in* the Being from whom it proceeds by an evolution which changes naught.

To some of these difficulties we shall probably have to return later. Let us glance now at another difficulty, more fundamental and comprehensive yet, a logical difficulty, seated in the very principle of causality as it is applied to the nature of the Supreme Being.

The principle of physical causation involves the sufficiency of every cause to accomplish the effect ascribed to it. The power manifested in the effect must have been previously in the cause. All causation is therefore merely the unfolding of the cause; and in this sense there can be nothing new. The brightness of the acetylene flame arises from the richness of the gas in carbon, the multitudinous particles of which, as they burn, give forth this extraordinary light. There can be no carbon burnt which was not in the unburnt gas. Hence if by naming God the Cause of the universe we mean that he is this in a physical sense he *must* always have had in himself all that ever appears in the universe to the end of time. Very well! But what, then, is the object of the universe? Why should it be created? The general answer which theologians have made to this question is, To *exhibit* God's perfections. But does this exhibition *do* anything? Or is it a vain and ineffective show? If it merely represents or repeats that which is eternally the same it lacks sufficient reason. The divine Being who seeks a mere *display* of his perfections is open to the charge of what men call in human affairs a poor and contemptible vanity. When the display is ended and all things have returned into themselves, what is the meaning of the whole? Or if there be a body of eternal created spirits to enjoy the eternal demonstration, what do they know of God that he did not know of himself before the eternities?

But we may go deeper still. The whole application of the law of causality to God is out of place. He is not an effect, and that puts him forever out of the *catena*. He is not even self-caused, for he is not "caused" at all. If he were it must be that he were (a) actually or (b) logically prior to himself. If actually, then, before he is you have him conceiving himself and then proceeding to call himself into being! Or if logically, then you have him, while existing, forming an idea of himself as not existing, perceiving a different and new idea of himself and executing it, in order to make himself logically exactly what he logically was from all eternity, by "inner necessity." This is stark nonsense. He is not "caused" at all: He *is*. He is not even "self-existent" but simply exists, having himself nothing more to do with that fact than I have with my existence.

Another example of the difficulties of the static view of God is to be found in the sphere of apologetics. How can the existence of pain, and particularly of sin, in the world be reconciled with the omnipotence and perfect goodness of God? John Stuart Mill said flatly that it could not. Orthodox apologetics accounts for sin by referring it to free will and affirming that God, *while* maintaining freedom, through which man *can* sin, cannot in every case prevent his actually sinning.¹ He postpones holiness to freedom. But says Mill, "Omnipotence could have made the objects compatible. Omnipotence does not need to weigh one consideration against another."² This objection has never been answered. In fact the really orthodox and the absolutist apologists both admit it, for they do not dare to admit freedom, but both resolve it into a "certainty" which evacuates it of all human significance.³ Mill also proceeds to deny the existence of any proof of the divine omniscience. It is vain to declare that Mill has here presented no

¹ Compare N. W. Taylor's discussion in Foster's *Hist. New England Theol.*, pp. 371 ff., and Park's *ibid.*, pp. 482 ff.

² *Three Essays on Religion* (Holt), p. 180.

³ Compare Howison's view: "Freedom means first our self-direction by this eternal Ideal and toward it, and then our power, from this eternal choice, to bring our temporal life into conformity with it, step by step, more and more" (*Limits of Evolution*, p. 376, *et passim*). Howison has more room in his system for freedom than most idealists.

real difficulties, easily removed on the basis of the static idea of God. When apologetics does not implicitly admit them it takes refuge in "mystery"; and mystery, like suicide, "is confession."

And finally the static view of God directly attacks and renders—not merely logically but, alas, in most frequent and concrete actuality—spiritual religion impossible. By spiritual religion I mean religion as conceived by Christ (John 17:3), viz., as the knowledge of God and the companionship (John 14:17; Rom. 8:14-16) of the soul with him.¹ How can there be companionship if there is no sympathy? And how sympathy if no fellowship in suffering (sym-path-y)? And how suffering in the ever-blessed and unchanging God? Even the Pauline pupil who wrote the Epistle to the Hebrews understood this necessity and the consequent difficulty on the basis of a static God, for he made the suffering of the divine Jesus essential to his perfection as a Savior (Heb. 2:14-18) and succoring friend (Heb. 4:14-16). But the suffering, to mean anything to us, must be the suffering of the divine nature through the humanity, and thus we are carried back to the unsolved and insoluble difficulties of the incarnation. There is no relief here from the embarrassments of the idea of a static God.²

¹ Personally I have been struck with the lack of sympathy with this view of religion and of interest in it among the generality of men as made evident by my experience as a preacher, on one occasion to Jews—a congregation of whom with their rabbi said they had never thought of it—but on countless occasions to the average run of our churches. And I found the same indifference among theological students in ten years of teaching systematic theology.

² I add the following quotation from William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 446 f., to express in words which I am incapable myself of equaling the feeling many thinkers now have of the impossibility of the orthodox theological view of God. Let the theologians mark them!

"What is deduction of these metaphysical attributes," he asks, "but a shuffling and matching of pedantic dictionary adjectives, aloof from morals, aloof from human needs, something that might be worked out from the mere word 'God' by one of those logical machines of wood and brass which recent ingenuity has contrived as well as by a man of flesh and blood? They have the trail of the serpent over them. One feels that in the theologian's hands they are only a set of titles obtained by a mechanical manipulation of synonyms; verbiage has stepped into the place of vision, professionalism into that of life. Instead of bread we have a stone; instead of a fish, a serpent. Did such a conglomeration of abstract terms give really the gist of our knowledge of the deity, schools of theology might indeed continue to flourish, but religion, vital religion, would have taken its flight from this world. What keeps

We are thus possibly prepared—we certainly ought to be prepared—for the suggestion derived from Bergson that God is himself by his very nature not a static but a progressing being, one himself passing through an evolution, or essentially a Becoming. Let us look at this idea a little more carefully.

Bergson, first, accepts the hypothesis of evolution, now as credible and, indeed, as imperative as gravitation, as the process by which the universe has become what it is, and by which it is going on to its illimitably great future. At its basis there is a unified force producing it and impelling it along its path of progress, a force which manifests itself in the most significant and interesting portion of the universe as life. Among all the orders of living beings it is the race of man with which we are chiefly concerned. This force, because life is its chief display, Bergson calls the Vital Impulse.¹

He accepts also the view of modern science that matter is itself not so much the product of force as force itself. It is composed of motions, whirling movements, vortices, which are continuous and constitute its being. It is not a thing which is made by these motions. And this force must be understood as identical with the Vital Impulse, not merely on the philosophical ground of the unity of the universe but on the ground of the tendency of experimental science to identify, through its increasing approach to electricity, the constitutive force of matter with the force manifested in innervation and in all life.

Viewing the universe thus, the fact which first and most constantly attracts the attention is the constant change through which everything is passing. All things are in a flux. But this is not a change without method or meaning, as it might be if flux were a full

religion going is something else than abstract definitions and systems of concatenated adjectives, and something different from faculties of theology and their professors. All these things are after-effects, secondary accretions upon those phenomena of vital conversation with the unseen divine, of which I have shown you so many instances, renewing themselves *in secula seculorum* in the lives of humble private men. So much for the metaphysical attributes of God! From the point of view of practical religion, the metaphysical monster which they offer to our worship is an absolutely worthless invention of the scholarly mind."

¹ I use and shall constantly refer to Mitchell's translation of the *Évolution Créatrice*; see p. 87.

expression of historical facts. It would be that if it manifested now improvement and now deterioration on the whole, as it undoubtedly does at isolated points. But as a whole the change is evidently a progress. If the Vital Impulse be called a *thrust* it is a thrust upward. First mollusks, and then vertebrates, and then mammals, and then man. But matter seems always to carry in it the seeds of decay and dissolution. Living matter is matter permeated by the vital force, which for the time seems triumphant. The bud unfolds into the leaf, which grows in size and beauty and functioning power; but it no sooner becomes perfect as a leaf than it begins to harden, to dry, to cease functioning, to become discolored, to fall, to decay, to cease to live or to be as a leaf. If it be essentially force, and if this force be motion and have direction, then it is a falling force, and it is the Vital Impulse *reversed*.

For a time the upward thrust of the Vital Impulse overcomes, as in the leaf, this reverse motion. It carries matter along with it in the powerful current of its progress. The leaf unfolds and grows. This is living matter; and it may be said to be the aim of the Vital Impulse to insert into the world of matter, into its spent and falling force, as much life, as much of the on-moving and upward-tending as possible. But its aim is evidently more than this. The upward current at first develops a life which is free and active, though only so in a small degree. This tends, however, to content itself with its small attainments, to become sessile, to take its nourishment from the earth, and to become torpid. It produces the vegetable world. Thus the Vital Impulse finds itself in danger of being thwarted because checked in its upward thrust. Hence it emphasizes dependence for food on pre-existing forms, and thus on search for food; it favors, it produces, the animal world. But here again life seems to be in danger of contenting itself with its attainments, with its skill in building its homes and finding its food, and it pauses and sinks into the torpor of instinct, indescribably skilled in using its organized instruments, its antennae, its proboscis, its claws, but bound to the endless repetition of almost unconscious processes. This again is pause; the reversed motion of matter has again neutralized the larger meaning of the upward thrust of the Vital Impulse. The life of instinct, perfect as it is in its limited activities,

"efficient" beyond the capacity of any Prussian organization, lacks the quality at which the Vital Impulse is aiming.

For, apparently thwarted here, it tries again. Diverging from the path of instinct is that of intelligence, and upon this the Vital Impulse now lays its emphasis. And with intelligence it emphasizes self-activity, constantly antagonizes torpor (into which both the vegetable and the animal world fell), and steadily perfects the organization of *indeterminism*—a "sensori-motor nervous system imposed on digestive, respiratory, circulatory systems"²—all of which are *for* it, to enable it to function, to exercise free choice. Thus emerges a moral world unto which as a goal the whole movement was tending, which is its explanation and its justification.

And in this moral world, how often thwarted has the Vital Impulse been, as today in the cataclysm of this vast and barbaric war! What is war but the temporary triumph of materialism, of the reverse current thwarting the upward thrust of human development? The aim of a moral world has been but imperfectly attained and the Vital Impulse will begin again, by emphasis at some new point, to penetrate matter, confer upon it the upward movement, and give new wisdom to man to guide his choices, and so to make not merely democracy but *freedom* safe!

From this brief review, if I have succeeded in spite of brevity in making it clear, it will be seen what the Vital Impulse is to Bergson—an upward moving force, imperfect in power, uncertain as to methods, struggling toward a great end, itself enlarging as it goes.

So far we are upon secure ground in our interpretation of Bergson's thought, for we have his own elaborate development of it before us. As to the relation of the Vital Impulse to God we have no such treatment from Bergson's own hand. But there can be little doubt, I think, that when he does speak he will identify the Vital Impulse directly with God. Certainly we cannot view God as trifling with this universe if he has thought fit to intrust creation to a subordinate and limited agency! He must be putting forth power sufficient to make things well if he can. The life of the world seems to be full, vibrant, intense, strenuous. And thus

² *Creative Evolution*, p. 120, *et passim*.

the imperfection of the Vital Impulse must be God's own imperfection, if he is morally in earnest with this world, that is, if he is God.

Or, to put it otherwise, if we may thereby arrive at greater clearness—if the world is made imperfect in any respect, that imperfection compels us to believe in the corresponding imperfection of the Ultimate, if that Ultimate is different from the immediate Creator. He owes it to himself to give to his limited Creator *enough* power to accomplish the task set him if he himself possesses an infinitude of power. Otherwise he allows himself to be reasonably conceived of as lacking in some perfection, power, wisdom, or the like. We may here best allow our opponents to argue for us, assured that they will not attempt to refute us when to refute us they must discard their own methods of proof. They are perpetually saying that an infinite God *must* stamp his perfection on all his work. In fact what seem to be imperfections in it at any point are stoutly declared by orthodox apologists to be really perfections. Pain, for example, is a discipline, and as developing perfect character is itself perfect, and a benevolent feature of the creation. The actual question between us is therefore only this, whether the apparent imperfections—the existence of the vermiform appendix in man, of sin in the world, of death—are really so or are really perfections. Some men are still claiming that the appendix is a perfection, has a useful purpose, and cannot be dispensed with except at a loss, and in this fashion are criticizing its removal by surgery. Very well! The imperfection of the world and of the World-Builder, if it is an imperfection, must therefore, after all, be the imperfection of God, in the opinion of those who believe in a static God. We may well accept their conclusion and are well convinced that Bergson will do so, for to us and to him there appear to be real imperfections, false solutions of creative problems, blind alleys into which evolution has run and where it has found itself unable to proceed, hesitations and new attempts—all of which, if actually what they seem, necessitate a developing World-Builder, and this necessitates a developing God since it is impossible upon the basis of a static God.

We shall therefore at once make this identification and say that as the Vital Impulse is to Bergson essentially a Becoming, so is

God.¹ But now there will be urged against this conception a variety of reasons from a number of differing philosophical and theological points of view.

1. With the a priori philosophy of the Absolute we need not much occupy ourselves. Their objection is, once for all, that our method is wrong from the very start. It is the age-long antagonism between the two schools of thought which have divided thinkers that meets us here. Hegel represents this school in its most extreme and even today its most representative form, and the Hegelian method, beginning with a mere abstraction, Pure Being—which, with a sublimely unconscious irony, he made equal to Nothing—and proceeding by purely logical and abstract processes to evolve the universe and everything in it, seems to the a posteriori school absolutely absurd. The distortion of history necessary to fit facts into the *cadres* of this scheme ought long since to have condemned it to eternal oblivion. There we shall in the main let the matter lie.

It may, however, do something toward that gradual accumulation of minor refutations under the load of which absolutism will

¹ L. H. Miller (*op. cit.*, p. 109) gives us two quotations from Bergson himself which tend to confirm the view of the logical bearings and the ultimately necessary form of his teaching on this point. The first is from a letter of Bergson's as follows:

"The considerations set forth in my 'Essay on the Immediate Facts of Consciousness' (*Time and Free Will*) are intended to bring to light the fact of liberty; those in *Matter and Memory* touch upon the reality of the spirit; those in *Creative Evolution* present creation as a fact. From all this we derive a clear idea of a free and creating God, producing matter and life at once, whose creative effort is continued, in a vital direction, by the evolution of species and the construction of human personalities." Note particularly here that God "creates," and creation to Bergson is an evolution; and that he "produces matter and life *at once*."

The second is from an interview with Louis Levine:

"This source of life (God) is undoubtedly spiritual. Is it personal? Probably. There are not sufficient data to answer this question, but Professor Bergson is inclined to think that it is personal. It seems to him that personality is in the very intention of the evolution of life, and that the human personality is just one mode in which this intention is realized. It is therefore very probable that the spiritual source of life whence our personality springs should be personal in itself . . . personal in the larger sense of the term—a spiritual unity expressing itself in the creative process of evolution."

But H. M. Kallen in his *William James and Henri Bergson* (1914) has a somewhat different view of Bergson's idea of God. He says:

The *élan vital* "revealed in the manifest movement of existence here and now . . . is limited and inhibited by its opposite, matter. For 'life is a movement,

finally collapse to dwell for a moment on the application, in the spirit of this school, of the term "infinite" to God. What does this word mean? Simply immeasurably great; and that is only one form of the *finite*, because, however great, "immeasurably" means that *we* cannot measure him. A perfect equivalent to infinite is found in the word "indefinite." In a word the only infinite of which we know anything is the mathematical infinite.

At this point of course absolutism enters its fierce protest. "By no means! The indefinite is gained by the summation of particulars, each one of which may be a matter of experience; and it is a merely negative term, indicating that we have never yet reached the limit of being. It is like a circle of "infinite" radius, that is, a radius which we have not measured; but if it is a radius at all it must in any given case have a definite length. The philosophical term "infinite" is, on the contrary, positive; it means not "without limit" but "perfect, possessing the totality of being." "Infinite," when applied to the Absolute, means "possessing all perfections," not only all conceivable perfections, but all existing perfections, whether conceivable by us or not.

materiality is the inverse movement, and each of these two movements is simple, the matter which forms the world being an undivided flux, and undivided also the life that runs through it, cutting out in it living beings all along its track.' The 'God, creator and free' must be something 'vaster and higher,' the eternal spring of both matter and life. The whole universe reveals the force which mounts and the force which falls, and the movement is from a center, 'a center from which worlds shoot out like rockets in a fireworks display.' *This center is God.* God is not a thing, but a 'continuity of shooting out.' 'He has nothing of the ready-made; he is unceasing life, action, freedom. Unbounded by any environment, it is the utterly indeterminate spontaneity becoming self-contained and self-limited, hence in the traditional sense of the word *infinite*. It is only 'the force which is evolving throughout the organized world,' that is, a limited force that is always seeking to transcend itself, that is, always inadequate to its own aspirations. The center from which this force springs has not these limitations. It is the making, indifferently, of both matter and *elan*, and its bearing upon human destiny therefore cannot with any honesty be said to be propitious. It is both the enemy and the friend, whereas the *elan* alone is utterly good, utterly a saving 'more'" (pp. 197 f.).

He says again: "If the *elan vital* is God, then the eternal center of creation from which springs matter (peer of the *elan*) is a super-god" (p. 206).

This interpretation seems to me as entirely against the general drift of the *Creative Evolution* as it is against the quotations made by Miller.

One can never be sure of stating antagonists' positions in a way to satisfy them, and I may not have done it here. Some Hegelians would undoubtedly object to the last clause of this statement, for they would maintain that, since thought and being are identical, all "existing perfections" are conceivable. Waiving this objection our contention as to the definition of "infinite" as a positive term is that the defining epithet is meaningless. We know what "great" is, and "greater," and "very great," and we ascribe a real meaning to the term "indefinitely great," thus reaching up toward the unknown through the known. But to begin at the other end is impossible for us. Perfection means simply *as good as it can be*, and is reached by *increments* of good. What is "positive" goodness more than this? If God is good toward me today, and again tomorrow, and as a fact always; and if he is good not only to me but to my next neighbor, and my more remote neighbors one by one, and to them all and always, what is this but *perfect* goodness, the goodness that never fails? What is positive goodness more? And this goodness is reached by the summation of details. It has its beginning in character, which is fixed holy choice, no doubt, and this may be called positive; but it is no more positive than *my* holy choice, and were my choice "fixed," that is, unbroken, the summation of uninterrupted details of goodness would make me "perfectly" good.

With so much of discussion we leave the absolutists. Instead of securing by their method a "rational" interpretation of the universe they are outside the pale of reason, for they *assume their premises*. They are not reasoners but sentimentalists; their philosophy is not wisdom (*sophia*) but a dream. They ought not to be permitted any longer to lay down the doctrine of God for the belief of men.

2. Plainer people will, however, meet Bergson's position with an objection from causation. How can God possibly be conceived of as ever progressing, enlarging, adding new degrees of strength and new attributes? To what cause shall this increase be ascribed? It can have no cause, for God is the ultimate Being upon whom all others are dependent, and they, who are the only possible sources of his increase, can increase only through him. The increase of the Ultimate is impossible because it must be an uncaused increase.

But we are here still in the realm of physical causation, with which, as already pointed out, the divine causation has little in common. As in so many other departments of thought, we get suggestions as to God from the examination of ourselves. And a view of our own causation, such as is drawn out by Bergson, shows that causation is not mere repetition, but is creative, that is, there is more in the effect than there was in the cause. The artist paints a picture. As Bergson points out you may in one sense explain it all by physical causation. It is produced in your mind by an image formed in the eye, and this is caused by rays of light proceeding from the canvas, determined in their nature and distribution by the location and chemical qualities of the paints. But those physical laws of themselves would no more produce a picture than a handful of Greek type thrown at random on a table would produce a page of Homer. There was needed the artist's soul ere the picture could be produced. And further there is more in the picture than there was in the antecedent purpose of the artist. He grew as he painted. He is a greater man and a greater artist because of his picture. Hence a *man* cannot be static if he is truly active because he becomes creative thereby; and God, if he creates, also cannot be static but grows.

Why should not power grow by exercise? The arm develops as it is exercised; why not any power, and especially God's? The answer to this question will seem easy to some, for they will say that we know how the strength of the arm increases by exercise, for as cells waste they are replaced by other and more cells. Food brings these cells, and thus everything is accounted for on the law of causation. But if one speaks of the increase of God's power by exercise, whence does the addition come? In man it is from the vegetable world and its stored-up energies; but in God, whence? for there is no vegetable or other world apart from himself from which he can draw. Wherefore he cannot increase.

But is the growth of spiritual power thus causally conditioned? Is the increase of strength in the arm the result of addition of cells? or is the increase of strength the cause of the addition? Certain it is that strength is not entirely material and does not depend on cells wholly. A man's right arm has today and under the

humdrum conditions of ordinary life a certain amount of capacity to lift heavy bodies; but tomorrow, with his muscles and their constituting cells all unchanged, some sudden necessity, some fright or frenzy, multiplies his powers, and he does "the impossible." The increase of power is not physically conditioned. Bergson makes a very interesting suggestion¹ bearing upon this point in connection with a discussion of the eye. Why, he asks, have two eyes so minutely similar appeared at so remote points of the evolutionary process and developed out of so dissimilar antecedents as those of the pecten and of man? He answers, in fine, that the Vital Impulse, willing a certain degree of sight, the same in both cases, has by one thrust carried to a certain point produced the same organ in both cases, the cells all falling into place in accordance with the one single and simple volition. So strength is a volition and exercise the expression of the same, and the cells fall in with, accord with, follow, execute, the volition. Unless all our knowledge of the building of the body fails this is the true procedure.²

But if our human strength thus increases, why should it not be so with God's? As he acts why should not he think? And as he progresses in action from the building of a snail to the building of a man why should not his thoughts progress? That is, why should he not think of things he had not thought of? And why should not his purposes progress? Why not, therefore, his power? "Inconceivable!" will be the answer to these questions—which simply means that *no cause* in God, or outside of him, can be assigned for such an increase. But the whole fabric of intellectual explanation through causation is a contrivance of the mind for the purpose of exploiting things, and does not apply to the Uncaused himself. Why cannot changes happen in God out of the depths of his own nature?

Wundt has formulated³ what he calls a law of the universe, that *spiritual energy tends to increase*, which he expressly opposes to the law of the conservation of energy in physical things. We get some

¹ *Creative Evolution*, p. 96.

² I can here only refer to the revelations of embryology as to the development of the human body.

³ *System der Philosophie*, p. 315.

illustrations of this law in ordinary affairs. The boy stumbles through Virgil with great difficulty and scarcely understands a thing he reads. The man reads Dante with far less difficulty and feels himself in contact with the mighty mind of the great exile. In one's late prime the mind works with a rapidity and a certainty never before known. Wundt himself grounds his doctrine thus:

The spiritual life is controlled both extensively and intensively by a *Law of the Increase of Energy*: extensively, inasmuch as the *diversification* of the spiritual developments is continually enlarging; intensively, inasmuch as the *values* arising in these developments are rising in the scale. . . . We regularly find cases in which gaps occur in the continuity of spiritual phenomena, in which our empirical association of these under the law of cause and effect completely fails. . . . Here arises a transcendent problem, the solution of which Psychology must leave to Metaphysics. . . . Psychology as an empirical science is limited to the circle of causes and effects which are given by experience, and consequently the principle of spiritual causality can be developed only from said experience, in which both members of the causal series are completely given. If we insist upon this indispensable condition, we must acknowledge the rule of the increase of spiritual energy as quite as universal as that of equivalence for material causation.

Now God is spiritual energy; and if this, as Wundt says, tends of its very nature to increase, then God is a Becoming by virtue of his very nature as spiritual—living.

After all, the difficulty of conceiving of an uncaused progression in the very nature and being of God is more imaginary than real. There is equal difficulty in conceiving an uncaused existence, as has already been too briefly indicated. To repeat with a somewhat different phrasing of the argument, in the hope of rendering the position more convincing, the question of our opponents may be put thus: How is it possible to believe in a Process, or even an evolving Being, as the Ground of all things? The answer to this question may be advanced by asking the further question, How do we ever establish confidence in any view of the nature of the Ultimate? And the answer of that must be, By simply accepting it. God simply *is*. We take him as he is. Is there any more difficulty in accepting him as changing than as at rest? We must have change somewhere. Why not in God's nature? "Yes," it may be said, "and yet how do you explain or account for the

change?" We simply leave it unaccounted for. The reasoner must accept something. You cannot get an ultimate as a ground either of existence or of explanation for the Ultimate. He *is* ultimate. Spencer has to assume (but the assumption is separated by the whole diameter of human thinking from the groundless assumptions of Hegelianism) for his system of evolution matter and motion. Whence that motion? It *is*: that is his only reply. And if some more theistically inclined thinker than Spencer insists that there is a better answer to the question, and answers, "God moves matter"; the rejoinder comes to him, "Who moves God?" and his only reply is: "God moves himself," which really means nothing but God moves, *is* motion. Why then not say, God *is* change? What greater difficulty in conceiving God in this aspect than in any other whatever?

The fact is, the difficulty lies not in conceiving God as essentially change, which is as easy as conceiving him as at rest. It lies rather in believing this conception. Belief in any proposition is conditioned upon its harmony with the entire body of our conceptions. If there is no greater difficulty in harmonizing the idea of the divine change with our knowledge of the universe than the idea of his immutability, we not only can, but when our thoughts have come to clarity and we find the difficulty less, we inevitably shall believe it.

But our opponents will not let us rest at this point. If God is ever progressing, they will say, then at each successive point as we view him in the receding past he was less, and he must once have been nothing. How then did he come into being? We might answer mathematically that such a recessive process would make him nothing only at infinity, that is, never. But we do say that our problem is not one of origins but only of existence. He is, and we believe that he never came into existence. Whether he was always progressing in the manner and at the rate of the present, or will always continue thus to progress, we do not know. There are many conceivable possibilities; but, as they are all beyond the reach of our observation, they do not concern us. The fact before us is that God exists and is progressing. There we pause.

3. The objection that man cannot certainly know anything, if God be conceived of as Becoming, very strongly urged as it will be, may seem the most difficult of objections to remove. No sooner has knowledge settled upon any proposition than this will be likely to be evacuated by the changes going on in the central element and fountain of truth, in God himself. Hence nothing is *fixed* which is the central feature of certainty. Certainty seizes fact correctly, holds it consciously, and never changes. Now it would be indisputably true that all certainty would be destroyed by universal and capricious changes in God, which should instantaneously and repeatedly make all things other than they are. But the idea of Becoming does not involve such changes; it rather excludes them. It involves simply the idea of growth, and this means logical connection with the past, relative slowness of mutation, and goal. Let the investigator lay down the principle that the nutritious character of any article depends upon the predominance in it of hydrocarbons, and we shall not expect tomorrow to find vegetables storing up and animals greedily appropriating metallic oxides. Such knowledge, the knowledge of a changing world, has a relative certainty, one at least good enough for practical purposes. Instinct changes to intelligence by such processes, and, however new and altogether different the world of intelligence may appear to the observer, it is not unintelligible because he has once learned to view life under the form of instinctive organization.

Of course this answer does not fully meet the extreme idealists, those of the Hegelian stamp. Their contention is first that thought is being, then that thought is perfectly logical, and hence that by the necessary processes of thought one may know being perfectly. Logic cannot conceivably change. The syllogism will always be true, just as it will always be true that two and two make four. Hence our knowledge of God can, upon the presupposition of idealism, be certain if God is unchangeable, as he must be, but is dissolved in uncertainty if God himself changes; and at the same time, even logic and thought itself are destroyed. But this difficulty, again, is more imaginary than real. However arrived at, the knowledge of God, if it is real knowledge, consists in conformity

to fact, to his actual existence, and will be unchangeable if that existence is static. But what if after all God is developing? Then to be sure the knowledge we shall have of him tomorrow may be different from that of today; but is today's knowledge of him as he is today thereby invalidated? Certainly we know something of man and of his life in the world today, though tomorrow many things will be different. Even mutable man has consistency in the midst of his mutations and remains essentially the same in these days of automobiles as he was in those days of the "one hoss shay." No! Knowledge of a changing reality is not uncertain or unreal, however changing, if at each point it corresponds to the reality existing at that point.

4. Somewhat more difficult is the point raised in the interest of an unchanging ethics. Not merely to the popular mind does it seem essential to say "Right is Right, for God is God," but every Kantian confesses not merely the moral sublimity of the "categorical imperative," but its connotation of necessity and hence unchangeability. A changeable right, most men will say, is a delusion, is a mere compromise, is a temporary situation, and cannot demand and certainly will not receive that spirit of unconditioned surrender and unflinching loyalty which has carried man again and again to his death, but gained great causes thereby. It is not Right at all!

But is this altogether so? Let the violent supposition be made that in the growing perfection of human society at last a point should be reached where the laws of human interaction were as well understood and easily operated as are the laws governing the action of an automobile. When men drove horses, kindness and consideration for the feelings and needs of their dumb servants were elements of their moral obligation toward them. But now the element of feeling may be dropped out. You cannot *love* an inanimate object! See to it that water, oil, and gasoline are supplied to it in proper quantities and you may drive your machine two hundred miles as inconsiderately as twenty. So, if society were mechanized, feeling might be eliminated. The Christian maxim, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," although the fundamental element of benevolent choice would remain, would be

so transformed as to be hardly recognized. Does not this mean that every concrete aspect of Right may change? If Right is the utterance of some abstract proposition, as the old theology declared justice to be justice, self-evident in its nature and unchangeable in its demands, then to be sure it has not simply changed, it has disappeared; but at the same time man has disappeared. On the other hand, if Right concerns *ends* and that course of action which secures right ends is Right, then the unfeeling and unloving system of throttle and spark adjustments which should bring society to the end of well-being would be right and essentially ethical, however strange at first sight.

But such violent suppositions are uncalled for. There will never be such a passage from man to superman as to afford any pertinence to the parallel of the passage from the horse to the automobile. While man is man—and *while* the horse is horse—feeling, tender choice, love, will still be called for. There is no advantage to the truth in unreasonable exaggerations. That a given course of action should be under one set of circumstances ethical and under another unethical is a commonplace of all systems. The supposition of a progressive God involves nothing more than that. *Man* certainly becomes; but the change in moral relations and actions toward the individual as he passes from childhood to adolescence and from adolescence to manhood—a process of evolution, of becoming—does not destroy the fundamental character of Right. Neither can “becoming,” inner and outer evolution, in God destroy it.

Bergson himself would undoubtedly conduct the examination of the points we have been raising differently. Particularly would he point to the various tangles into which church teaching as to the nature of God has fallen as the inevitable consequences and as the annihilating illustrations of the falsity of the method employed. The church has not only never attained a purely rational formulation of such a doctrine as the Trinity, but she never can, because her methods and the tools with which she works were never intended for such a use. This is not the sphere where logic is applicable. He develops this point at length, though in an entirely different application and for a different purpose. The intellect “has for

its chief object the unorganized solid";¹ "of immobility alone does it form a clear idea";² it "is characterized by a *natural inability to comprehend life*."³ The intellect is not without place in the formulations of theology; in fact it is indispensable to them, for its very essence is abstraction, systemization, formulation.⁴ But it cannot furnish the premises of this study. It cannot *know* God, which is the office of the intuition. And here, certainly, Bergson is following the Master.

5. Yet it is precisely here that we are met again by our opponents; for the strongest group of objections (and the last which shall detain us) is that arising from the interests of religion.

We meet here not only the more definite objections which religious people have to offer—of which later—but also the imponderable atmosphere of religious conservatism. It is "the native air" of religion. There is an instinctive tendency to resist all change simply because it is change. I have known a good woman who was disturbed because the first hymn in morning service in church was not given out in its regular place! The feeling of reverence, which is almost of the essence of religion, breeds conservatism. What is revered is regarded as perfect, and perfection admits of no change. The principal difficulty which the proposal of a new view of God will meet will undoubtedly be the horror which even men of theological training will feel when they hear it; and the epithet which its opponents will universally use in reference to it will be "blasphemous." Very well! What we foresee we can perhaps endure.

With an atmosphere it is useless to reason. But it may not be so useless to attempt to meet the specific items of objection which conservative theologians will present. In default of any adequate discussion up to the present moment we must draw for the objections upon our imagination and upon the memory of our own reaction to the proposal of a "finite God" when it first fell upon our ears. We shall not fail, probably, in anticipating the chief difficulties of others.

¹ *Creative Evolution*, p. 153. ² *Ibid.*, p. 155. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 157; the whole context demands most profound study.

a) It would seem to be the first necessity of religion that God should be unchangeable. Amid the changing conditions of the world he must abide. Our hopes are disappointed, our plans frustrated, the solid foundations of our prosperity crumble beneath us, our friends betray us, but God is ever the same. The "arms" that are beneath us are the "everlasting arms," and they will never fail. The value of this idea needs no amplification or enforcement.

But does it depend upon God's "unchangeability"? Not at all, but simply upon his *reliability*.¹ The difficulty lies in the confusion of thought into which the a priori schemes of philosophy are always falling—the confusion of a practical need, a value, with a metaphysical generalization. The need is that in the stresses of life we may be able always to turn to God and find him invariably helpful, dependable, reliable. The religious relation is at this point a filial relation and demands only what the filial relation among men demands, that the father shall preserve his paternal attitude toward his son, not that he be "unchangeable."

b) The objection gains definiteness, and its reply also, if we view it at another angle. Our religious needs, it will be said, require that God should be infinitely capable of meeting those needs, or that he should be omnipotent. Not "infinitely," do they? Not infinitely capable in order to meet *my* individual needs, but only sufficiently, and that will be only slightly, for my affairs are small. Nor infinitely to meet those of my neighbors, or the town, or even the world, but only great—very great, immeasurably great, but after all nothing more than indefinitely great. That man would certainly have an extraordinary idea of himself, or even of the world, in the midst of the horrors of the year 1917, who should look out upon the starry heavens at night and think that the Being who could sustain and sway all these millions of suns and worlds had not power enough for him and all the earth! But the Vital Impulse of Bergson creates the stellar universe, finite though it may be.

I acknowledge at once and freely that the limitations of the finite God do certainly enter in at this point to try our faith. The

¹ See Miller's *Bergson and Religion*, p. 132, for a good statement of this point.

refractoriness of matter and of men sets limits that now and here he *cannot* overcome. So we argue. But that does not destroy the greatness, the illimitability, of his power any more than do the limitations which are conceived under the old apologetics to arise from his choices, from his preference of moral control over physical, or from limitations which, in his wisdom, he sets himself. Limitations there are in either case; and in either case he will do all that he now can and will ultimately bring all things into perfect order. In neither case will he miraculously and now do everything we wish. Neither the one answer of our difficulties nor the other demands, now and here, infinitude in the old conception of that term.

c) The same line of objection and reply adjusts the matter of God's knowledge and care of so insignificant a being as the single man in this great confused world. What we demand is a doctrine of God's greatness large *enough* to give us ground for a personal and individual trust in him.

d) But Christian love and the sense of spiritual dependence gather about the concrete objects of mundane relations more constantly and warmly than about abstract doctrines. To many it will be a more individual and stronger objection to the new doctrine that it evacuates the church of all unchangeability of doctrine and ritual. The power of the Catholic idea of the teaching infallibility of the church and its essential unchangeability through the ages is felt by many outside the pale of Catholicism. Princeton deems herself certain of the truth and unchangeability of the Westminster system of doctrine. But if the principle of change lies at the very basis of the universe, and God himself is progressing, evidently no infallibility can be attached to the present teaching of the church or to any future teaching. And the reliability of the church is gone.

But this is, after all, a verbal and not a real difficulty. Chemical doctrine is undergoing extensive and radical revision, but common salt is still composed of chlorine and sodium in definite proportions, and water of hydrogen and oxygen. The guidance of good men and of careful and learned thinkers will be exceedingly valuable, and in a very real and important sense authoritative, upon the

new basis as upon the old. Natural science, without any strict authority, has attained an undisputed certainty such as theology never had. Even in Catholicism, men in their feebleness of apprehension fell into error, as Protestants think, and no one doubts that Calvinism made an error when it taught the infallibility of the "received" text of the New Testament. *Christians have never had anything but value, worth, reliability, in these regions; never absolute perfection.* And for this the immeasurable gives as firm a basis as the "positively infinite."

The moral of all this discussion culminates in the exhortation, *In forming your idea of God first get at the facts.* Theologians have as yet very imperfectly learned the lesson of Darwin's *Origin of Species*, the lesson, that is, of what competent investigation of the facts in any case is. Many a single sentence in that book depends upon hundreds and hundreds of examinations of individual facts. The theologian passes lightly over them, unconscious of the vast toil they have cost. Hence many fail to see how extensive have been Bergson's studies and how competent he has become to arrive at correct conclusions. The new philosophy endeavors with tremendous earnestness and by exhaustive labor to arrive at facts. In the religious sphere it endeavors to explore the mysterious depths of the soul which lie open only to the gaze of an intuitive faculty of which neither philosophy nor theology has heretofore made any adequate use, although it alone promises to afford abiding results. Careless and confused reasoning will never furnish theologians with a successful refutation of this new philosophy or discredit its contributions to theology.

In conclusion a word or two may be added as to the advantage of the conception of God as a "Becoming." The great advantage is that Bergson's view meets, once for all, one of the great demands of our thought, that for a true progress, and answers finally the objection to most of the cosmogonies—that they are at bottom eternally and unbearably monotonous, wearisome, and altogether incredible. A static God must be frightfully bored in such worlds! To recur to Herbert Spencer, his evolutionary view begins in one vast mass of perfectly homogeneous gas in motion. Particles impinge on particles, and the constant play of forces resident in

the mass knocks the various atoms together into molecules, into subordinate masses, into systems and worlds, into living beings, into this world with all its forces and life, into *us*; but the same forces playing in the same way will begin to knock all apart, and finally you will have the homogeneous-gas-in-motion again from which you started and are where you began, nothing accomplished, and all this to be repeated in recurring cycles forever! What more dreary and senseless proceeding can be conceived? What more incredible?

Orthodox theology, with its universe created for "the glory of God," leaves us in the same place. When you have got the glory of God by creation, what is it? Just what you had before. If it is to be rescued from the natural implication already mentioned, that God by seeking his own glory is indulging in a boundless (and, considering the details it involves, the war of 1914-17, the white-slave traffic, and hell, a recklessly selfish) personal vanity, there must be something gained, on the whole, *something new, some progress*. But this is totally impossible, for everything that is in the result is, by the static presupposition, involved in the eternal and unchangeable Original. The unspeakable agonies that have attended human progress are all simply to exhibit to himself what was perfectly known to God at the beginning. Unthinkable!

But what beauty is added, even to the idea of God's glory, by the proposed view of God as Progress! Power ever increases. God, not in manifesting himself, but in doing, in exercising his powers for the good that may thereby be gained, struggles with a task at first too mighty for him; but at last he puts into the world that "indetermination" upon which he decided, and so prepares for the career of a free humanity. But that humanity, that freedom, proves at first and for long too much for its Originator. As instinct settled into mechanism and torpor, so intellect tends to selfishness, greed, diabolic ingenuity, recklessness, "frightfulness," war. The Creator is not yet the absolutely successful Governor of his creation. Vain to apologize for such colossal evil as this of 1914-17 by saying: It is *attended* with good, it will *work out* for the best. It is not best, and never can be. Men but for their egotistic greed were on the very verge of gaining by the methods of peace every good that can

ultimately come from the war, when one half-insane man precipitated the world into this hell which perverse intellect had created. But as God got the better of torpor, so he will of perverted intellect. And whatever may be the difficulties which may later occur these also he will surmount. For he is himself ever growing to the growing task which he sets himself, and he and his universe are ever going on. To what? To a concrete and actual excellence, just as this earth is concrete and excellent, stored with minerals, clothed with vegetation, bathed in light; and that excellence shall as much exceed this as sunlight does all the lights man kindles. The glory of God thus attained will be light ineffable. Is not this a better interpretation of creation?

I conclude by saying that it is time for the theistic proposal of the radical *a posteriori* philosophy to be discussed. The intrinsic importance of the proposal, the eminence of its propounders, and particularly of Bergson, the evident insufficiency and untenableness of the static view of God, the relief the dynamic view gives to the apologist, and the prospect it opens of eternal progress to the entire universe, demand an adequate consideration of the definition of God as essentially an eternal Becoming. If these pages shall provoke to such consideration, and especially if they shall be found to further it a little, the object of the writer will have been attained.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

MEDIAEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

Some years ago the Catholic party in the Prussian diet complained of discrimination against Catholics in appointments to chairs at the universities. One of their grievances was that a chair of philosophy in the University of Breslau, which, on the ground of a provision dating back to the time when the Jesuits had control of Silesia, was reserved to the Catholics, had not been filled by a conforming Catholic. The minister of education, explaining the *modus operandi* by which one chair of philosophy was to be filled by a Catholic and one by a Protestant, could not suppress a smile, and the house heartily joined in the humor of the occasion. The humor would also apply to Jewish philosophy, unless we accept it as a technical term, which, rightly or not, has been accepted in literature, and we understand by it—what it really is—apologetics of Judaism.

In this respect Professor Husik has done a meritorious work,¹ by which he has earned the gratitude of all people interested in the history of religion and for which he may claim the credit due to a pioneer. We have had so far a number of excellent works dealing with individual philosophic authors, or with a special branch of the subject, but none which covered the whole field and is satisfactory from a scientific point of view. The work of Neumark, which aims at completeness, has in two volumes only covered part of the subject. Those of Spiegel in German and of Bernfeld in Hebrew are neither satisfactory nor accessible to an English-reading public.

Husik begins his work with Isaac Israeli, who lived in the ninth and tenth centuries, and leads it down to Joseph Albo, who lived in the fifteenth century. In a closing chapter he gives a few more remarks on some authors of the fifteenth century who may be included among the writers on philosophy, dismissing all later attempts along this line with a general statement about the degeneracy of Judaism that has not developed any Jewish philosophy. In this the reviewer must differ with the author. The works of Moses Mendelssohn, of Mordecai Gumpel

¹ *A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy*. By Isaac Husik. New York: Macmillan, 1916. i+462 pages. \$3.00.

Schnaber, of Samuel Hirsch, and of his antipode, Samson Raphael Hirsch, may be poor attempts at an apology for Judaism, but they deserve historically a place next to their mediaeval predecessors.

The reviewer has to admit that the problems treated in the literature lucidly presented in Mr. Husik's book have merely a historic interest to him. Terms like "active and passive intellect," "vegetative, animal and rational soul," the theory of the four elements and of the spheres surrounding this earth like the skins of an onion, have been so completely abandoned since the Copernican system has been generally accepted, and since the theory of evolution took the place of the old notion of creation, that it requires the self-abnegation of the genuine scholar to wade through such arguments and to present them in the clear style of which Mr. Husik has a right to be proud. The subject possesses in some respects an actual interest. Solomon Ibn Gabirol, who built up his system on neo-Platonic ideas, was known to the mediaeval world as "Avicebron," and was supposed to be an Arabic philosopher. Some of his leading ideas were appropriated by Thomas Aquinas, whom Pope Leo XIII recommended as the philosopher who had definitely settled the world's problems. Maimonides, the greatest Jewish theologian of the Middle Ages, was studied by the Christian scholastic philosophers and had a great influence on Albertus Magnus. These and some others, principally Abraham Ibn Ezra, as well as some Cabbalists, whose works Mr. Husik passes by, had their influence on Spinoza, who studied them during the formative period of his life and was through them guided beyond the confines of strictly Jewish thought, laying the cornerstone of modern philosophy.

I would not subscribe to Mr. Husik's final statement that the Jews were in no way influenced by the Renaissance movement. We have, in the sixteenth century, two men who contributed very prominently to the critical study of Old Testament literature. Elijah Levita (1468-1549), a German, was the first to point to the fact that the vowel points in the Hebrew text of the Old Testament are late inventions. Azariah Dei Rossi (1514-78), an Italian, boldly demonstrated that the rabbinic views of science and history are not authoritative, and by this fact assisted in revising the blind belief in the stories of the origin of the Septuagint, and of the Aramaic version of the Pentateuch, which up to his time were blindly accepted. Neither of the two men gave us a presentation of Judaism as a system of thought, but both helped considerably to emancipate their co-religionists, and the scientific world at large, from blind submission to ecclesiastic authority. Mr. Husik, including

Abraham Ibn Ezra among the philosophers, although he never wrote a systematic work on the subject, ought not to have overlooked the work of these men, nor the work of a most remarkable and original character like M. L. Malbim (1809-79), a Polish rabbi, whose exegetical work contains, in spite of the anachronism which it represents, a large number of brilliant apologetic ideas. Abraham Ibn Ezra gives us in his *Pentateuch commentary* (Deut. 20:6), in spite of the obscurity by which he tries to shield himself against heresy-hunters, a clear idea that he does not accept the dogma of predestination in its full severity. Similarly his discussion of the sin of Moses, a problem treated very extensively in rabbinic literature (Num. 20:12), has a distinctly pantheistic tone and may have exercised considerable influence on Spinoza. The space assigned to this review does not permit going into details, and therefore any criticism of individual points would create the impression that the reviewer can say little or no good of the book, while he wishes to state most emphatically that the author has made a lasting contribution of great value to an important branch of the science of religion.

Having expressed this conviction, I do not apprehend any misunderstanding when I point to the perseverance of an old legend in Mr. Husik's book. He speaks of the spiritual life among the Spanish Jews that began with Moses Ben Enoch, who was ransomed by the congregation of Cordova. This story, which is found as early as the twelfth century, is one of the legends on which a comparative Jewish folklorist might engage in profitable research. It is an old folklore theme in Jewish historical literature that God will never abandon his people, and if their home is destroyed in one place he will provide another.

This, however, is not to the point. Jewish philosophy—to adopt this term—presents two aspects. One has its classic expounder in Maimonides, the rationalist, in whose opinion neither the Bible nor the vast rabbinic literature can contain anything which the highest intelligence will not accept. The other is the mystic attitude, chiefly represented by Judah Halevi, who looks upon Israel as God's favorite child, destined to be a model community for the benefit of the whole world. Maimonides—to make this idea clear—will see in the sacrificial cult a compromise with the weakness of human nature that requires ostentatious ceremonies, while Judah Halevi sees in it a mystic agency, somewhat like our electrotherapeutics. Both present an immense progress over the old rabbinic literature, which took everything for granted, magnifying all miracles and accepting the biblical precepts as something which is unquestionably the will of God. We may smile today at

some of the puerile attempts of rationalizing the old Jewish beliefs and practices, but they represent, after all, an emancipation from blind beliefs and a progress of humanity.

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THE DEFENSE OF GOD AND OTHER PROBLEMS

A great contrast is offered to the Christian thinker in the discussion of the same or at least closely related themes by Principal Forsyth and President King. The former¹ is particularly concerned to justify God in view of the horror of the *sin* of the world which has culminated in the present war. The awfulness of the war and all that it implies weighs upon him from the preface to the last page of his book. President King, writing before the United States entered war, and much farther from its frightfulness, gives special attention in the first part of his book² to the *suffering* or *pain* which afflicts the world, although the problem of sin is not neglected.

In judging a theodicy it is well to consider at the outset what is wanted in a theodicy. It is that such considerations should be presented to men as should make it reasonable for them to believe that God is *good* in view of particular difficulties in the way of such belief. Forsyth undertakes this task in two lines of argument. In the first he shows that this war has arisen as a result of false ideas of God, and that doubt as to God's goodness, in view of the war, follows these same false ideas. In the second he undertakes to give us the certainty that his idea of God is the true one, by pointing out what he regards as the supreme action of God in demonstrating his holiness and goodness, in the cross of Christ.

The great error in recent thought about God, according to the principal of Hackney College, is that we have desired him to be on our side, instead of being concerned ourselves about being on his side. Our religion has been anthropocentric instead of theocentric. The explanation of Germany's action is that she has come to view the ultimate power of the universe as immanent and pantheistic, rather than as transcendental and personal, and that this has led to the worship of craft and power at the expense of humanity and every ethical principle.

¹ *The Justification of God; Lectures for War-Time on a Christian Theodicy.* By P. T. Forsyth. New York: Scribner, 1917. vi+233 pages. \$0.90.

² *Fundamental Questions.* By Henry Churchill King. New York: Macmillan, 1917. vii+256 pages. \$1.50.

With the foregoing criticism of some current religious ideas we shall largely agree. *Deep* thought is sure to reveal the shallowness of a divine love which does not insist on *righteousness*, and will readily agree that it would be most wholesome for men to ask more about what the holy will of God is, and strive to do it, than about what would be most pleasant and comfortable for man, and try to use God to gain it.

But so far from contenting himself with these considerations, Dr. Forsyth insists that there is no theodicy, no justification of God, apart from the cross. In various places he gives us hints at what he means by the cross. "The one meaning of an atoning Cross is the securing and establishing of God's holy and righteous judgment throughout the moral world to its victory in love—his bringing forth judgment to victory," he says. And elsewhere: "A holy God, self-atoned in Christ, is the moral centre of the sinful world," and yet again, "The cross meant more change in God than in man." These words suggest some more or less vague ideas, and raise many questions which the author signally fails to answer. In explanation of this lack he says in one place: "I feel, of course, that these statements rest on a theological groundwork for which there is here no space." That suggests one of the fundamental difficulties which students who admire this author's literary power and ethical passion have with his writings, namely, that he *never* has space for the theological groundwork upon which his doctrine of the cross rests.

In brief, we must say of this second line of Forsyth's justification of God (1) that it is quite unnecessary—the considerations previously advanced by this author, and others offered by President King in the book referred to, are sufficient for anyone who is willing to believe in God and able to think clearly; and (2) that, at least without further help which is here wanting, it is much more difficult to accept Forsyth's theory of the cross and its meaning than to believe that God is holy, loving, and good, and (3) that the hints which the author does give us as to his theology of the cross indicate adherence to theological formulæ which have been seen to involve contradictions, or at least speculations which are without rational basis for us, and hence have had to be abandoned by students today.

President King's discussion of the problem of evil is not so saturated with the thought of the war, but offers, not one or two, but many, considerations which help to make it possible to believe in a good God and a good order in the universe in spite of the prevalence of suffering and sin. A helpful section in his preliminary considerations is con-

cerned with suffering in the animal world—with the idea of “nature, red in tooth and claw.” He quotes passages from Darwin and Wallace which indicate their view that the suffering in the animal world is very much less than it has been pictured, and that the evolutionary system with its struggle for existence “really brings about the maximum of life and of the enjoyment of life, with the minimum of suffering and pain.”

In his chapter on “The Prerequisites of Character” Dr. King holds that the development of human character involves “some genuine freedom of volition on man’s part; some power of accomplishment in the direction of volition; an imperfect developing environment; a sphere of laws; that men should be members one of another and that there should be a struggle against resistance,” and that every one of these involves the possibility of suffering and, most of them, of sin.

The section on “Light from Christ” is most helpful and illuminating. It is not “fireworks in a fog,” as Forsyth’s writings were once characterized. Every eye enjoys fireworks, but many would be willing to forego them if they could avoid the fog. President King’s discussion is simple, clear, logical, and convincing. A few pages of the same sort would have multiplied the convincing power of Forsyth’s doctrine of the cruciality of the cross. “If Christ was allowed to suffer and die in rejection and apparent defeat, your suffering too, though it were equally undeserved, does not mean that God has forgotten you or his kingdom. . . . The fact that Christ’s suffering death has so counted for men in all the generations since, is a very direct intimation that all suffering may be vicarious, may directly count for other lives.”

President King takes up other fundamental problems of life from the Christian standpoint, in the same simple, brief, and convincing way: “The Question of Prayer,” “The Question of Christ,” “The Question of Life’s Fundamental Decision,” “The Question of Life’s Fundamental Paradox (Liberty and Law),” “The Question of Christian Unity,” “The Question of Christianity as a World Religion”—the only hopeful basis for oriental civilization and for a New World civilization.

The brevity and simplicity of Dr. King’s presentations of the great problems of life and their solutions make this book one very suitable to be put into the hands of the thinking layman, while the learning and power of logical thought and expression embodied in it should make it very useful to the minister and theologian.

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GREEK AND ROMAN MYTHOLOGY

The series to which Professor Fox's book belongs¹ is under the editorial management of Louis Herbert Gray and is to consist of thirteen volumes. Three of these besides the volume under review have already appeared: VI, *Indian, Iranian*, by A. B. Keith and A. J. Carnoy respectively; IX, *Oceanic*, by R. B. Dixon; and X, *North American*, by H. B. Alexander. The purpose of the series is excellent. Not only specialists in the different fields but also students of comparative religion will find here well-written accounts of the myths of the races. There is nothing else on so comprehensive a scale in English.

At the end of each volume are some notes and a bibliography, but no index. One of the commonplaces of reviewers is a lament over the lack of indexes. This wail is so frequently heard that I hesitate to raise it again. But the fact remains that the place of the index-maker shall be high in heaven, and its omission from the volumes of a series of this kind constitutes an almost incomprehensible editorial idiosyncrasy. To be sure the thirteenth volume is to be an index of the whole work, and when that appears the difficulties which now beset the reader (especially the student of comparative religion) when he attempts to gain access to the material collected in the volumes published will be less formidable; but each volume should have had an index of names and especially an elaborate and detailed subject index, which would give a short cut to all the myths bearing on any religious conception. Presumably such a subject index will form the chief part of Volume XIII. Otherwise the usefulness of the series will be enormously impaired. It will be like a fair and goodly mansion without entrances or connecting corridors.

Professor Fox has done his part of the work with distinction. He writes easily and well, and his accounts of the myths are strikingly lucid. He has moreover the faculty of selecting from a tangle of conflicting versions that form of the legend which lies closest to the original religious idea from which it sprang. It is however a matter of regret that he has not devoted more space to the elucidation of the ultimate significance of the myths. He almost always says something on this phase of the stories, and the explanations suggested are sound; but the value of the volume would have been much greater if this interpretative element,

¹ "The Mythology of All Races," Vol. I, *Greek and Roman*. By William Sherwood Fox. Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1916. lxii+354 pages; with 63 plates and 11 text figures. \$6.00.

which is after all the important thing, had been increased and the purely narrative material reduced.

After an introductory essay on the Greek myths (pp. xli-lx), in which he is at his best, the author divides his work into three parts: I, "Myths of the Beginning, the Heroes and the Afterworld"; II, "The Greek Gods"; III, "The Mythology of Ancient Italy." This arrangement of the material is logical and economical. The stories of the local heroes clear the way for the accounts of the gods and make them more intelligible.

Of the 328 pages in the book proper 307 are devoted to Greek, 21 to Roman, mythology. Moreover, much of the material included in the Roman section falls under the head of religion rather than of mythology. Undoubtedly, the store of Roman mythology is much smaller than that of Greek, but the difference is not so great as is indicated by these figures. Not only more Roman myths should have been treated, but some of the subjects touched on merited fuller discussion—for example, the cult of Diana on page 294 and that of Fortuna on page 295. There is in fact in the Roman section a lack of the genial sympathy that makes the discussion of the Greek myths such good reading. Yet the history of Roman religious thought, as it developed in the successive stages of indigenous pandemonism, of Etruscan, Greek, and oriental influence, furnishes a vast amount of material of first importance for a series, the aim of which is to clarify our knowledge of religious consciousness.

GORDON J. LAING

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COE'S PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

Investigators of the psychology of religion have been equipped in such different ways and have had their attention upon such different aspects of the subject that there has long been need of some survey and report of the work as a whole. Professor Coe's present volume¹ is planned to meet this need; in his own words, the book is "intended primarily as a handbook for beginners in the psychological analysis of religion"; and it has as its foremost concern "to make clear the nature of the problems, the kind of data, the methods of research, and the achieved results." This purpose has been excellently attained, having

¹ *The Psychology of Religion*. By George Albert Coe. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1916. xvii+365 pages. \$1.50.

brought us a clear and scholarly account of the work, wherein justice is shown even to those contributors toward whose methods or conclusions the author's heart least warms.

In recounting the ways in which the data are gathered for the psychological study of religion, he well indicates the safe stretches and the pitfalls in the path of one who relies upon the questionnaire, the religious biography, the sacred Scripture, and other records, or upon the methods of anthropology or psychological experiment. As for religion itself, Professor Coe finds its origin in the action of groups of men concerned with the supply of food, with war, with initiation into tribal lore and custom, and with sex; and where religion is intimately conjoined with totem, *mana*, taboo, magic, spiritism, myth, and fetish. In so far as there is an attempt to complete, unify, and conserve recognized values, we find here religion.

From these beginnings there come the various religions, whose differences are traceable to differences of geography, of economic life, of social and political organization, of culture which takes the form of philosophy, science, and art. Professor Coe views as important here the effect also of religious institutions, of religious leaders, and of the interaction of peoples.

He next indicates the significance, for the development of religion, of the crowd, the priesthood, and the deliberative body, in which the individual appears, respectively, as impulsive, as regulated, and as self-emancipating. An account in some detail is given of conversion and of certain classes of religious leaders ranging from shamans through priests to prophets.

Professor Coe does not find the focus of religion in our subconscious life; he says, rather, that "religious experience tends to focalize itself where individuality is most pronounced, not at its obscure outer edges; where self-control is at its maximum, not its minimum; where the issues are those of a society as a deliberative (or potentially deliberative) body." Thus religion is personal and social; it cannot, as science often is, be contented with an abstract world, something apart from personal relations; indeed science never can supplant religion. Religion ever presses on to a fuller recognition of persons. The culminating expression of religion, for Professor Coe, is found in fellowship with a Divine Being. "The thought of God may, indeed, undergo many transformations," he says, "but in one form or another it will be continually renewed as an expression of the depth and the height of social experience and social aspiration."

The volume throughout is of admirable moderation and balance. He would have religion intelligent, but will not grant that it has its very seat and center in the intellect. Rather the seat and center is in the activity of appreciation, in valuation. Professor Coe regards religion "as an imminent movement within our valuations, a movement that does not terminate in any single set of thought contents or in any set of particular values." The most significant mark of religion is thus found in valuation; but this valuation itself is ever moving forward, ever learning better what should be desired, discovering what in life has immeasurable worth. Religion, to use his term, is marked by a persistent "revaluation of values." He thus makes a purely intellectualist account of religion know its place; yet without abandoning the field to emotion or to primitive instinct or to organic appetite. The book is evolutionary without being ridden by biological habits of estimating facts and methods. The character of religion is found in what it develops out of, but perhaps even more in what it develops into. The importance of the sexual impulse in religion is recognized, but the sources of religion are found by no means exclusively in the sexual life; this impulse is of limited influence, not only in the religious beginnings of the race, but also in personal conversion and in religious leadership. Social influences in religion are recognized, but the significance of the individual is not lost to view. Professor Coe urges the important truth, neglected by those who see in religion only the suppression of the individual by his society, that in religion there is also a giving of freedom to the individual, a grant of strength to oppose his society, to intensify his very individuality.

Yet, with all his moderation in using the very things he likes, Professor Coe seems almost upon occasion overtempted. The idea of function and the social principle come perhaps nearest to being his special weakness. The belief in survival after death, for example, he hardly expects to be greatly affected either by mediumistic phenomena or by experiment; we shall gain assurance if at all, he holds, not because the supposition of such survival would enable us to explain certain observed phenomena, but by the discovery of some common enterprise for both the quick and the dead. He here drives the social interest somewhat hard, and with a lax perception of the use and abuse of the causal principle as a means of discovering reality. It is true that we cannot through causation demonstrate the existence of a single other person. But having once made, perhaps largely on emotional grounds, the great assumption that other minds exist, we satisfy ourselves of the presence of this or that particular mind by noticing facts which call for such a

presence to explain them. When Robinson Crusoe saw footprints on the sand, he did not withhold belief in their obvious meaning until there should arise some common work for the savages and himself. Likewise we believe in the existence of the Neanderthal man because of indubitable signs and though until Doomsday neither we nor he can lend the other a hand at his work. One may be far from inclined to believe that psychic research has proved that the dead yet live, while yet equally far from holding that the enterprise itself is on an almost futile course. If the "researchers" were to get enough of a certain kind of evidence, most of us would believe, even without knowing whether those on the two sides of death could ever labor in common. Professor Coe carries more conviction when he says that the desire to survive is by no means directed solely to *my own* continuance; immortality is desired for others, especially for those we love. It is, however, strange that in a book which makes so much of the "functional" point of view so little should be said of the effect, for good or ill, of the belief or unbelief in immortality.

Indeed here and elsewhere one cannot but feel that the author has been hampered by his own conception of function itself, since he so often finds it close to satisfaction. In seeking the function of various activities in religion, he occasionally tells of their effects in general, but yet he seems primarily interested in a particular group of their effects, namely, the satisfactions they bring. Now it is of course true that conversion, prayer, the belief in immortality, the belief in God, and every other phase of the religious life does satisfy some desire; but the function of these and of religion as a whole may well be far more than this—even as certain subconscious processes may be of great importance functionally, yet of themselves be not satisfying. The task of the psychologist, after he has analyzed and found the causes, is to lay bare all the important consequences, and particularly the psychic consequences, of religion; and in the end he will wish to know in what degree these consequences are satisfying, in what degree they fulfil the deep longings of the spirit. This will be to measure the worth of religion in all its parts and forms. But, first of all, we must discover and describe the effects themselves, regardless of their value, the search being continued with something of that detached and impartial interest with which we seek for causes.

If this be so, there is no gulf fixed between the method which analyzes and causally explains religion, and the method which seeks for the "function"—that is to say, the results—of religion in the entire region of mind. Professor Coe having rightly joined them seems ever to be—if not misjudging their true relation—at least to be obscuring it and to be

exalting the one at the expense of the other. Especially would beginners, one must think, gladly have been spared this overemphasis on the distinction between structure and function. The terms are, for the moment, badges and rallying-cries in psychology; and Professor Coe's colleagues and fellow-workers, as "fans" in the subject, will cheer or hiss each reappearance. But the newcomer, for whom the author is expressly writing, would doubtless prefer—unless he be an odd fish—to give himself more completely to the rich and abundant findings here displayed, and be spared a nudge at every turn lest he forget by which particular tool in psychology the precious thing was unearthed.

Current party enthusiasms thus modify, some will think unfortunately, the even contour of the work; yet none can fail to appreciate the restraint, the accommodation to more established and tested ways of thought. The psychology of religion can well be approached by the book, while the further means of study are indicated by careful bibliographies both of the subject as a whole and of special and important topics.

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RENDEL HARRIS ON THE PROLOGUE OF JOHN

The importance of this book¹ is not to be judged by its modest dimensions. It presents a theory which, if accepted, would profoundly modify our view, not only of the Fourth Gospel, but of New Testament theology as a whole. Mr. Harris maintains that the Prologue to the Gospel was originally a hymn in praise of Wisdom—the substitution of Logos for Sophia being little more than a concession to Hellenistic sentiment. He argues that from the earliest days of the church it was customary to identify Jesus with the divine Wisdom, as portrayed in the eighth chapter of Proverbs. In the lost missionary manual of "Testimonies against the Jews" a central place was given to this Old Testament passage, which henceforth became the *locus classicus* of messianic theory. The Prologue, therefore, has its basis, not in Philonic speculation, but in a theology which had grown up within the church itself. Mr. Harris subjects the language of the Prologue to a detailed examination and lays bare a number of unsuspected coincidences with the eighth chapter of Proverbs. He contends that this chapter, supplemented by kindred passages in

¹ *The Origin of the Prologue to St. John's Gospel.* By Rendel Harris. Cambridge University Press, 1917. vii+66 pages. \$1.25.

the Wisdom literature, is the true source of early Christology, and that its influence can be detected in Col. 1:15-17 and the opening verses of Hebrews, as well as in the Prologue.

The main thesis of the book, as Mr. Harris himself points out, is not wholly new, but it has never before been defended with such learning and acumen. Its validity, however, remains more than doubtful. The parallels adduced from the Wisdom literature are indeed striking—though in most cases it would be possible to discover even closer parallels in Philo. But it may fairly be objected that the method of literary analysis on which the author relies is here inadequate. The Prologue to the Fourth Gospel must be taken in connection with the whole theological movement which is traceable in Christian thought from Paul onward. From the time of its entrance into the gentile world Christianity presents its message in the light of certain ideas, which were also current among Hellenistic thinkers. Was this a mere matter of accident? When it adopted the prevailing doctrine of the Logos was the church simply following up a speculation of its own, derived from the native Jewish idea of Wisdom? Such a conclusion is, to our mind, inadmissible. Mr. Harris has certainly done good service by emphasizing the fact that the Logos doctrine found points of attachment in Jewish tradition. He has shown that the language in which it was expressed was borrowed, to a greater extent than has hitherto been supposed, from the Wisdom literature. But this does not imply that the idea itself was evolved from the primitive Christian teaching. May we not rather conclude that when it was once taken over from Hellenistic thought there was a conscious endeavor on the part of Christian teachers to set it forth, as far as possible, in biblical language? The eighth chapter of Proverbs lent itself with a special aptness to this purpose, all the more so as it had already been pressed into the service of Logos speculation in such works as the Wisdom of Solomon.

We do not believe that the new theory of the origin of the Prologue will seriously disturb the view which has now found general acceptance. But the work of a great scholar who is at the same time an independent thinker is always fruitful and illuminating. By his latest book Mr. Harris has increased our debt to him, and has drawn attention to factors in the early development of Christianity which must henceforth be taken into account.

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THE PAULINE IDEA OF FAITH

In an able and scholarly book Dr. Hatch has made a contribution of real value to the study of New Testament theology.¹ His object is a limited but highly important one—to examine the Pauline idea of faith with a view to determining its relation to the mystery-religions. In the first chapter he deals with the historical antecedents of the idea, showing that in the Old Testament and the later Jewish literature faith consists essentially in trust in Jahveh. This conception of trust is peculiar to Hebrew religion and lies at the root of the later Christian doctrine. Dr. Hatch then proceeds to discuss the Pauline teaching on the subject of faith. He collects and analyzes the various references in the Epistles and makes it clear that for Paul faith is the central principle of religion and the spring of all moral action. Faith as he conceives it has its direct object in Christ, but the religious attitude involved is fundamentally the Hebraic one. At the same time there enters into the Pauline conception an element which is foreign to Hebrew thought. Paul thinks of faith as a mystical condition, and can speak indifferently of being “in faith” and being “in Christ.” In the concluding chapter faith is considered in its relation to pagan forms of religion. It is shown that in classical paganism the religious attitude demanded is not one of trust, but merely one of reverence, expressing itself in stated rites and observances. The oriental cults made occasional approaches to the idea of faith, but faith as they understood it has nothing of the moral significance which it bears in Paul. On the burning question of the indebtedness of Paul to the cults Dr. Hatch arrives at a guarded and probably a sound conclusion. Granting that Paul was influenced by the cults in the direction of mysticism and sacramentalism, he considers it misleading to speak of Pauline Christianity as a “mystery-religion.” Resting as it does on the principle of faith, it belongs, in its intrinsic character, to the sphere of psychology and ethics, not to that of mystery and magic.

As an attempt to place the Pauline idea of faith in its historical relations the book deserves the attention of all New Testament students. The clear discrimination between the Hebraic attitude to God and that which obtained in pagan religions is particularly valuable. It has never, to our knowledge, been pointed out before that the idea of faith was native to Hebrew piety and has no real parallels elsewhere. We

¹ *The Pauline Idea of Faith in Its Relation to Jewish and Hellenistic Religion.* By William Henry Paine Hatch. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917. 92 pages. \$1.00.

could have wished that the author had completed his survey by a more adequate account of Philo's doctrine of faith. He might also have dealt more fully with the process whereby faith in God was transformed for Paul into faith in Christ. A word of emphatic praise is due to the exegetical work in which the book abounds. A study of this kind necessitates the detailed analysis of many difficult passages, and in this part of his task Dr. Hatch is always thorough and well balanced, and in most cases convincing. The question of Paul's relation to the cults has given rise, of late years, to much loose and ill-digested criticism, and it is a pleasure to meet with a treatment of it which is marked throughout by competent scholarship and theological insight.

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BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT

TRUYOLS, A. F. *Breve introducción a la crítica textual del A.T.* [Estudios de crítica textual y literaria, Fasc. I]. Roma: Pontificio Instituto Bíblico, 1917. xii+152 pages.

Every work that endeavors to popularize the methods by which scholars are arriving at the true and full meaning of the Scriptures is welcome. It is gratifying to see that the pontifical Biblical Institute at Rome is willing to publish a Spanish work that begins at the right place to ascertain the significance of biblical criticism. This little work has happily made use of the best material, especially on the Books of Samuel. The author treads cautiously but firmly along the path to a sane textual critical method, leading his reader through: I. "Importance and Necessity of Textual Criticism"; II. "Actual Condition of the Massoretic Text"; III. "Means of the Restoration of the Text"; IV. "Principles That Obtain in Regular Textual Criticism." Each of these divisions is amply illustrated by quotations and examples from the material of the Old Testament.

Pr.

TRUYOLS, A. F. *I Sam. 1-15, Crítica textual* [Estudios de crítica textual y literaria, Fasc. II]. Roma: Pontificio Instituto Bíblico, 1917. vii+93 pages.

The test of the principles advocated in Fasc. I is here applied. Driver, Dhorme, Schlögel, Kittel, and H. P. Smith came into the consideration of the author while working out his textual conclusions. With praiseworthy learning and careful distinctions he makes use of Septuagint, Vulgate, Syriac, as well as the Massoretic Text, in determining the true text in the passages discussed. This is a step in advance for the modern scholarship of Spain, whose predecessors gave us the Complutensian Polyglot Bible.

Pr.

BARNES, W. E. *Haggai and Zechariah*. With Notes and Introduction. Cambridge: University Press, 1917. lx+118 pages; and *Malachi*. With Notes and Introduction. [The Cambridge Bible.] Cambridge: University Press, 1917. xvi+28 pages. 2s. 6d.

This is a useful addition to the Cambridge Bible. The commentaries are based on the British Revised Version, though Dr. Barnes generously concedes the superiority of the American Standard Version. The notes and introductions confine themselves to the most essential facts. The introduction to Haggai and Zechariah is especially good. A strong argument is made for dating Zechariah, chaps. 9-14, within a generation or so of the first Zechariah, in opposition to the prevailing tendency to put these chapters down toward the Maccabean era. In this connection exception may be taken to Dr. Barnes's use of the phrase "sons of Javan" (p. xvii) as implying that the Greeks were not yet organized into strong national groups, but are thought of only as an ethnographical unit. The same reasoning would deny national consciousness to the "sons of Zion," which is, of course, out of the question. Further the phrase is not "sons of Javan," but "thy sons, O Javan," and thus there is no real basis for the argument.

Dr. Barnes denies that Zerubbabel was looked upon by Zechariah as the promised Messiah. He thinks rather that Zechariah looked to Zerubbabel for certain political achievements, but did not elevate him to the supreme rank. Perhaps it would be safer to say that Zechariah's Messiah was a lesser figure than that of certain other prophets. In Mal. 1:11 f. no mention is made of the view that the prophet is here alluding to the worship in other Jewish temples than the central sanctuary at Jerusalem, such as that of the Assuan colony (see my discussion *ad loc.* in *I.C.C.*). Lack of space prevented the author from giving us much that we should like to have had. But as a work for the public in general, this commentary is full enough and worthy of high praise.

J. M. P. S.

NEW TESTAMENT

GILBERT, GEORGE H. *Jesus: for the Men of Today*. New York: Doran, 1917. 176 pages. \$1.00.

The published title of this book doubtless indicates the purpose of the author to bring the figure of Jesus near to present-day readers. The method of the writer might be suggested by such a title as "Jesus in His Own Day." We have here an attempt to present vividly the significant events in the life of Jesus in their original setting of time and place. In a dozen brief chapters the story of the Gospels is retold, with the addition of imaginative incident and detail. These supplementary touches vary in value. The episode of Hannisi, the spy sent from Jerusalem to Galilee to report on Jesus' teaching, may or may not represent the procedure of the Pharisaic opposition. The last chapter, in its account of the rise of the resurrection faith in the experience of Peter, also relies upon the imagination, but it is at a point where a reverent imagination must be our guide in solving the problems raised by the incongruities of the resurrection narratives, and the writer is quite convincing in his picture of the possible origin of Peter's faith. The book is marred by occasional slips, as when in the Introduction it makes the mature Jesus a contemporary of Herod the Great, or uses "Sunday" and "Sabbath"

as identical terms (pp. 163 f.), or says "waived" for "waved" (pp. 91, 113). The reader is likely also to be annoyed by a rhythmic prose in which the recurring accents divert the attention from the substance of what is being read.

J. P. D.

HISTORY OF RELIGION

CARUS, PAUL. *The Gospel of Buddha*. With Illustrations by MISS OLGA KOPETZKY. Chicago and London: Open Court Publishing Co., 1917. xv+311 pages. \$1.00.

This is a *de luxe* edition of a compilation from ancient Buddhist records which made its first appearance in 1894. Not many years after the first edition appeared a copy was purchased by the writer of this brief review, who at that time was wholly unacquainted with any of the literary sources from which the compiler of this work drew his materials. Consequently the content of the volume, its arrangement, and its speciously suggestive title deeply and favorably impressed its then rather youthful reader.

During the intervening years twelve editions have been issued and exhausted. The appearance of this new one affords occasion to refer to the character of this work. Mechanically and artistically it is about all that one could wish in the bookmaker's art. However, as to the character of the compilation, which seeks to present a sketch of the Buddha's life, one is compelled on historical and ethical grounds to give a very different judgment. In the first place it is exceedingly doubtful that the scholars whom Dr. Carus quotes so freely in the introduction to his work and whose scholarly work he lays under such heavy tribute continually, would indorse the method he has used with his sources in order that he may accomplish his desired aim. Indeed, one can easily imagine how many of them, at least, would characterize such an unscientific and subjectivistic piece of literary work as this is, which professes to present in sketch "the picture of a religious leader of the remote past" (p. xi). True, he intimates that he does not intend to offer "a scientific production." But has a writer any moral right to set out with an avowed aim, such as his is, without a consistent effort to treat his sources historically? As a matter of fact he has ranged through practically the whole field of available Buddhistic literature, selecting and eliminating arbitrarily from his materials regardless of whether the sources from which he quotes are early or late, or as to whether they may have some basis in fact or are the constructs of pure imagination; and he has done this in much the same way as a printer before a font of type might select his material to suit his purpose. While it is true that many orthodox theologians follow this method with biblical material, yet "two wrongs do not make one right." In following the sources from which Dr. Carus quotes one notes how carefully he prunes away "the exuberance of wonder": quite a euphemistic phrase indeed, when one notes what it is that is so often "pruned away"!

The Open Court Co. has published some literature for which the serious student will ever be grateful. But here is a work that the world can well afford to be without. The only heart it will delight will be that of the ardent and uncritical Buddhist propagandist, who looks upon Westerners generally and the more enlightened youth of the East as material for propagandism, and who finds in this work a picture of the Buddha from which have been eliminated such stories as might shock the aesthetic and moral susceptibilities of such readers.

On the one hand this work is a snare to the unwary and to those who are largely ignorant of the sources from which the material has been drawn. On the other hand, and in view of its professed aim, it is an insult to the intelligence and ethical standards of the serious and earnest student of religions, who is eager to visualize as clearly as may be possible the real life and work of this great Indian religious leader and reformer. Such a juggling of the sources as this volume exhibits is calculated to turn away in disgust the really thoughtful student rather than to lead him on into a more extended study of such a worth-while religious movement as grew up around this noble young Indian prince, whose memory and work religious people will never let perish from the earth.

W. C. MACD.

CHURCH HISTORY

LEGG, J. WICKHAM. *Essays Liturgical and Historical*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1917. 182 pages. 5s.

This volume contains seven essays on the following subjects: "The Structure of Collects"; "Criticism of the Roman Liturgy by Roman Catholic Authors"; "The Taking Away of the Priesthood from the Rev. Samuel Johnson in 1686"; "The Rite Used by Cranmer in Blessing the Pall"; "An Early Liturgical Colour Sequence"; "Survival of the Use in Sicily of the Lenten Veil"; "The Carrying in Procession in Church of England Services of Lighted Candles and Torches."

Dr. Legg's name is a sufficient guaranty that the work in these essays has been thoroughly and adequately performed. But their appeal will be—and is meant to be—only to professional students of liturgiology.

B. S. E.

SOCKMAN, RALPH W. *The Revival of Conventual Life in the Church of England in the Nineteenth Century*. New York: W. D. Gray, 1917. 230 pages.

A Methodist minister writes his Doctor's dissertation for Columbia University on a subject which, as he suggests, might seem more appropriate for an Anglican, or a member of some monastic community. Yet in the matter of perspective and proportion he has special advantages on his side.

Although the *Revival of Conventual Life* deals with the nineteenth century, the author, for the sake of complete historical setting, goes back to the suppression of the monasteries in the time of Henry VIII. While formerly the monasteries were destroyed, the spirit showed considerable tenacity of life. There were attempts at revival, but at last this spirit was chilled to numbness in the rationalism of the eighteenth century.

Near the close of this century, however, a considerable number of Roman Catholics came to England from France as voluntary exiles. They were kindly received, and so conducted themselves as to win respect. They thus became a strong influence in warming up the dormant spirit of monasticism which was to come to fulness of life in the succeeding century. During the first fifteen years of this century there was much discussion favorable and unfavorable. Upon the whole it was found that social conditions fostered monastic ideals; that church conditions looked in the same direction; moreover, there were powerful personal influences, such as Southey, Wordsworth, Sir Walter Scott; and by the time we reach the beginnings of the Oxford movement the revival is well under way. The growth toward full fruition during the

Oxford movement is clearly and strikingly described. The earliest development was that of the Sisterhoods, which was followed almost twenty years later by that of the Brotherhoods.

From the day of the French refugee clergy the "strand of interest grew stronger until now it binds together in conventual life more than thirty communities of men and women, with numerous branch houses throughout England and the British Empire."

The work bears the usual scholarly earmarks of the Doctor's dissertation—and is a valuable contribution.

J. W. M.

DOCTRINAL

DROWN, EDWARD S. *The Apostles' Creed To-Day*. New York: Macmillan, 1917. 129 pages. \$1.00.

That the so-called Apostles' Creed is an ideal brief statement of Christian doctrine will be contended by very few nowadays, but—to note a mere matter of simple fact—this creed will undoubtedly remain central in the formularies of most Christian churches for a long time to come. And so the interpretation of the creed is not at all an out-worn question for contemporary theologians. But Dr. Drown goes much farther than this: to him the creed is far from being "a necessary evil of which we should make the best" (p. 111). For Christianity is more than a merely personal religion; it is an intensely corporate matter, and the creed is "a badge of corporate fellowship." And in addition the life of the Christian fellowship is a life continuing from the past and into the future, which by the creed is bound into a unity. Past attempts at a creedless Christianity have failed in practical efficiency (pp. 116-20).

But this is not to say that the meaning of the creed today is to be determined of necessity by its literal meaning in the past. What is important are the religious ideas that the clauses of the creed were meant to express, not the precise form in which the clauses have chanced to clothe those ideas. The creed was not created as a single document; it embodies phases of a religious life that extended for centuries. So it is not to be interpreted as a static document, for "simply to abide by the old formula is to forfeit the very truth that that formula was intended to express" (p. 76). The interpreter must know the religious motives that underlay the development of the creed, and must endeavor to state and reapply those motives in terms of the needs and the thought of the present day. And Dr. Drown's application of these principles is the work of a very able scholar in sympathetic touch with modern social theology.

Certain questions, however, inevitably present themselves to the reader. As the creed was a product of growth, is there any reason why it should not continue to grow? As the unity of the church was preserved for seven or more centuries despite changes in the creed, is there any reason why changes should not occur again? The time has passed when these questions were merely academic.

B. S. E.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

Barnes, W. Emery. Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi. (Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges.) Cambridge: University Press, 1917. lx+118+xv+28 pages. 2s. 6d.

NEW TESTAMENT

Abbott, Edwin A. The Fourfold Gospel. Section V—The Founding of the New Kingdom, 1917. Cambridge: University Press, 1917. xxxii+796 pages. 16s. 6d.

Asin et Palacios, Michaël. *Patrologia Orientalis*. Tome XIII. Fascicule 3. Logia et Agrapha Domini Jesu. Paris: Firmin-Didot et Cie., 1916. 101 pages.

Case, Shirley Jackson. The Evolution of Early Christianity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1917. ix+385 pages. \$2.25.

Riegel, John I., and Jordan, John H. Simon Son of Man. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1917. xviii+269 pages. \$1.50.

Wilson, P. Whitwell. The Christ We Forget. New York: Revell, 1917. xvi+328 pages. \$1.50.

Zahn, Theodor. Introduction to the New Testament. New York: Scribner, 1917. xx+539 pages.

CHURCH HISTORY

Brehaut, Ernest (translator). History of the Franks by Gregory Bishop of Tours. (Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1916. xxv+284 pages. \$2.50.

Case, Shirley Jackson. The Millennial Hope. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918. ix+253 pages. \$1.25.

Loomis, Louis Ropes. The Book of the Popes. I—to the Pontificate of Gregory I. (Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies.) New York: Columbia

University Press, 1916. xxii+169 pages. \$2.00.

Rockwell, William Walker (editor). Papers of the American Society of Church History. New York: Putnam, 1917. lxxv+147 pages. \$3.00.

Walker, Williston. A History of the Christian Church. New York: Scribner, 1918. xiii+624 pages. \$3.00.

Zollmann, Carl. American Civil Church Law. (Studies in History, Economics and Public Law.) New York: Columbia University Press, 1917. 473 pages. \$3.50.

DOCTRINAL

Everett, Walter Goodnow. Moral Values: A Study of the Principles of Conduct. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1918. xiii+439 pages.

Kohler, K. Jewish Theology. New York: Macmillan, 1918. xiii+505 pages. \$2.50.

Rauschenbusch, Walter. A Theology for the Social Gospel. New York: Macmillan, 1917. 279 pages. \$1.50.

Streeter, Burnett H., and Others. Immortality. An Essay in Discovery. New York: Macmillan, 1917. xiv+380 pages. \$2.25.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

Anderson, C. P. The Work of the Church on Behalf of Unity. Chicago: Western Theological Seminary, 1917. 42 pages.

Athearn, Walter Scott. Religious Education and American Democracy. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1917. xi+394 pages. \$1.50.

Baker, Smith. Higher Living. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1917. x+404 pages. \$1.75.

Book of Prayer for Use in the Churches of Jesus Christ. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1917. 299 pages. \$1.25.

- Guild, Roy B. (editor). *The Manual of Inter-Church Work*. New York: The Commission on Inter-Church Federations of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1917. xv+221 pages. \$1.25.
- Hobart, Alvah Sabin. *Pedagogy for Ministers*. New York: Revell, 1917. 184 pages. \$1.00.
- Macfarland, Charles S. *The Progress of Church Federation*. New York: Revell, 1917. 191 pages. \$1.00.
- Morison, E. F. *The Lord's Prayer and the Prayers of Our Lord*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1917. vii+198 pages. 3s. 6d.
- Torrey, R. A. *The Gist of the Lesson*. New York: Revell, 1917. 155 pages. \$0.25.
- MISCELLANEOUS
- Beardslee, John Walter, Jr. *The Use of ΕΤΕΙΣ in Fifth-Century Greek Literature*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918. v+126 pages. \$0.75.
- Botsford, G. W., and Sihler, E. G. (editors). *Hellenic Civilization. (Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies.)* New York: Columbia University Press, 1915. xiii+719 pages. \$3.75.
- Hastings, James (editor). *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*. Vol. IX, *Mundas-Phrygiens*. New York: Scribner, 1917. xx+911 pages. \$7.00.
- Jacks, Lawrence Pearsall. *Life and Letters of Stopford Brooke*. 2 vols. New York: Scribner, 1917. x+350+vii+368 pages. \$4.75.
- Johnston, Mercer Green. *Patriotism and Radicalism*. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1917. 218 pages. \$1.25.
- Legg, J. Wickham. *Essays Liturgical and Historical*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1917. 182 pages. 5s.
- Miller, Edward Waite, and Scudder, Jared Waterbury (translator). *Wessel Gansfort—Life and Writings*. 2 vols. New York: Putnam, 1917. xvi+333+v+369 pages. \$4.00.
- Morrison, A. J. *East by West*. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1917. 177 pages. \$1.25.
- Munro, Dana C., and Others (editors). *German War Practices*. Washington: The Committee on Public Information, 1917. 94 pages.
- Noiré, Ludwig. *The Origin and Philosophy of Language*. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1917. 159 pages. \$1.00.
- Notestein, Wallace, and Stoll, Elmer E. *Conquest and Kultur*. Washington: The Committee on Public Information, 1917. 171 pages.
- Roure, Lucien. *Le merveilleux spirite*. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1917. viii+398 pages. Fr. 3.50.
- Salter, William M. *Nietzsche the Thinker*. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1917. x+539 pages. \$3.50.
- Seebach, Julius F. *The Book of Free Men*. New York: Doran, 1917. 234 pages. \$1.25.
- Strong, Augustus Hopkins. *A Tour of the Missions*. Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press, 1918. xxii+223 pages. \$1.50.
- Sturge, M. Carta. *Theosophy and Christianity*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1917. 94 pages. 1s. 6d.

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MARTIN LUTHER IN THE ESTIMATE OF MODERN HISTORIANS

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On the last day of October, 1517, four hundred years ago, Martin Luther, then a comparatively inconspicuous Augustinian friar, theological professor, and preacher, posted on the doors of the castle church in Wittenberg his ninety-five theses concerning indulgences. This event, which at that time seemed so insignificant, marked, in the opinion at least of Protestant historians, the inauguration of the Reformation or Protestant revolt from the mediaeval Roman Catholic church. The leading actor in this introductory scene of the sixteenth-century religious-revolutionary drama, Martin Luther, has been, from that day to this, the subject of investigation and exposition by numerous confessedly partisan friends and foes as well as by biographers and historians who have sought to depict his character and work with scientifically objective impartiality.

It is the purpose of this article to present a critical examination of the methods of treatment employed in the discussions of Luther which have appeared during the last hundred years and to point out some characteristic differences of attitude, of tendency, and of judgment, as well as of method, exhibited in these modern attempts to portray and interpret the most widely influential of the earliest founders of Protestantism.

Although accounts of Luther written before the dawning of the nineteenth century do not come within the scope of the present discussion, yet a knowledge of the nature of these historical or biographical ventures and of the methods they illustrate should help us to perceive the advance which the nineteenth- and twentieth-century portrayals of Luther mark over such earlier attempts to describe Luther's person, work, and place in history.

For a number of reasons it was not to be expected that sixteenth- or even seventeenth-century writers should be able to produce impartial, reliable, or adequate presentations of Luther and his times; the conception of history in that age was far too crude. Even the educated were still too much under the domination of the credulity and superstition, of the deductive and analogical methods of reasoning, characteristic of the Middle Ages to be able to portray or interpret persons and events reliably. The paucity of available documentary information, the lack of interest or demand for such materials, and the ignorance of that age regarding the forces at work in the world also made impossible a correct estimate of Luther's relation to his environment. Moreover, the partisan feeling of the rival religious factions was still too deep and dominating to permit a calm, dispassionate attitude toward Luther to be assumed and maintained by either friend or foe. Hence centuries had to elapse before an even approximately impartial, scientifically accurate, and sociologically adequate discussion of Luther could appear.

It is not surprising that the earliest accounts of Luther, written by his adherents, were extravagantly laudatory, extolling their hero as a saint or at least as a divinely commissioned prophet, minimizing or explaining away if not wholly disregarding his blemishes, emphasizing and exaggerating his virtues, and presenting his words and deeds as evidently due to divine inspiration or guidance. Similarly no one need be amazed that opponents of Luther's views and achievements, not only in Luther's own day but even for a century and more thereafter, could see little or no good in him, depicted him as one depraved, possessed by devils, if not as the devil himself. To Roman Catholic writers Luther's apostasy could be accounted for only on the ground that he was

fundamentally wicked or that he was at the very least a self-deceived, mentally unbalanced, hence dangerous and harmful, person. Protestant writers who rejected certain Lutheran tenets were often but little less severe in the judgments they passed upon Luther.

Not unlike this narrow, partisan attitude toward Luther, based upon religious prejudice, is the attitude taken by biographers or historians who were unable to comprehend or discuss him sympathetically because their education and point of view differed so widely from his. Moreover, it was doubtless natural and inevitable that Luther should be judged by some writers in the light of the *Zeitgeist* or dominating intellectual tendency of the time at which the history or biography was written. Such writers praise only so much in Luther or in his work as harmonized with their conception of things, and condemn or disregard the rest. Hence we get one-sided, inadequate views of the reformer, now from an eighteenth-century rationalist, now from an early nineteenth-century German nationalist, or from a representative of the Romantic movement.

Another very obvious defect in all biographical or historical discussions of Luther which appeared before the first quarter of the nineteenth century had passed was their largely legendary and generally unscientific character. The sources on which such earlier works were based were comparatively meager and many of these far from trustworthy. Not until Leopold von Ranke wrote his still admirable and in the main reliable *German History in the Period of the Reformation* did the world receive an even approximately scientific presentation of Luther and his times.¹ It is true this work is strongly colored with national German feeling, but this peculiarity does not seriously depreciate its value. Most of the histories and biographies dealing with Luther which have appeared since the publication of Ranke's discussion of the German Reformation bear the traces of his influence upon historical method.

In all the earlier treatments of the foremost reformer two general types of historical interpretation find expression, either singly or combined. One of these we may call the supernatural

¹ Berlin, 6 vols., 1839-47.

type, since it explains persons and their actions by postulating either divine or diabolic control, not only of natural phenomena, but also of human beings and of their conduct. The other of these two types of historical writing is the heroic or "great man" type. It found both description and dogmatic formulation in Thomas Carlyle's famous phrase: "History is little more than the biography of the world's great men." Representatives of this type or school of historical interpretation explain events wholly, or almost wholly, by the actions of the personalities involved, disregarding, in whole or in part, the influence of environmental forces, such as the geographical, political, economic, religious, or intellectual movements in the midst of which their heroes lived and wrought. Although these two kinds of interpretation are met with more frequently in the histories and biographies of the first three centuries of modern times than thereafter, yet one does encounter them also in the historical writings of the nineteenth and even of the twentieth century. In later modern times, however, one finds them seldom so clearly and forcibly represented or so easily discernible as formerly.

The supernatural type may be illustrated by a single rather moderate statement taken from the pages of William Robertson's *History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles the Fifth*.¹ Referring to Luther's achievement the author declares: "To overturn a system of religious belief founded on ancient and deep-rooted prejudices, supported by power, and defended with no less art than industry, to establish in its room doctrines of the most contrary genius and tendency, and to accomplish all this, not by external violence or the force of arms, are operations which historians the least prone to credulity and superstition ascribe to that Divine Providence which with infinite ease can bring about events which to human sagacity appear impossible."²

These words were written in the age of Voltaire, when eighteenth-century rationalism was rising toward its zenith. It exhibits little of the crude, irrational credulity of the sixteenth or seventeenth century, yet, even to this mild representative of the supernatural method of interpretation, the *ultima ratio* of historical changes is Divine Providence. This method is deserv-

¹ New edition; Philadelphia: Lippincott & Co., 1875.

² *Op. cit.*, I, 459.

ing of adverse criticism—as every educated person should know—not because the historian is denied the right to have a personal faith in a providential or supernatural control of the world, but because it fails to distinguish between mere belief and demonstrable fact and asserts as fact what is nothing more than an individual's faith, in support of which no universally acceptable evidence can be adduced. Since the end of the eighteenth century, or since writers of history began to adopt the inductive methods and criteria in vogue among investigators in experimental sciences, the supernatural type of historical interpretation has been gradually disappearing. Of the historical writings of the last fifty years comparatively few reveal any traces of this unscientific method of explaining persons or events.¹

The heroic or "great man" conception of history has been much more enduring, although it too has tended to become less and less pronounced, less and less true to its original type. Under the influence of antagonistic views, such as those of rationalism, of philosophical positivism, and of the sociological and materialistic-evolutionary schools of historical interpretation, it has lost much of its former distinctive character.

One of the earlier of the modern representatives of the "great man" theory of history was Heinrich von Treitschke. He describes as well as defends his attitude in the following words:

Everywhere the science of history finds itself confronted with the riddle of personality. It is persons, men, who make history, men like Luther, like Frederick the Great and Bismarck. This great heroic truth will ever remain true; and the fact that it does happen that these men do appear, the right man at the right time, that will always be for us mortals a riddle. The age educates the genius, but it does not create him.²

In an address entitled *Luther and the German Nation* the same historian betrays his hero-worship in the following statement:

The most precious gift which Luther bequeathed to our people remains, however, himself and the living power of his God-inspired spirit. No other of the modern nations has yet seen a man who so took, as it were, every word

¹ Among these few may be mentioned Philip Schaff's *History of the Christian Church* (Scribner, 1888), VI, 105.

² *Die Politik* (1897), I, 6. The quotation given above is almost an exact, literal translation of the original.

from the mouth of his countrymen, who so embodied in every particular the essential qualities of his people. . . . Out of the deep-set eyes of this native German son of peasant parentage flashed the old heroic courage of the Germans, which does not deny and flee the world but which seeks to conquer it by the might of its moral will-power; and just because he gave utterance to that which was already in the mind of his people, could this insignificant monk . . . grow and develop in a few years until finally he became actually as fear-inspiring to the new Roman world-power as formerly the invading German tribes had been to the empire of the Caesars.¹

It is most natural and easily accounted for that German Protestant, especially Lutheran, writers should express admiration and even veneration for Luther. And surely there is much in both the man Luther and in his work that deserves praise and commands approbation. Even bitterly hostile religious opponents have admitted as much. Moreover, reared, as most German Protestant historians and biographers of Luther have been, in an environment resounding often with extravagant eulogies of this hero of the Reformation, is it any wonder that even their scientific writings bear traces of this early educational influence? The learned but vehemently partisan Catholic historian, Denifle, has suggested, by clear and unmistakable insinuation, another explanation for the exalted estimate of Luther found in the writings of German historians. He accuses them of lauding Luther, despite their better knowledge and conviction, through fear of popular disapproval and loss of favor or of position.² However, not a particle of proof has been or probably could be adduced to support such an accusation. Furthermore, it is not necessary to assume such an unworthy or unlikely motive to explain the somewhat extravagantly appreciative attitude toward Luther adopted by German Protestant writers.

A fact it is, however, that to many non-German students of sixteenth-century history it does indeed seem as if the significance given to Luther's achievements and the glorification of his per-

¹ *Essays von Heinrich von Treitschke und Erich Marks* (Deutsche Bücherei, Vol. 29), pp. 22 f.

² Denifle-Weiss, *Luther und Luthertum* (2d ed.; Mainz, 1904), Vol. I, Part 1, translated into English under the title *Luther and Lutherdom*, by Raymund Volz (Somerset, Ohio: Torch Press, 1917), Vol. I, Part 1, Vorwort, iii ff.; Part 2, 427 and 843-89.

sonality by many modern biographers and historians were not wholly justified by the information at our disposal nor the result of calm, unbiased, and severely scientific interpretation. From practically all the accounts of Luther and his work produced by German Protestant theologians or secular historians during the past hundred years, passages might be selected which illustrate this tendency toward hero-worship or to ascribe to Luther's personality and initiative changes due rather to environmental forces or conditions.¹ Even in Germany this defective historical interpretation has not passed unnoticed or unchallenged. At least a few historians have attacked this "great man" method of writing history or biography and suggested needed correctives.²

The same "great man" theory of history finds expression also, in a slightly different form, in the writings of several historians evidently hostile to Luther. The undisguised aim of the Catholic historian Johannes Janssen, in his *History of the German People at the Close of the Middle Ages*, is to make Luther chiefly responsible for the checking of the intellectual awakening or Renaissance, for the comparative failure of the movement for a conservative reform, and for the general decay of society in the sixteenth century. More recent Catholic discussions of Luther exhibit, although not so obviously, the same tendency.³ Some anti-Lutheran Protestant writers likewise overstate the case when they wish to cast blame upon Luther for what they consider unfortunate events or conditions. For instance, one of these holds Luther to have been the one impassable obstacle to Protestant unity.⁴

This comparatively modern inclination to overemphasize the significance of personalities in history came into vogue largely

¹ L. von Ranke, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation* (7th ed.; Leipzig, 1894), II, 23 f.; F. von Bezold, *Geschichte der deutschen Reformation* (Oncken's *Allgemeine Geschichte in Einzeldarstellungen*), Berlin, 1890, p. 764; Gottlob Egelhaaf, *Deutsche Geschichte im 16. Jahrhundert* (Bibliothek deutscher Geschichte), I, 232 ff., and elsewhere; R. Seeberg, *Text-book of the History of Doctrines* (translated into English by Hay, Philadelphia, 1905), II, 221 ff.

² Cf. Karl Lamprecht, *Alle und neue Richtungen in der Geschichtswissenschaft* (1896); also, by the same author, *Die historische Methode* (1900); also W. Koehler, *Idee und Persönlichkeit in der Kirchengeschichte* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1910), pp. 41 ff.

³ Denifle-Weiss, *Luther und Luthertum*; Hartmann Grisar, *Luther*.

⁴ H. C. Vedder, *The Reformation in Germany* (New York, 1914), p. 316.

as a reaction against the almost complete subordination of personality to ideas characteristic of the Hegelian school of historians of the earlier nineteenth century. This reaction has performed some valuable services, despite its not uncommon tendency to go to extremes. It has, no doubt, contributed much toward the making of history more living and more full of interest for the average reader. It is an easily comprehended and widely recognized fact that non-professional students of history are more fascinated by vividly portrayed personalities than by records or descriptions of impersonal ideas, institutions, or events. Moreover, a still more valuable service has been rendered by the modern emphasis on personality, in that it has led to a more thorough study of the psychological development of persons involved in historical movements. So great attention has been given, of late, to the explanation of the rise of the genius or great man, to the consideration of the mental processes through which he passed and which made him what he became, that it has become customary to regard these efforts as illustrations of the psychological method of historical interpretation.

All the more extensive discussions of Luther which have appeared during the last forty years betray, at least in some measure, the influence of this psychological method. The space given to Luther's childhood and early school days; to the impressions he received from his home, school, and university environment; to the influences which molded his temperament, interests, and ideas, and which determined his conduct; to the mental struggles in the Erfurt monastery; to the effects upon him of his journey to Rome and of his professorial responsibilities at Wittenberg, contrasts strikingly with the conspicuous absence of these interesting details in the earlier accounts of Luther.

Julius Koestlin's notable biography of Luther, the first edition of which appeared in 1875, led the way in this new psychological direction.¹ Kolde, Berger, and Hausrath, all three, like Koestlin, staunch in their loyalty to Protestantism, pursued the same path, some of them penetrating even more deeply into the by-ways of

¹ Julius Koestlin, *Martin Luther, sein Leben und seine Schriften* (1st ed.; Elberfeld, 1875; 5th ed., revised and re-edited by Gustav Kawerau, Berlin, 1903).

Luther's mental or religious development.¹ The same psychological method, or at least interest, is exhibited in the rather short and popular Luther biographies by the English historian Charles Beard, and by the American Protestant professor of church history, A. C. McGiffert.² All these highly estimable works present the anti-papal, anti-hierarchical, evangelical Luther as the product of a long, slow, psychological process. They attempt to trace and elucidate Luther's whole development from his earliest childhood to the moment when he consciously and deliberately sundered his connection with the visible, hierarchically organized, papal Roman Catholic church.

In these discussions no effort seems to have been made to portray Luther as exceptionally precocious or otherwise extraordinary. The aim has been rather to make him the product of his humble home and subsequent school environment. To the Luther of the premonastic period is ascribed an interest, an earnestness, and a high average proficiency in his studies, first at Eisenach, and later at the Erfurt University; also a deep, genuine religious feeling. His decision to flee the world or to become a monk and thereby win greater favor with God as well as make more certain his ultimate salvation, these authors, without difference of opinion, ascribe to Luther's profound and oppressive fear of the wrath of God, whom he conceives as an angry judge rather than as a loving and forgiving savior. In the monastery Luther is represented as surpassing his brother monks in asceticism, subjecting himself to excessive fasting and other forms of self-mortification. He seeks thus to find peace of mind, escape from his overwhelming fear of punishment—but in vain. His diligent search for help in the writings of scholastic theologians only increases his gloom and despair. In due course of time, however, aided by the wise and encouraging counsel of the friendly visiting vicar, von Staupitz, by his study of the Pauline epistles, of Tauler's sermons, and of the anonymous *German*.

¹ Theodor Kolde, *Martin Luther* (Gotha, 1884-89); Arnold E. Berger, *Martin Luther in kulturgeschichtlicher Darstellung* (Berlin, 1895-98); Hausrath, *Luthers Leben* (Berlin, 1903-4).

² Charles Beard, *Martin Luther and the Reformation in Germany* (London, 1889); A. C. McGiffert, *Martin Luther, the Man and His Work* (New York: Century Co., 1914).

Theology, of St. Bernard, of Gerson, and of St. Augustine, he finally attains the long-sought peace of mind. With such help he discovers what became for him an emancipating gospel—the conviction that sinful man is made righteous or justified and saved, not by any good works he may have done or might do, but alone by faith (i.e., trust) in a God who delights to forgive and save men. Just when Luther made this discovery these biographers do not venture to inform us. The first clear evidences that Luther had found his new gospel—the theological basis for his subsequent revolt from the church—these biographers discover in some marginal notes (ascribed to the years 1509–10) in books he had used; also in his lectures delivered at the University of Wittenberg on certain biblical writings, such as those on the Psalms (1513–15), the Epistle to the Romans (1515–16), the Book of Judges (1516), and on the Epistle to the Galatians (1516–17). Largely on the basis of later utterances of Luther concerning his own development the biographers referred to conclude that Luther had vaguely grasped his new gospel some years before he had become sufficiently convinced of its truth or had attained enough self-confidence to teach it in the classroom or to preach it in the pulpit. By 1515 or 1516, if these Protestant authorities are correct, the doctrine of “Justification by Faith” had become the controlling principle of Luther’s thought and teaching, although he was even then far from comprehending the full significance and far-reaching implications of this important doctrine. In connection also with a few other crises in Luther’s life, such as his Wartburg exile, his appearance before the Diet at Worms, the Peasants’ Revolt, and the bigamy of the Landgrave Philip of Hesse, explanations of his mental processes have been attempted. With regard to these events the sources of information are more numerous, rich, and satisfactory than they are for the period before 1517.

An investigation and interpretation of Luther’s psychological development, both before and after his break with mediaeval papal Christianity, widely at variance with the views of the Protestant biographers we have been considering, is to be found in the late Father Denifle’s notorious discussion of Luther and his work. A brief summary of the more important conclusions reached

in this recent Catholic contribution to the history of the Reformation will suffice to reveal the essential character of this work and also its author's interest in psychological analysis.

According to Denifle, Luther's discovery of his gospel could not have occurred before 1515, since all his writings of an earlier date demonstrate his orthodoxy and genuinely Catholic attitude of mind.¹ Attempts to show that Luther had found his new doctrine previous to 1515 are based, asserts Denifle, upon statements made by Luther long after he had become a heretic—statements which are unreliable, perversions of the truth, and wholly out of harmony with his utterances before 1515.²

The fall of Luther, the transformation of this talented, once beneficently influential and conservatively orthodox reformer into a heretical moral pervert and instigator of corruption, occurred after he went to Wittenberg.³ His fall was due to the laxity of religious discipline in the Augustinian convent at Wittenberg, to Luther's personal and admitted neglect of devotional exercises, to his excessive use of beer and wine, to his irrepressible sexual lust, and to his inordinate pride or love of self.⁴ Throughout his whole monastic life Luther never attacked or criticized any essential principles of monasticism, but because of his complete moral and religious collapse or bankruptcy he became an assailant of celibacy, of vows, of submission to authority, of religious discipline, and of good works.⁵ Subsequent to his fall Luther sought to justify himself in his new positions and actions by deliberately misquoting St. Augustine, Tauler, and other religious writers, by consciously incorrect interpretations of Scripture, and by demonstrably exaggerated and inaccurate descriptions of conditions in the church as well as of its teachings and practices. After Luther became a heretic he became also a deliberate and inveterate liar, availing himself of "a good strong lie" whenever he found one necessary, useful, or helpful, which according to Denifle was far from infrequent, in

¹ *Luther und Luthertum* (2d ed., 1904-9), I, Part 2, 430 ff., 447.

² *Ibid.*, I, Part 1, Vorwort, xxiv, 381 ff.; Part 2, 423 ff., 475 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, I, Part 2, 447 ff., 475 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, Part 1, 33, 97 ff.; Part 2, 454 ff., 620 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I, Part 1, 40 ff., 97 ff.

his effort to defame the church.¹ In Luther, Denifle saw the consummator of a process of moral and religious degeneration which had begun long before the sixteenth century but which reached its climax in the Protestant schism. Such a brief summary of the salient results obtained in an extensive, voluminous complex of facts, documentary evidence, interpretation, ratiocination, doctrinal exposition, and polemical diatribe of the sort Denifle has given us does not do full justice to the author. It conveys no adequate conception of the enormous labors of research he accomplished, of his great erudition, of his valuable and stimulating contributions to the history of the Reformation, nor of his dialectical ingenuity. It will suffice, however, to demonstrate the author's psychological interest (and incidentally his adherence to the "great man" theory of history) as well as to exhibit, free from beclouding details, his somewhat startling estimate of Luther.

The Dominican friar Albert Maria Weiss, upon whom devolved the task of editing the second edition of Denifle's discussion of Luther, added in two supplementary volumes a contribution of his own to supply what seemed to him to be lacking in Denifle's work. To the first portion of this contribution he gave the title *Luther's Psychology, the Key to the Luther-Legends*. He who turns to this so-called psychology of Luther in the hope of finding here any new light thrown upon Luther's mental development, upon the action of his mind under the influence of environmental stimulation, will be greatly surprised and disappointed. For he will find here merely a catalogue of intellectual and moral characteristics which the facile and fluent, if not profound, author ascribes to Luther's personality.² The entire consideration of Luther in Weiss's supplementary volumes harmonizes almost completely with Denifle's conclusions and is constructed largely thereon. Only in two particulars does Weiss adversely criticize his more erudite Dominican brother. In his confessedly unauthoritative opinion Denifle overestimated the extent and importance of Luther's influence and emphasized too strongly Luther's will-power.³

More creditable than his ventures in the field of psychology are Weiss's remarks concerning Luther's place in the history of his times

¹ *Luther und Luthertum*, I, Part 1, 126, 248ff., 348, 391, 397, and elsewhere.

² *Ibid.*, II, 206 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

and the rather lengthy discussion he gives us of the causes of the Protestant revolt. In this connection, it may be noted in passing, we find an explanation for the surprising omissions in his treatment of Luther's psychology, for he expressly belittles the value of Luther's development as a means of revealing the true Luther or of estimating the true significance of his work.¹ The fundamental position taken by Weiss represents a reaction not only against the psychological interpretation of history but also against the assertion that "personalities make history." In his treatment of Luther he pursues, therefore, a method widely at variance with that of Denifle, whose work betrays adherence to both the "psychological" and "great man" tendencies in historical exposition. According to Weiss, Luther was in no sense a creative genius.² Lutheranism was not the product of Luther's personality, for it was in all its essentials already in existence before Luther revolted from Rome.³ At least in the earlier years of Luther's revolutionary career he was much more the creation of the Protestant movement than its creator.⁴ The general conditions of the period immediately before as well as during Luther's lifetime had much greater influence than had the leading German reformer's own personality or labors.⁵ The Reformation, we are informed, was not an ethical reaction against prevailing immorality, much less was it a religious renovation; rather it was the consummation of a movement for theological and ecclesiastical reform which had begun to make headway a century or more earlier. That this movement began, during the sixteenth century, to take on the peculiar characteristics which go by the name of Lutheranism is to be ascribed to Luther's influence. He gave it a certain form; its essentials he took from, or rather found in, the dubious, dangerous, and almost heretical productions of a philosophy and a theology which, consciously or unconsciously, had for its object the depreciation and dissolution of the church and of its doctrines.⁶ The specific elements which contributed to or were involved in this revolutionary process, the so-called Reformation, were a widespread moral degeneracy which penetrated all classes, clergy as well as laity; decline of respect for authority; loss of faith in the spiritual character of ecclesiastical

¹ *Op. cit.*, II, 2 ff.² *Ibid.*, p. 3.³ *Ibid.*, pp. 6 ff.⁴ *Ibid.*⁵ *Ibid.*⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 19 ff.

persons, due to the close union of clerical with worldly functions; the growth of a spirit of individualism and the increased importance of the laity, not only in political and social affairs, but also in scientific and literary activity; economic conditions and self-interest; political ambition, the rise of nationalism, and the clash between ecclesiastical and political interests; the influence of pagan and rationalistic humanism; the rise of a critical, skeptical, and frivolous tendency in scholasticism or among the theologians, illustrated by nominalism; the movement for conciliar reform, discrediting and undermining both papal and conciliar authority; and, finally, the rise of heresies. The Reformation was the *cloaca maxima* which received into itself all these corrupt and corrupting influences or forces. It did not represent a moral betterment, but rather a departure from the true faith and an attack upon the fundamentals of the Christian religion. Its aim was not to remove existing abuses, but to deprive the church of her power and right to dispense the treasures of grace conferred upon her by Christ.¹ Only gradually did Luther become aware of these facts. Eck, in the Leipzig disputation, opened his eyes to the fact that he was walking in the path of error formerly trod by Wycliffe and Hus. But Luther would not have been Luther had he been content to be a mere follower of others. Hence he had to become a more radical assailant of the church and of her doctrines.² From statements such as these one can readily picture to himself this writer's estimate of Luther and of his work. They betray also his strong religious bias, which has wholly unfitted him for presenting an objective view either of Luther or of the Protestant revolt.

Some years subsequent to the completion by Weiss of Denifle's *Luther und Luthertum* there appeared in Germany another lengthy Catholic discussion of Luther. Its author, the learned Jesuit Hartmann Grisar, in his Introduction expresses the intention to present a thoroughly scientific, unbiased life of Luther, based upon documentary research and emphasizing particularly the inner processes, the soul-history, of the foremost agent in the sixteenth-century religious schism.³ In some respects, if not in all, this

¹ *Op. cit.*, II, 13 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 17.

³ Hartmann Grisar, *Luther* (Freiburg: Herder, 1911), 3 vols., I, v, viii.

expressed intention has been abundantly realized. Any candid reader of Grisar's *Luther* will admit it exhibits an amazingly extensive and intensive familiarity with the sources and that it presents the most elaborate attempt to trace and interpret Luther's psychological development which has thus far been given to the public.¹

The original source of Luther's troubles and the fundamental cause of his peculiar religious and theological development Grisar finds in the abnormal physical and mental equipment with which Luther was endowed by nature. Therefrom arose his tendency toward morbidity, his proneness to look upon the dark side of things, and his inclination to judge his spiritual condition so pessimistically. This natural endowment included also an abnormal spirit of obstinacy, which prevented Luther, in spite of good instruction and counsel concerning the loving and forgiving character of God, from following such counsel and thereby obtaining peace of mind.² In Luther's lack of humility, in his failure to seek help in trustful prayer, Grisar finds a further explanation for the ultimate apostasy of the restless, severely troubled monk.³ His melancholy thoughts concerning predestination, however, furnished the real starting-point for Luther's doctrinal divergencies from the true faith.⁴ Luther manifested early in his monastic career a tendency toward quarrelsomeness, a fondness for disputation, and a readiness in controversy which could not but lead to unfortunate consequences.⁵ An additional factor in the transformation of Luther, Grisar finds in the journey to Rome. Its effect on Luther was twofold. It converted him from a strict Augustinian observant into an adherent of the liberal or laxer faction headed by von Staupitz. It also undermined his respect for papal authority and his faith in the church.⁶ His desertion of the Observantist party in his order Grisar regards as another point of departure in Luther's development.⁷ Thereafter he began to attack his former co-partisans, the "little saints," as Pharisees and hypocrites. To this intraorder conflict Grisar traces the origin of Luther's

¹ A possible exception is O. Scheel's *Martin Luther, vom Katholizismus zur Reformation* (Tübingen, 1915), Vol. I, which I have not yet been able to examine.

² Grisar, *Luther*, pp. 6 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 31 ff.

³ *Op. cit.* (English ed.), I, 18.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

opposition to good works. His hostility to self-righteousness, to holiness by works, led to a one-sided insistence on the power and efficiency of faith, on the application of the merits of Christ, and on the divine grace which he considered as the *nuda et sola misericordia Dei et benignitas gratuita*. So fascinated does Luther become with the righteousness which God gives through faith that he relegates man's share in securing the same increasingly into the background.¹ Out of these conceptions arose his view concerning the persistency of concupiscence or of carnal, worldly desire; concerning the utter inability of the unregenerate to do good; concerning the impossibility of storing up merit and the necessity of imputed righteousness.² The acquisition by Luther of a lectureship at the University of Wittenberg, with the responsibility it involved of expounding Holy Scripture, when he was so young and badly instructed was, thinks Grisar, a fatal misfortune.³ It gave too great opportunity for the development of his extraordinary subjectivity and permitted too free a rein to his active imagination. It stimulated the growth in him of a spirit of self-sufficiency and of intellectual pride.⁴ While at Erfurt and later at Wittenberg, Luther had not been able to escape the influence of Humanism with its spirit of change and libertinism. From Humanism he borrowed a critical tendency and a sentiment of independence toward ecclesiastical authority. Yet Luther was ever more in sympathy with late mediaeval mysticism than with Humanism. Moreover, everywhere the old restraints were breaking down, everywhere a forward movement of individualism was in progress at the expense of the commonweal and of the traditional order of the Middle Ages, but above all at the expense of the church's religious authority, which alone, till then, had kept individualism in check to the profit of humanity.⁵

Grisar rejects as legend the customary Protestant view that Luther was led to his new doctrine of "Justification by Faith"

¹ *Op. cit.*, I, 71 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 97 ff.

³ Because Luther was self-educated in biblical knowledge and because the theologians he studied were of the degenerate and semiheretical Occamistic school, he seemed to Grisar to have been badly instructed.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, I, 38 f.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 40 ff.

through some unusual inward religious experience by which he attained the joyful assurance of salvation by faith alone.¹ That Luther's struggle with the church arose out of the indulgence controversy he decisively denies and adequately demonstrates. Likewise false, he argues, is the view of older Catholic writers that this struggle had its origin in the jealous rivalry between Augustinian and Dominican friars. He denies also that Luther's apostasy can be traced to the teachings of Wycliffe or of Hus, although he admits that views held by these earlier heretics probably helped to complete a process which had begun as a result of other causes. To affirm that Luther, impressed with the need for reform in the church, deliberately concluded such a reform could best be achieved by a preliminary rectification of the church's doctrines, Grisar regards as childish.² He takes issue, also, with the common Protestant view that Luther's transformation resulted from his experimental dissatisfaction with the monastic life or from his failure to find peace through good works. Least of all, thinks Grisar, was Luther's break with his past due to his desire for virtue or for true righteousness or to any essentially ethical impulse.³ Of particular interest is Grisar's attitude toward the well-known Catholic tendency to find the motive for Luther's new opinions in his worldliness and sensuality. While he does not explicitly deny the validity of this interpretation of the evidence available, yet his discussion of the matter casts doubt upon such an interpretation, if it does not wholly discredit it.⁴ Grisar's own explanation of Luther's deviation from orthodoxy he summarizes as follows: "The real origin of Luther's teaching must be sought in the fundamental principle which governed him, which was fostered by the decline in his life as a religious and as a priest, and more particularly by his inordinate love of his own opinion and by the uncharitable criticisms he passed upon others. This was his unfavorable estimate of good works and of any effort, natural or supernatural, on the part of man."⁵

It is clear that in Grisar's opinion Luther's personality exhibits abnormalities and pathological peculiarities which must be taken into consideration in explaining his development. Evidence of

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

² *Ibid.*, p. 108.

³ *Op. cit.*, I, 104 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

this abnormality Grisar believes he finds in Luther's morbidity, irascibility, egoism or exaggerated sense of his own importance, and in his uncontrolled wilfulness or obstinacy. Upon this native endowment there operated certain external factors, such as the individualistic spirit of the age, the Humanistic critical tendency, his one-sided theological training, his journey to Rome, his too early elevation to professorial responsibilities, and his neglect of the devotional and disciplinary means of grace at his disposal.

Grisar agrees with Denifle as to the late date of Luther's departure from the path of orthodoxy and from genuine Catholic piety, although he finds, as has been noted, in Luther's native endowment and defective education early harbingers of his subsequent apostasy.¹ Likewise in agreement with Denifle is Grisar's emphasis upon pride, self-love, and self-sufficiency as essential factors both in Luther's original fall from the faith and in his failure to rise again or to recover his lost faith.² Also reminiscent of Denifle is Grisar's emphasis upon Luther's great will-power and wilfulness. By the oft-repeated exertion of his strong will, Grisar explains, Luther overcame his anxieties, so-called temptations, or inner conflicts, which were nothing else but the pricks of conscience warning him and reproving him for his apostasy. This inner voice Luther wilfully refused to hear or heed and obstinately persisted in following his self-chosen path of error.³ During the years 1515-17 the first important steps in the direction of heresy were taken, but the completion of his new doctrinal views and apostasy proceeded gradually and steadily after 1517.⁴ The corruption of the papacy and of the church at large, which Grisar admits was serious enough, if not as bad as Luther was wont to depict it, served merely as a convenient and welcome weapon in Luther's hands for his subversive rather than reformatory campaign against the church, furnishing a deceitful pretext for the seducing of countless souls.⁵

Grisar's picture of the apostate Luther agrees in all essentials with that drawn by other Catholic biographers. The Wittenberg

¹ *Op. cit.*, I, 66 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 123, and Denifle-Weiss, I, Part 2, 463.

³ Grisar, *Luther* (2d German ed.), III, 605.

⁴ *Op. cit.* (English ed.), I, 66 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 325 ff.

professor is a powerful influence for evil in the world; by no means a reformer or uplifter. Himself largely the product of the corrupting, subversive forces of his age, he only adds to their destructive power. In Grisar's portrayal Luther is presented in the midst of his environment. An attempt has here been made to describe the effects of external forces on Luther, and, in turn, Luther's influence upon his age. Grisar has given us what might well be called a sociological as well as a psychological presentation of Luther. This latest Catholic biography of Luther displays, however, a moderation, an absence of polemical passion, which is greatly to the credit of its author. Notwithstanding the fact that Grisar is always loyal to Catholic doctrines and practices, notwithstanding the fact that all his judgments are more or less warped by religious bias, yet it may be safely affirmed that no more scholarly, no more fair-minded, no less biased consideration of Luther has ever issued from the ranks of Catholic scholarship.¹

The method of historical interpretation most antagonistic to the heroic or "great man" theory is that pursued by the materialistic-evolutionary historians. It is the conviction of adherents of this school that individual personalities have been of little consequence in the making of history; that individuals have been much more the product of the forces and conditions about them than they have been themselves causes or instruments of changed circumstances. Not personalities, they would say, but material forces, such as economic self-interest or the struggle for existence, have made history or man's evolution what it has become. In such an interpretation the individual plays an insignificant part. His

¹ For a critical discussion of several particular views of Luther contained in the works of Denifle-Weiss and Grisar, see Heinrich Boehmer, *Luther im Lichte der neueren Forschung* (3d ed.; Leipzig, 1914; English translation by Huth, New York, 1916). This brief, critical résumé of the multitudinous estimates of Luther is exceedingly valuable and illuminating. It reveals the author's extensive (and generally intensive) familiarity with the literature concerning Luther and an admirable grasp of the problems involved therein. Boehmer has shown himself, in this work, to be remarkably open-minded and capable of learning from Roman Catholic as well as from non-Lutheran Protestant critics of Luther. Yet, admitting a large measure of open-mindedness in its author, this little volume is nevertheless not altogether free from bias or even from hero-worship, nor altogether just to Luther's critics, and is open to the charge of superficiality in a number of instances.

freedom of action is extremely limited, his influence practically negligible. He is the plaything of mighty movements, partly material (i.e., of natural forces) and partly human (of men acting together, *en masse*, not however as individuals). These environmental forces mold and determine his ideas, his conduct, and his career. Although this method has been applied to other periods of European history no attempt has been made as yet to apply it with any thoroughness to the period of the Protestant revolt. Efforts have been made in plenty, however, to present Luther and the rise of Protestantism in their relation to environmental forces and thus to avoid the extreme one-sidedness of the "great man" type of historical interpretation.

In the Introduction to his biography of Luther, Theodor Kolde declares that his chief aim in the preparation of this work had been to present Luther, more fully than had been done theretofore, in the midst of the entire development of his people; to take into consideration as far as possible the varied contemporary movements—political, social, and economic, as well as religious—which had either furthered or hindered Luther in his evolution and achievements. His purpose in so doing, he explains, was to make more intelligible not only the successes of the reformer but also the forces of opposition which he encountered.¹ A comparison of this work with Koestlin's *Life of Luther* will show that Kolde did succeed in presenting to his readers a little more fully and clearly the complex conditions of the age in which Luther lived than one finds in the older biography. Yet a perusal of Kolde's two-volume history of Luther and his times will reveal to any observant reader that its author is still too largely under the influence of the "great man" method of historical interpretation to do full justice to the task which he undertook.

An English Unitarian writer of the latter half of the nineteenth century, in his discussion of *Luther and the Reformation in Germany*, likewise thought it necessary to depict the leading German reformer in the midst of his environment of complex and varied forces.² Possibly under Kolde's influence the Scotch church historian,

¹ Theodor Kolde, *Martin Luther*, Vol. I, Vorrede.

² C. Beard, *Luther and the Reformation in Germany* (1887).

Thomas Lindsay, wrote first a brief *Life of Luther* and later *A History of the Reformation*, in which he stressed considerably environmental conditions.¹ A still more elaborate and successful attempt to do justice to the milieu in the midst of which Luther lived and wrought, will be found in Arnold E. Berger's *Martin Luther in kulturgeschichtlicher Darstellung*.² The author of this comparatively recent biography, by profession an investigator in the field of literature rather than in that of history, became convinced that the then-existing biographies of Luther treated far from adequately the great reformer's relation to his environment, and undertook to produce a genetic exposition of Luther which would do justice both to his psychological development and to the effects upon him of environmental conditions as well as to Luther's influence upon the world about him.³ One does not have to read far in this highly rhetorical and popular rather than scientific presentation of Luther to discover that its author is a hero-worshiper *par excellence* and far more representative of the view that personalities make history than of the contrary view. A single quotation will suffice to demonstrate this fact:

With every living thing he [Luther] formed connections: the religious, social, political, economic, and the legal questions of the day, the national pathos, the free rights of man, everything in fact in the nature of ideal demands which dominated his century, streamed into his great soul. Not that he had sought such a thing, but that all forces gathered themselves together, irresistibly, about the mysterious lodestone of his personality, which, with magnetic power, drew unto itself all the enduring elements of his generation, as if by some concealed affinity, in order to endow them with a new productive capacity and, by means of this union with them, to make possible for the first time the full realization of his mission . . . in this [Luther's] justifying faith he had brought into being the new life-power which assembled about itself the entire culture of the period and filled it with the creative energy of a new spirit—the spirit of Protestantism.⁴

The name Karl Lamprecht suggests at once to anyone at all familiar with the modern tendencies in historiography the sociological, civilizational, or complex-cultural conception of history.

¹ *Luther and the German Reformation* (Edinburgh, 1900); *A History of the Reformation* (Scribner, 1906).

² Berlin, 1895.

³ Cf. I, Vorrede, v ff.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, I, 463, translated as literally as possible.

From such a historian one would expect to receive a treatment of Luther most completely free from hero-worship and most accurately depicting Luther's relation to his environment. And in fact such an expectation is not wholly disappointed by Lamprecht's discussion of German history in the sixteenth century. He has given us an unusually full picture of the milieu into which Luther was born. In his portrayal of the inaugurator of the German religious revolt he is never completely blind to the environmental factors with which Luther came in contact. He presents Luther as an influential personal agent modifying perceptibly, by his ideas and activity, the course of events, but molded and limited and often thwarted by the forces which surround him. "What place," asks Lamprecht, "did the clearly revealed kernel of Luther's religious view of life take in the course of historical development? This is the matter most important for a comprehension of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries; for in the tranquility of the cloister cell, first at Erfurt, then at Wittenberg, there was brought to completion, at least prophetically if not then actually, the definitive separation between the mediaeval and post-mediaeval spirit."¹ Lamprecht then proceeds to contrast the mediaeval European world out of which Luther emerged with the new age toward the production of which Luther's emancipating gospel contributed so effectively. Throughout his discussion he maintains a highly appreciative attitude both toward Luther's person and toward his work without losing sight of the time and place which surrounded the German reformer. While it is probably true that Lamprecht approached more nearly to the desired goal in his estimate of Luther than the historians who preceded him, yet there is still need for further investigation of Luther's environment and of his relation thereto, particularly as regards mass-psychology. It is already a widely admitted opinion that the milieu out of which Luther proceeded has not yet received adequate consideration.

Amid the great variety of estimates of Luther, two additional, mutually antagonistic, types may be distinguished. We may classify them under the broad terms liberal and conservative, a

¹ Karl Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte*, V, 245 ff.

distinction based evidently upon the theological attitude of the historian. As leader, chronologically considered, in the list comprising the former category we may mention Ferdinand Christian Baur.¹ In his *History of the Christian Church* he presents Luther from the point of view of Christian rationalism—if such a denotation is permissible—freely criticizing him, stressing the difference between the earlier and the later Luther, but withal exhibiting a sympathetic and even appreciative attitude toward the reformer quite surprising in one so widely separated in thought from Luther. In this category belongs also Heinrich Lang's biography of Luther, in which one meets much severe criticism of the foremost German reformer and an attempt to show how closely Luther remained bound to Roman Catholicism even after his break with Rome, and how much material antagonistic to Protestantism he retained and passed on to his adherents.² Albrecht Ritschl, while not a historian by profession nor the writer of a biography of Luther, deserves nevertheless to be included also in this list of liberal exponents of Luther. In his writings and lectures he attempted to draw a distinction between the real Protestant Luther and the whole Luther, or rather, perhaps, to make a simplified Luther, minus metaphysical speculation, neo-Platonic mysticism, and every other remnant of Roman Catholicism, appear as the real Luther for whom he could and did have the deepest admiration.³ Under the influence of Ritschl, Herrmann wrote his *Communion of the Christian with God*, in which the Ritschlian attitude toward Luther finds clear expression.⁴ From the same standpoint, in the same spirit, and likewise inspired by the same Leipzig theologian, Rade penned his biography of Luther which reveals the author's adherence to the Liberal Protestant School of historians.⁵ The most widely known representative of a somewhat similar yet distinctively non-Ritschlian attitude toward Luther is Adolph Harnack, in whose *History*

¹ *Geschichte der christlichen Kirche*, 1863.

² Heinrich Lang, *Martin Luther, ein religiöses Charakterbild* (Berlin, 1870).

³ Cf. Horst Stephan, *Luther in den Wandlungen seiner Kirche*, p. 110.

⁴ W. Herrmann, *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott im Anschluss an Luther dargestellt* (1886; revised ed., 1903), translated into English under the title given above.

⁵ Martin Rade, *Dr. Martin Luther's Leben*, 1884.

of Dogma Luther's doctrines and dogmatic significance receive extensive treatment.¹ So interesting is this discussion in itself and so important because of its author's influence both within and beyond Germany that a rather full presentation of Harnack's point of view and estimate of Luther will not be inappropriate or superfluous.

According to Harnack, the Reformation, as it expressed itself in Luther's Christianity, was in many respects an "Old Catholic," in certain other respects a mediaeval, phenomenon. Yet judged by its religious essentials it was rather a reproduction of Pauline Christianity in the spirit of a new age. Harnack regards as very one-sided that estimate of Luther which glorifies him as the hero of a newly dawning era or as the creator of modern spirit. If one would point out such a hero, Harnack affirms one would have to select Erasmus, Hans Denck, Sebastian Frank, Michael Servetus, or Giordano Bruno rather than Luther. Those few years from 1519 to 1523 Harnack denotes the grandest of the Reformation, for in those years Luther was elevated out of and above himself and had apparently overcome the limitations of his personality. He was the Reformation, in so far as everything which tended toward a return to Pauline Christianity and toward the founding of a new era concentrated itself in him. But unfortunately, like everyone else, Luther had his limitations and submitted to them. Only in one respect was Luther truly great, powerful, and irresistible, the master of his age, able to alter the trend of the previous thousand years, and to lead his contemporaries out of the old and into a new path, namely, in his rediscovered perception of God through the gospel, i.e., through Christ.

In Harnack's opinion Luther was not merely, or even chiefly, a restorer of Pauline Christianity. He was also a restorer of the Old Catholic (post-apostolic) dogmas and dogmatism. Upon his age, ecclesiastico-political rather than dogmatic in character and permeated with the non-dogmatic, practical, ascetic, and mystical conceptions of the friars and other brotherhoods, and permeated also by the antidogmatic tendencies of humanism, Luther imposed not only an interest in his gospel but also a resuscitated interest in the older theology. Even Luther's gospel of "Justification by Faith"

¹ Adolph Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte* (3d ed.; Freiburg and Leipzig, 1894), III 725 ff.

became for him a dogma necessary to salvation. Moreover, his gospel was made to include the old doctrines of postapostolic times. Luther was not a great thinker striving for theoretical clearness. On the contrary, he had an instinctive repugnance and distrust toward all those who criticized or rejected dogmas as a result of intellectual or ratiocinative effort. Furthermore, Luther never fully absorbed the elements peculiar to the culture of his day, nor did he ever admit that unrestricted inquiry was the right and duty of the individual, nor did he manifest any ability to appraise sympathetically the critical tendencies of his age.¹ It is evident that in Harnack's estimation Luther was not merely a restorer or conservator of outgrown doctrines and conceptions but also a temporary hindrance to progress, a diverter of human energy from beneficent intellectual activities into almost exclusively religious and theological channels. The emancipating effects of his essential gospel was largely nullified by his emphasis on the old dogmas and by his actual recognition of and insistence upon the principle of authority in religion.

Along with all of Harnack's adverse criticism of Luther one finds also a deep, sympathetic appreciation of the great reformer's contribution to the world's progress. This author makes clear how irreconcilable were Luther's fundamental religious ideas, his experimental perception of God in Christ, with the outgrown dogmatic survivals in his Christianity. The "whole Luther" was a complex of irreconcilable contradictions. As such he was not a representative of Protestantism nor can Protestants find in him their leader. Only as the restorer of Pauline Christianity, as the discoverer of a simplified gospel, as the revealer of a new yet old conception of God and of salvation, can Luther be of significance for Protestants. It is the essential Luther, the emancipator from dogmatism and authoritative religion, the exponent of the liberty of the Christian man, the critic of the New Testament writings, the founder of a new type of Christian piety—it is this genuinely Protestant Luther whom Harnack reveres and glorifies.²

¹ Harnack, *op. cit.*, 726 ff.

² In this list of "liberal" estimates of Luther one might well include the biographies, mentioned above, by Charles Beard and A. C. McGiffert; also A. Hausrath's *Luther's Leben* (Berlin, 1903-4), and H. Boehmer's *Luther im Lichte der neueren*

In opposition to this "Christian-rationalist" attitude toward Luther, which has just been described, there began to appear in the early nineteenth century a series of discussions of Luther from the ranks of the more conservative, antirationalist Lutherans. Writers like Stahl, Philippi, Vilmar, Loehe, and Kliefoth took up the gauntlet in behalf of the more traditional Lutheran conception of Luther. A somewhat more liberal representative of this tendency was Konrad von Hofmann, the founder of the new Erlangen school of theologians. To this school belonged Theodor Kolde. In more recent years there has sprung up a mediating type of theological historian who approaches more closely to the "Liberal Christian Rationalists" than to the Erlangen school. The leading exponent of this new tendency is Reinhold Seeberg, whose *Text-book of the History of Doctrine* contains a brief discussion of Luther which it would be worth while to compare at length with Harnack's views of the reformer were our space unlimited.

There remains to be mentioned one further type of attitude toward Luther, the leading exponent of which is Ernst Troeltsch.¹ The chief peculiarity of this recent tendency among writers in the field of Reformation history is their reaction against the extravagant claims of earlier and even present-day biographers and historians concerning the influence of Luther and of other reformers upon the course of history. Writers of this school depreciate the importance of the Reformation as a factor in the world's progress. The present age of intellectual liberty, of scientific methods, of democracy, and of simplified, non-dogmatic Christianity they maintain is the product of humanism, of investigation in the field of natural science, of eighteenth-century rationalism and enlightenment, much

Forschung. Possibly in this category belongs also Preserved Smith's *Life and Letters of Martin Luther* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911), although the method here employed of presenting Luther's character and work by means of extracts from his correspondence, supplemented by brief comment by the author, makes it difficult to obtain any clear idea of the author's estimate of Luther.

¹ Cf. the following writings of this church historian: *Die Bedeutung des Protestantismus für die Entstehung der modernen Welt; Historische Zeitschrift*, XCVII (1906), 1-66; the same, expanded and translated into English under the title *Protestantism and Progress* (New York: Putnam, 1912); also, *Historische Zeitschrift*, CX (1913), 519-36.

more than of the Reformation, which was essentially reactionary and in its dominant forms radically opposed to progress. Advance has been made since the sixteenth century in spite of, not because of, the Reformation. The writings of men of this school represent a decided departure from the hero-worship of earlier historians as well as from religious prejudice and also a movement in the direction of sociological historiography.¹

In concluding this discussion it will be sufficient to summarize briefly the most noteworthy tendencies and indications of progress discernible in the attitude of modern historians and biographers toward Luther. Most encouraging is the evident intention and effort of most of these writers to discuss Luther and his work impartially and in a thoroughly scientific manner, basing their conclusions upon contemporary evidence. Even among Roman Catholic historians progress in these directions has been made. The old supernatural attitude has almost entirely disappeared. While traces of hero-worship still remain it is much less common, much more restrained, less conspicuous and irrational, than formerly. Interest in the psychological development of Luther has led to the discovery of many facts hitherto unknown, has made Luther's personality appear less mystical, more natural, more human, and has helped to dispel much of the darkness and ignorance in which Luther's early life and growth has long been concealed. Recent reaction against the "great man" theory of historical interpretation, together with the greater modern interest in sociology and environment, has resulted in the exposition of Luther in the midst of his milieu and in his relation thereto. While the desired goal in this direction has not yet been reached, we have today a more accurate knowledge of Luther, of his defects as well as of his beneficent achievements, than ever before. If recent historical research and interpretation have brought into clearer light Luther's limitations and have given his personality a somewhat less significant or less important place in human progress than did the writings of earlier historians, yet the essential uprightness and

¹ For a criticism of these modern estimates of Luther, written from the viewpoint of a conservative American Lutheran, cf. J. M. Reu, *Thirty-five Years of Luther Research* (Chicago, 1917).

sincerity of this leading German reformer have been established more firmly than before. Moreover, the emancipating power of the gospel which he discovered and proclaimed but failed fully to understand or to realize in his own life has received abundant confirmation, even though the free operation of this force was hindered by Luther's personal limitations, and this force was by no means the only factor or even the most important factor in the emancipation of Europe from the shackles of mediaeval ignorance, superstition, and subjection to authority.

THE ARAMAIC PAPYRI OF ELEPHANTINE IN ENGLISH—*Continued*

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B. NAME LISTS

Mere lists of names with here and there a note, sometimes revealing their purpose, more often abbreviated to unintelligibility for the uninitiated, are to most people not very interesting. In this instance, however, they offer not a little insight into the ethnic composition of the frontier post at Elephantine. Moreover, many ancient names, Semitic names in particular, reveal not a little of the religious thought of the people who use them, as George Buchanan Gray has demonstrated for Hebrew.

It is hoped that the copious biblical references will be of use to teachers and students and to thoughtful readers in general; to facilitate reference for non-Hebraists, the forms of the American Revised Version are used wherever possible without implying that they represent the Elephantine pronunciation.

Chronological order is in most cases impossible to determine; No. 16 should, indeed, probably precede No. 15, as an examination of the cross-references will show, but its relative non-importance relegated it to second place, while the *pièce de résistance* was placed at the head.

NO. 15. NAME LIST WITH AN ACCOUNT (PROBABLY OF A TEMPLE-TAX COLLECTION)

A list of persons who contributed two shekels each to a fund or collection having to do with the service of Jahweh and, as appears in the body of the document, with two bethels or inhabitants of a bethel. Hidden under the guise of a mere name list and account this document is fully as important for our knowledge of the religious thought and habits of the Jewish community at Elephantine as is the great petition, No. 8. Suggestions for its interpretation will be found in the footnotes.

This papyrus is a palimpsest; the underlying script, which appears throughout in varying degrees of preservation, as is its habit after washing, was Demotic, and appears to have been a name list also. In the present writing Col. VII, ll. 1-6, are in a different hand from that which precedes. The rest of Col. VII and Col. VIII seem again to be in a different hand or hands. Col. VII, ll. 1-6, may have been written by *Idnīh*, the son of Gemariah himself.

The probable date (419 B.C.) and purpose are discussed in the notes. *APE* Pap. 18 (P. 13488).

Superscription¹

On the 3. of Phamenoth,² year 5.³ These (are) the names of the Jewish army who gave (in ?) money (*lit.* silver) to (or for) *Jh*⁴ the god man for man the sum (*lit.* silver) of sh(eqels) <2>.⁴

Column I

<1>M . . . ⁵<daugh>ter of Gemariah⁶ son of Mahseiah⁷ the sum of
š. 2;

1⁸ Zaccur⁹ son of Zaccur⁹ the sum of š. 2;

¹ This is placed, as a sort of title or heading, at the head of the document, which is written on a wide sheet or roll in eight successive columns, seven on the recto and one on the verso. The superscription runs in one continuous line over the top of Cols. I and II, three words near the middle, "who gave (in) money," being heavily underscored. Otherwise the space of a line is left blank between this heading and the first lines of Cols. I and II.

² The original has *Pmnhit*, as elsewhere in *APA* and *APE*.

³ In all probability of Darius II; cf. Col. VII; l. 1, n. 2.

⁴ Only a fragment of a stroke, probably the first stroke of the letter š, abbreviation for sheqel, remains. The rest, as well as the numeral 2, both readily supplied from the body of the document, is broken away.

⁵ The fragments of letters between M . . . t may be restored to read Meshulle-meth; cf. II Kings 21:19.

⁶ Cf. No. 12 (*APE* 5): l. 1, n. 1; No. 13. l. 5, n. 2.

⁷ The name occurs not infrequently in both *APE* and *APA*; see index of proper names, which is in preparation and to which readers are once for all referred for all except the more important cross-references in these papyri. In the Old Testament it is found in Jer. 32:12 and 51:59.

⁸ The series of strokes placed before every individual name in this list do not, perhaps, correspond exactly to the numeral 1, whereby they have been rendered in the translation, but are rather to be understood as check marks added in counting after all the names had been written.

⁹ So the name is written, after the commonly received form of the Massoretic text in the English version of Num. 13:4; 1 Chron. 4:26; 24:27; 25:2; Ezra 8:14

- 1 Šr(or d)ḥ Hosea son of Ḥr(or d)mn¹ the sum of š. 2;
 — All<3>²
- 5 1 Hose<a?> ʾlnyrḥ ḥy the sum of š. 2 l<h>³
 1 Hḥš son of Hoshaiah son of Zephani<ah⁴ the sum
 of š. 2> lh;
 1 ḥ the sum of š. 2 lh;
 ḥ the sum of š. 2 lh;
 son of Ḥh <the sum of> š. 2 lh;
 10 son of Nh ḥ<the sum of š.> 2 lh;
 son of ʿAnani
 <dau>ghter of Zbd⁵

(variant); Neh. 3:2; 10:12; 12:35; 13:13. The name is quite as common in these documents as in the later texts of the Old Testament. The name of the king of Hamath, whose inscription, written early in the eighth century B.C., published by the French consul Pognon in 1907, will be found in English translation in the Appendix, is often so read; this reading is anything but certain, as the consonants of the papyri and the Old Testament are regularly *Zḥr*, those of the inscription *Zkr*. Cf. note on the name under the translation of the inscription.

¹ Except for the Hosea, the names of this line cannot be identified. Hosea son of Ḥrmn was probably closely related to Ḥrmn son of ʾḥš No. 16, l. 2. Ḥrmn may be Syriac *ḥarmnd*, "serpent." It may, however, also be an abbreviation of some Ḥrm name, like Ḥrmnathan. Any connection with Mt. Hermon is exceedingly improbable. Of the first name, as we do not know whether the first letter should be read as *s* or *sh*, nor whether the second letter is *d* or *r*, nor whether something is missing after *j* or not, nothing further can be said.

² The horizontal line before the "All" is probably used to eliminate this line from the count of individuals. The number 3 is not quite certain; one stroke and a fragment of a second is all that the original exhibits.

³ The first name may be read Hosea or Hoshaiah; both forms of the name occur in these documents, the former with especial frequency, as both are found in the Old Testament (Num. 13:8, 16; Deut. 32:44; II Kings 15:30; 17:1, 3, 4, 6; 18:1, 9 f.; Hos. 1:1, 2; I Chron. 27:20; Neh. 10:23; and Neh. 12:32; Jer. 42:1; 43:2). The second name, probably father of Hosea or Hoshaiah, may be read either *Elnār* or *Beḥelnār*. The mysterious *hy* and *lh*, the latter supplemented from the following lines, might be read "he (himself)" and "for him(self)," respectively; more probably they are abbreviated notes of some sort in common use in these lists. In either case we are not certain of their meaning; cf. l. 19, n. 5, Col. VII, l. 6, n. 1, and Col. VIII, l. 1, n. 6. In view of the examples in Col. VIII, the possibility that something more than simple *h* should be supplied after this first *l* of a series of *lh*'s, perhaps the name of the century, *Ṣndn*, l. 18, must be left open.

⁴ Zephaniah (Zeph. 1:1; Jer. 21:1; 29:25, 29; 52:24; II Kings 25:18; Jer. 37:3; Zech. 6:10, 14; I Chron. 6:21; cf. 6:9; 15:5, 11). The first name in the line may have been Hosea <son of X> son of Hoshaiah; more probably it was a longer name not otherwise known compounded with *Hōšā* "the" hath helped." The mention of the grandfather, perhaps even of the great-grandfather, may indicate a person of some consequence, or, in the absence of surnames, it may serve to differentiate this from a similar list of common names.

⁵ Possibly Zebadiah (I Chron. 8:15, 17; 12:7; 27:7; Ezra 8:8; 10:20; cf. I Chron. 26:2; II Chron. 17:8; 19:11), or abbreviated to Zabdai, the Zebadaeus of

..... <dau>ghter of *Plḥt*
 15 daughter of
 daughter of
 The whole century of *Šndn*²
 Century of *Nbḥḡqb*⁴ 1 Shallum son of Menahem⁵

Column II

1 Meshullam the son of *Šmḥh* (the) s(um of)⁶ š. 2 *lh*;

1 *Plḥt* the son of Micah⁷ (the) s(um of) š. 2 *lh*;

the New Testament, or Zabdiel (I Chron. 27:2; Neh. 11:14), or Zabdi (Josh. 7:1, 17 f.; I Chron. 8:19; 27:27; Neh. 11:17).

² Here probably a masculine proper name; the same name, feminine, in No. 13, l. 3; cf. n. 8. The full name *Pelḥiah* is found in this document, Col. IV, l. 20; *Plḥh*, possibly to be read as in the received form of the Old Testament Massorah Pelaliah (Neh. 11:12), but possibly also simply a shorter (older?) writing of Peluliah is found in Col. VI, l. 11.

³ See No. 1, l. 6, n. 1. The name *Šndn* may possibly be the Babylonian *Sin-iddin*, though at this time we should expect for this the writing *Sndn* instead of *Šndn*; but note *Šnh-rjb*, more frequent than *Šnh-rjib* in the Aḥlqar fragments; cf. Col. VIII, l. 1, n. 6.

⁴ The original exhibits between ll. 18 and 19 a heavy stroke similar to the one found under the superscription, see above, Superscription, n. 1; evidently a paragraph or section divider.

⁵ See No. 7, l. 23, and n. 1.

⁶ The final letter of this name is not quite certain. Cf. No. 14, l. 2, nn. 2 and 3. Note that the mysterious *lh* does not appear after this first name in the new century; see above, l. 5, n. 3, and compare Col. VIII, l. 1, n. 6.

⁷ Meshullam occurs frequently in these documents, as it does in the Old Testament (II Kings 22:3; Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah, *passim*). The father's name, from the root *sāmāh*, "to rejoice," is pure Hebrew, although it is not found in the Old Testament; the form would seem to be *Sammā(a)h*, a much used hypocoristic form, like Shallum, Zaccur (Col. I, l. 2), Nahum, etc. From this point onward the word *keseḥ*, "silver, money, the sum of" is abbreviated in the original to *k*, "(the) s(um of)."

⁸ *Plḥt* may be either Palti (Num. 13:9; I Sam. 25:44) abbreviated from Paltiel (II Sam. 3:15; Num. 34:26); or Piltai (Neh. 12:17), probably abbreviation of Pelatiah (Ezek. 11:1, 13; I Chron. 3:21; 4:42; Neh. 10:22). The latter is slightly more probable, as the unabbreviated form is also found in these documents and corresponds better to the taste of the time as indicated in the Old Testament. The father's name is, of course, Micah, like the name of the prophet, Mic. 1:1, abbreviated from Micaiah (Jer. 26:18; see also II Kings 22:12, cf. II Chron. 34:20). The earliest occurrence would seem to be Judg., chaps. 17 and 18. "Michael," abbreviation of which might have the same or a similar form, is not probable, as it does not occur in these papyri, though it, too, occurs frequently, not only in Daniel, but also in Chronicles and Ezra.

- 1 Malchijah the son of *Ilym* the son of Hadadnûrt¹ <(the) s(um of) > §. 2 lh;
- 20 1 Shelemiah the son of Jashûb (the) s(um of) § < 2 l > h;²
- 5 1 Gdyl the son of Meshullam the son of Mbthi³ < h³ (the) s(um of) > §. 2 lh;
- 1 1 Menahem the son of Hsyul hy the son of Šm⁴ ;
- 1 1 Šimk the son of Meshullam hy (the) s(um of) §. 2 lh;
- 1 1 Gdyl⁵ the son of Šmyh hy (the) s(um of) §. 2 lh;
- 1 1 Meshullam the son of Haggai⁶ the son of Hsyul (the) s(um of) §. 2 lh;
- 10 1 Hsyul the son of Haggai the son of Hsyul (the) s(um of) §. 2 lh;
- ḏ ;
- §. 2;
- §. 2;
- ;
- 15 2⁷
- ;
- §. 2⁸

¹ Malchijah (Jer. 21:1; 38:1, 6; Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, *passim*). *Ilym* is scarcely the Hebrew *idōm*, "orphan"; like *Ilm*, APA, l. 1, and Ithmah (I Chron. 11:46), it is probably an abbreviation. *Ithm* has been suggested as the full name by Lidzbarski. The form here is perhaps to be read *Iallūm*, see n. 6, on l. 1, above. *Hadad-nûrt*, "Hadad is my light," is not elsewhere found, though both component elements are well known.

² The number 20 before this line is correct with what we have of this document only on the assumption of Sachau that it is placed before No. 21 "according to the scribe's system." Of this "system" we have no further evidence. More likely the counter's eye skipped Col. I, l. 19, as did that of the translator at least twice. This first number 20 is by all odds the most troublesome of the lot. Cf. Col. III, l. 10, n. 6. Shelemiah (Jer. 36:14, 26; 37:3, 13; 38:1; Ezra 10:39, 41; Neh. 3:30; 13:13). Jashub (Num. 26:24; I Chron. 7:1; Ezra 10:29); Sachau: *Izsb*, wrong. Of the number 2 after §(eqels) part of one stroke is preserved.

³ *Gdyl*, hardly *Gdōl*, "great," is, perhaps, like other forms (see n. 6, on l. 1, above) an abbreviation, to be read *Gaddāl*, and related to Gedaliah, found both in these texts and in the Old Testament. *Mib-* (or rather *Miv-*) *ṣahiah* is found in APA as a woman's name. One stroke of the numeral 2 after §(eqels) is missing.

⁴ *Hsyul*, *Haššul*, is another hypocoristic name for both men and women in these texts; cf. Hazzeleponi (I Chron. 4:3). *Šm*, probably *Shema'iah*, see No. 12, l. 3, n. 3.

⁵ The *ḏ* is not quite clear in this name; hardly *m*, Gamul, I Chron. 24:17 (Sachau).

⁶ Haggai, see No. 12, l. 3, n. 4; hardly Haggi (Gen. 46:16; Num. 26:15), though abbreviated from Haggiah (I Chron. 6:30).

⁷ The *l* may be a remnant of "all, the whole" as in Col. I, ll. 4 and 18.

⁸ The last stroke only of the number 2 is preserved.

⁹ The remnants are small, but clear. The number of lines at this point is not certain, as the papyrus is completely broken away. There may have been from one to four lines more in Col. II.

Column III

	<1>	<i>Šlm</i> the son of <i>Hṽdy</i> ¹ 2;
	1	<i>Hṽrī</i> the son of <i>ṽnh</i> ² 2;
	1	<i>Shammua</i> ³ the son of <i>Šlm</i> 2;
	1	<i>Mattan</i> the son of <i>Idn</i> ⁴ 2;
5	1	⁵ 2;
	1	<i>nn</i> ;
	1	<i>Zk</i> §. 2;
	1	<i>Anani</i> ;
	1	<i>Hṽš.</i> son of <i>Nṽn</i> ⁵ 2;
10	20 ⁶	1 the son of 2;
	 §. 2;
	 2;
	 <i>šbḫ</i> ⁷ ;
	 §. 2;
15	 2;
	 2;
	 Hosea (the) s(um of) §. 2;
	 <i>ḫṽt</i> ⁸ (the) s(um of) ;

¹ Shallum (?), Shillel (?) (Gen. 46:24; Num. 26:49). For *Hṽdy* see No. 13, l. 3, n. 5.

² Huri (I Chron. 5:14). *ṽnh*, cf. Vaniah (Ezra 10:36); the similarity is the more remarkable because very few words in Hebrew and Aramaic begin with the sound of *w*, which, rather than *v*, correctly represents the original. On the other hand, most of the words in the Old Testament which do so begin are proper names—but nearly all proper names of non-Semitic, or at least non-Hebraic, type.

³ Num. 13:4; Neh. 11:17 (cf. I Chron. 9:16); 12:18; II Sam. 5:14; I Chron. 14:4 (cf. I Chron. 3:5).

⁴ Mattan (*Mtn*) (Jer. 38:1; II Kings 11:18; II Chron. 23:17). *Idn* . . may be *Idnīk*, found elsewhere in these documents.

⁵ Probably Hosea the son of Nattūn; cf. No. 12, l. 5.

⁶ The number 20 here is quite clear, although the papyrus is broken. It corresponds perfectly to other numbers that follow. What is its relation to the number 20 in Col. II, l. 4 (cf. n. 2)? Four additional lines at the end of Col. II (see Col. II, l. 17, n. 9) would make ten persons in Col. II, ll. 12–27, following what may have been a summation in Col. II, l. 11 (cf. n. 7). If a new count was begun at this point, our number 20 would then be correct. But why should a new count have been begun? For further discussion of the relation between the total number of persons listed and the sum total of moneys collected, see Col. VII, l. 3, n. 3.

⁷ Joshibiah (I Chron. 4:35).

⁸ Cf. Abital (II Sam. 3:4; I Chron. 3:3); Hamutal (II Kings 23:31; 24:18; Jer. 52:1).

- 20 *nmī* (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 *Isbīk* ;

Column IV

- 1 Hosea the son of *Sgr* (or *dī*)¹ (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 1 Menahem the son of Mattan (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 1 *Ntyn* the son of Haggai (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 1 Haggai the son of Micah² (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 5 1 *Mhsh* the son of Uri³ (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 1 Shallum the son of Zechariah⁴ (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 1 Menahem the son of Zechariah (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 40 1 *Mslk* the son of Uri (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 . . . *mt* the son of *Sgr* (or *dī*) (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 10 1 'Anani (?) the son of *M'ysī* (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 . . . *šc* the son of Menahem (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 1 . . . the son of Hodia⁵ (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 . . . *hm* (?) the son of Uri the son of *Msl*. (the) s(um of) §. 2;

 15 (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 Mattan (?) (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 <the so>n of Mattan (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 *š* the son of Menahem the son of *Pysī* (the) s(um of)
 <§.>2;

¹ If *Sgrī*, then a similar name is found in a Cappadocian bilingual inscription (cf. Lidzbarski, *Eph.*, III, 66). Greek *Σαρδίοις*, Aramaic S(a)g(a)r. Persian? And how account for final *-ī*? Not, as has been done by comparison with Old Testament Bigvai (Ezra 2:2, 14; 8:14; Neh. 7:7, 19; 10:16), for *v* (i.e., *y*) is as much part of the ending, in this name as is *-ī*. A hypocoristic form in *-t* or *-aī* seems most probable. Even if *Sgr* be read, an Aramaic compound of *sgr*, "inclose, lock," + *īk*, Jahweh, of which this would be an abbreviation, is quite possible, though not otherwise known. If *Sgdī* be read, then what? Certainly not Segadiah, "Jahweh worships." Perhaps Sāgadiah, equivalent to Hebrew, Obadiah, "worshiper of Jahweh."

² Here written *Mjk*, as in II Sam. 9:12; I Chron. 9:15; Neh. 10:12 (English version: 11), and Neh. 11:17, 22 for Micaiah, Neh. 12:35. The last equation makes it probable that the writing *→* for *-h* is merely the usual Aramaic variant writing of final long *-ā* or *-ah*. Against this the attractive hypothesis that *Mjk* might be abbreviated from Michael, but Micah (i.e. *Mīkh*) from Micaiah will not hold good. See also Col. II, l. 2, n. 7.

³ *Mhsh* is an abbreviation, not uncommon in these papyri, of Mahseiah; cf. Col. I, l. 1, n. 7. Uri (Exod. 31:2; 35:30; I Kings 4:19; I Chron. 2:20; Ezra 10:24), abbreviation of Uriah.

⁴ II Kings 14:29; 15:8, 11; 18:2; Zech. 1:1, 7; 7:1, 8; Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, *passim*. In this and the following line the name is written *Zkrī*; cf. n. 2, above.

⁵ See No. 13, l. 3, n. 5, and the passages there referred to; note the variant Hodeiah in Neh. 7:43.

- 1 Hagg<ai>(?) the son of Menahem <the son of P> μ s $\dot{\imath}$ (the)
s(um of) $\dot{\imath}$. 2;
20 1 *Phyl $\dot{\imath}$ h*¹ the son of . . $\dot{\imath}$ ^c (the) s(um of) $\dot{\imath}$. 2;
1 *Mnhmt* the daughter of $\dot{\imath}$. . the son of \supset st $\dot{\imath}$ ^h (the) s(um of) $\dot{\imath}$. 2;
1 Meshullemeth³ the daughter of . . h (the) s(um of) $\dot{\imath}$. 2, sister of
Mht μ s⁴ . . . ;

Column V

- 1 *Mpt $\dot{\imath}$ h* the daughter of Tstz(or μ) (the) s(um of) $\dot{\imath}$. 2;
1 *Ih μ s $\dot{\imath}$ m*⁵ the daughter of Nathan (the) s(um of) $\dot{\imath}$. 2;
1 *Sbj $\dot{\imath}$* ⁶ the daughter of Huri the son of *S $\dot{\imath}$ m* (the) s(um of) $\dot{\imath}$. 2;
1 *R $\dot{\imath}$ $\dot{\imath}$* ⁷ the daughter of *Nr $\dot{\imath}$* ⁷ (the) s(um of) $\dot{\imath}$. 2;
5 1 *Ih μ s $\dot{\imath}$ m*⁵ the daughter of Meshullam (the) s(um of) $\dot{\imath}$. 2;
60 1 *Mpt $\dot{\imath}$ h* the daughter of *S $\dot{\imath}$ m* (the) s(um of) $\dot{\imath}$. 2;
1 *Ih μ yl* the daughter of *Pl $\dot{\imath}$* ⁸ the daughter of *I μ s⁹* (the) s(um of) $\dot{\imath}$. 2;
1 \supset bi $\dot{\imath}$ ⁹ the daughter of \supset μ s⁹ (the) s(um of) $\dot{\imath}$. 2;

¹ Cf. Col. I, l. 14, n. 1.

² *Mnhmt*, perhaps Menahemeth, is, of course, feminine of Menahem. The grandfather's name remains unsolved.

³ II Kings 21:19.

⁴ The five letters following the word "sister of" are written together as indicated in the transliteration. It is possible, but by no means certain, that two persons are mentioned: "sister of *Mht* and *S* . . ."; crowding might account for the lack of a definite space between *Mht* and μ *S*, although the space between "sister of" and what follows is perfectly clear. It is quite possible, however, to read *Mht μ s*, whether anything else followed or not as a single name; such a name would be no more astonishing or unintelligible than, e.g., \supset st $\dot{\imath}$ in the preceding line, and a number of others. The assumption that another giver is here listed in the same line with Meshullemeth, and that we must correct μ s to $\dot{\imath}$ s (i.e., "the sum of $\dot{\imath}$ eqels <2>") is absolutely gratuitous; such a procedure would have destroyed the value of the check marks carefully placed before each individual giver's name, cf. especially Col. I, l. 19, where this mark is inserted after the name of the century.

⁵ = "Jahweh has heard," like Shemaiah; for the form, compare Jehosheba (II Kings 11:2).

⁶ The masculine names Shobai (Ezra 2:42; Neh. 7:45) and Shobi (II Sam. 17:27) may be compared.

⁷ *R $\dot{\imath}$ $\dot{\imath}$* , comparable to masculine *R $\dot{\imath}$ $\dot{\imath}$ yah*, found elsewhere in these documents, not in the Old Testament [but cf. Reu (Gen. 11:18-21); Reuel (Gen. 36:4, 10, 13, 17; I Chron. 1:35, 37, etc.)], rather than to Hebrew *r $\dot{\imath}$ $\dot{\imath}$ d*, "beloved" of the Song of Songs. *Nr $\dot{\imath}$* , cf. Neriah (Jer. 32:12, 16; 36:4, 8, 14, 32; 43:3, 6; 45:1; 51:59). In both cases *d* instead of *r* is at least theoretically possible.

⁸ *Ih μ yl*, probably *Iahmal*, not *Iahmdl*, not otherwise known. *I μ s*, perhaps abbreviation of Josiah (Zech. 6:10, written *I \supset st $\dot{\imath}$ h*, and I Kings 13:2; II Kings 21:24, 26; 22:1, 3; 23:16, 28; Jer. 1:2 f., etc., written *I \supset st $\dot{\imath}$ h μ* , and Jer. 27:1, written *I μ s $\dot{\imath}$ h μ*).

⁹ With \supset bi $\dot{\imath}$ (Abihi?) a number of Old Testament names may be compared, none of them very satisfactorily; nearest to it is the masculine Abihu (Exod. 6:23; Lev.

- 1 *Nhbr* the daughter of *Mhsh* (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 10 1 *Ihyn* the daughter of *Igd* (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 1 Meshullemeth the daughter of *Spłi*³ (the) s(um of) §. 2;

 *mt* the daughter of <2>;
 . *Nhbt* the daughter of §. 2;
 15 . *Ihmyl* the daughter of (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 70 1(?) *Ihysm*^c the daughter of Hosea the son of Zaccur (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 1 *Ihy*<§>^c the daughter of Haggai (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 1 *ḡi*<h>ⁱ the daughter of *Nlyn* (the) s(um of) §. 2;

Column VI

- 1 *Ihyn* the daughter of Gedaliah⁴ (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 1 *Slyh*⁵ the daughter of *Nri* (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 1 *Ihyfl* the daughter of *Islh* (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 1 *ḡṣr* (or *d*) the daughter of Hosea (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 5 1 *Ihyli* the daughter of *ṣmnh*⁶ (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 1 *Mpt*^h the daughter of *Spłih* (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 1 *Nhbt* the daughter of Zaccur (the) s(um of) §. 2;
 80 1 *Mnhmt* the daughter of *Idnih* the son of *ṣni*⁷ (the) s(um of) §. 2;

10:1, etc.); *ḡṣ* is a variant of Hosea (*Hys*); the variant *ḡ* for *h* at the beginning of a word is not uncommon, though less frequent than at the end; cf. Col. IV, l. 4, n. 2. The two cases are quite distinct and should not be confused.

³ Perhaps a variant of *Nḡhbt* found elsewhere in these documents, and to be read *Nôhebeth* or *Nôheveth*, "the beloved," Amanda.

⁴ *Ihyn*, not elsewhere found in this precise form, but very probably a feminine form or usage of Jehohanan (Ezra 10:6; Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, *passim*) = Johanan (II Kings 25:23, etc.), in hypocoristic abbreviation; cf. English, John and Joanna, Joan. *Igd* is likewise abbreviated, probably from Igdaliah (Jer. 35:4).

⁵ Is this and *Spłih*, Col. VI, l. 6, a mere phonetic variant of Zephaniah, Col. I, l. 6, n. 4?

⁶ Jer. 38:1; 40:5 f., 8; 41:1-18; II Kings 25:22; Zeph. 1:1; I Chron. 25:3, 9; Ezra 10:18.

⁷ The same name with slightly different spelling occurs elsewhere in these papyri. Perhaps one may compare *Sallû* and its variant spelling, *Sallu*³ (I Chron. 9:7; Neh. 11:7; 12:7; cf. vs. 20, *Sallai*), or *Salu* (Num. 25:14).

⁸ Perhaps Immanujah, "with us is Jahweh," an interesting variant of Immanuel, Isa. 7:14; 8:8.

⁹ This name is not found elsewhere. But the name of the goddess Anath, identified on Phoenician inscriptions with the Greek Athene, is found in two composite divine names in these documents, one of them, *ṢAnath-bethel*, in this papyrus, Col. VII, l. 6. In the Old Testament, Anath, father of Shamgar (Judg. 3:31; 5:6); Anathoth (I Chron. 7:8; Neh. 10:19), and the village of Anathoth (Jer. 1:1 and elsewhere),

- 1 Meshullam the son of *M^cu₂i* (the) s(um of) *š*. 2;
 10 1 Meshullemeth the daughter of *Pn₂u₂i_h* (the) s(um of) *š*. 2;
 1 *N₂u₂n* the son of Pelaliah¹ the son of *N₂u₂n* (the) s(um of) *š*. 2;
 1 *H₂u₂i* the daughter of *H₂u₂i_h* (the) s(um of) *š*. 2;
 1 Nathan(?) (the) s(um of);
 1 *p₂n₂i_h* (the) s(um of) *š*. 2;
 15 1 the son of Nathan the son of *h* (the) s(um of) *š*. 2;
 1 the son of *Š₂l₂m* the s<on of> (the) s(um of) *š*. 2;
 1 <*h*>*u₂š₂m^c* the daughter of *Q₂u₂n* (the) s(um of) *š*. 2;
 90 1 *R^cu₂i_h* the son of ²Uri (the) s(um of) *š*. 2;
 1 Meshullam the son of Shemaiah (the) s(um of) *š*. 2.

Column VII

The money which was on hand that day in the hand of²
Id₂n₂i_h the Son of Gemariah in the month of *Pm₂n₂h₂i₂p*:
 The sum of *krš* 31, shekels 8;³

may be compared. The personal names in all these cases are without much doubt abbreviations of compounds whose first element is the name of the goddess Anath. With *u₂i₂h₂*, used in an oath in another document, the unabbreviated name Anthothijah (I Chron. 8:24) should be compared.

¹ The name is here written in conformity with the Old Testament spelling; cf. No. 13, l. 3, n. 8; but see Col. I, l. 14, n. 1.

² Cf. Superscription. The translation is an attempt to transfer into English an original of whose precise meaning we cannot be sure. The term "was on hand" seemed colorless enough to express all we can be fairly sure of and renders perfectly one of the meanings of the Aramaic word. "In the hand of" is a literal translation. Another possible rendering would be: "This is the money (or sum) which was raised by *Id₂n₂i_h*"; but *Id₂n₂i_h* seems too important a man to have done much of this collecting personally; cf. introduction to No. 5. It is through *Id₂n₂i_h*, moreover, that we can be quite certain of the date in the superscription. The year 5 must be the fifth year of Darius II, which with the Egyptian month would be 420-419 B.C.; cf. "Chronological Notes from the Aramaic Papyri," *AJSL*, XXVII (April, 1911), 258. Phamenoth would be very nearly our June (*ibid.*, pp. 235-37), i.e., June, 419.

³ The sum total here given, 1 *krš* = 10 shekels, would be 318 shekels. The total of names up to this point, as far as we can be relatively certain of them from the papyrus as we have it, is 114; quite probably we must add four more; cf. Col. II, l. 17, n. 9; Col. III, l. 10, n. 6. At the rate of two shekels per person this would give us but 228 or 236 shekels. And even if we add the ten names which follow in Cols. VII and VIII, we would still have but 248 or 256 shekels. How the deficit is to be made up we cannot be sure. The least probable hypothesis to the translator's mind is that of the original editor, Sachau, followed by the German translator, Staerk. There is no good ground for supposing that before Col. I enough names were lost to make up the deficiency; the superscription pretty clearly marks the beginning of the list. The limitation of the superscription to Jahweh, whereas after the summing up he must divide with others (ll. 5 f.), does not help us in the sum total, though it may bear upon another difficulty; cf. the following note. There is a possibility that between

Cols. II and III, where the break was complete and the joint established is very small, or between what is now Cols. III and IV, where there is a complete break with no close joint whatever, the necessary thirty to forty-five names are missing; but considering the expertness and painstaking conscientiousness of Ibscher in fitting together papyrus shreds by the fiber, the probability of such an error in the original edition is very small. Is it necessary to assume that more names are missing than have been indicated in the notes and text above? This is not an extraordinary collection of voluntary donations; the fixed sum of two shekels precludes this. It can hardly be a collection for the rebuilding of the temple (see No. 8), as the temple was not demolished until nearly ten years later, if our date above be correct; besides the gifts are inadequate for this purpose. The whole looks very like an annual temple tax such as obtained in Judea also at this time and later (Neh. 10:32; Exod. 30:11-16; II Chron. 24:6; Matt. 17:24). If two shekels in Egypt seem excessive as against the $\frac{1}{2}$, later $\frac{1}{2}$ shekel of Judea, it must be remembered that "shekel" may mean very different things. If in Jesus' time the didrachmon or didrachma represented the half-shekel of the temple tax, there is evidence that Aramaic-writing people in Egypt probably in Ptolemaic times, some of whom bear Jewish names like Samuel, Abram, Nathan, Abiathar, called a single drachme a shekel (Lidzbarski, *Ephemeris*, II, 244 ff.), which makes 2 shekels exactly = 1 didrachmon. Moreover, for the time of our papyri, No. 14, ll. 4 f., makes it certain that 2 shekels (@ 5.6 grams, *σῆκος Μηδικός*) = 1 stater (Persian, @ 11.2 grams), i.e., the later didrachmon; while shekels coined in Palestine in the second century B.C. were in weight and value very nearly equal to the Attic tetradrachmon (Josephus, *Ant.*, III, viii, 2, controlled by weighing extant specimens). If, therefore, the Judean temple tax, fixed some time between Neh. 10:32 ($\frac{1}{2}$ shekel) and Matt. 17:24; Josephus, *BJ*, VII, vii, 6, amounted to a didrachmon = $\frac{1}{2}$ shekel, the weight and value of this Palestinian half-shekel was very nearly that of two shekels of these papyri. This makes it very probable, indeed, that we have to do here with a fixed, annual contribution to the temple revenue. In this case, however, the sum total need not represent merely the amount of contributions listed up to that point; much less need this total include the following names, tardy payers, who came in and were listed at a later date, probably in several detachments and by various hands (see Introduction, and Col. VII, ll. 7 ff.; Col. VIII, with notes). *Idniš* simply sums up the cash on hand in the temple treasury, including the balance of the previous year with the sum of the present year's contributions up to Phamenoth 3, 419. The most natural rendering of Col. VII, l. 1, supports this view (cf. n. 2). Moreover, this rendering and the reckoning based upon it will hold good, whether the temple-tax theory just developed stand the test of time or not. Whatever the payments and their purpose, the list up to the summation at this point represents payments made on or before Phamenoth 3, 419 B.C., the sum represents these plus cash on hand from previous contributions, the following names represent later contributions not included in any sum total until the next balancing of accounts. If the temple-revenue theory be right, it is interesting to notice that the payment and the closing of accounts fell in Egypt late in the fifth century B.C. in June, in the middle of the solar year, whereas in Palestine at a later date proclamation was made on the first of Adar and payment was due from the fifteenth (in the country) to the twenty-fifth (in the temple itself) of the same month, i.e., in March (Mishnah, *Šeqaltin* 1:1, 3; chaps. 6 and 7, also, are interesting laws, in case the tax of one person was paid by another), i.e., at the close of the ecclesiastical year.

5 Therein to *lh* k. 12, §. 6;
 to *šmbjpl* Krš 7;
 to *šnbjpl* the sum of krš 12.¹

¹ It is very surprising to find that moneys given to or for Jahweh are now divided between him and others; Jahweh, in fact, receives less than half of the whole sum, and but little more than one of the Bethels who share with him:

Jahweh	§. 126 (should be 128?)	} §. 190 (192?)
<i>šmbjpl</i>	§. 70	
Anathbethel	§. 120 (possibly 122)	

Before proceeding further two points deserve mention. The total of the divided sums, §. 316, lacks two shekels of the sum total, §. 318. Did two shekels go to the scribe? Was it a lapse of the pen by homoioteleuton after the portion of Anathbethel, krš 12, written XII, and 2, written II? Or was it caused by a forgotten transfer of two shekels from one of the Bethel funds to the general Jahweh fund, or vice versa, to even up the krš in the Bethel funds? This last query was suggested to the translator by a re-examination of the mysterious *lh*, Col. I, l. 5, n. 3. Col. I, ll. 5-10, and Col. II, ll. 1-5 and 7-10, 15 names in all clearly show this addition. It is not found before nor after these points except in Col. VIII (on which see n. 2). But between Col. I, ll. 10 and 19, lie 8 names and between Col. II, ll. 5 and 7, one in which the end of the line is missing; it is possible that these 9 names, too, had after them the same *lh*, making 24 in all. Deducting these 24 from a total of 118 leaves 94 persons, 188 shekels; a mistake of one person in our count or a transfer of two shekels from the Jahweh fund would make for the Bethels 190, for Jahweh 46. This is the result arrived at on the assumption that *lh*, "for him," means contributions specifically designated for the Jahweh fund. In adding the 46 to last year's balance, the final 6 of 46 may have caused the error 126 for 128, aided by the fact that the two units of Jahweh's 12 krš with the 6 of the shekels make 8 strokes together. The translator is fully aware of the weakness of this suggestion: 188 is not 190, and the division between the Bethels is not indicated by another mark like *lh*. Yet some means of regulating the division *Idnjh* must have had; and if the proportion 12:7, both holy numbers, served for the Bethels, no like principle seems to serve for Jahweh's proportion, although 126 may stand in preference to 128 because of its divisibility by 3. In the main, the more general Jahweh fund may have received the bulk made up of balance plus specially designated contributions, while the others were regulated by the foregoing proportion. This is, of course, only a possibility, no more. Perhaps, however, it is significant that in the absolutely certain *lh*-names no woman's name is found; cf. Col. I, l. 5, n. 3; l. 19, n. 5; Col. VIII, l. 1, n. 6, and No. 1, l. 6, n. 1, which may need correction, i.e., the century may, after all, be a military unit. Now who are Jahweh's consorts and what is their relation to him? Jahweh is superior to the others, he appears to be the supreme God: the temple is his (Nos. 8 and 12), he alone is mentioned in the superscription, his name is first in the division, the priests are priests of Jahweh (No. 11), the altar and service are his (No. 8), he is "the God and Lord of heaven" (Nos. 8 and 9). But after all, not only in the life and speech of the people, but even in the very cult, probably the cult of the Jahweh temple itself, Jahweh is not absolutely alone. The Ba'als and Ashtartes, indeed, whom the old prophets had so fiercely denounced, are nowhere found in the Jewish colony; only on the jars of Phoenician wine-dealers does Ba'al appear. But more than a half-dozen

- 1 Micaiah the son of *Ihūšm*^c (the) s(um of) š. 2;
 1 ^cu^c the son of Nathan the son of *Hūdūh* (the) s(um of) š. 2;
 1 ^chū^c the son of Nathan the son of ^cAnani (the) s(um of) š. 2;

Aramaic gods or Aramaized Assyrian gods play some part in the documents. Hadad, Nebo, Nusku, Atthar, and ^cAte (in the form ^ct, before ^cidri, No. 1, l. 20), as well as Haram (Harmān?), ^cšm, ^cAnath, and Bethel are found in proper names. Not only is Khnum recognized as a god, as well as Jahweh, even though his priests be stigmatized (No. 8), not only does a Jewess, named after Jahweh, upon occasion swear by a local Egyptian goddess Satis (*APA F*), but a plurality of gods is called upon for blessing in the greeting (Nos. 3, 10; cf. No. 4, and in several fragmentary private letters), oath is taken by Haram-bethel (perhaps designated as "our god"), and probably also by ^cAnathⁱ*h* (who may be identical with the ^cAnath of the Bethel here) and the *msgd*, "place," or "object of worship" (i.e., temple, altar, or Bethel-stone); cf. No. 1, l. 6, n. 2. And if all this be popular, here is a document representing the official religion, in which two Bethels, remnants of fetishism, or two inhabitants of a Bethel, share the cult moneys, and probably also a place in the temple and service of the cult, with Jahweh. Such pillars and paraphernalia were not in the temple of Zerubbabel, Haggai, and Zechariah, but they were found in the Solomonic temple; cf., e.g., I Kings 7:15-22; Jer. 52:17-23; II Kings 18:4 (cf. Col. I, l. 3, n. 1). And however much the service of these Bethels and their inhabitants was merged with the service of Jahweh, as is that of the saints today with the supreme Deity conceived as one; however unclear the ideas of these people as to the difference and relation between these minor deities and their great divinity (they had no Mohammed to corner them into a statement about Allah's daughters), they can hardly have been quite unaware of their true nature. The warlike and severe ^cAnath, whose riding-beast was the lion, was well enough known in the Hellenistic world a century later (cf. Col. VI, l. 8, n. 7). And if ^cšm was until recently much less well known than his relatives Eshmūn and the female Ashima (II Kings 17:30; cf. Amos 8:14, "the sin [^cašmath] of Samaria"), whom Latin inscriptions of our era identify with Juno, Greek ones with Athena, Jupiter's daughter, and whom Pseudo-Melito still knows as Hadad's daughter, yet he too, with a *συμβέτυλος*, perhaps our very ^cšmbethel, is still honored with a Greek inscription in North Syria in 223 A.D. (Lidzbarski, *Ephem.*, III, 260 ff. and literature there referred to). As Bethel is a god's house or dwelling-place, ultimately deified (cf. No. 1, l. 6, n. 2), and *Hrm* is the divine sanctity and inviolability localized and then personified, so ^cšm may be the divine name personified, though these Jews probably did not recognize this fact. The name ^cšmrām, elsewhere in these papyri, indicates that to them ^cšm was masculine; or is the Babylonian Išum there (No. 22, l. 6, n. 8) to be distinguished from an Aramaic ^cšm, perhaps female, here?

¹ "Jahweh hears," the only name of this form, *Ihū* followed by an imperfect, in these papyri; like its congener, the feminine *Ihūšm*, it is not found in the Old Testament. Similar forms in the Bible are Jehoiakim, Jehoiachin, and Jehoiarib, none of them earlier than Jeremiah. Between ll. 6 and 7 the space of about two lines is left blank. On the handwritting of these lines, see the introductory statement to this document.

² Cf. No. 13, l. 5, n. 5; the *h* there should have a dot under it.

- 10 I 'Azariah' the son of *Hšyū* (the) s(um of) š. 2;
 I Isaiah the son of Berechi <ah> (the) s(um of) > š. 2;
 2;
 I the daughter of *Kš*³ (the) s(um of) š. 2;⁴

Column VIII

- I *Bgprn* the son of *Ušhš*⁵ (the) s(um of) š. 2 *l?nr*(or *d)m*,⁶
 I *Uššš* the son of *Zr*(or *d)mr*(or *d*) (the) s(um of) š. 2 *lh*,⁷
 I Haggai the son of *Mphšhš*⁸ (the) s(um of) š. 2 *lfb* . . .

³ I Kings 4:2, 5; II Kings 14:21; 15: *passim*; Jer. 43:2; Dan. 1: *passim*; 2:17, and frequently in Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah.

⁴ Neither name is absolutely certain. Isaiah (cf. Isa. 1:1 and *passim*; II Kings 19:20 ff.; II Chron. 26:22; 32:20, 32; Ecclus. 48:20; written Jeshaiiah, I Chron. 3:21; 25:3, 15; 26:25; Ezra 8:7, 19; Neh. 11:7). Berechi <ah>, thus, certainly not as Sachau and Ungnad read, *Bnš* (Zech. 1:1, 7; I Chron. 3:20; 6:39; 9:16; 15:17, 23; II Chron. 28:12; Neh. 3:4, 30; 6:18).

⁵ Perhaps Chidon (I Chron. 13:9; cf. II Sam. 6:6).

⁶ Below l. 14 a space corresponding to five lines in the adjoining Col. VI is left blank. Col. VIII follows on the back of the papyrus with not more than three names, again queerly spaced; cf. the following notes. For a probable explanation of this spacing see l. 7, n. 1, above, and the introductory statement on the handwriting.

⁷ *Bgprn*, Megaphernes, cf. No. 6, l. 6, n. 2. *Ušhš*, probably also Persian or Iranian; cf. names like Vashti (Esther, chaps. 1 and 2), and Vashni (I Chron. 6:28 [American Revised Version, n. 13]).

⁸ In ll. 1 and 3 of Col. VIII the place of *h* after *l* is taken by a longer word, in both cases probably a proper name. Unfortunately both cases offer difficulties in the reading. The name in l. 1 ends in *rm* (*rām*?) or *dm*; this is preceded by a not uncommon form of *n*; the sign between *n* and *l* is clear enough, but is not found just so elsewhere; it may be a miswritten *z*, a miswritten *š*, ligature of *š*, ligature of *šj*; both the second and last reading offer *Sin-rām* or *Sndm*, perhaps Aramaization or misspelling of *Sin-iddinam*, as possibilities; *šmrm*, however tempting, is hardly probable; the other readings offer no intelligible solution. In line 3 *fb* may be the beginning of *Tabeel* (Isa. 7:6; Ezra 4:7) or *Tobiah* or the like. This rather makes against the explanation of *lh*, mentioned, Col. VII, l. 6, n. 1. It is, however, by no means certain that the two words discussed are proper names; they may be other cult objects, parts of the service, or something quite different from any of these suggestions. Yet the similarity of the *Sndm*, here suggested, with *Sndn*, Col. I, l. 18 (cf. n. 2), is striking; for the most part, *lh* follows a line mentioning a "century," by name, and in the last analysis seems most probably to mean "belonging to the same (century);" cf. Col. I, l. 5, n. 3; l. 19 n. 5.

⁷ A space of four or five lines between this and the next line is blank, partly by reason of poor erasure of the underlying Demotic writing. If, however, no space at all had been desired, l. 3 might very well have been written directly under l. 2.

⁸ *Miphšhš*, a common phonetic variant for *Miphšhš*, Col. II, l. 5, n. 3.

NO. 16. NAME LIST. PURPOSE UNKNOWN

This list is of little importance in itself. It is probably a generation or so earlier than No. 15, as the handwriting and the names (cf. especially l. 7, n. 5) seem to indicate. It is placed after No. 15 because of its lesser importance and the lack of any dating, but before the more important No. 17, both because it is probably earlier, and so as not to separate it from its relative, perhaps very near, No. 15. *APE* Pap. 17 (P. 13484).

- Haggai the son of *Ntyn*,¹
Hrmn the son of *ʿuś*,²
ʿuś the son of *Jtym*,³
ʿuś the son of *Hwdy*,⁴
5 *Šmy* the son of Haggai;
Nathan the son of Neriah;
Menahem the son of *Puśi*,⁵
Juś the son of Azaniah,⁶
Bḫḫ-qb the son of 'Aner',⁷
10 Total of 9 men.

NO. 17. NAME LIST WITH ACCOUNT (OF RATIONS FURNISHED TO A PART OF THE SYENNESE ARMY?)

This is another important document for the secular history of the community at Elephantine. It compares with No. 15 as does No. 7 with No. 8. Very fragmentary, and with much still unclear and in debate, as the text and notes will show, in what little is clear it offers valuable information on administrative affairs (cf. No. 3, l. 1, n. 4; No. 5, l. 12, n. 6), and fascinating problems in its very uncertainties. The names in Col. I are for the most part non-Jewish

¹ Cf. No. 15, Col. IV, l. 3; but see also No. 13, l. 5; cf. No. 15, Col. III, l. 9, and No. 12, l. 5.

² Cf. No. 15, Col. I, l. 3.

⁴ Cf. No. 15, Col. VII, l. 8.

³ Cf. No. 12, l. 4; No. 13, l. 5.

⁵ Cf. No. 15, Col. IV, ll. 17, 18.

⁶ Neh. 10:9. This and its congener Jaazaniah, found elsewhere in these papyri, and in Jer. 35:3; II Kings 25:23 (cf. Jer. 40:8; 42:1, Jezaniah); Ezek. 8:11; 11:1, present earlier forms of the name *Jdnjh*, *Jʿdnjh* (cf. No. 11, l. 17, n. 11; according to the vocalization of the received Massoretic text to be read Jedaniah and Jaadaniah, respectively).

⁷ Not *ʿsr*, as Sachau and Ungnad read. *ʿAner* (Gen. 14:13, 24; I Chron. 6:70). *ʿsr*, pronounced Ezer or Azzur, occurs a number of times in Jeremiah, Ezekiel, I Chronicles, and Nehemiah.

in type as are those of No. 3 and of several other lists to be offered later. We may thus have to do with the rationing of a non-Jewish portion of the Persian (or Egyptian?) army at Elephantine (cf. Nos. 1 and 2).

Of course the value of this observation, slight as it is, would be reduced to almost nil, if it should turn out—as is possible, but hardly probable—that Col. I does not belong here.

For the rest, e.g., a possible date, see the footnotes. *APE* Pap. 19 (P. 13479).

Column I

. šm. §² 1
 § Zbī <so>n of Nbušlu³ §, 1
 § Hḫī <so>n of Šm³i³ §² 1

¹ Like No. 15, this document, a statement or account of some sort, is full of abbreviations. The first of these to occur in the extant text is §. Least probable and least consistent within themselves are the suggestions of Sachau: § = Babylonian šu (corresponding to Hebrew šd, Gen. 18:6, etc.); § (before each line in Col. I) = shekel; k (before Col. I, ll. 7 and 16) = kesef, "silver, the sum of"; g and h (Col. III, l. 9) = gerah (Exod. 30:13, etc.) and ḫallār (*APA*, *passim*). Of these suggestions only the last two have any verisimilitude, as will appear presently. The end of Col. II and Col. III suggest that we have to do with a statement on the disbursement of rations to the Syennese army or garrison (cf. Nos. 1 and 2). Eduard Meyer believes that § = sheep, and that we have to do with meat rations, 100 sheep being divided between 54 persons, 2 receiving each 1½ sheep, 22 each 1, and 30 each 2½ (cf. Col. II, ll. 9-14). In this case § might be the relative pronoun šē, used in the sense of "portion of x sheep y"; k is left unexplained, except as a mark of the two, who receive each 1½. We have, however, no other evidence of provender payments in meat rations, and such largesse of flesh would hardly accord with either modern oriental usage or what is known of the rationing of ancient armies, especially in the East; but cf. Exod. 16:3. Comparing Nos. 1 and 2 and a document to be presented later, *APE* No. 36, in which a soldier agrees to pay from his wages 1 qab of barley monthly, much the most probable suggestion is that of Lidzbarski (*Ephem.*, III, 252, end of p. 251, n. 2), that § = šm, "barley," the genus, and ḫdb, artabae, the measure (cf. k = kesef, "silver, the sum of," § = shekels in No. 15). In this case the § before each name might very well stand for the same thing: "the barley of x"; k to be explained, as above noted, as a mark of rank or station, entitling to a larger ration of 1½ artabae, the exact rank or title being

[Note 1 continued on p. 365]

² Cf. No. 1, l. 8, n. 4. Zbī . . . , the following sign looks like an s, in which case the uncertain Babylonian *Za-bi-si* (*CIS*, II, 67) may be compared. The names in this document have in general a very non-Jewish appearance in marked contrast with, e.g., Nos. 15, 16, 19, 20.

³ Šm³i, neither the i nor the existence of another letter quite certain, may be Shemaiah or an abbreviation (II Sam. 16:5, etc.) Hḫī reminds of Huppim (Gen. 46:21; I Chron. 7:12, 15), Hupham (Num. 26:39), and Huppah (I Chron. 24:13).

5 § ʔšm¹ 1
 § Pšš² son of H(?)r³š⁴ ʔ 1
 §/ Šh⁵ son of H⁶ur l. ʔ 1 h⁷š⁸
 k §/(?) Šm ʔ 1 r⁴ 2
 §
 10 §
 §/ šh 2(?)⁹
 § nln §<ʔ> 1
 § son of Hlqī.⁶ <ʔ> 1
 § <so>n of N⁷urš⁸š⁹ ʔ 1
 § Š(?) gr(or d)¹ son of Blbn(?)⁸ ʔ 1
 15 § Ur (or d) son of Z¹u²ī³

unknown. The *g* (gerah, $\frac{1}{16}$ shekel) and *h* (*hallur* $\frac{1}{4}$ or $\frac{1}{16}$ shekel) of Col. III, l. 9, seem to be too small to have any reference to the distribution of barley and are units of weight like the shekel, not of measure like the artaba; yet note No. 1, l. 7: "for each man barley, artabae 2, g. 2 . . ."; *hallur* occurs elsewhere only in connection with shekels as a unit of money values. If Col. III, l. 9, refers to money values, two possibilities are open: the rather large sum mentioned may refer to the payment for the rations purchased; or, since a soldier received in wages money (*APA* L) as well as rations, the money payment may there be summed up as were the rations, Col. II, *fm*. If *h* and *g* be grain measures the large number (anywhere from 152-952) preceding indicates a total of weight, all the rations purchased, or those delivered from some town (*Nḫ*, Thebes, Col. III, l. 4) or district (*Tšrs*, l. 7).

¹ Looks like a compound with the god ʔšm; cf. No. 15, Col. VII, l. 6, n. 7, and Index of Proper Names; Eshmun is also possible.

² *Pšš* probably Petisis, Egyptian. *Hr³š⁴*, cf. No. 3, l. 6, n. 4, another document of non-Jewish appearance.

³ With the names of this line compare those in No. 5. For *h⁷š⁸*, see No. 15, Col. I, l. 5, n. 3. The curious stroke after § here, l. 10, and perhaps also l. 7, looks very like the check marks of No. 15.

⁴ *r* (or *d*), frequent in *APA*, designates in many places a unit of weight smaller than the shekel. It has been a matter of debate whether it means *rb^c*, $\frac{1}{4}$, or "a fourer," i.e., 4 gerah = $\frac{1}{4}$ shekel. Col. II, l. 10, below, where two persons, probably the two designated by prefixed *k* in this line and l. 16, receiving each ʔ 1 r 2, receive together ʔ 3, proves almost beyond a doubt that here $\frac{1}{4}$, "two fourths," are meant.

⁵ This 2 is very uncertain; may be *h⁷š⁸* as in l. 6, or something else.

⁶ *Helkai* (Neh. 12:15) or the full name *Hilkiah* (Isa. 22:20; 36:3, 22; II Kings 18:26 f.; Jer. 1:1; 29:3; I Chron. 6:45; 26:11; Neh. 8:4; 12:7, 21) are possibilities, especially as this name occurs elsewhere in these name lists.

⁷ *N⁷urš⁸š⁹*, a common phonetic variant in Babylonian of *Nur-Šamaš*.

⁸ Perhaps Babylonian *Šamaš-giriya* and *Bel-bšni*.

⁹ Why is the "ʔ 1" omitted? Does he with the following "*H⁶ur* . . ." etc., receive only ʔ 1 r 2 together?

k § *Hu* son of *I^cu^u* (or *n*) § 1 r 2
 § son of *rⁱ hu* § 1
 § *Phr.* § 1

Column II

. *gu* *pb_i* § 1 *hu*

 100
 *cⁿ* § 1
 5 §³.

 son of *tnⁿ* § 1
 *nkl* son of *d* (or *r*)_i § 1

(Between ll. 8 and 9 the space of a line is left blank in the original.)
 every soul (i.e., altogether) 54 wherein (or whereof)

10 . . to (each ?) one § 1 r 2 = (?) § 3 (?)²
 . . 22 (+ ?) to (each ?) one § 1 = (?) § 22
 soul³ 30 to (each ?) one § § 75.
 total disbursement
 § 1 100⁴

Column III

total disburse <ment> <gi>ven to the Syennese⁵
 army
 i.e., d <ay> <Me>hir, year 4,⁶ unto day

² Ari, abbreviated from *Arjay*, "lion of Jahweh" (Samaritan Ostraca)? Or abbreviation of Uriah? Or *d_i*; cf. Babylonian *Addija*, etc.?

• ³ It is possible from the photographic reprint to read 4 or some other number preceded by 10. Eduard Meyer and others are sure of 3 from the original. As 3 fits the sum total of persons and § excellently (cf. Col. I, l. 1, n. 1; l. 7, n. 4), it carries probability very near to the boundary of certainty.

⁴ I.e., of course, person, individual; 2½ or some other form of 2½ may be supplied after the first § in this line with nearly the same certainty ascribed to the reading "3" for l. 10 in n. 1, above.

⁵ I.e., one hundred, the number of hundreds being indicated, not as in the case of the twenties by a repetition of the numeral, but by single strokes up to nine placed before the numeral 100; see below, Col. III, ll. 6 and 11. 1,000 is written in this document as elsewhere, though a tear in the papyrus does not permit us to say whether abbreviated, *lp*, or in full, *lp, ²elef*, Col. III, l. 11.

⁶ Cf. No. 12, l. 6, n. 5.

⁷ What year 4 is meant, that of Darius II, or of Amyrtaeus (cf. No. 14), or still another, it is impossible to say. To the translator by reason of the few names of Jewish appearance, Amyrtaeus appears at least as probable as any other; cf. Nos. 13 and 14.

- 20 to(?)*m* which was given in provisions (?) . . .
 brought(?) city of Nδ² by *Unpr*.¹
- 5 son of ²*h* and ²*dr*² son of ².
 . . . thousand(?) 4 100 (i.e., 400) 46 (i.e. in our Arabic numeral
 writing 1(?)446) g 2 h 4(+?) . . .
- (The space of about two lines is left blank between ll. 6 and 7 in the original.)
 And of (or from) grain(?) <T> *štrs ptp*³ which he(?) gave
 to the a<rmy> (?)
 from (or of) ²*lyn* 2(+?) 5(+?)
 152 g 1 h
- (Again the space of a line or two is left blank.)
- 10 And (that) which was given *pt* . . to the army . .
š <thou> sand⁴ 4(+, perhaps 6) 100 90 (i.e., 1490 or
 1690+).
- (The space of a line appears to be blank.)
 M(?)*ehir* yea<r>
 and from (or of)
 76 (+, perhaps 197)

Five or six small fragments perhaps belonging to the foregoing
 add nothing new. Only disconnected words are legible: "to the
 army . . . he brought . . . was given . . . city of Nδ²
 . . . *Šh*² son of . . ." etc.

NO. 18. NAME LIST

Remnants of two columns, only a shred of the second preserved.
 The intermingling of Egyptian names with Jewish is worthy of
 note. *APE* Pap. 20 (P. 13487).

Column I

- ²*hiu* the son of Nathan⁵ . . .
 Nathan the son of *M'uzih* . . .
Hur the son of h . . .
Mhsh the son of *Ihyt* . . .
 5 Hanan the son of *Phnm*⁶ . .

¹ Probably an Egyptian name.

² Abbreviation of some name like Adriel (I Sam. 18:19; II Sam. 21:8).

³ Probably an abbreviation in soldiers' slang of *ptprs*; cf. No. 11, l. 3, n. 2; the
 meaning is in all probability "pay in rations," wages paid in rations.

⁴ Cf. Col. II, l. 14, n. 4.

⁵ Cf. No. 31 = *APA* J 19.

⁶ Hanan (I Chron. 8:23, 38; 9:44; 11:43; Ezra 2:46; Neh. 7:49; 8:7; 10:10,
 22, 26; 13:13); *Pa-Khnūm* is Egyptian.

- Shallum the son of *H* . . .
Plîî the son of Mattan¹ . . .
 10 *Kîî* the son of *ʿzyr*²
Pîhnm the son of *Hûrî*³
 10 *Rʿyîh*⁴ the son of Zechariah 10 3. . . .
 Menahem the son of Mattan
Pîhnm the son of Zaccur
 Haggai the son of Micaiah
*Uîdî*⁵ the son of Uri the son of *Mîsh*
 15 *Šy*⁶ the son of Zechariah

NO. 19. NAME LIST

Another fragment containing names largely of Jewish type.
APÉ Pap. 21 (P. 13486):

-
*Bʿdîh*⁷ the son of . . .
*ʿyî*⁸ the son of *ʿy* . . .
 Mattan the son of *Šîm* the son of . . .
 5 Mesh<ull>am the son of *Šmʿî* . . .
 Shemaiah the son of *Šîm* . . .
 Menahem(?) the son of *Mî* . . .
 Haggai the son of *ʿznî*⁹ . . .
ʿgr(or *dî*) the son of *ʿšî*¹⁰ . . .
 10 Nathan the son of *Hîdîh*.

¹ Sachau misread this into "the curious name *nbtu*."

² Compare the curious name of the prophet Zephaniah's father, Cushi (Zeph. 1:1), found also Jer. 36:14. *ʿzyr*, *ʿAzzûr* or *ʿAzôr* is a hypocoristic form of Azariah or the like.

³ Egyptian names. *Pefî-Khnûm*.

⁴ Cf. No. 15, Col. V, l. 4, n. 7.

⁵ Nothing further than this numeral, corresponding to the similar numeral in Col. I, l. 8, is preserved of Col. II. It is clear that two names are missing at the top of Col. I; how much else is missing we do not know.

⁶ Perhaps abbreviated from *ʿayîda* (Lidzbarski); Sachau and Ungnad read *D*(or *R*)*îd*(or *rî*); cf. the queer *Lîîy* and *Tb*, *APA* K (No. 32).

⁷ Consonants exactly like *Sheva* (I Chron. 2:49; II Sam. 20:25).

⁸ Cf. No. 31 = *APA* J 18; perhaps Baʿadiiah, "for me (i.e., my protector) is Jahweh" (Lidzbarski); Cowley aptly compares the king ʿIaubi-di of Hamath mentioned in the cuneiform inscriptions; see inscription of king *Zkr* of Hamath in the Appendix.

⁹ Cf. No. 16, l. 8, n. 6; probably Jezaniah.

¹⁰ Probably a compound with the name of the god *ʿšm*; hardly Eshcol (Gen. 14:13, 24), as Sachau proposes.

NO. 20. NAME LIST

Names of extraordinary type; some Persian, the others what?
APE Pap. 23 (P. 13482).

.....
 . *tyh*
 . *br*
Bh
 5 *U'hsib* . . .
rtbny . . .
r
isk
Prnm
 10 10 *Bgbhš*
Prniš
Zbmn
Prtnyn
šjdt

NO. 21. NAME LIST

APE Pap. 22 (P. 13483).

Column I contains only the sorriest scraps from the ends of eight lines running, as they approach the bottom, increasingly over toward, and finally into the territory of, Col. II. "And we judge" or "and was judged" and "they cry, shout," is the sum total of what can be made out with any degree of probability. The meaning of the peculiar signs before the names in Col. II has not yet been discovered.

Column II

┐ . . . *ih* the son of
 ┐ Haggai(?) the son of Zechar<iah?> . . .
M(or H)'d(or r)š hš
 ┐ Shemaiah the son of
 5 Hoshaiah the son of . . *nih*¹

¹ Sachau reads *Brzi*, *Barzi*, Bardija, i.e., Smerdes.

² *Aprdšavos*.

³ *Bāgabuhkhša*, i.e., *Merydšvōs*.

⁴ *Ašjadāta*, present of Asja, angel of the seventeenth day of the month. As far as they have been identified at all, the names of this list are Iranian. All of them as far as they are preserved look strange, non-Jewish, non-Semitic.

⁵ Cf. No. 15, Col. I, l. 6.

- Jaazaniah the son of . . . *tjh*¹
- Zechariah the son of . . . *r*(or *d*)*jh*²
- Meshullam the son of . . . *snjh* (Jaazaniah?)
- Jaazaniah the son of Hilkiah.³

NO. 22. NAME LIST

Note the mixture of types. *APE* Pap. 24 (P. 13481).

RECTO

- the son of Nath <an>
- Ptjst⁴ the son of *Ntjn* (or *Ntj*)
- R (or D) . . the son of *B-rj*⁵
- Psy*⁶ the son of *Ksj*
- 5 . *n*(?)*h*(?)*hnm* the son of *Hnmw*⁷
- šm-kdr*⁸ the son of *š*(?)*p*⁹
- Hyr the son of *š-kšjt*

VERSO

- šmrn*¹⁰ the son of *Nbynd*.
- Psy* the son of *Mnkj*¹¹
- *n*.

II. LEGAL DOCUMENTS

A. *APA*

The ten documents included under this head form a sort of family archive containing records of a variety of legal transactions concerning questions of ownership and property rights, marital

¹ Jaazaniah; cf. No. 16, l. 8, n. 6; Sachau (with great assurance) and Ungnad read faultily an otherwise unknown *Jšjh*. The father's name may be supplemented with Sachau, Shephatiah (II Sam. 3:4; Jer. 38:1; Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, *passim*) or, more probably, because elsewhere found in these documents, Pelatiah, cf. No. 15, Col. II, l. 2, n. 7.

² If . . . *djh*, then probably Zebadiah (cf. No. 15, Col. I, l. 12, n. 5), or Obadiah (I Kings 18:3-7, 16; Obad. 1; I Chron. 3:21; 7:3; 8:38; 9:16, 44; 12:9; 27:19; II Chron. 17:7; 34:12; Ezra 8:9; Neh. 10:5; 12:25), not found elsewhere in these papyri, misread or misprinted by Cowley in *APA*, J=No. 31, l. 18 (cf. No. 19, l. 2, n. 8).

³ Cf. No. 17, Col. I, l. 12, n. 6.

⁴ Possibly Beeri (Hos. 1:1; Gen. 26:34).

⁵ Egyptian Hierius.

⁶ Cf. No. 11, l. 11, n. 5.

⁷ Both names are compounds with the name of the Egyptian god Khnum; the second seems to be *Khnum-oh* (cf. Pharaoh), "Khnum great," the lord of Yeb-Elephantine.

⁸ *šm-kudurri*; the Babylonian type of the name speaks for Ungnad's identification of *šm* with *Išum*, a Babylonian god of pestilence.

⁹ *šm-rām*, cf. No. 15, Col. VIII, l. 1, n. 6, and preceding note.

¹⁰ Cf. No. 11, l. 11, n. 5.

affairs, matters of inheritance, etc. They settled troubles of this nature for three generations of one and the same Jewish family in Elephantine, from 471-410 B.C. Perhaps they were gathered together to establish claims upon an inheritance with minor details of which the last of them deals. Whether this be so or not, these family papers were apparently kept together for some occasion of this sort; in any case, they are admirably adapted for such a purpose, establishing both legitimacy of descent and, chiefly, legal title to properties. Excellently preserved, they are as a set quite as interesting, and from some points of view nearly if not quite as important as anything yet found at Elephantine.

Their title, *Aramaic Papyri Discovered at Assuan*, dates from the days when the lie of the fellah finders was still believed, while their truth was rejected. The truth is, of course, that these, as well as *APE*, were found, not in any mysterious hole in the rock near Assuan, not on the main land at all, but on the island of Yeb-Elephantine.

All but the first, which is in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, are now in the Museum at Cairo, whose numerical designation will be set forth at the head of each together with the letter assigned to it by the original editors.

NO. 23. AGREEMENT CONCERNING A PARTY WALL(?)

It is not absolutely certain that a party wall, i.e., a wall on the boundary between the properties of two parties, is meant (see notes); the parallel with Kohler and Ungnad, *Hammurabi's Gesetz*, p. 29, No. 79, is striking and adds, perhaps, to the probability of the interpretation given below. In any case a party of the first part (A) has built on ground belonging to a party of the second part (B), and A here renounces all right of ownership in both ground and construction.

APA A, Bodl. Libr., Aram. MS, No. 1:

On the 18th of Elul, that is the 28th day of Pachons,¹ the 15th year

¹ On these double dates see "Chronological Notes," *AJS*, XXVII (April, 1911), 233-66; also Ed. Mahler, "Die Doppeldaten der aramäischen Papyri von Assuan," *ZA*, XXVI (February, 1912), 61-76. The translator takes this occasion publicly to thank Mr. J. K. Fotheringham for the gift of a copy of his able article on the "Calendar-Dates in the Aramaic Papyri from Assuan," *Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society*, November, 1908.

- 2 of Xerxes' the king, said | *Qynih* the son of *Šdq* an Aramaean of
 Syene, belonging to the colors of *Urist*, to *Mahseiah* the son of *Idnih*,
 3 an Aramaean of Syene, | belonging to the colors of *Urist*,² saying:
 I came to thee and thou didst give me the gateway of thy house
 4 to build | one buttress-wall(?)³ there. That buttress-wall which
 is attached to my house at its corner which is toward the south
 5 shall be thine. | That buttress-wall shall adjoin the side of my house
 from the ground upwards from the corner of my house which is

² The date, as now generally accepted by all competent scholars, is September 12, 471 B.C.; Mahler's "17th of Elul" involves a misreading of the original, as is now generally recognized. Xerxes is written *Hšp̄rš*, as in *APE* Pap. 70 (Tafel 57, Pap. 13442), No. 20 (a small fragment; beside the king's name only a few words, "he sent [word ?] to thee," and "Egypt," can be read with certainty), and probably, also No. 29 (a still smaller fragment; bits of two lines are legible: . . . who [are] bound [as prisoners?] . . . | . . . <H>šp̄<r>š, the king" . . .); cf. also No. I, l. 1, n. 1.

³ Of these names one only, *Mahseiah*, is found just so in the Old Testament (Jer. 32:12; 51:59; cf. No. 15, Col. I, l. 1). *Šdq* may be *Zadok* (II Sam. 8:17, etc.; I Kings 1:8, etc.; II Kings 15:33; Ezek. 40:46, etc.; Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah, *passim*), or some other form of abbreviation for *Zedekiah* or a similar name. *Urist* is Persian *Wartsath*, *Ὀβάρις*. *Dgl*, "flag, standard," translated "colors," cf. No. 14, l. 3, n. 4; see also G. B. Gray in *JQR*, XI, 92 ff. The word "colors" has been chosen in translation because it designates a flag used as an emblem to distinguish military units from one another; complete transfer of meaning as in the German "Fähnlein" has not been made in English. The reading *rgl*, translated "quarter (clientèle)" by Cowley, may now be dropped as very improbable.

³ The word here translated "buttress wall" may in the original be read either *ʔgr* or *ʔgd*. The one thing quite clear is that *Qynih* must build on *Mahseiah*'s ground (see plan, to follow *APA*), the stipulation of this document being that both ground and construction shall be *Mahseiah*'s property. This indicates a necessity, rather than a luxury. Now, a real necessity in not a few cases, as shown by the excavations (*ZdS*, XLVI [1910], 1-61), was a buttress wall, since the mud-brick (adobe) walls not infrequently weakened and became unsafe, either through faults in hasty construction or by reason of the frailty of the material. If we read *ʔgr*, Assyrian, Persian, and Arabic derivatives from this root suggest the meaning given above, which further fits the description of ll. 4 and 5 perfectly. A *maštaba* (Cowley) is much less probable. *ʔgd*, a vaulted construction, probably of wood, to support an extension of *Qynih*'s (roof-) terrace (Barth, *Rév. Sév.*, XVII, 149 ff., and many German scholars after him) would have been a decided luxury, for wood was scarce in Elephantine; it would be imperfectly described in ll. 4 and 5 ("from the ground up," and it would probably have extended to *Mahseiah*'s house as well as to *Zechariah*'s), and of such wood construction in the private houses of that time the excavations discovered no remains nor palpable trace. If *ʔgd* be read, then a vaulted or arched support of a staircase leading to the roof or upper story of *Qynih*'s house would be more probable, judging from the finds. Even so, however, Cowley's "at the upper end" instead of "toward the south" is wrong; upward, i.e., upstream, is south, downward is north in these papyri, as from time immemorial in Egypt.

- 6 toward the south as far as the house of Zechariah.¹ | Neither tomorrow nor on any later day shall I have power to restrain thee
 7 from building upon (or above) this thy buttress-wall. | If I should restrain thee, I will pay thee the sum of 5 *krš* by the king's weights,
 8 pure silver,² and that buttress-wall | <shall be thine> nevertheless.³ And if *Qunih* should die, neither tomorrow nor on any later

¹ This line was omitted at the first writing; it is crowded between what are now ll. 4 and 6. It is interesting that one of the parties to the agreement, probably Mahseiah, in whose interest it was drawn up, should have noticed the omission of this important legal detail and insisted upon its insertion. The legal usage of these documents reflects Babylonian rather than Egyptian law and practice (although of the latter we know very little). Space and time forbid the giving of parallels in detail. The student and general reader is referred to Sayce's brief statement in the Introduction to *APA*, to C. H. W. Johns, *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts, and Letters* (New York, 1904), and to Kohler and Ungnad, *Hundert ausgewählte Rechtsurkunden* (Leipzig, 1911). For more serious study the following works may be recommended: Kohler and Peiser, *Aus dem babylonischen Rechtsleben* (Leipzig, 1890); C. H. W. Johns, *Assyrian Deeds and Documents* (Cambridge, 1898-1901); *Business Documents of Murashu Sons*, Bab. Exp. of the University of Pennsylvania, Series A, No. IX, 1898 (Hilprecht and Clay), and Vol. X, 1904 (Clay); A. T. Clay, *Babylonian Records in the Library of Pierpont Morgan*, Part I, 1912, and, especially, Part II, 1913. See also, Kohler, Peiser, and Ungnad, *Hammurabi's Gesets* (Leipzig, 1904-9). For comparison with Talmudic usage, one may consult S. Fuchs, "Talmudische Rechtsurkunden," *Mitteilungen des Seminars für oriental. Sprachen* (Berlin, 1912 and 1915), and in *Zeitschrift für vergleich. Rechtswissenschaft*, XXX (1913).

² The *Krš*, as these papyri show, is a "tenner," a money value (coin?) of ten shekels. "The king's weights," literally "stones" (cf. the singular of the same expression in II Sam. 14:26) represent a standard fixed by the royal government; the standard for the silver shekel was 5.6 grams in weight, representing a money value of \$0.27846, making the *krš* or "tenner" 56 grams = \$2.7846; cf. No. 11, l. 12, n. 7, and No. 14, ll. 7 and 9. The translation "pure silver" is practically certain. It occurs but once more in these papyri, No. 32 (*APA K*), ll. 10-11. Its exact meaning as a technical term in these locutions dealing with money values cannot be determined; whether or not it be an equivalent for the expression "*r* (or *d*) 2 to the tenner," used in similar connections elsewhere (see note on No. 24 = *APA B*, l. 15) cannot be said. It is possible that a payment in silver, without regard to the gold standard for money values obtaining in the Persian empire, was intended. This fine for the amount of a sum agreed upon to be paid as penalty for offense against the agreement which constitutes the substance of the document is a characteristic feature in these papyri; cf. also Nos. 1 and 2.

³ Cowley, "assuredly." "Shall be" or "is thine" is omitted by inadvertence, or, rather, "that buttress-wall" was written for "the buttress-wall shall be thine" (cf. ll. 10, 11); such slips are not uncommon in these documents (see l. 5, above, with n. 1), although in other respects legal details are highly developed. However well fixed the forms might be, duplicates were not struck off by a printing press or manifold machine in those days; they were written by the human hand.

- 9 day shall son or daughter, brother or sister, | near or distant relative,
trooper or civilian,¹ have power to restrain *Mhsh*² or any descendant³
10 of his from building upon (*or* above) | that buttress-wall of his.
Whoever shall restrain any one of them shall pay to him the sum
11 which is written above, and the buttress-wall | shall be thine never-
theless, and thou shalt have full power to build upon (*or* above) it
12 upwards,⁴ and I *Qynih* shall not have power | to say to *Mhsh*,
saying: That gateway is not thine, and thou shalt not go forth (by
13 it) into the street which is | between us and the house of *Pftynih*⁵
the sailor. If I should restrain thee, I will pay thee the sum which
14 is written above, | and thou shalt have full power to open that
gateway and to go forth (by it) into the street which is between us. |
15 *Pelaṭiah*⁶ the son of Ahio⁷ has written this deed at the dictation⁸ of
16 *Qynih*. The witnesses thereto⁹: | witness *Mhsh* the son of Isaiah,
17 witness *Šbrsn* the son of *ṛlī*,¹⁰ | witness Shemaiah the son of Hosea,
18 witness *Prtprn* the son of *ṛtprn*,¹¹ | witness *Bgdī* the son of *Nbykdri*,¹²

¹ Literally "master of flag and city," "flag" being the same word as that which is translated "colors" above, ll. 2 f., and elsewhere. Cowley's "foreign resident or citizen" rests upon his imperfect understanding of this word and of the military character of the "foreign residents," whom the later and larger finds of *APE* definitely show to have been a Persian garrison.

² Clearly abbreviation of Mahseiah, l. 2.

³ Literally "son"; Cowley's "his son" is too narrow and does not exactly render the original.

⁴ E.g., by placing upon it one side of a barrel vault to span the gate or passageway, the other side springing from the side of Mahseiah's house, to which by this process a new room might be added. This makes for the translation "buttress-wall"; for what could be built upon a staircase? Or what good would an extension of his roof terrace be to *Qynih*, if it might be "built upon" at any moment thereafter, the space itself not being his property in any case.

⁵ Clearly an Egyptian name, meaning "his breath is in the hands of Neit," the goddess; his son, described as a cataract sailor or boatman, occurs a few years later in Nos. 24 and 25 (*APA* B and D). For a graphic illustration of the probable situation of these houses, streets, and passageways with respect to each other see plan to follow *APA*.

⁶ Cf. No. 15, Col. II, l. 2, n. 7; No. 21, Col. II, l. 6, n. 1.

⁷ Cf. No. 13, l. 5, n. 5.

⁸ Literally "according to the mouth of."

⁹ Literally "within."

¹⁰ *Satibarzanes* (Persian); the father's name may be an abbreviation of a compound with the North-Syrian goddess *Athtar*, even though there be here no further *c* to change the first to *ṣ*, as in *Ṭar-ateh*, *Athargatis*. This is, however, by no means certain.

¹¹ *Phrataphernes*, son of *Artaphernes*, both Persian.

¹² *Baga-dāta* (*Bagdates* = Persian), son of *Nabû-kudurri* (Babylonian).

- 19 *Nbūlī* the son of *Drg*,¹ | witness *Bntrš* the son of *Rhmr*,² witness *Šlm* the son of Hoshaiāh.

Docket (on the outside of the roll)

Deed³ of the buttress-wall which he built, written by *Qunih* to *Mhsh*.

¹ Nabū-ll(u) (Babylonian); *Drg*, abbreviated from *Drgmn*, No. 24 = *APA* B, l. 2; cf. No. 27 = E, l. 19(?).

² The first name, not elsewhere found, may be Babylonian; the second, whose reading is not altogether certain, seems to be a compound of the Semitic *rh̄m*, perhaps "mercy (of)," and the great Egyptian sun-god Re, who was combined with Khnum of Elephantine into Khnum-Re.

³ Perhaps [better "document," as being less specific; yet most of these documents are "deeds," and so the word may stand, as the first translator, Cowley, put it.

THE PRIMARY PROBLEM FOR AN EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY. II

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Modern philosophy had its roots in a quickened sense of the distinction between the human self and the nonhuman world in the midst of which its existence is cast. This enhanced self-consciousness of man began to move around two foci of difficulty: on the one hand the freshly stimulated intellect was keenly aware of its privilege of striving to know its environing world at first hand; on the other the new evaluation of human worth, accompanied by diminution of vital interest in the traditional "other" world of ecclesiastical thought, inevitably threw the objective "natural" world into the position of a more or less enigmatical vis-à-vis. Hence developed at once a twofold dualism, that of the knower and the object-of-knowledge, and of the self and the nonhuman "other." To comprehend the difficulties of the former phase of this dualism has been the task of epistemology; to solve those of the latter, the philosophical problem of religion. The two are obviously closely interwoven. Any solution of either one will ultimately have to reckon with the other. The great need is for a philosophy that embraces both problems from a unitary point of view, and works always with an empirical rather than a speculative method.

For an empirical theology, of course, the second of these two dualisms and its various difficulties and proposed solutions are of primary importance. But the moral self, which must face its environing nonhuman world and discover, for weal or woe, whether that world is "spiritual" or "material," is also a knowing self, and the value of its religious convictions must always depend ultimately on the validity of its cognitional processes.¹ To the primary aspect of this twofold problem the present paper is devoted;

¹ "Cognitional" is here used in the broadest sense, as including any form of consciousness that seems to grasp reality.

of the other, its indispensable complement, a discussion will be given later.

The present article is the continuation of an effort¹ to state in brief and simple outlines the way in which what I have called the mechanical-mystical dilemma has presented itself in the course of philosophical reflection. In the previous article it was pointed out that when serious reflection is thrown back upon nature, on the collapse of some long-standing supranature scheme of things, man always finds some aspects of this nonsupernatural environment which elicit from him *social* responses, more vague, less anthropomorphic, to be sure, than the original animism (or "animatism") of primitive religion, but no less truly social in their essential character. Of such social responses to the nonhuman environment (in other than these social moods called the physical world) the hylozoism of the Ionians was typical, as also the "nature poetry" of Bruno and Boehme. This sort of attitude, instinctive-reflective, I have called mysticism (or classical mysticism to distinguish it clearly from the other type, which is an attitude directed toward the clearly supernatural socii of the divine "other" world). This social sort of attitude toward nature, however, is continually checked and modified by the mechanical habits of thought and action which the events and things of life ordinarily elicit from us. The mystical attitude and the mechanical attitude are thus pitted against each other, neither one being able to force the other completely from the field. Thus through philosophy runs the *mystical-mechanical dilemma*.

It was pointed out, further, that the outstanding efforts to find some resolution of this dilemma have moved upon one or other of three levels. In the first period, that of Greek philosophy, the problem was typically upon an objective level; in the second, from Bruno² to Leibniz, subjective-objective, that is, the external physical world is mechanically interpreted, the inner world is felt to

¹ See "The Primary Problem for an Empirical Theology," *American Journal of Theology*, XXII (April, 1918), 233.

² In its beginnings, it is true, this period attributes to the "macrocosm" a quasi-personal quality, under the idea of *natura naturans*, and in so far it remains on the first or objective level. But the subjective-objective dualism is soon clearly formulated by Descartes.

be spiritual, that is, it is mystically interpreted, and hence the problem of the relation between the microcosm and the macrocosm, the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa*, the "monad" which is soul and the "monad" which is (or seems to be) matter. Though Rousseau and the Romantic movement gave a check to the victory which, in rationalism, mechanism seemed to be winning over mysticism, the advent of physiological psychology, in particular, plunged thought into the old dilemma again, and during the last three-quarters of a century the battle has been waged with increasing bitterness, on the question whether the soul or the mind can have, rightfully, any mystical evaluation at all, or whether the human spirit must be seen in the last analysis as only an exceedingly complex mechanism of strictly material forces or elements. Of the tendency to give the inner life this latter purely mechanistic interpretation, Haeckel's philosophy is typical.¹

On the third level, however, the problem is given a distinctly new formulation by Kant. His "Copernican revolution" consists, in a word, in relegating the question of the ultimate nature of reality, as it is apart from human consciousness, to the limbo of the unknowable and in striving instead to understand how it is that the human mind, by virtue of its very constitution, gives to experience the two incompatible aspects of necessity and freedom, and then to discover the underlying unity of this, the mind's twofold activity, which produces these apparent irreconcilables. The explanation of how the mind mechanizes experience is given in the *Critique of the Pure Reason*; of how it mysticizes experience, in the *Critique of the Practical Reason*; of how these two are fundamentally unitary, in the *Critique of the Judgment* (especially the first part, concerning the aesthetic judgment).

It will be helpful to make, for the present, a definite effort to keep this phase of the significance of Kant's innovation distinct from the epistemological questions with which it is so closely connected. So far as the religious problem is concerned the importance of Kant consists simply in this, first, that the mechanical-mystical

¹ Haeckel, in reality, only pushes the problem back to the first level, in that he attributes to the material atom a rudimentary sort of feeling or inclination—only one more of the many modifications of hylozoism.

dilemma becomes primarily a question of how the human mind by virtue of its own operations gives of the same facts both a mechanistic and a mystical interpretation; and that, secondly, the reconciliation of these irreconcilables is seen to be primarily a psychological and not a metaphysical problem. This is the new cue for the discussion of the old problem. In so far as it has been ignored by the nineteenth-century philosophy nothing new has been added to the earlier viewpoints. And for the most part it has been ignored on account of three different directions in which the philosophy of the century has moved.

1. The epistemological difficulties of a *human* idealism at once pushed philosophers on to an *absolute* idealism. Within this "absolute" doctrine the same mechanistic-mystical dilemma asserted itself again, so that, as in the case of rationalism and Rousseau, there was the antagonism of the mathematical-logical ideal and the ethical-emotional ideal; in absolute idealism we find a rationalistic dialectic which tends toward a denial that the absolute is "personal" (e.g., Bradley), and an ethico-mystical tendency which asserts that the absolute is "personal" (e.g., Royce). But obviously any attempt at a reconciliation of these opposing viewpoints must, in the nature of the case, be metaphysical or merely dialectical; and such an undertaking is not in line with the psychological method which Kant undertook (which, it is true, gave place to a logical and metaphysical procedure before his task had been carried very far).

2. The inevitable reaction against idealism carried the problem back at once to the first, the objective, level. Herbart's "reals," for instance, are an attempted amalgamation of the primitive static and the primitive dynamic conceptions—the "reals" are absolutely changeless in themselves, and yet each seeks to "preserve its identity against disturbances on the part of the other reals." The common, unconfessed assumption of all such systems, from Democritus to Haeckel, is that if one can but reduce the non-dynamic (the non-mystical or mechanical) and the dynamic (the mystical) phases of experience each to the lowest conceivable terms, they will somehow fuse in a single type of existence, a simple entity. The success of all such systems depends upon either an

elusive fallacy of equivocation, as in the case of Leibnitz' use of the term "representation," or the uncritical acceptance of a hyphenated atom or monad in place of the rejected enigma of a hyphenated (mechanical-mystical) world.

3. The century has been characterized by heroic efforts to ignore both the religious and the epistemological problems by restricting philosophical attention to the questions of the relation of the self and its human environment. But it is interesting to observe how inevitably these movements are forced to come ultimately face to face with the very extra-human reality from which they tried to withdraw reflection. In this third tendency there are three clearly distinguishable types. (a) Positivism. But note that Comte, in his later days, recognizes the need of religion to supply the social movement with an adequate dynamic, and therefore elaborates his "religion of humanity"; this is a long step toward grounding ethics in an extra-human background, for "humanity" spans the ages and takes on some sort of cosmic significance. Guyau goes farther and describes ethical conduct as a sort of co-operation with the cosmos or with nature. (b) Utilitarianism. But note that Spencer's evolutionism drags the utilitarian ethics irresistibly into the realm of the philosophy of the extra-human by raising the question as to the relation between the law of biological survival and the law of human conduct; through Huxley and Green this issue is pushed on into an idealistic metaphysics. (c) In Germany, Max Stirner and Bahnsen give the non-metaphysical ethics an utterly individualistic tendency, defending a regardlessly solipsistic morality. Deprived thus of even its social anchorage (which it had in those typical French and English movements), the reaction against the philosophical tradition, with its apparently unsolvable religious and epistemological perplexities, finds a frantic culmination in the Nietzschean demand for a "revaluation of all values."

We come back then to the question as to how far Kant's formulation of the mechanical-mystical dilemma has guided philosophy in the last century. In one way his example has had a very great effect, in the practical dualism of existence and value, of intellectual processes and appreciative insight, of scientific method and religious faith, which has played so large a part in recent thought. For

example, the whole Ritschlian movement is based on the Kantian dualism of the "pure reason" and the "practical reason." But this neo-Kantian movement fails to do justice to Kant's concern for the underlying unity of the mind, which, as said above, found expression in his *Critique of the Judgment*.

The philosopher who in recent times has made the greatest effort to orient this problem of the mechanistic-mystical aspects of life on the third level, that of Kantian constructive idealism, and to seek a solution for it from the larger Kantian viewpoint is Bergson. He starts, as Kant did, to make a psychological study of the contradictory testimony which our human consciousness gives as to the nature of reality; his psychology proves inadequate, as Kant's did, and is supplemented by metaphysics; he combines a constructive idealism with dualism and realism, as Kant also did. (And yet, professing a radical empiricism and a thoroughgoing evolutionism, he seems to some to have much in common with the "pragmatism" of William James.) It seems to the present writer that a brief examination of Bergson's philosophy may make a particularly appropriate background against which to suggest the direction in which a strictly psychological, non-metaphysical method of approaching this ancient dilemma must probably proceed.

Let us note, in the first place, how forcibly Bergson states the issue regarding the mechanical and mystical aspects of experience, especially in that realm where the ancient debate has taken on its peculiarly modern intensity, that of the inner life. This is the theme of the first of his three major works, *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*.¹ Note in the first place his discussion of the two conceptions of causality, the mathematical and the dynamic.² These two conceptions are continually striving to replace each other.

Unfortunately the habit has grown up of taking the principle of causality in both senses at the same time. . . . Sometimes we think particularly of the regular *succession* of physical phenomena and of the kind of inner effort by

¹ Paris, 1889; English translation by Pogson, *Time and Free Will*. Macmillan, 1910 (3d ed. 1913).

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 204 ff. and 211 ff.

which one *becomes* another; sometimes we fix our mind on the absolute *regularity* of the phenomena, and from the idea of regularity we pass by imperceptible steps to that of mathematical necessity. . . . And we do not see any harm in letting these two conceptions blend into one another and in assigning greater importance to the one or the other *according as we are more or less concerned with the interests of science.*¹

But with the progress of science this quasi-personal notion of causation is more and more excluded in favor of mathematical equivalence.

The sundering of these two ideas is an accomplished fact in the natural sciences. The physicist may speak of forces and even picture their mode of action by analogy with an inner effort, but he will never introduce this hypothesis into a scientific explanation. Even those who, with Faraday, replace the extended atoms by dynamic points will treat the centres of force and the lines of force mathematically, without troubling about force itself considered as an activity or an effort. It then comes to be understood that the relation of external causality is purely mathematical and has no resemblance to the relation between psychical force and the act which springs from it.²

Science cannot deal with time and motion except on condition of first eliminating the essential and qualitative element of time, *duration*, and of motion, *mobility*.³

Nevertheless, we cannot entirely succeed in mathematicizing the natural world. On this pertinacity of the anthropopathic element in our conception of nature, the way in which some not entirely necessary factor seems to remain, our feeling for a residual spontaneity in the natural process, note the following:

We certainly feel, it is true, that although things do not endure as we do ourselves, nevertheless there must be some reason why phenomena are seen to *succeed* one another instead of being set out all at once. And this is why the notion of causality, although it gets indefinitely near that of identity, will never seem to us to coincide with it, unless we conceive clearly the idea of a mathematical mechanism or unless some subtle metaphysic removes our very legitimate scruples on that point.⁴

With regard to the inner life there is the same mechanical-mystical dilemma as in the case of outer fact.

"There are finally two different selves, one of which is, as it were, the external projection of the other, its spatial and, so to speak, social representa-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 216 (last italics mine).

² *Op. cit.*, p. 115.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 218-19.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 210.

tion. We reach the former by deep introspection, which leads us to grasp our inner states as living things, constantly becoming, as states not amenable to measure, which permeate one another and of which the succession in duration has nothing in common with juxtaposition in homogeneous space. But the moments at which we thus grasp ourselves are rare, and that is just why we are rarely free. The greater part of the time we live outside ourselves, hardly perceiving anything of ourselves but our own ghost, a colorless shadow which pure duration projects into homogeneous space. Hence our life unfolds in space rather than in time; we live for the external world rather than for ourselves; we speak rather than think; we "are acted" rather than act ourselves. To act freely is to recover possession of oneself, and to get back into pure duration."¹

"But, in our view, there is a third course which might be taken, namely, to carry ourselves back in thought to those moments of our life when we made some serious decision, moments unique of their kind, which will never be repeated—any more than the past phases in the history of a nation will ever come back again. We should see that if these past states cannot be adequately expressed in words or artificially reconstructed by a juxtaposition of simpler states, it is because in their dynamic unity and wholly qualitative multiplicity they are phases of our real and concrete duration, a heterogeneous duration and a living one. We should see that, if our action was pronounced by us to be free, it is because the relation of this action to the state from which it issued could not be expressed by a law, this psychic state being unique of its kind and unable ever to occur again. We should see, finally, that the very idea of necessary determination here loses every shred of meaning, that there cannot be any question either of foreseeing the act before it is performed or of reasoning about the possibility of the contrary action once the deed is done, for to have all the conditions given is, in concrete duration, to place oneself at the very moment of the act and not to foresee it. But we should also understand the illusion which makes the one party think that they are compelled to deny freedom, and the others that they must define it. *It is because the transition is made by imperceptible steps from concrete duration, whose elements permeate one another, to symbolical duration, whose moments are set side by side, and consequently from free activity to conscious automatism.* It is because, although we are free whenever we are willing to get back into ourselves, it seldom happens that we are willing. It is because, finally, even in the cases where the action is freely performed, we cannot reason about it without setting out its conditions externally to one another, therefore in space and no longer in pure duration. The problem of freedom has thus sprung from a misunderstanding; it has been to the moderns what the paradoxes of the Eleatics were to the ancients, and, like these paradoxes, it has its origin in the illusion through which we

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 231-32.

confuse succession and simultaneity, duration and extensity, quality and quantity."¹

"In whatever way, in a word, freedom is viewed, it cannot be denied except on condition of identifying time with space; it cannot be defined except on condition of demanding that space should adequately represent time; it cannot be argued about in one sense or the other except on condition of previously confusing succession and simultaneity. All determinism will thus be refuted by experience, but every attempt to define freedom will open the way to determinism."²

Certainly we are under a great obligation to Bergson for stating so clearly the dilemma of the mind that is both religious and scientific. The fact stands out—amazing, fascinating. In the great moments of life we know ourselves to be free, but we can give no account of the experience in definite description, without, *ipso facto*, showing the whole experience to be utterly determined, step by step, element by element, in unbroken and unbreakable succession of cause and effect, condition and consequence. We know our own free act as free and spontaneous, but the moment we reflect upon it our freedom utterly vanishes. The Greeks began this baffling quest by finding the world, self-contradictingly, both spirit and matter, both spontaneous and machine-like, both fortuitous congeries of soulless atoms and meaningful system of events and ends. For us moderns the struggle of the two motifs has been, by psychology, reduced to the more bitterly contested arena of inner experience. That this is the core, the crux, of the religious problem, there can be no doubt. The fact that Bergson has put his finger so definitely and clearly upon it and has offered an apparently promiscuous solution is ample explanation of his great popularity with thoughtful religious people.

Let me anticipate here, for the sake of clearness and emphasis, the point which I hope to make at the conclusion of this paper. Bergson's problem turns upon this *transition made by imperceptible steps* from intuition to intellect, from the mystical to the mechanistic type of cognitional consciousness. The question is, Are these steps really imperceptible? In spite of the fact that in many places Bergson speaks of intuition (or instinct) and intellect as

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 238-40 (italics mine).

² *Op. cit.*, p. 230.

fused and blended in every moment of consciousness (and so, one would think, amenable to close psychological scrutiny and possible disentanglement), he has conceived of them, in his metaphysics, as so profoundly different in their respective natures that any actual psychological account of the "transition," any analysis of the "steps," from intuitional to intellectual operations is simply out of the question. If his psychology had been adequate to the task of analyzing these so-called "imperceptible steps," would not his metaphysical account of the gulf between instinct and intellect have been quite uncalled for? In other words, if the gulf which seems to yawn between them could be seen, by psychological analysis, to be filled with a series of conscious states differing not in kind but only in innumerable delicate degrees, no metaphysical explanation would be required, for the gulf would not exist. *A more adequate psychology would render unnecessary a more "subtle metaphysic."* This doubtless is the direction in which an empirical theology must look for light on its primary problem, the mechanical-mystical dilemma.

What then is the explanation which Bergson gives of this peculiarity of human experience, that by a kind of mystical direct apprehension we grasp the reality of spontaneity and freedom but by every act of intellectual reflection thereon we inevitably cognize our acts and thoughts as utterly determined, of this "illusion through which we confuse succession and simultaneity, duration and extensity, quality and quantity," of the fact that "the transition is made by imperceptible steps from concrete duration, whose elements permeate one another, to symbolical duration, whose elements are set out side by side"?

The explanation is, briefly, as follows:

The Original Impetus, the *Élan vital*, the primordial "consciousness," like a jet of steam, becomes "congealed" into a kind of inert negation of its self; falls back, as it were, upon itself and so offers a kind of resistance and obstruction to its own free movement. This "inverse movement" of "consciousness" is "matter." But the *Élan vital* pushes its way into matter, retarding its "inverse" tendency, in part held back by it and in part carrying it along on its own current. In this partial imprisoning of the Impetus by its

inverse movement, in this organization of inert matter by "consciousness," consists what we mean by "life." Life takes three directions—torpor, instinct, intellect. These, it is important to note, are not successive stages or levels but parallel branches of evolution. The contrasted characters of instinct and intellect are explained on the ground that in its progress life as instinct has been turned inward upon itself, whereas life as intellect has been turned toward matter. Instinct has thus a power of getting directly at the secrets of vital processes, whereas intellect must play forever upon the surface of living things as upon the surface of inert solids.

The following citations (from Mitchell's translation of *Creative Evolution*) will make clear the foregoing interpretation.

Consciousness, or supraconsciousness, is the name for the rocket whose extinguished fragments fall back as matter; consciousness again is the name for that which subsists of the rocket itself passing through the fragments and lighting them up into organisms [p. 261].

Life appears in its entirety as an immense wave which starting from a centre spreads outwards and which on almost the whole of its circumference is stopped and converted into oscillation [p. 266].

That undivided movement of descent which is materiality itself [p. 271].

The double form of consciousness is then due to the double form of the real, and theory of knowledge must be dependent upon metaphysics [p. 178].

Vegetative torpor, instinct, and intelligence—these, then, are the elements that coincided in the vital impulsion common to plants and animals, and which, in the course of a development in which they were made manifest in most unforeseen forms, have been dissociated by the very fact of their growth. *The cardinal error which, from Aristotle onwards, has vitiated most of the philosophies of nature is to see in vegetative, instinctive, and rational life, three successive degrees of the development of one and the same tendency, whereas they are three divergent directions of an activity which has split up as it grew.* The difference between them is not a difference of intensity, nor, more generally, of degree, but of kind [p. 135].

One of the clearest results of biology has been to show that evolution has taken place along divergent lines. It is at the extremity of two of these lines—the two principal—that we find intelligence and instinct in forms almost pure [p. 175].

Intuition and intellect represent two opposite directions of the work of consciousness: intuition goes in the very direction of life itself; intellect goes in the inverse direction and thus finds itself naturally in accordance with the movement of matter [p. 267].

Instinct and intellect are two divergent developments of one and the same principle, which in the one case remains within itself, in the other steps out of itself and becomes absorbed in the utilization of inert matter. This gradual divergence testifies to a radical incompatibility and points to the fact that it is impossible for intelligence to reabsorb instinct. That which is instinctive in instinct cannot be expressed in terms of intelligence [p. 167].

Consciousness is essentially free; it is freedom itself; but it cannot pass through matter without settling on it, without adapting itself to it. This adaptation is what we call intellectuality [p. 270].

The intellect has been cut out of it [life] by a process resembling that which has generated matter [p. 268].

If consciousness has thus split up into intuition and intelligence it is because of the need it had to apply itself to matter at the same time as it had to follow the stream of life [p. 178].

The success of physics would be inexplicable, if the movement which constitutes materiality were not the same movement which, prolonged by us to its end, that is to say, to homogeneous space, results in making us count, measure, follow in their respective variations terms that are functions one of another. To effect this prolongation of the movement, our intellect has only to let itself go, for it runs naturally to space and mathematics, intellectuality and materiality being of the same nature and having been produced in the same way [p. 219].

For—we cannot too often repeat it—intelligence and instinct are turned in opposite directions, the former toward inert matter, the latter toward life. Intelligence, by means of science, which is its work, will deliver up to us more and more the secret of physical operations; of life it brings us, and, moreover, only claims to bring us, a translation in terms of inertia. It goes all around life, taking from outside the greatest possible number of views of it, drawing it into itself instead of entering into it. But it is to the very inwardness of life that intuition leads us [p. 176].

The intellectual representation of continuity is negative, being at bottom only the refusal of our mind before any actually given system of decomposition to regard it as the only possible one. *Of the discontinuous alone does the intellect form a clear idea* [p. 154].

Of immobility alone does the intellect form a clear idea [p. 155].

The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life [p. 165].

The main purpose of the present discussion is to point out, first, that Bergson's philosophy has the inveterate mechanical-mystical dilemma as its central problem; then, that his discussion which begins with psychological analysis (the third level, upon which the problem has gained a footing since Kant's great innovation)

is soon forced to re-enter the metaphysical realm because of the inadequacy of this psychological analysis; and, finally, to suggest, against this background, the direction in which a more tenacious and consistent psychological investigation must probably proceed in order to overcome this deficiency, and thus enable empirical theology to come to terms with science upon ground that is itself a proper subject for strictly scientific treatment. A criticism of the Bergsonian metaphysics, therefore, is beside the mark. It is, however, pertinent to the main issue to note at least one point (a pivotal point it is) in which the metaphysics most obviously points to an unsolved psychological problem, and to indicate how unsatisfactory the proffered metaphysical solution is. And the point in question is not merely a pivotal point so far as Bergson's treatment of this religious problem is concerned; it is likewise essential to his treatment of the other, the epistemological, phase of that great underlying self-and-nature dualism which, as I indicated at the outset, is the most important motif of modern philosophy. I refer to his doctrine of the relation between the spatiality of matter and the spatiality of the intellect. Note the following characteristic statements: "Determinations of space or categories of the understanding, whichever we will, spatiality and intellectuality being moulded on each other" (p. 257). "Intellectuality and materiality have been constituted in detail by reciprocal adaptation" (p. 186). "The division of unorganized matter into separate bodies is relative to our senses and to our intellect, and matter, looked at as an indivisible whole must be a flux rather than a thing" (p. 186). "It is our perception which cuts inert matter into distinct bodies" (p. 227). But compare with these last two statements the following: "Things have a natural tendency to fit into a frame of this kind." "A certain natural geometry suggested by the most general and immediately perceived properties of solids" (p. 161). In a word, space is partly real and partly ideal; matter has a "certain natural geometry," and "all the operations of our intellect tend to geometry." "When we observe that a thing really *is* there where it *acts*, we shall be led to say (as Faraday was) that all the atoms interpenetrate and

¹ Mitchell's translation of *Creative Evolution*.

that each of them fills the world. On such a hypothesis, the atom, or more generally the material point, becomes simply a view of the mind, a view which we come to take when we continue far enough the work (wholly relative to our faculty of acting) by which we subdivide matter into bodies. Yet it is undeniable that matter lends itself to this subdivision, and that in supposing it breakable into parts external to one another, we are constructing a science sufficiently representative of the real" (p. 203).

And what is the explanation of this reciprocal spatiality of matter and intellect? The most concise statement is the following: "The space of our geometry and the spatiality of things are mutually engendered by the reciprocal action and reaction of two terms which are essentially the same, but which move each in the direction inverse of the other . . . ,"¹ a statement which neither in itself nor in its thirty-odd pages of exposition is very illuminating or convincing. But—and this is the important thing—Bergson's treatment suggests here the very point at which the problem of knowledge needs most to be attacked. "This long analysis was necessary to show how the real can pass from tension to extension and from freedom to mechanical necessity by way of inversion."² But this analysis *begins* with a little psychological introspection.³ Query: Might not a more thoroughgoing psychology, genetic as well as introspective, with the aid of physics, give us a more empirical and hence a more useful account of this undeniable reciprocity of spatiality, of quantity-ness, between thought and things, which is the strength of exact science and the stronghold of realism?

Let us now note some general aspects of Bergson's psychology. Probably its chief point of inadequacy is its lack of an appreciation of the instinctive nature and primary importance of social experience. For Bergson the individual seems to be primary and social consciousness secondary. This inadequacy is of special importance in connection with the question of the *self*. What is the "fundamental self," and what are the "parasitic selves" of which he

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 202. This recalls the similar fashion in which Aristotle resolved the dilemma as it shaped itself in his time, namely the skilful playing upon one another of two mutually necessary and strictly complementary conceptions. See the preceding article on this subject in the *American Journal of Theology*, XXII (April, 1918), 242.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 236.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 199-220.

speaks so often? Here one cannot but observe how little Bergson appreciates the part which social experience plays in the actualization of any real selfhood. For him the parasitic self is the "spatialized," that is, social, self. The fundamental self is essentially nonsocial.

As the self thus refracted and thereby broken to pieces is much better adapted to the requirements of social life in general and language in particular, consciousness prefers it and gradually loses sight of the fundamental self. Below the self with well-defined states, a self in which *succeeding each other* means *melting into one another*, and forming an organic whole. . . . But we are generally content with the first, i.e., with the shadow of the self projected into homogeneous space.¹ . . . In order to recover this fundamental self, as the unsophisticated consciousness would perceive it, a vigorous effort of analysis is necessary, which will isolate the fluid inner states from their image, first refracted, then solidified, in homogeneous space.²

But to discover the "fundamental self" by withdrawing from all human intercourse, surely that is impossible. Yet Bergson is certainly right in insisting that if we are to get to the bottom of life's problem we must discover the fundamental self and assign it a rightful sway over the parasitic selves. That indeed is a most important point for the philosophy of religion. But an empirical procedure would surely require every man to answer the question, what is *for him* his fundamental self? If the psychologist can discover any unanimity in the results of such an inquiry, well and good—such a definition may be taken as authoritative. But the futility of looking for a self that is just itself, a pure, isolated, unconditioned self, surely is apparent. The great question is, In what situation is the self most active, most free, most alive? What is the most vital relationship in which we find it? When is a man most truly himself? Even our freedom, whenever and however deeply experienced, is never an utterly relationless freedom. We are free for something, from something, to do something, to be something. Just sheer unadulterated freedom is the barest abstraction. And furthermore, it may well be that the less important phases of life are not so much parasitic selves as conditioning and contributing selves. The fundamental self is the organizing

¹ *Time and Free Will*, p. 128.

² *Ibid.*, p. 129.

self, the dominating self, the integrating and unifying self, the self of most vital function.

The psychology of Bergson, then, has this crucial defect of isolating the self. But this is a twofold isolation. In the first place the self is regarded as fundamentally individual, atomistic. The social self is a "parasitic self." The "real self" is a self which can never be known in social, that is spatialized, experience. In the second place the "real self" is still further isolated within the larger and more "spatial" phases of even personal experience. To find this real self one must turn in upon the deepest of "deep-seated psychic states." Now this is a most interesting counterpart of the Cartesian self. The self which has figured strategically in the post-Cartesian epistemological discussions is the knowing self. *Cogito, ergo sum.* The real self is the self of cognitive function. This cognizing self has been isolated within the vague general matrix of experience, and from this isolation have grown the whole brood of epistemological perplexities. But for Bergson the isolated self is the exact opposite of the Cartesian cognizing self. It is the self which does not cognize but feels, intuitively. But the isolation is no less extreme and no less troublesome. For the Cartesian the fatal difficulty is to pass from the acts of the isolated cognizing self to the common-sense, everyday acts and experiences of the human organism. For Bergson the difficulty is to pass from the acts of the isolated *pure durational* self to commonplace knowledge and social, spatial experience. In this Bergson is, though apparently so far removed from the traditional epistemologists, really at one with them. Likewise he is at one with them in isolating the self from the social organism of which it is an integral part. The two sorts of isolation, however, are practically the same. It is a severing of the vital ties between the so-called real self and its supposedly less real experience. The importance of this point cannot be overestimated. With such a psychology no one can possibly escape the necessity of seeking in metaphysics a cure of the troubles which follow in its train. It surely is obvious that since such an isolation of the self is artificial any other solution than an undoing of this isolation is bound to be artificial. If this isolation be frankly denied, the passing by "imperceptible" steps from

the experience of the so-called real self to that of the so-called parasitic self is not a mystery to be solved by a "subtle metaphysics," but a process capable of psychological analysis.

There is another most important point in which Bergson has failed to scrutinize closely enough the actually observable workings of the human mind. The business of the intellect, he insists, is to facilitate our actions upon solids. In this, and in so far, he is an "instrumentalist." But he stops far short of the broad truth recognized today by many American psychologists and logicians, namely, that intellectual processes are "instrumental" not only for action upon solids but for all desired ends, whether they be ethical, religious, political, or physical. Not only so, but these "instrumental" forms of consciousness are not merely spatial in their essential character; rather they are "abstract"—this is their very usefulness, in that irrelevant characteristics of things and events are pro tempore ignored, and only the one or the few characteristics of those things or events which are of supreme importance *in the situation* are emphasized or even noticed. No doubt the spatializing, unitizing type of "abstraction" is of tremendous importance; but the "intellectual" processes are not necessarily only spatial. "Spaciality" is no doubt a conspicuous character of "intellectuality," but by no means all of it. And "fabrication," action upon solids, is no doubt a conspicuous example of instrumental consciousness, but it by no means monopolizes it.

But not only is Bergson's metaphysics made necessary by the inadequacy of his psychology; not only is this metaphysics quite unconvincing, especially in such a central matter as the theory of "inversion"; but the basic distinction between instinct and intellect leads logically to the most undesirable practical consequences. The isolation of the intuitional self from the intellectual self, in spite of the "subtle metaphysics" which seeks to reveal their underlying unity, continues the divorce of religion and science; and the isolation of the real self from the social self continues the divorce between religion and social endeavor. Social life, civilization, the technique of progress, are obviously dependent upon the intellect. All mystical experience, all sense of freedom and spontaneity, all direct sense of the original life, these, for Bergsonism, are functions

of intuition. To save our souls we must renounce the world. There is no idea of a corporate salvation. The fusion of scientific social service and religious enthusiasm is logically impossible. But this means ethical apriorism, religious fanaticism, and socially barren intellectualism. To separate the real self and the social self, the self of intuition and the self of collective endeavor, is to divorce the vision of God and the task of civilization, to paralyze the Christian conscience, to quench the dream of the twentieth-century religion of a "new heaven and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness."

To summarize the foregoing discussion of Bergson: His philosophy is primarily an effort to resolve the mechanical-mystical dilemma upon the plane of constructive idealism (the third level on which this ancient perplexity has moved). This task evidently calls for a psychological examination of the antagonistic mechanizing and mysticizing activities of consciousness, and an attempt to find some underlying unity of the two tendencies. Bergson, however, has recourse to a so-called intuitional metaphysics to supplement his psychology ("theory of knowledge and theory of life" seeming to him to be "inseparable"). The real reason, however, why metaphysics is so soon fallen back upon probably is that his psychology is fundamentally inadequate. As it is, the core of his metaphysical explanation, the theory of "inversion," is not by any means convincing, and the dualism of intuition and intellect is not sufficiently mitigated by Bergson's theory of evolution to remove the unfortunate practical dualism of religion and science, religion and social endeavor. What then are the chief points of inadequacy in the psychology with which Bergson approaches the mechanical-mystical problem? There are four such points: (a) the individual self is too much isolated from its real social matrix; (b) the "instrumental" character of intellectual processes is too closely restricted, being affirmed only of the consciousness accompanying our action on solids; (c) the instinctive-intuitional and the intellectual phases of consciousness are too rigidly distinguished, even though their fusion in common experience is admitted; (d) no effort is made toward a genuinely genetic psychological study of the "undeniable" mystery of a mutual spatiality in thought and things, but instead

we are given a purely speculative account of the common genesis of intellect and matter.

Of the first two of these four defects we have in contemporary American thought abundant correction: of the first in our social psychology¹ and of the second in the literature of "experimental logic."² Some of the discussions in the latter have a bearing also upon the third point.³ But so far as I am aware the last two difficulties have not been discussed in any way that throws light upon the problem of religion. It is the question involved in the third of the four points⁴ urged here against Bergson's psychology that is most crucial for the primary phase of the problem of religion, which is, as this and the preceding article have maintained, the mechanical-mystical dilemma. I have already stated the issue.⁵ It amounts simply to this: ignoring for the time being the question as to which of the two types of cognitional consciousness gives us the nearer approach to reality, we are primarily concerned to understand how or why we do move from one type to the other, how they are related to each other, what, in a word, the "imperceptible steps" actually are by means of which we pass from the moment of "practical reason" to that of "pure reason," from that of "duration" to that of "spatiality," from the mystical to the mechanical, from religion to science. For surely these are not two incommensurable activities of a divided ego, but are part and parcel of each other, inextricably interwoven, fused by innumerable connective activities, with which they are continuous, into an integral organic consciousness.

¹ E.g., Cooley, *Social Organization; Human Nature and the Social Order*.

² E.g., Dewey, *et al.*, *Studies in Logical Theory*; Moore, *Existence Meaning and Reality*, Decennial Publications of University of Chicago, First Series, Vol. III.

³ E.g., Moore, chapter entitled "The Reformation of Logic," in *Creative Intelligence*, p. 75.

⁴ On both the third and fourth points I hope to make a few tentative suggestions in my next article in *The American Journal of Theology*.

⁵ *Supra*, p. 384.

CHURCH AND STATE IN MEDIAEVAL GERMANY. III

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The abbey of Cluny, from whose ascetic precincts the movement was destined to come forth to overturn the world, had a humble beginning. In 910 William, count of Auvergne and duke of Aquitaine, for the safety of his soul deeded to Berno,¹ abbot of Beaume and Gigny, a small tract located on the borders of the little river Grosne in the county of Macon, in the midst of the hills which marked the watershed between the Loire and the Saône, whence in clear weather one might descry the blue ridge of the Jura. No spot was more central to Christian Europe, for it was accessible to the Alpine passes into Italy over which ran the pilgrimage roads to Rome, and on the edge between Germany and France in proximity to the future broad commercial highway which was soon to develop through mid-Europe via the Saône and the Meuse rivers. The territory was neither French nor imperial, but part of the "middle kingdom" of Burgundy.

At the time of its foundation Cluny was in a secluded and forested spot. The original group of Cluniacs was made up of six monks from Beaume and six from Gigny.² After seventeen years of rule Berno gave way to Odo, a young noble, a native of the county of Maine, who had for some years been in the service of William of Aquitaine and had then abruptly renounced the world and come to Cluny.³ With him the energetic and expansive history of Cluny really begins. He was the first of a long list of abbots—all of noble blood—remarkable for their moral force and administrative ability.

While nominally adhering to the ancient Benedictine rule, actually Cluny created a new type of monasticism, even though

¹ On Berno's life before he came to Cluny, see Poupardin, *Le royaume de Provence sous les Carolingiens*, 153.

² Sackur, I, 40.

³ *Ibid.*, I, 41; *Vita Odonis*, I, c. 1.

its influence was exerted more to reorganize cloisters already established than to found new ones. Practically most of the *de novo* Cluniac monasteries were those belonging to the Congregation of Hirschau in Southern Germany.¹ Cluny emphasized manual labor less and study more than did Benedictinism. It laid more emphasis on moral character than on sentimental piety. It frowned upon bizarre and extravagant forms of asceticism. It aimed to establish and maintain a balanced life, physical, intellectual, and moral. The Cluniac monks wore a comfortable, attractive, even elegant costume; their diet was generous and wholesome, and included wine and beer.² They bathed often, for with them slovenliness was a vice and filth a sin. The ascetics and fanatics in the order were usually foreigners, as Hildebrand.³

¹ "Der Einfluss von Cluny im zehnten und in der ersten Hälfte des elften Jahrhunderts macht sich mehr in der Reform des Klosterlebens als in neuen Stiftungen geltend; dagegen giebt in der zweiten Hälfte Hirschau auch der Klostergründung einen neuen Impuls."—Waitz, VII, 185.

² *Vita Majoli*, II, c. 8.

³ The tradition that the Rule of Cluny was not codified until the time of Hugh the Great is now exploded. The genesis of the Rule of Cluny has recently been cleared up by Dom Bruno Albers, O.S.B., in perhaps the most notable research of its kind since the seventeenth-century age of erudition—scholarly evidence that the genius of Luc d'Achery and his fellow-students in St. Maur still survives in modern Benedictinism. These volumes are: *Consuetudines monasticae*, Edidit Bruno Albers, O.S.B. Vol. I, *Consuetudines Farfenses* (Stuttgart: Roth, 1900). Vol. II, *Consuetudines Cluniacenses Antiquiores* (Typis Montis Casini, 1905). Vol. III, *Antiquiora monumenta maxime consuetudines Casinenses inde ab anno 716-817 illustrantia continens* (Typis Montis Casini, 1907). Before the appearance of these works the oldest written Customs of Cluny were supposed to be the *Ordo Cluniacensis* of Bernard of Cluny, printed in Herrgot's *Velus disciplina monastica* (1726), and the *Antiquiores consuetudines Cluniacensis monasterii*, compiled by Ulric of Zell and printed in D'Achery's *Spicilegium*, both drawn up in the eleventh century, though the relation of each to the other had not yet been determined. Dom Albers has revolutionized this belief by the discovery of far more ancient compilations among the MSS of the library of Monte Cassino and in the Barberini Library at Rome. The result of his researches shows that Cluny had compiled its rules before 930, that Abbot Majolus (954?-94) revised them, and that a further extension and revision was made between 996 and 1030. The Customs of Farfa is edited from a Vatican MS which materially differs from the version published by Herrgot. Dom Albers has traced back some of the elements of these customs to the Customs of Benedict of Aniane, who in turn was indebted to the *Concordia regularis* of Ethelwold of Winchester, who again goes back to the *Capitula* of 817 and the *Ordo qualiter*, which last was probably composed by an

From its foundation Cluny was under the immediate authority of the Holy See and free from the control of any bishop. Its material possessions enjoyed a similar immunity, for early in its history King Raoul of France (923-36) granted Cluny absolute and independent proprietorship of its lands, which made it completely exempt from feudal control—an evil which tortured so many monasteries in the ninth and tenth centuries.¹

But the most notable feature of Cluny was its form of government. All the monasteries founded by or reformed by Cluny were directly dependent upon it. The mother-monastery alone was a monastery. There was but one abbot of Cluny. The affiliated houses were all priories,² though a very few which were so affiliated, out of courtesy, still were permitted to retain the old title of abbey, as Vezelay, St. Germain d'Auxerre, and St. Bertin. In this wise the famous Congregation of Cluny was formed. The priors were required to convene periodically in the chapter-general under the presidency of the abbot, and the latter made frequent visitations among the priories. How centralized this form of government was, in contrast with the complete separateness of every Benedictine monastery from every other, is manifest. It was the feudal system minus the looseness and particularism of that system. The abbot general was a grand suzerain. It was the adaptation of feudal

unknown Benedictine monk of Italy or Provence. The reader interested in this history may consult further: Dom Albers' summary of his editorial researches in *Untersuchungen zu den ältesten Mönchgewohnheiten* (Munich, 1905) and his article in the *Revue Bénédictine*, XX, 690; Miss Bateson's article on "Rules for Monks and Canons," *English Historical Review*, IX, 690; and Miss Rose Graham's review of Dom Albers' works in the same, XXIV, 121-24.

¹ The text of the bull of John XI is to be found in the *Bullarium S. Ord. Clun.*, 1. It is a matter of regret that Sir G. F. Duckett has omitted it in his two admirable volumes, *Charters and Records of Cluny* (privately printed, 1888). Cluny is not the first instance of this immediate dependence of a monastery upon the pope, as Gfrörer, *Kirchengesch.*, I, 42, thinks, but it is the earliest notable one (Blumenstock, *Der päpst. Schutz im MA*, 33, Innsbruck, 1890). Robert the Pious forbade the construction of castles in the vicinity of Cluny in order to protect it from the violence of the feudality (Pfüster, *Robert le Pieux*, 306). For other examples of zones of protection see Mortet, *Recueil de textes relatifs à l'histoire de l'architecture en France au moyen-âge*, 114, No. xxxii.

² For list of the abbots of Cluny see Duckett I, 24 f.

practices and methods to monastic organization, the conveyance of feudal ideals of lordship, homage, service, fidelity, into the cloister.

This combination of feudal institutions and ideals with monasticism in large part accounts for the rapid spread of the order. Cluny was thoroughly in harmony with the spirit of the age.¹ It also accounts for the attraction Cluny had for men of noble blood and the large part they played in its history.

Like the earlier reform movement, Cluny's propaganda encountered bitter opposition from the monks. At Fleury the monks barricaded themselves in and hurled stones, shard, and other improvised projectiles at Odo.² At La Réole they killed Abbon, the abbot's representative.³ But the efficiency of its organization and the immense appeal which Cluny made to the imagination of the time ultimately secured its success over all opposition. Under the administration of Odo it spread over Aquitaine, Upper Lorraine, the valley of the Loire, and North Italy as far as Rome.⁴ Every new acquisition in turn became a new center of propaganda.⁵ Under the famous Majolus (954?-94), Champagne, Burgundy (the kingdom), German Switzerland, and Provence were brought within its sphere.⁶ With Odilon (994-1049) and Hugh the Great (1044-1109)⁷ Cluny spread over Germany, Hungary, Poland, Spain, South Italy, and England. At the climax of the order in the twelfth century it ruled 2,000 priories.⁸

¹ On the history of this expansion see Sackur, *in toto*. A brief account may be found in Pfister, 282 ff.

² *Vita Odonis*, III, c. 8; Sackur, I, 80.

³ *Vita Abbonis*, 16-20; Imbart de la Tour, *Les coutumes de La Réole*; Pfister, 288-89; Pardiac (abbé), *Histoire de St. Abbon ... martyr à La Réole en 1004*, Paris, 1872.

⁴ Sackur, I, 71-114.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 186-204; II, 133-54. For Normandy, Pfister, 309-10.

⁶ Sackur, II, 232-52.

⁷ Ringholz, *Der heilige Abt Odilo von Cluny in seinem Leben und Werke* (in *Studien und Mittheilungen aus dem Benedictiner- und dem Cistercienser-Orden*, Vols. V-VI (Würzburg, 1884-85); P. Jardet, *St. Odilon, abbé de Cluny, sa vie, son temps, ses oeuvres* (962-1049) (Lyons, 1898); Neumann, *Hugo I der Heilige, Abt von Cluny* (Frankfort am M., 1879).

⁸ Helyot, *Hist. des Ordres monast.*, V, c. 18.

But before this summit was reached the great abbey had also invaded the field of the secular clergy. Without ceasing its agitation for reform of the monasteries it began to demand in imperative tones the reformation of the episcopate also. The French bishops were more deeply involved in the coils of feudalism than were the monks, and, moreover, many of them were imbued with the ancient Gallicanism of Hincmar of Rheims.¹ Indeed, Rheims, Chartres, Tours, and Cambrai together constituted a school of opposition. Instead of adopting a compromising spirit the Cluniacs aggravated the irritation of the bishops. They refused to acknowledge any rights claimed by the bishops over them, declared canceled all the ancient obligations of former monasteries which had become Cluniac, closed their houses when the bishops on their visitations asked for lodging, refused homage and the payment of those manorial dues which the bishops had long collected from the lands of the monasteries, imposed the tithe on their own account, diverted into the coffers of Cluny gifts which the bishops used to receive, ignored all diocesan or metropolitan authority, and dealt directly with Rome.²

It requires some effort of the imagination to appreciate the depth of jealousy, not to say hatred, which divided the two branches of the mediaeval clergy. The feud was due to rival authority, both spiritual and temporal. The bishops pretended to a kind of ecclesiastical suzerainty over the monasteries in addition to their episcopal authority and right of examination, often exacting an oath of homage when ordaining an abbot.³ Many monasteries too were required to pay a portion of their revenues into the bishop's coffers. Then the bishops roundly abused the right of hospitality which they had the authority to exact upon their visitations, often quartering a large entourage upon the monastery. Title to church lands and the right to assess the tithe were also subjects of feud between

¹ Gerbert of Rheims, later Pope Sylvester II, opposed the Cluniac doctrine of the supremacy of the papacy (*Lettres* [ed. Havet], Nos. 192, 193, 217).

² See Pfister, *Robert le Pieux*, 313 f. The letters of Abbon of Fleury-Migne, *Pat. Lat.* CXXXIX, cols. 441 f., abound with information on this matter. Cf. Certain's article on Arnoul in *Bib. de l'école d. Charles*, XIV, 455.

³ *Ep. Fulb. Chartr.* Bouquet, X, 448 C.

the bishops and the abbots. The former opposed the claim of the monks to collect tithes, citing the capitularies of Charlemagne and the findings of councils to the effect that *decimae sint in manu episcopi*. The monasteries, however, interpreted this regulation in another way.¹

The issue between the regulars and the seculars was fought bitterly at various synods in the last decade of the tenth century² and the first part of the eleventh, when the kings of France, notably Robert the Pious, threw the weight of the crown in favor of Cluny.³ Hugh, archbishop of Tours, made a special trip to Rome to protest to John XVIII against the arrogance of Cluny.⁴ But the papacy saw on which side its bread was to be buttered, and that it could diminish the powers of the bishops by supporting the monks and so enlarge the authority of the pope.⁵ But papal intervention or even papal anathema never wholly abated the feud. For years there was strife between Fleury-sur-Loire, the Cluniac bastion in Central France, and the bishops of Orleans, which finally came to open fight on the floor of a council and culminated in the offending bishops being summoned to Rome.⁶ A similar incident took place in 1025, when the bishop of Soissons and the monks of St. Médard resorted to physical conflict.⁷ In the same year the French and Burgundian bishops united at Anse near Lyons declared null and void the papal bull exempting Cluny from the jurisdiction of the bishop of Mâcon.⁸

¹ The point is elucidated in a long note in Lot, *Hugues Capet*, 184, note.

² Pfister, 315-16.

³ "Les évêques, cette aristocratie de l'église, étaient pour lui [Robert] aussi redoutables que l'aristocratie laïque; ils voulaient se rendre maîtres dans les diocèses comme les seigneurs dans les comtés. Les uns et les autres avaient mêmes intérêts et représentaient le morcellement féodal.—Pfister, 305.

⁴ Rod. Glaber, II, c. 4; Sackur, II, 87.

⁵ Pfister, 319-320; Lot, *op. cit.*, 36. This feeling accounts in part for the Catilinarian invective of Bishop Arnulf of Orleans at the synod of Rheims in 991 against papal corruption: "O lugenda Roma, quae nostris majoribus clara patrum limina protulisti, nostris temporibus monstruosas tenebras futuro saeculo famosas effudisti. Olim accepimus claros Leones, magnos Gregorios; quid sub haec tempora vidimus? —Mansi, XIX, 131.

⁶ *Vita Gauslin*, I, cc. 14, 15, 16; Sackur, I, 273 f.

⁷ Bouquet, X, 474.

⁸ Pfister, 307, 317-18; Lot, 156-57; Hessel, *Zeitschrift für Kirchengesch.*, XXII (1901).

In 1026 Count Landri of Nevers dispossessed the inmates of a monastery belonging to him and replaced them with monks from Cluny, whereupon the bishop of Autun threw his lands under interdict and so aroused the lay population against him.¹ At Tours there was prolonged quarrel between Archbishop Archambaud and the monks of St. Martin.²

Quite as acrimonious as these quarrels dividing the bishops and the monks was the protracted feud between the monks and the feudal nobles, who resented Cluny's attacks upon their immemorial feudal right to appoint to church livings and control church revenues. The history of the first Capetian kings of France, of the dukes of Normandy and Burgundy, and of the counts of Anjou and Champagne is filled with this struggle.³

The Cluny reform in its original purpose and policy and in its ultimate application constituted two very different movements, so different that the two were actually separate and distinct propaganda. The original Cluniac movement was a real movement for moral reform and was exerted in the monasteries only. It was a renaissance of the old ideals of poverty and chastity and aimed to emancipate the monasteries from the worldly and feudal practices which had been intruded into them. Owing to the peculiar conditions of its foundation Cluny was free from the prevailing confusion which obtained in other cloisters, for it was independently governed under its own abbot. Thus Cluny tasted of the sweets of independence and was free from political control, as other foundations were not. Moreover there was undeniably a deeper spiritual life at Cluny.

If the reform had continued to be solely a reformation movement seeking to purify the morals of the clergy and to eliminate the grosser features of feudal abuse its propaganda would have been both reasonable and salutary. But when the Cluny reform began to preach church independence as well as moral reform it invaded

¹ Petit, *Hist. des ducs de Bourgogne*, éclaircissements 17-18, 27.

² *Lettres de Gerbert* (ed. Havet), 190-91.

³ See Sackur, II, 24 f.; Pfister, 180 f.; Luchaire, *Inst. mon. de la France*, II, 72 f.; Imbart de la Tour, *Les élections épiscopales*, 177 f.; Viollet, *Inst. polit.*, I, 416 f.; Lavissee, *Hist. de France*, II, Part II. Book 1, chaps. iv and v, Book 2, chap. i.

the field of politics and at once took issue with the secular authority, whose supremacy it challenged. This second stage was reached when the Cluny reform became identified with the papacy, in whose hand it became the weapon for the establishment of a universal dominion, and may then be fittingly termed the Gregorian reform. For its purposes then were less religious than political, less moral than monarchical. This is the Roman stage of the Cluny reform.

Yet the movement was Italian before it became Roman. But even thus early it was anti-German in its direction. Lombard and Tuscan Italy by the middle of the eleventh century had begun to chafe under German domination, and that a domination chiefly maintained by the imposition of German bishops in Italian sees. For the emperors, both Saxon and Franconian, distrusting the native ecclesiastics, systematically appointed German bishops to Italian sees. Between 950 and 1000 the presence of 47 German bishops in the bishoprics of Italy is attested, and undoubtedly there were more of such of whom we have no record. The precaution was warranted, for by the time of Henry II all the prominent noble families of North Italy were allied against German domination south of the Alps. Within twenty-four days after the death of Otto III in 1002, on February 15, in the church of St. Michael at Pavia, Arduin, margrave of Ivrea, already famous for his hostility to the Germans in Italy, assumed the Iron Crown of Lombardy.¹ Two years later the Pavians destroyed the German castle which was the key to their hold upon the city.²

But the Pretender had undertaken an impossible task. Henry II crossed the Alps in the spring of 1004 and gave Pavia over to the flames, though Arduin escaped and continued to call himself king of Italy until his death in 1015.³ The news of the emperor's death at Grona, on Saxon soil, in 1024 was received with shouts of rejoicing in Lombardy, where the populace of Pavia utterly destroyed the new citadel which Henry II had built.⁴ Conrad II again riveted

¹ Pfister, 362, n. 1.

² Giesebrecht, II, 231 f.; Lamprecht, II, 278-79.

³ Pfister, 362; Sackur, II, 14; Provena, *Studi critici sopra la storia d'Italia a' tempi del re Ardoino*, Turin, 1844.

⁴ Wipo, *Vita Conradi*, c. 7.

German domination upon the turbulent country and colonized it with German bishops and German soldiery.¹ His humiliation of the archbishop of Milan and devastation of Parma² foiled a plot for the massacre of all the Germans in Lombardy³.

Italy was sullen and sore under the German heel. But though revolt after revolt failed, nevertheless Arduin of Ivrea and later conspirators managed to sow dragons' teeth in the path of the Germans. In 1004 Arduin had vainly made overtures to Robert of France, true to the traditional Italian policy of seeking some powerful intervention from without, when he perceived that his cause was failing. The suggestion was not lost. When Arduin died the Italian anti-German party offered to yield the March of Ivrea to Rodolph, king of the Two Burgundies, as the price of his intervention,⁴ and when Henry II died in 1024 they offered the Italian crown successively to a son of Robert the Pious, to William of Aquitaine, and finally to Odo, count of Champagne, who in 1037 invaded Lorraine, took Commercy, failed before Toul, and laid siege to Bar-le-Duc, where he was slain (November 15).⁵ Once more retribution was visited by Conrad II upon the rebellious cities of Italy, especially Pavia and Parma.⁶ However much Italy might be divided against itself with warring feudal houses and rival bishops, its hatred of German domination and of the Germans has almost the dignity of a national feeling. The chronicles for every century, even from

¹ The subject of German bishops in Italian sees in these times has recently been attentively studied in three dissertations: Groner, *Die Diözesen Italiens von der Mitte des zehnten bis zum Ende des zwölften Jahrhunderts* (Tübingen, 1904); Pahncke, *Geschichte der Bischöfe Italiens deutscher Nation von 951-1004* (Halle diss., 1912); Schwartz, *Die Besetzung der Bistümer Reichsitaliens unter den sächsischen und salischen Kaisern* (Freiburg i, Br. diss., 1913).

² Pabst, *De Ariberto II, Mediolanensi primisque medii aevi motibus popularibus* (Berlin diss., 1864); cf. the array of sources and authorities in Richter, *Annalen*, III, Part II, pp. 312-20.

³ Nitzsch, II, 32. For the Romans' hatred of the Germans in 962 see *Benedicti chronicon*, I, c. 39, SS. III, 719. For general evidence: Liutprand, *Antapod.*, I, 23; *Gesta Bereng.*, III vss. 80 f.; Regino, *Chron.*, annis 894, 896; *Annal. Fuld.*, 886; Folcuin, *Gesta abbat. Leob.*, c. 28, SS. IV, 69; *Annal. Qued.*, 1014; Sackur, I, 321 ff.

⁴ Pfister, 367-70.

⁵ Giesebrecht, II, 231 f.; Lamprecht, II, 278-79; Richter, III, Part II, pp. 273-74 (annis 1025-27).

⁶ Richter, III, Part II, pp. 311, 319 (anno 1037).

before the permanent establishment of German rule by Otto the Great in 962, bristle with the evidences of it.

Ever since the intervention in Italy in 901 of King Louis of Burgundy, whom Pope Benedict IV had crowned emperor after Arnulf's death, Italy had been a field of exploitation for adventurous and greedy transalpine Burgundians and Provencaux.¹ The overtures of the rebellious Italians in the reigns of Henry II and Conrad II to Robert the Pious, William of Aquitaine, Rodolph of Burgundy, and Odo of Champagne increased this French influx. It was the Italian national party which saw the political advantage latent in the Cluny reform, abandoned open revolt for more insidious conspiracy, and began to agitate against lay investiture as a means of emancipating Italy from German rule. Then and there the Cluny reform became a formidable political movement against the German monarchy, all the more formidable because under the guise of religion it could pursue its purposes. "Reform" became a means to an end, and that end the liberation of Italy. In soil so fertile with an anti-German spirit the Cluny reform found a congenial field. Many of the rebellious Italian nobles were ardent devotees of Cluny. Arduin of Ivrea, who had rebelled at the death of Otto III and had had himself crowned king of the Lombards at Pavia in 1102, and whom Henry II crushed, terminated his stormy career in Fructuaria, one of the earliest Cluniac foundations.²

But if the independence of Italy could be so secured, why not also that of the church in the same way? And if the independence of the church, why not the supremacy of the church? It was this enormous possibility in the application of the Cluny reform which Hildebrand saw, as did no other man, while he was yet little more than a simple monk. He saw the tremendous implications in the issue: that by identifying the papacy with a war to abolish lay investiture the papacy might not only emancipate the church from secular control, but subordinate, even demolish, the state. "Aboli-

¹ Poupardin, 65-66, 223, and especially 377-99; Gregorovius, III, Book 6, cc. 1-2; La Potre, *L'Europe et la St. Siège l'époque Carolingien*, 330-34. For Italian feeling toward these adventurers from beyond the Alps see Liutprand, *Antapod.*, Book II, c. 60; Book III, c. 44; Book V, c. 6.

² Fructuaria was founded by William of St. Bénigne in 1003 (Pfister, 266); Abbé Chevalier, *Le vénérable Guillaume, abbé de St. Bénigne*, 86.

tion of simony" was to become the slogan of papal victory. The Cluny reform might be made an Archimedean lever with which to overthrow the world: *Eripiet coelo fulmen sceptrumque tyrannis*. The time was not yet ripe to unveil a program of such colossal magnitude, but it was implicit in the enterprise of the Italian nationalist party.¹ Arduin of Ivrea's rebellion had exhibited marked antiepiscopal tendencies.²

It is obvious that the original nature of the Cluny reform and this Italian nationalist expression of it were two very different movements. Italy had early become a seed plot of the real reform, for its clergy in the tenth century was perhaps even more degraded and corrupt than that north of the Alps. Even corrupt and mutilated forms of ancient paganism had resurgence.³ The Benedictine rule was a reminiscence in such famous monasteries as Monte Cassino, San Vincenzo, Farfa, Peschiera, and Subiaco.⁴ Marozia and Theodora paid their soldiery with money and plate taken from Roman convents.⁵

The Cluny reform was introduced into Italy by Odo, the second abbot, whom Alberigo, founder of a short-lived Roman republic (932-54), is alleged to have made abbot general over all the monasteries in Rome and its environs. In any case the famous monastery of Sancta Maria, where Hildebrand was educated, was established at this time on the Aventine in a palace given over to it by Alberigo, and a long series of old foundations reorganized by Odo, as St. Lorenzo, St. Andrew, St. Agnes, St. Sylvester, St. Stephen, Subiaco, Farfa, St. Peter in Pavia, and finally Monte Cassino. When Odo died in 944 the progress of the Cluny reform in Italy was interrupted for two decades, but was resumed under Majolus (954?-94).

¹ Giesebrecht, II, 30 f.; Lamprecht, II, 278 f.; Sackur, II, 1-14. Contemporary Italian literature at this time shows marked French influence and is prevalingly hostile to the Germans (Zimmer, *Roman. Forsch.*, XXIX [1911]).

² Giesebrecht, II, 240; Lamprecht, II, 284.

³ Dresdner, *Kultur- und Sittengesch. der italien. Geistlichkeit im X. und XI. Jahrh.* (1890), 51 f., 174 f., 263 f., 307 f., 362 f.; Schulz, *Atto von Vercelli*, 40 f.; Vogel, *Rather von Verona*, I, 43 f.; Sackur, I, 93 f.; Nitzsch, I, 338-39.

⁴ Gregorovius, Book 6, c. 12, sec. 3 (Eng. trans., III, 307-10).

⁵ Sackur, I, 96-97. On Farfa see Gregorovius, III, 314-15 (Eng. trans.).

In 971 St. Savior in Pavia was reformed, in 972 St. Apollinaris near Ravenna, in 982 St. John in Parma, in 987 Monte Celio in Pavia, where Odo had been successfully resisted by the monks some years before. Pavia, significantly for the seat of the Italian national party, at this time indubitably the richest and most populous city in North Italy, became the chief seat of the order in Italy, where Cluny in 967 had acquired extensive lands both within the city and along the banks of the Po.¹ The reformation of Farfa about the year 1000 was the work of Majolus' successor, Odilon, who founded La Cava near Naples in 1025. Odilon's greatest conquests though were made in Piedmont, where Fructuaria was established in 1003 by Odilon's able assistant William of St. Benigne, and Novalesse in 1027. The last is a curious example of monastic migration, for the original monastery had been founded in Bremen.²

But by this time—we are within the eleventh century and in the reigns of Henry II and Conrad II—the Cluny reform in Italy had ceased to be so much a reform as an anti-German and nationalist propaganda. The Italian who first saw the Cluny reform in this new light was Guido of Arezzo. He voiced the earliest deliberate formulation of mediaeval Italian nationalism in a letter to Herbert, archbishop of Milan and a bitter enemy of German rule in Italy, in 1031.³ He was clever enough, though, to conceal his political purpose under the drapery of religion, and inveighed against the “simoniacal” practices of the German kings in denunciatory fashion. But “simony” with Guido meant not the *abuse* by the German kings of their appointive power to church offices in Italy, but the very exercise of that appointive power at all. He branded lay investiture as heresy and declared that countless thousands of Christians had suffered eternal damnation because of it. In this wise the agitation was artfully made to gain the support of the ignorant and terror-stricken lower classes in the Lombard cities. A national and popular Italian and anti-German party was thereby formed in Lombardy, of protest against “lay” investiture,

¹ Bern. et Bruel, *Recueil des Chartes de Cluny*, II, Nos. 1143, 1229, 1295.

² Bresslau, *Jahrbuch*, II, 164, n. 4; *Vita Odilonis*, II, 12.

³ *Libelli de lite*, I, 1-4; Bresslau, III, 271-73; Waitz, VIII, 425.

"simony," and the marriage of priests, with a political undercurrent and a religious overcurrent of enmity against the German bishops. This was the Pataria, in which the Italian feudality, the lower priest class, the bourgeoisie of the rising towns, and the rabble were all commingled.

Milan now, and not Pavia as formerly, was the center of this agitation for Italian independence, but most of the cities of the Lombard plain were more or less partisans of the movement. Two Milanese clerks named Ariald and Landolph traveled from town to town, preaching in the churches, haranguing the populace in the public squares, and everywhere inveighing against the German bishops, the marriage of priests, simony, etc., in passionate and popular speech, seeking to fan the flame into open revolt and even going so far as to advocate the assassination of all German priests.¹

The upper clergy in Lombardy, frightened by the violence of the agitation, implored the archbishop of Milan to suppress it. Ariald and Landolph were condemned in a synod which the archbishop convoked, and promptly appealed to Rome against the verdict. In 1056 Alexander II canceled the archbishop's excommunication. The Pataria was formally recognized by the papacy.² In the next year Hildebrand, already the power behind the papal throne, and Anselm of Lucca, who had studied at Bec in Normandy under Lanfranc,³ appeared in Milan as legates of the Holy See and concluded a papal-Patarian alliance, the league being under the captaincy of Landolph's brother Erlenbald, to whom Alexander II sent a special standard which he had blessed.⁴ Thus officially recognized by Rome, the Pataria became bolder. The archbishop of Milan and the German hierarchy in North Italy generally, frightened by the popular fury and the thunders of the Lateran, bowed before the storm. In 1059 they advocated, outwardly at

¹ Arnulf, *Gesta epp. Mediol.*, III, 11, SS. VIII, 19.

² *Ibid.*, III, 13, p. 20; Andreas, *Vita Arialdi*, Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, CLXIII, col. 1439, 1447.

³ *Vita Alex.*, II; Labbé, *Concil.*, XII, 69.

⁴ Arnulf, III, 14, p. 20; 16, p. 21; Bonizo, VI, 592; Andreas, 33, col. 1455; Bernold, *Annal.*, 1077, p. 305.

least, the Patarian program at the synod of Rome.¹ The seeds of that revolt against the imperial authority in Lombardy were already sown which came to fruition in the reign of Frederick Barbarossa in the formation of the league between the Lombard cities and the papacy in 1167, when the independence of Lombardy was won on the battlefield of Legnano (1178) and at the peace of Constance (1183). The papacy had scattered dragons' teeth in the imperial path in Italy.

The eleventh century is one of the most fascinating of epochs to the psychological historian, for a religious renaissance, so to speak, then actuated Europe which took many and intense forms of expression. The Cluny reform and the crusades were the two greatest of these. But the variety of the stirrings of the new consciousness was almost infinite. Almost a craze for the building of new and more magnificent churches developed, from which was born the first positive example of mediaeval ecclesiastical architecture, the Romanesque.² New heresies appeared, symptomatic of fervent religious thought.³ Relic worship became a mania.⁴

¹ Petr. Dam., *Epp.* xlii, Vol. I, pp. 66-67; Arnulf, III, 14-15, p. 21; Bonizo, VI, 593; Meyer von Knonau, *Jahrbuch*, I, 131.

² Rodolph Glaber's beautiful figure descriptive of this enthusiasm for church building is famous: "contigit in universo pene terrarum orbe, precipue tamen in Italia et in Galliis, innovari ecclesiarum basilicas. . . . Erat enim instar ac si mundus ipse, excutiendo semet, rejecta vetustate, passim candidam ecclesiarum vestem indueret."—Book III, c. 4, sec. 13, ed. Prou. For a vivid account of the building of a monastery see Ord. Vit. *Hist. eccles.*, VIII, c. 27; Guibert de Nogent, *De vita sua* [ed. Bourgin, 1907], 85, 110, 193-94, testifies to the same enthusiasm. For literature see Viollet le Duc, *Dict. d'architecture*, I, 107-30, 241-42; Merimée, *Études sur les arts au moyen âge*, c. 1; Reinach, *Story of Art*, 98; Moore, *Gothic Architecture*, c. 1; Kurth, *Notger de Liège*, I, c. 15; Rosières, *La chaire française*, II, c. 6; Mortet, *op. cit.*, Introd., xxxi-xlviii; Enlart, *Manuel de l'archéologie franc.*, I, c. 4, especially pp. 202, 206, 208-9.

³ Rod. Glaber, Book II, c. 11; Book III, c. 8; Book IV, c. 2. For literature see Pfister, 325 f.; Lea, *Hist. of Inquisition*, I, 108 f.; Rosières, *La chaire française*, I, c. 2; Sackur, II, 30-32; Rénan, *Averroes et averroïsme*, 284 f.; Havet, *Bib. de l'école des chartes*, XLI, 570 f.; Lea, *Sacerdotal Celibacy*, c. 13; Hahn, *Gesch. der Ketzer im Mittelalter, besonders im 11, 12. und 13. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart, 1845.

⁴ Rod. Glaber, Book III, c. 6; Petrus Venerabilis, *De miraculis*, Book 2 (Migne, *Patrol. Lat.*, 189); Guibert de Nogent, *De pignoribus sanctorum*, *ibid.*, CLVI, 607-79; Lefranc, *Le traité des reliques de Guibert de Nogent* (in *Études Monod*); Duchesne, *Les origines du culte chrétien*, 265-90; Reuter, *Gesch. der relig. Aufklärung im Mittelalter*, I, 147 f.; Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, V, 267, 302-8; VII, 54 f.; Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen*, II, 247 f., has good bibliography for Germany.

The Truce of God attempted to suppress the worst features of private war and made strong appeal to the popular mind.¹ Pilgrimages to the Holy Land enormously increased.² The first intimations of chivalry, that curious commingling of the ideals of a military society and of the faith of the Middle Ages, began to be manifest.³

In such an atmosphere the Cluny reform had operated until it became identified with Italian nationalist sentiment in Lombardy, with feudal resistance to the monarchy in Germany, and finally with the papacy, which saw in it, not merely an instrument for securing the independence of the church from secular control, but a means wherewith to overthrow the state.

This stage was reached between 1046 and 1056 with the ascendancy of Hildebrand in the curia in 1046 and the accession of Henry IV to the German throne in 1056. The first period of the Cluny reform was a genuine and legitimate movement for reformation of the mediaeval clergy, especially the monks. The second, or Hildebrandine, period was a huge political propaganda for the establishment of papal supremacy over the national churches and over the nations, masked under the guise of religion and morality.

When the Cluny reform had first entered Germany out of France the attitude of the German kings had not been one of hostility to it.⁴ Henry II had encouraged the movement and can hardly be accused of merely playing politics because he used the reform in order to secularize much of the lands of the monasteries

¹ On the Truce of God see Luchaire, *Manuel*, 231-33 (bib.); Holtzmann, *Franz. Verfassungsgesch.*, 127, 129, 164 f., 153 (bib.); Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, II, 2, 133-38 (bib.).

² See Pfister, 344 f.; Bréhier, *L'Eglise et l'Orient au moyen âge*, 42-54; Lalanne, *Des pèlerinages en Terre Sainte avant les croisades*, *Bib. de l'école des chartes*, 1845, 1; Riant, *Les établissements latins de Jérusalem au X^e siècle*, *Mem. de l'acad. d. inscrip.*, XXI, Part II, pp. 151 f.; Lavissee, II, Part II, 81.

³ Wattenbach, in *Deutschlands Geschichtsq.* (5th ed.), II, 217-23, has some admirable pages characterizing and summarizing the processes indicated in this paragraph. See also Flach, *Les origines de l'anc. France*, II, 431-579; Lavissee, II, Part II, pp. 139-43 (bib.); Luchaire, *Manuel* (index); Guilhaume, *L'origine de la noblesse en France au moyen âge*; Garreau, *L'état social de la France au temps des croisades*, 165-90. The close affiliation between Cluny and chivalry still is to be worked out.

⁴ Lamprecht, II, 327.

whose misuse of their wealth had become a scandal, and which needed to be bled for their own health's sake.¹ Conrad II had been a *Realpolitiker*. But though he seems to have been without the religious sentiment of Henry II, in the main his ecclesiastical policy was sane and just.²

Henry III, however, was distinctly a man of the high eleventh century, one deeply and sincerely religious. The argument of expediency was without force with him; his actions had to have a moral sanction as well. This religious earnestness pervaded the whole working of his government.³ Henry III's marriage with Agnes of Poitiers, daughter of William V of Aquitaine,⁴ undoubtedly accented his attachment for things French and inclined him more than ever to be favorable to the Cluny reform, for Cluny had been founded by a duke of Aquitaine, and the house had ever taken interest in its history.

No mediaeval German ruler assumed the crown under more favorable conditions or exercised his authority with greater power than did Henry III. Of the six German duchies two only, Saxony and Lorraine, had independent dukes. The four others, Franconia, Swabia, Bavaria, and Carinthia were in the king's hands. From the Rhine to Moravia, from the Harz to the Brenta, Henry III was both duke and king. But unfortunately Henry III was less practical than his predecessors and of a more refined education, and fell under the charm of the priest class. The future was already determined when the emperor, without reservation, espoused the Cluny reform. He was betrayed from the beginning of his reign by those in whom he reposed confidence. His endeavor to put a stop to simony was more laudable than successful, for it chiefly diverted the revenues from appointment to church benefices from the treasury of the king into the pockets of his officials.⁵

¹ Hauck, III, 448 ff.

² Voigt, 3-8; Feierabend, 5.

³ For estimates of the character of Henry III see Hauck, III, 572 f.; Nitzsch, II, 38-40; Gerdes, II, 119-21.

⁴ Henry III's French marriage irritated the German clergy (Hauck, III, 571; and letter of Siegfried of Gorze to Poppo of Stavelot in Giesebrecht, II, 702 [4th ed.]).

⁵ Henry III's sacrifice of the royal patronage financially embarrassed his government. He gave generously to the church, which already was perilously rich; the church at Goslar, for example, was given one-ninth of the income from the local crown lands. At one time Henry III was so cramped for funds that he was compelled to pawn the crown jewels (Waitz, VIII, 292).

At the synod of Constance, at the close of a successful campaign against the Hungarians, in gratitude for the victory, and perhaps sentimentally affected by the recent death of his mother, the emperor publicly pardoned all his enemies.¹ He petitioned Siegfried of Gorze, an austere reformer, to pray for him.² He wanted to make Richard of St. Vannes in Verdun, the Cluniac leader in Germany, a bishop. While the reform principles of Cluny appealed to his conscience, the Italian Camaldoli appealed to his religious emotion.³ He abandoned his father's unfinished and sensible plan for consolidated management of the royal abbeys. When agitation arose for establishment of the Truce of God in Germany also, as in France, Henry III, too sensitive of his prerogative avowedly to approve of a movement which in its very nature was a reflection on the ability of the crown to maintain law and order, sought to compromise by instituting the *Landfrieden* instead, which attempted to effect the purposes of the *treuga*, but saved the honor of the crown. As a result neither purpose was wholly accomplished. The *Landfrieden* was a revival of the old Carolingian ban re-enforced by the threat of ecclesiastical penalties.⁴

Yet Henry III was not clay in the hands of the Cluniacs. His conception of his prerogative was perhaps even more theocratic than that of Charlemagne had been. He treated the papacy as he would a bishopric. Matters of faith were one field, politics was another.⁵ He was not afraid of collision with the Cluniacs and those bishops (and there were not a few at this time in Germany) who were tinctured with "reform," but he did not have the discernment to sense the danger in their opposition.

Meanwhile the immense significance of the Cluniac movement in Italy had been perceived north of the Alps. In 1044 Henry promised the bishopric of Ravenna to a canon of Cologne named Widger, over the protest of a synod at Pavia. The new bishop was so rash as to celebrate mass without yet having received formal investiture from the emperor. For this breach he was summoned to the synod of Aachen, over which Henry III presided. But when Widger was brought forward for trial Wazo, archbishop of Liège, declared that the emperor had no authority to summon an Italian

¹ Hauck, III, 572.

² Pfister, 312; Hauck, III, 572.

³ Giesebrecht, II, 718.

⁴ Bresslau, I, 448; Nitzsch, II, 39.

⁵ Hauck, III, 577.

priest before a German ecclesiastical body, and that furthermore only the pope had the right to appoint bishops.¹ Italy, Lorraine, and the Flemish lands had struck hands and were all linked together in organized protest by the Cluny reform, now a regular political machine under papal direction. The emperor stood by his guns and deposed Widger, but it was a frontal attack upon the German monarchy. Two years later, when Henry offered the archbishopric of Lyons to Halinard, abbot of St. Benigne, the haughty abbot denied to the king's face his right of investiture and refused to do homage to him at the diet of Speyer in August, 1046.² This bold action was applauded by Richard of St. Vannes and the bishop of Toul, the future Leo IX.

But events far more significant than these soon happened in Italy. In 1045 there were three rival popes in Rome. To put an end to this scandal Henry III called a synod at Pavia. Peter Damiani, a Cluniac of the "old school" and an enthusiastic admirer of the Holy Roman Empire, who had sustained Henry in the recent controversy over Widger,³ was inclined to favor Gregory VI, although he was alleged to have bought the papal office, because, as pope, he had openly pronounced against simony.⁴ The emperor hesitated and called another synod at Sutri, where all three popes were deposed.⁵ When Adalbert of Bremen declined the honor, Henry III chose the bishop of Bamberg, who took the name of Clement II and crowned Henry emperor. The Cluniacs sullenly acquiesced, comforting themselves with the reflection that Clem-

¹ Hauck, III, 578-79; Sackur, II, 284; Hegel, *Städteverfassung von Italien*, II, 230; Nitzsch, II, 42; Bresslau, I, 309.

² Sackur, II, 274-75. ³ *Ep.*, VII, 2. ⁴ Jaffé-Wattenbach, 4130, 4, 126.

⁵ A mystery still hangs over what happened at the synod of Sutri. Did Henry III depose Gregory VI, as he did the others, or did Gregory VI abdicate? There can be no doubt that he was legally pope, and there is ground to suspect that under Hildebrand's urgency the pope abdicated rather than to have the papacy humiliated by an overt act of deposition performed by the emperor. The act, in other words, was done to save the theory of pontifical authority. This action of self-sacrifice on the part of Gregory VI may have been the reason why Hildebrand, when made pope himself, took the name of Gregory too as a tribute to his friend. If true, it shows that Hildebrand was a master of intrigue or an ardent zealot of the "new" Clunyism. See the interesting article by Sir Frederick Pollock, "The Pope Who Deposed Himself," in *English Historical Review*, X, 123-24, and compare Sackur, *Neues Archiv*, XXIV, 734 f.

ent II had also pronounced against simony. But when the new pope soon died and Henry appointed the bishop of Brixen as Damasus II, and a few months later, on his decease, Bruno of Toul became Leo IX, the triple exhibition of imperial control of the Holy See was too much for the Cluniacs. The archbishop of Liège bluntly told the emperor that he had no right to appoint the pope,¹ and in France an anonymous pamphlet was circulated against Henry.²

But the reform party quickly went from despair to elation. Henry III with his passionate idealism, his religious emotionalism, could not read men. Already he had naïvely appointed bishops imbued with Hildebrandine ideas to Italian sees.³ Now he little realized, when he gave the papal scepter to his uncle Bruno of Toul, that he was undermining his own throne, for Leo IX proved to be a devoted Cluniac.⁴ From his pontificate (1049-54) dates the immense influence of Hildebrand,⁵ with whom worked Halinard of Lyons, a notorious ultramontanist,⁶ Humbert, soon to be the author of a famous Cluniac tract, and a swarm of Lorrainer and Burgundian prelates.⁷

Hitherto the popes had been accustomed to assign the presidency of synods to legates. But Leo IX traveled from country to country and personally inquired, examined, authorized.⁸ The keynote of the future was sounded at the synod of Rheims in October, 1049.⁹ Three canons of that assembly were of great importance. The very first one read: *Ne quis sine electione cleri et populi ad regimen ecclesiasticum proberetur*.¹⁰ The second forbade the purchase and sale of altars, church offices, or churches. The third made it obligatory upon all bishops to enforce the canons of election and installation. Bishop after bishop came forward and

¹ *Gesta epp. Leod.*, II, 65.

² *De ordine pontif.*; Hauck, III, 599; Sackur, II, 305, n. 2.

³ Hauck, III, 609.

⁴ *Ibid.*, III, 600; see Lamprecht's characterization, II, 308.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 597, n. 1.

⁶ Steindorff, *Jahrbuch*, II, 54, note.

⁸ Hauck, III, 601 and note.

⁷ Sackur, II, 314-15.

⁹ Sackur, II, 322-23.

¹⁰ Mansi, *Concilia*, XIX, cols. 796 f.; Bonizo rightly said of this legislation, *Haec gladium in viscera mersit inimici*.

made obeisance to the pope.¹ From Rheims, Leo IX went to Mainz where he received like homage.² The pope preached to the people in their own tongue, presided over the synod, and everywhere proclaimed the teachings of the Cluny reform. The changed relation between pope and emperor is significant. The pope was gradually and artfully edging the emperor out of his legal and traditional headship of state and church.³

The immense moral prestige which the papacy acquired during the pontificate of Leo IX was not lost; the cumulative force of ideas and things carried the papacy forward and upward. The brief pontificate of Stephen X saw some of the fruits of his predecessor's reign ripen. Through the clever maneuvering of Hildebrand and Anselm of Lucca the new pope qualified without the usual formality of securing imperial approval. This success was followed by the bold stroke of Nicholas II in establishing the College of Cardinals (1059) and thereby emancipating the papacy completely from any legal control by the imperial authority.⁴ The minority of Henry IV, the weakness of the empress-mother Agnes, the feud between Anno of Cologne and Adalbert of Bremen, at this time compromised Germany to such a degree that the papacy could do such revolutionary things almost without protest.⁵ The provenience of these mid-century popes is instructive in this particular: Leo IX was an Alsatian, Stephen IX a native of Lorraine, Nicholas II a Burgundian, Alexander II a Lombard. In these regions the Cluniac reform already had secured firm root.

The monasteries in the reign of Henry III had enjoyed a new lease of prosperity to which they had been strangers since Henry II's time. In addition to recovering the right to elect their abbots,⁶ they were liberally endowed again, even acquiring once more considerable parcels of the lands of which Henry II and Conrad II

¹ Hauck, III, 633.

² *Ibid.*, III, 615.

³ For extended demonstration of this statement see Hauck, III, 600-615, and Lübbersledt, *Die Stellung des deutschen Klerus auf päpstlichen Generalkonsilien von Leo IX bis Gregor VII (1049-1085)*, Greifswald diss., 1911.

⁴ On the establishment of the College of Cardinals see Meyer von Knonau, *Jahrbuch*, I, 134 f.; Hefele, IV, 824 f.; Giesebrecht, *Münchener Jahrb.*, 1866; Gustav Schöber, *Das Wahldekret vom Jahre 1059*, Breslau diss., 1914.

⁵ Hauck, III, 664.

⁶ Nitzsch, II, 54.

had deprived them.¹ They were protected from the greed of the bishops.² The monastic chroniclers are unanimous in testifying to the prosperity of the abbeys under Henry III.³

But the monks ill repaid the crown for its generous treatment of them. Henry III's work was ruined in advance, his deeply religious nature abused, the very monarchy betrayed. The Cluny reform which he so favored was at bottom insidiously destructive of secular government.⁴ The Cluniac monks who surrounded Henry III were secretly hostile to the German theory of government of a strong church within a strong state and were determined to reverse the relation. What they artfully called the "confusion" of temporal and spiritual authorities was not so in point of fact, for law and order was the ideal of and permeated the whole dual system. But it was this very law and order which maddened the Cluniacs. The mere existence of any sovereignty except that of the papacy was their ground of feud.

The German kings claimed the right of control of the German church because the German church had freely accepted the conditions under which its prosperity had developed. But a party had gradually grown up within the church which was eager to establish, not only ecclesiastical independence, but even ecclesiastical supremacy; which denied that the grants of the emperors had been made conditionally, or that the church had ever willingly entered into such a relation with the state. This party stigmatized all secular control of church offices as "simony," and found the readiest means to attain its end in a denial of the legality of lay investiture. This was the new teaching of the Cluny reform. The war of investiture was at bottom a contest for control of church patronage, and the root of the whole matter was the temporalities of the church. The contest was fundamentally motivated by economic interest. Gregory VII and his successors strove to repudiate those feudal duties and obligations to both government and society which the church's possession of vast landed property naturally and legally entailed, *and at the*

¹ Bresslau, II, 138, n. 5; Feierabend, 6.

² For example, the case of intervention in the feud between Herbert, bishop of Eichstadt, and the abbot of Neuberg (Voigt, 15).

³ Voigt, 19.

⁴ Gerdes, II, 102.

same time to keep the church's lands.¹ Whatever the weight given to the influence in Gregory's mind of Augustinian ideas of a *Civitas Dei* on earth, whatever the arguments of papal legists and proponents, I am convinced that the papacy never would have attempted to translate these vague, abstract aspirations into actuality if the economic development of the church in Germany had not stimulated the papal ambition and created the opportunity. Naturally the popes kept this materialistic ambition in the background and forced the issue on other grounds. It used phrases like the "Rock of St. Peter" and the "Living Church" as clever watchwords in order to conceal its real purpose and to cover its conduct with the draperies of sanctity. *But the real striving of the popes was for wealth and power*, in the chief form in which wealth and power were embodied in the feudal age, namely, *land*.

It is a mistake, however, to think that as yet Hildebrand had complete control of the Cluniac party. There was a radical and a conservative wing in it, a left and a right. Hildebrand, Cardinal Humbert, and the famous curialist Placidus of Nonantula, represented the extreme faction. Its position was that investiture was wholly an ecclesiastical act, and that the grace which was administered through the bishop's office must not be sullied by any form or degree of lay control. It contended that the feudal authority and the temporal functions of the bishop were merged within his episcopal nature, and that no differentiation could be made between them—a contention which was tantamount to depriving the state of all the enormous resources and political authority vested in the bishops by the emperors from Charlemagne down.²

¹ Placidus of Nonantula (1070). "Quod semel ecclesiae datum est, in perpetuum Christi est nec aliquo modo alienari a possessione ecclesiae potest, in tantum ut etiam idem ipse fabricator ecclesiae, postquam eam deo voverit et consecrari fecerit, in ea iuncipsum nullum jus habere possit."—*Lib. de hon. eccles.*, c. 7. Hinschius, II, 628.

² Humbert was the author of the tract *Adversus simoniacos* (1059), which may be with right regarded as the opening gun of the Gregorian party. It is printed in the *Libelli de lite*, I, 95–253, and see comments of Meyer von Knonau, *Jahrb.* I, 104 f.; Hauck, III, 674 f.; Lamprecht, II, 317 f. There is a large literature on Cardinal Humbert, e.g., Halfmann, *Kardinal Humbert, sein Leben und seine Werke* (1882); Giesebrecht, *Kaiserzeit*, III, 19 f.; Meltzer, *Gregor VII u.d. Bischofswahl*, 37 f.; *Münchener histor. Jahrb. for 1886*, 106 f. On Placidus see Kayser, *Placidus von Nonantula: De honore ecclesiae, ein Beitrag zur Investiturstreits* (Kiel, 1888). His tract is in Migne, *Patrol. Lat.*, CLXIII, 613 f.

On the other hand, Cardinal Damiani was not so radical. He was a sincere admirer of the Holy Roman Empire and appreciated the debt which the church owed to the state. He distinguished between the purely ecclesiastical and the feudo-temporal nature of the bishop's office, and advocated a double coronation ceremony for the bishops, which would give simultaneous and just expression to the claims of both church and state. This is the germ of the idea which finally triumphed in the settlement at Worms in 1122.¹

By the time of Hildebrand's ascendancy over the papacy the division of Cluny into two parties, an old and a new—or what I have just called a "right" and a "left," amounted almost to a schism. The real Cluniac party was out of sympathy with the political designs of this radical minority.² We are specifically told that Odilo sympathized with the work of Henry II and Conrad II in the reformation of the German monasteries;³ that Henry III "loved him [Odilo] beyond measure and humbly adhered to his counsels."⁴ Cluny

. . . had regarded with sympathetic interest every intervention of the emperors for the reform of the church from the days of Otto I to Henry III. She had rejoiced at the purification of the papacy, at its gradual ascendancy over the noble families at Rome, and at the attempt of the reformed papacy to tighten the reins of discipline over the bishop. . . . But further than this she was not prepared to go, and when the movement under Stephen IX turned from the reform of the church to its freedom the Cluniac held back. The anti-imperial bias of the new reform movement estranged his sympathies, and Cluny had perhaps stood too near to the emperors to get the proper perspective. When, therefore, the movement for the freedom of the church took new impetus under Gregory VII, and when the latter worked to set the church above all worldly and temporal powers, the reformed monasteries took neither a decided nor a unanimous stand for the papacy. . . . Against simony in the church and the marriage of priests Cluny cannot be shown to have been a pioneer. . . . For

¹ Damiani argued that the act of royal investiture was *only* for the church lands and not for the office (*Ep.*, 13, cited by Bernheim, *Zur Geschichte d. Worms Konkordat*, 4). See also Ficker in *Wiener Akad.*, 1872, 100, and Kayser, 11. Waitz, *DVG.*, VIII, 433-51, has admirably summarized the arguments and contentions of both parties.

² Hauck, III, 864.

³ Odilo ordered the memory of Henry II to be regularly celebrated at Cluny (Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, CXLII, col. 1038; *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, XXVI, 33, n. 7, 8).

⁴ *Qui supra modum eum diligebat, illiusque consiliis humiliter adherebat.*—Vita, II, 12.

any organized campaign against either simony or the marriage of priests evidence is wanting. Silence reigns on both points in the *Lives*. . . . Dangerous as it may be to argue from silence, it is perhaps still more dangerous to maintain a theory which, with no other proofs, is built up in defiance of that silence. On this point we believe Kerker's judgment to be sound,¹ while Hauck cites William of Dijon's zeal against simony as in striking contrast with the attitude of the other Cluniacs.²

The original Cluny reform was designed to purge the monasteries and to establish a new life within them. It was indifferent to the condition of the secular clergy and held aloof from them, frowning upon those members of the order who were persuaded to accept episcopal appointments.³ Otherwise than this Cluny was chiefly interested in promoting the Truce of God,⁴ pilgrimages, and church building.⁵ Even when the radical Hildebrandines captured the reform and twisted it to the ends of papal supremacy, Hugh of Cluny, although impotent to check the new tide, remained a conservative. Gregory VII reproached him for his indifference in the war of investiture.⁶ Hugh was godfather to Henry IV and

¹ *William der Selige* (1863), 109.

² Hauck, III, 864. The quotation is from L. M. Smith, "Cluny and Gregory VII," *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, XXVI, 25-26.

³ Miss Mary Bateson says (*Eng. Hist. Rev.*, X, 140) that Odilo "had a strong desire to be himself a leader or general of an army of monks is very probable."

⁴ Mansi, XIX, col. 593; Pfister, 164-73, 266. The influence of chivalry upon Cluny is very interesting. This fact is the pith of the satire of Adalberon, bishop of Laon (in Bouquet, X, 65), who attacked the military conception of monasticism in a fable which Miss Bateson has paraphrased, telling "how a doubt having arisen in a monastery as to the interpretation of contradictory precepts, the bishop considered the matter and sent one of the monks to Odilo for advice. He returned in the evening mounted on a foaming steed. The bishop could scarcely recognize him. He wore a bearskin on his head, his gown was cut short and divided behind and before to make riding easier. In his embroidered military belt he carried bow and quiver, hammer and tongs, a sword, a flint and steel, and an oaken club. He wore wide breeches, and as his spurs were very long he had to walk on tiptoe. The bishop asked: 'Are you my monk whom I sent out?' He answered: 'Sometime monk, but now a knight. I here offer military service at the command of my sovereign who is King Odilo of Cluny.'"—*Eng. Hist. Rev.*, X, 140. See further: Hüchel, *Les poèmes satiriques d'Aldeberon*. Bib. de la faculté des lettres de Paris, fasc. xiii, 1901. For the influence of Cluny on pilgrimages, see Pfister, 344 f.

⁵ Cf. page 5 (3).

⁶ Jaffé, II, 81; *Reg.*, I, 62, p. 81; VI, 17, p. 351; VIII, 2 and 3, p. 429; VIII, 52. Cited by Smith in *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, XXVI, 29.

finally, according to Berthold the annalist, was excommunicated for his loyalty to the emperor,¹ and when Henry IV was put under the papal ban the monks of Cluny prayed for him.² At the conference at Tribur and Oppenheim, Hugh was with the emperor and did his best to mitigate the verdict.

The real originator of the "new" Clunyism, i.e., the movement to abolish lay investiture in order to elevate the papacy over the state, was Wazo of Liège. But with political Clunyism the conservatives of the order had no sympathy. Peter Damiani was an admirer of the Holy Roman Empire; the *Lives* of Majolus and of Odilo emphasize respect for secular authority and secular dignitaries.³ To Abbo of Fleury "ascendency of the crown over both worldly and spiritual dignities was the foundation of all public law."⁴ Majolus' refusal of the papacy when it was proffered him by Otto II "showed no consciousness that such power of choice did not lie with the emperor."⁵ Imperialistic Clunyism was born in Rome, not in France. The unapprehended thought of Wazo and Cardinal Humbert was seized by the mind of Hildebrand, who, as Pope Gregory VII, converted it into a thunderbolt: "Man darf geradezu sagen dass eine Parteibildung überhaupt nur von Rom ausgehen konnte."⁶ It has been well said that "the century which is called the century of Gregory VII, with much better reason might be called the age of Cluny. For it was only because he was the greatest of the Cluniacs that Gregory became the greatest of the popes."⁷

¹ Berthold, *Annal.*, 289; for Hugh's activity in favor of Henry IV see Paul Bernried, *Gregor VII*, c. 7, Nos. 56-59; Lambert of Hersfeld, 290, 294, ed. Holder Egger.

² D'Achery, *Spicilegium* (ed. 1723), III, 426. "Neque tamen debita poenitentia errorem cognitum emendavit."—Letter of Halinard of Lyons to Countess Matilda.

³ *Vita Majoli*, I, 7; *Vita Odilonis*, I, 7.

⁴ Smith, "Cluny and Gregory VII," *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, XXVI, 23; cf. Sackur, II, 305. Duke William of Aquitaine broke up the synod of Poitiers in 1078, though a papal legate was present (Mansi, XX, 495). Mr. Smith rightly says that "the Cluniacs do not seem to have preached any special doctrine as to the papal power."—*Op. cit.*, 23.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Hauck, III, 515; cf. Grützmacher, *Realencyclopädie für protestantische Theologie*, XIII, 183. Wazo enjoyed high repute in Flanders and the Rhinelands as a canonist, and it is to be remembered that Hildebrand had once studied at Cologne.

⁷ Dehio and Bezold, *Gesch. der christl. Baukunst im Mittelalter*, I, 387.

For six successive pontificates, from that of Leo IX to his own ascension of the throne of the Fisherman in 1073, Hildebrand was the power behind the papal chair. During that period the Cluny reform had become an organized and formidable propaganda directed by the Holy See; the creation of the College of Cardinals had emancipated the papacy from secular interference; papal power in Europe had been consolidated, especially through the creation of the papal legates;¹ the financial resources of the popes had materially increased, both through extension and through improved methods of collection; the states of the church were solidly buttressed on either hand by the establishment of papal suzerainty over the kingdom of Norman Italy, and the close alliance effected between the papacy and Countess Matilda of Tuscany, a strong papal partisan and ruler of the most extensive and compact territory north of the Norman kingdom.

In Gregory VII's brain were blended a huge ideal and a practical, vivid political program. There was nothing vague or indefinite about either. Using the current feudal conceptions of the time he held that God was supreme suzerain of the world, that the pope was God's vicar and vassal, that every secular authority, every state, was to be held within the overlordship of the pope, that national governments were not rightfully independent sovereignties, but *imperia in imperio*, that the church was both a political and an ecclesiastical empire as wide as Christendom and as high as heaven. He claimed all Italy, with Corsica and Sardinia, as the "States of the Church"

¹ Engelmann, *Die päpstlichen Legaten in Deutschland bis zur Mitte des 11. Jahrhunderts*, Marburg, 1913. For other literature on the institution of the papal legates see Werminghoff, 205. Gregory VII's legates were nearly all radical Cluniacs, as Hugh the Venerable, with whom Gregory continually consulted (*Vita St. Gregor.*, AASS., Bolland., May, VI, 115; *Reg. Greg.*, VII, 6; Labbé, *Concil.*, VI, 17; Hug., *Epp.*, IV, 22); Odon and Gérard, priors of Cluny (*Reg. Greg.* I, c. 62; AASS., *Ord. Ben.*, IX, 786); Hugh, the prior of St. Marcel de Châlons, who suspended the archbishops of Rheims, Tours, Bourges, and Besançon and convoked no less than ten synods or councils (Hug., *Flav. Chron.*, 194; Berthold, *Annal.*, 1078); Simon of Valois, abbot-prior of La Chaise-Dieu and later of St. Benigne, who was Gregory's ambassador to Robert Guiscard (Hug., *Flav. Chron.*, 229); Bernard of St. Victor in Marseilles, legate in Spain and Germany, where he presided over the diet of Forchheim which deposed Henry IV, and was papal agent among the revolted Saxons (Berthold, *Annal.*, 1078-79; *Epp. Greg.*, VII, 15); Richard, a brother of Bernard of St. Victor, who also served in Spain (AASS., *Ord. Ben.*, IX, 488).

in virtue of the alleged donation of Constantine; that "Spain belonged of old to St. Peter," and that this right had never been lost, although the land had been occupied by the infidel; that Hungary belonged to the Roman church by gift of King Stephen; that Charlemagne had given Saxony to the Holy See; that "the empire is a fief of Rome."

With less pretension and more concreteness Gregory VII tried to convert the conferring of the bishop's pallium and his episcopal oath into an act of homage and oath of vassalage to the pope as the bishop's immediate overlord. Except the requirement of celibacy, no demand of Gregory so stirred the opposition of the episcopate, for it outraged their national sentiments as well as impugned their long-established political attachment to the emperor.

The most practical and the most successful of Gregory VII's reforms was in the field of church finance. His achievements in this particular field testify to his administrative capacity and the essentially material nature of his aims and projects. Ever since the ninth century, owing to the violence and insecurity of the feudal régime, it had been the practice of weaker proprietors to commend themselves to the stronger; sometimes the latter were bishops or abbots. But many churches and monasteries, in order to protect themselves from feudal spoliation, gradually fell into the way of putting themselves under the patronage of the papacy. Through this practice the pope often became the eminent proprietor of lands of churches and monasteries widely scattered in Europe. These foundations, thus liberated from any other human control, lay or clerical, and protected against spoliation by apostolic anathema, recognized this protection by paying an annual sum (*cens*) into the papal treasury. Under various forms the papal patronage was spread over hundreds of churches and monasteries in Germany, France, and Italy. Gregory VII saw in the practice both a means to extend his authority and a means to reduce the power of the bishops, and a lucrative source of papal revenue as well, and so widely extended the system.

Not only ecclesiastical establishments, but private nobles and even towns appeared upon the revenue rolls of the papacy as "wards" paying for papal protection. The pope thus became, as has been

justly said, "a veritable suzerain, to whom both homage and money service was due." If we add to these resources the sums derived from the Peter's Pence, from administrative fees of many sorts, and from the Patrimonium Petri, it is evident that not for nothing had Hildebrand been *oeconomicus* of the Roman church before his elevation to the pontificate.¹

It is difficult for a modern scholar accurately to evaluate the motives and practices of the Cluny reform and to do justice simultaneously to both state and church. On the one hand, one must guard against judging the history of the eleventh century by the standards and practices of the twentieth; on the other hand, it requires an effort of the historical imagination to appreciate the theories and to visualize the conditions which then prevailed.

It may be premised, however, that the absolute and complete separation of church and state was an impossibility in the feudal age. Granting this, there were two alternative courses open: (1) to define the sphere of authority of each in such a way as to give simultaneous and due expression to the sovereignty of each without jeopardy to the other by the determination of the *reserved* or particular rights of each, and at the same time to provide for enough articulation between the two in order to enable them to function together by specific delegation and concurrent jurisdiction; (2) failing the establishment of the coequality of each in separate spheres, the other alternative was either the supremacy of state over church or that of church over state.

It may be objected that the first solution was incompatible with the Germanic form of government created by the Saxon and continued by the Franconian emperors. This is probably true. But there are clear indications that such a solution was possible. The reigns of Henry II and Henry III had shown that the political functioning of the church did not necessarily exclude its spiritual working. The church, i.e., the radical wing of the Cluny reform which dominated it after 1049, was really the uncompromising party. For it was resolutely bent upon achieving the supremacy of the papacy over both church and state.

¹ See on this subject Waitz, VII, 218-20; Schreiber, I, 9 f.; II, 463 f.; Werminghoff, 70, n. 4, 184-85; Blumenstock, *Der päpstliche Schutz im Mittelalter* (Innsbruck, 1890); Hauck, III, 865 f.

The just and reasonable remedy, if the church chafed under its relation to the state, would have been for the church to renounce its feudal possessions and its feudal rights and privileges—lands, countships, coinage and market grants, octrois, regalian perquisites in general—and to be content with its allodial lands, which were of vast extent in themselves. Radical as this solution would have been in the feudal age, it was thought of and suggested. The imperial government was willing to make the performance, but the church was too rich to make the sacrifice. It was determined to keep its lands and privileges, but to repudiate the obligations to the state which it had assumed with their possession—a policy little less than robbery under the guise of religion. Firmly resolved upon this course from the time of Hildebrand's ascendancy at Rome, there was only one way for the church to attain its ends, namely, to establish its sovereignty over the state. When the state resisted the church went to the length of seeking to destroy the state, to dissolve the historical and legal bonds which centuries had developed, by organizing rebellion and creating anarchy. In a word, the policy of the Gregorian church was a rule or ruin one. It was a policy of no compromise, not even shrinking from the annihilation of civil society.¹

The struggle between the mediaeval empire and the papacy, some of the history of which has been anticipated in the preceding paragraphs in order to show the nature of it, began openly at the death of Henry III in 1056. The Hildebrandine party, already in league with the Pataria and the Lombard nobility, had also effected an alliance with the feudality of Western and Southern Germany.

¹ "The piety of the Carolings and the Saxons brought a nemesis in the end, for one of the main agents in the downfall of the mediaeval empire was the territorial ambition of the princes of the church."—Fisher, I, 81. Cf. Nitzsch I, 390; Waitz, VII, 202-3. There is enormous significance in the words of Theoderich, *De reb. Norv.*, c. 5 [Langebek, V, 316], speaking of the policy of Otto II: "Iste est . . . qui ecclesiam omnemque clerum plus honorabat et pene plus ditabat quam expediret, subdendo ei pheodatos duces et comites. Nam ex opulentia nata postea insolentia, ut usque hodieque est cernere. Unde et illi, ut in Romana historia reperitur, ab angelo est dictum: 'Venenum addidisti ecclesie.'" Cf. also Gerhoh, *De aedif. Dei*, c. 9. The *Dictatus Papae*, sec. 27, had theoretically formulated the principle that the pope could dissolve the secular organization of society: "That he [the pope] may absolve subjects from their oath of fidelity to wicked rulers." Gregory VII gave it practical application in the first deposition and banning of Henry IV in 1076, which threw Germany into the throes of a long civil war.

"Reform" was the vehicle for expression of the enmity of the German dukes toward the crown. Feudalism and the papacy were leagued together.

The chief seat of the movement was Lorraine, perhaps the most refractory of all the feudal principalities in Germany. In the time of Otto I the duke Gilbert had coquetted with France and the archbishop Frederick of Mainz who had so resisted Otto's church policy. Under Otto II, Otto III, Henry II, and Conrad II, there had been new plots for French intervention vaguely identified with the French reform movement. But with Henry III the compact between the feudal elements in Lorraine and the Hildebrandine "reform" became close. The whole rule of the German kings over the lands in the valleys of the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Moselle was challenged. Most of the religious houses in this vast region were peopled with offspring of the local feudal families, and Henry III had been unwise enough to permit the bishoprics of Lorraine to be filled with representatives of this local aristocracy, thus letting the strongest instrument of his government of Lorraine, the episcopate, slip out of his hand. Hermann II of Cologne was made arch-chancellor of the apostolic see; Bruno of Toul became Pope Leo IX.¹ The feudal aristocracy of Lorraine, and the bishops, most of whom were of noble birth, combined their political aspirations with the Cluny reform and worked together against the monarchy. The identification of the Cluny reform in Germany with the elements and forces of feudal particularism and revolt is plain. The abbey of St. Vannes in Verdun quadrupled its landed wealth in certain years owing to the generosity of the nobles of Lorraine.

This double feudal and "reform" tendency was incarnated in the person of Duke Godfrey of Upper Lorraine, a redoubtable warrior and a born adventurer, who was descended from the ancient counts of Verdun.² Expelled from his duchy by Henry III, who

¹ Hauck, III, 482 f.; Sackur, II, 152 f.; Gerdes, II, 519 f. Lambert of Hersfeld (anno 1071, ed. Holder-Egger), 133, clearly shows the intimate relation subsisting between the high German feudality and the Cluny reform, ". . . principes regni ad instituendam in Galliis divini servicii scolam Transalpinos monachos evocabant, nostrates autem, quicumque in illorum instituta ultro concedere noluissent, de monasteriis cum ignominia eiciebant."

² Petr. Damien. *Epp.*, VII, 10, p. 450; *Triumph. Remaci*, I, 11, SS. XI, 443; Leo Ostiens, *Chron. Cass.*, xi, 97.

awoke too late to the danger of the situation in Lorraine, Godfrey, in 1051, wandered over the Alps to Italy, where he captivated Beatrice, the widowed marchioness of Tuscany, whose daughter was the great Countess Matilda, and married her.¹ Thus the string of border states along the French edge of the empire clear to Rome were bound together in a papal-feudal association between 1046-55 against the German monarchy.² Yet Henry III's eyes were so sealed to the real import of things that on his deathbed he commended Empress Agnes and the little Henry IV to Godfrey's care.³ The ramifications of the Hildebrandine-Lorraine intrigue even penetrated into Bavaria in Henry III's reign. In 1042 Henry, son of Count Frederick of Luxemburg (who was also vogt of St. Maximin in Trier) was made duke of Bavaria by Henry III, who gave it out thus instead of holding it in the hands of the crown as he should have done. Thus the feudo-papal program became identified with Bavarian sentiments of ducal autonomy also.⁴

ADDENDUM

Since this article has been typed and page-proofed, Professor R. L. Poole has published a study entitled "Benedict IX and Gregory VI" (*Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. VIII). I have not seen the original article, but a review of it in the *English Historical Review*, April, 1918, pp. 278-79, states that—

Mr. Poole shows that the usual version that there were three popes co-existing at the same time, whom the emperor Henry III had deposed in 1046, is a mere popular tale given out, he considers, by the imperial entourage, for Benedict IX had abdicated and the anti-pope Sylvester III (John bishop of the Sabina) had abandoned his claims. In fact, at Sutri the reigning pope Gregory VI was deposed for simony, and at Rome the ex-pope Benedict IX was also deposed, presumably because the validity of his abdication was considered doubtful. It would be a natural source of the tale of the three rival popes. . . . Mr. Poole further makes it probable that the Tusculan popes, though no model ecclesiastics, have been painted in over-dark colors; and gives an explanation of the descent of Gregory VI and his connection with Gregory VII which satisfactorily combines the available evidence.

¹ Dupréel, *Hist. crit. de Godfrey de Le Barbu*, 59 f.

² Nitzsch, II, 47-48.

³ Lamprecht, II, 266.

⁴ Gerdes, II, 68.

CRITICAL NOTES

ON "CLEMENT OF ROME"

The problems connected with the date, personality, and writings of "Clement of Rome" cannot fail to be interesting to the classical student who is led to consider the development of the new religion in the early centuries of the Roman Empire and its relations to the Roman state. But the available information concerning this Clement is extremely scanty, vague, and perplexing. The name Clemens is a very common one in the first and second centuries of the Empire, so common that the classicist would say it cannot be expected to furnish any basis for deductions concerning the identity, antecedents, or connections of any Christian of that name.

A Christian Clement is mentioned by Paul in Phil. 4:3, but there is no justification for any attempt to connect him with any other Clement known to us, and no possibility of success in such an attempt.

One of the early bishops of Rome is reported on the authority of various pontifical lists to have been called Clement. The Latin name looks curious by isolation in the midst of a considerable number of appellations purely Greek, but it is not on that account of necessity to be suspected. Of course the bishop Clement might have been of Greek birth or parentage, and might owe his Roman name to being a *libertinus* of some Roman citizen. This has been suggested; but at the period when the bishop Clement is alleged to have lived it is not very likely that a *libertinus* would be known by the *cognomen* of his *patronus*. He would more likely retain his former slave name as his ordinary appellation, though he would be entitled to prefix to this for formal purposes the *praenomen* and *gentilicium* of his *patronus*. Yet it is possible that the descendant of a *libertinus* might have a Roman *cognomen* substituted for that borne by his father or grandfather, though this would appear more likely in the second century of the Empire than in the first, if one may hazard a guess based on apparent general tendencies rather than propound an inference founded on evidence which is not available (but cf. Tenney Frank, "Race Mixture in the Roman Empire," in *American Historical Review*, XXI, 692 f.). Tacitus, however (*Ann.* ii. 39), tells us

of a slave of Agrippa Postumus, as early as 14 A.D., who bore the name of Clemens. Whence he derived it is quite unknown, as is also his nationality. Dr. L. R. Dean in his *Study of the Cognomina of Soldiers in the Roman Legions* shows that Clemens was one of the most popular *cognomina* in the "regular army" of the Empire, so far as the testimony of extant inscriptions can give us information. These soldiers apparently took Roman names according to their fancy, but very many of the men themselves were not Italian in origin. A bishop Clemens, if indeed a Greek, might well be, not of servile, but of military antecedents. (Dr. Dean's tables show two soldiers named even Flavius Clemens.)

But whatever the source of his name, the various pontifical lists and other traditions are in considerable disagreement concerning Bishop Clement's date and his position in the succession. Indeed he is the chief disturbing factor in the enumeration of the early Roman pontiffs. No statements about him can be judged to have the absolute quality of historical facts. There might even appear to be some rational defense for a doubt whether such a bishop of Rome actually existed in the early decades of the see. The lists of the early Roman bishops do not seem to rest surely on accurate record or tradition. They appear to be tentative compilations made when historical interest began to quicken, and later to have been more or less revised, but probably without any further access of knowledge.

A certain Flavius Clemens, a member of the imperial family of the Flavians, who was put to death by Domitian, is believed by many modern scholars to have been a Christian. This may possibly be true, though no extant ancient authorities of importance, whether Christian or pagan, appear to have been aware of the fact, and the statements on which is based the modern guess (it is hardly more than that) are at least susceptible of other interpretation (cf. my article "On the Early Persecutions of Christians," to appear in *The American Journal of Theology*, XXII, No. 4). He certainly played no active part in the history of the church, and there is not the slightest reason (save perhaps in pious desire and imagination) for connecting any other Christian Clement with him or with his family, though of course the possibility of such a connection cannot be denied. But the pursuit of such will-o'-the-wisps may lead into a realm of mental haziness concerning the quality of historical evidence. It is best avoided, however sentimentally or romantically attractive it may appear. Especially in the process of identification where there is little or no direct evidence available and many conflicting

indications are to be reconciled much more caution is requisite than is frequently observed. Even identifications unquestioningly made by early Christian writers are not implicitly to be trusted, as, though these writers had at command more evidence than is available to us, or depended on an unbroken and genuine tradition from the times concerned, they were notoriously uncritical, and in the first century or two there appears to have been a lamentable defectiveness of record and tradition in the local churches. The early church history had to be painfully pieced together by succeeding generations, and was largely conjectural. And it should always be remembered that a "unanimous ancient tradition," of which we often hear so much in modern historical discussion, may often mean nothing more than that an attractive but baseless conjecture made by some one writer gained general credence among non-critical successors who had no other source of knowledge on the subject.

One Hermas was, at any rate in his early life, the slave of a woman apparently resident in or near Rome. There are certain textual difficulties which lead most critics to think that at the time of at least the first two of the *Visions* which form the subject of the first part of his *Shepherd*, he was living in or near Cumae. I am more disposed to avoid the emendation of κώμας to Κούμας (*Vis.* i. 1.3; ii. 1. 1), and to understand that at these times, as at that of *Vis.* iv, Hermas was merely on his way from "the city" into the neighboring country, where in another passage (*Vis.* iii. 1. 2) he speaks of himself, or rather his interlocutrix speaks of him, as regularly engaged in farm work.

This understanding is, to be sure, in spite of the fact that the expression πορεύεσθαι εἰς κώμας would be helped by explication or support from other examples, which are lacking. But there is much greater difficulty in reconciling Cumae with the context, and there is no value in the remark long ago made that when Hermas takes the old woman with the book in her hand to be the Sibyl it is the Cumaean locality of the vision that suggests the identification. Stories of the Sibyl, and in this guise, were probably a commonplace all over Italy. Moreover, those who would put the *Visions* in the neighborhood of Cumae have to imagine an unrecorded Via Campana to suit the locality (*Vis.* iv. 1. 2). On the other hand, Rome had a well-known Via Campana leading from the city down the right bank of the Tiber to the Campus Salinarum. The ancient Latin versions of Hermas interpret κώμας in *Vis.* i. 1. 3 by the gloss *ciuitatem Ostiorum*, which clearly supports the Roman identification. But the corresponding rendering of the same word in *Vis.* ii. 1. 1 is *regionem Cumanorum*, which quite spoils the former

testimony and indicates an early misapprehension. *Κώμη* is defined in *CGL*, II, 357, by *uilla castellum hic uicus*. Possibly the references in *Hermas* may be to some as yet unidentified *uilla* or *uicus* in the district of Rome. I do not think it can possibly refer to any *villeggiatura* (cf. *Vis.* iii. 1. 2).

"The city," or "this city" (cf. *Vis.* ii. 4. 3), of the *Shepherd* is therefore always Rome, and the local church is the church at Rome. In *Vis.* ii. 4. 3 *Hermas* represents his supernatural instructress as charging him concerning her revelations, "You are to write out two booklets and send one to Clement and one to Grapte. Clement then is to send it to the cities outside, for that is his function. . . . But in this city you are to read it aloud in the company of the presbyters who preside over the church." As "the cities outside" seem to be contrasted with "this city," it appears certain that this Clement is a contemporary official of the church in Rome (the church of *Hermas* himself), who acts as a clerk or secretary in charge of its foreign correspondence. He may, of course, have also held other office. He might be very probably one of the deacons, or presbyters, or (so far as this is concerned) even the bishop, in the limited sense of the distinctly episcopal title and authority in the Roman church of that day. Granted the authenticity and sincerity of the *Shepherd* of *Hermas*, its testimony to the contemporary existence of a Clement qualified and appointed to represent the church at Rome in its communications with churches elsewhere is simple, clear, and unsuspectious. If any difficulties can be invoked to invalidate it, they are at any rate not visible on the surface. The reference, of course, might plausibly be taken as indicating that *Hermas* thought his non-Roman readers would already know that such a Clement existed in the church at Rome at that time. But could he have thought that non-Roman readers would also know of the existence in the Roman church of that Grapte—a deaconess perhaps?—to whom the other copy of the book was to be sent? This consideration suggests caution regarding the otherwise plausible inference concerning his possible notion about foreign acquaintance with Clement, and makes it more likely that the reference to Clement is entirely without ulterior motivation.

The *Shepherd* of *Hermas* dates in all probability from toward the middle of the first century after Christ. The external evidence for this is found in the statement of the Muratorian Canon, which affirms that the *Shepherd* was written "quite recently, in our own time, in the city of Rome, by *Hermas*, when his brother Pius was filling the see of the church in the city of Rome." The internal evidence harmonizes with

this, being derived from the character of the theological questions treated or touched upon in the book, and (as suggesting a *terminus ante quem*) from the indication in it that the episcopate was not yet sharply distinguished from the presbyterate (cf. *Vis.* ii. 2. 6; ii. 4. 2, 3; iii. 1. 8; iii. 5. 1 *bis*; iii. 9. 7; possibly also *Sim.* viii. 7. 4; ix. 25. 2; ix. 27. 2). The Muratorian Canon agrees then with the inference drawn from the text of Hermas that the treatise is Roman in origin; and it also indicates that the foreign secretary, Clement, was certainly not bishop at that time. It is impossible that he should have become so at a later date, since from the middle of the second century the list of the Roman bishops appears to be in general fairly trustworthy, and no second Pope Clement figures in history, after the somewhat intangible personage already mentioned, until we arrive at nearly the middle of the eleventh century. The pontifical lists and traditions, with all their variations, put Pope Clement I far too early to make it possible, under ordinary principles and processes of interpretation and reconciliation, to identify him with the Clement mentioned by Hermas as living toward the middle of the second century, and not bishop—unless, indeed, we are to imagine that the second *Vision* was written much earlier than the reign of Pius, and Clement the writer might have been bishop at that previous time. Those moderns who feel the temptation or the urgent need to identify the two Clements at almost all hazards are wont to be content with this explanation. But even that involves an unconscionable strain on each of the two elements that are thus stretched, one forward, one backward, to a chronological meeting-point. Serious difficulty is worked for either the alleged order or the terms of the early popes, or with both order and terms, and the testimony of the Muratorian Canon must also be disregarded, unless it is helped out in one of two ways—by the arbitrary device already mentioned of attributing a much earlier date to the composition of *Vis.* (i and) ii, or by pushing the date of Pius much farther back toward the beginning of the second century, a process which in its turn makes confusion worse confounded in the pontifical annals, and possibly introduces some trouble with the date or testimony of the Muratorian Canon.

And after all, what is the pressing need of such an identification—and at the expense of such painful intellectual contortions? If it appears necessary in behalf of other considerations thus far to dislocate the traditions of the papal succession, why is it not more simple and reasonable rather to conclude at once that, since Clement the pope *ex hypothesi* cannot be other than Clement the writer, and Clement the writer is a suffi-

ciently well-authenticated personage living at a time when Clement the pope could not have lived, that shadowy pontiff from a practically pre-historic papal age cannot ever have had an actual existence, but must be a mere mythical double of Clement the writer, a creature of later imagination, fashioned to suit and explain the tradition of the great dignity and importance that Clement the writer came to possess in popular Christian belief? This would be at any rate more satisfactory than to attempt, in the interests of yet another theory, to drag these two discordant dates into a violently forced agreement.

The ancients who identified Clement of Philippi with Clement the Roman writer, and the latter with Clement the bishop, were in happy case. They had no troublesome knowledge about conflicting dates, no care about possible discrepancies in equally plausible pieces of evidence, no anxiety about corroborative testimony. A conjecture was often as valid to their minds as a deduction. An identification looked attractive; they recorded it, with a placid disregard of difficulties that cause anguish to their modern disciples. A peculiarly striking instance of the desperate straits into which the latter are occasionally driven may be mentioned here. It has actually been suggested in all seriousness that Hermas may have inserted the reference to Clement the writer as a "literary device," knowing that there was no such man then living in the Roman church, but aware that there had been a well-known one at a considerably earlier time. The object of this "literary device," to the minds of those who thus explain the reference, could have been only "to lend an air of verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative." But how it could have seemed likely to Hermas to accomplish such a result in the view of his contemporaries I am quite unable to conceive. Of course the modern expounders must attribute to the professedly inspired recorder of divine visions some esoteric conceptions of truthfulness as well as of literary effect, and this is particularly amusing, inasmuch as Hermas in *Mand. iii* has a most earnest and highly virtuous homily on the necessity of scrupulous veracity in all matters. At that gait any stumbling-block in the path toward any desired conclusion can be readily avoided or removed. If such canons of explanation are approved, there is an end to all critical examination of historical evidence.

Various other judgments of the learned concerning the date and authorship of the *Shepherd* are conveniently summarized in Gebhardt-Harnack-Zahn, *Patrum apostol. op.*, fasc. 3, pp. lxxxiii-iv. I need not discuss them here, as my modest comments are not meant to traverse the entire subject.

But let us proceed to the examination of other ancient witnesses. For the testimony of Hegesippus we have to depend upon the remarks and excerpts in the *Ecclesiastical History* of Eusebius. Hegesippus had certainly spent some time in Corinth and then apparently several years in Rome. It appears from the passages in Eusebius (*H.E.* iii. 16; iv. 22) that while Hegesippus was in Corinth the church in that city made him acquainted with a "noteworthy and admirable" letter that had been addressed to them by the church in Rome. It does not appear that in his account he ascribed any individual authorship to the letter, or any date beyond assigning it to a time when a serious dispute had arisen in the Corinthian church. There is no indication that he knew even approximately the period of this church quarrel. Of course he may have had very definite views on these points, but if he had expressed them in writing it might seem likely that more certain indication of the fact would have got into the text of the *Ecclesiastical History*. Yet perhaps this would be too much to expect of Eusebius.

The testimony of Hegesippus to the existence of such a noteworthy letter to the Corinthians is the earliest definite testimony on that point available. It dates probably from a time well back toward, or even before, the middle of the second century, as he sojourned in Rome, according to his own account, "up to the time of" Anicetus, and Anicetus succeeded Pius, the brother of Hermas.

Dionysius, bishop of Corinth, is definitely quoted by Eusebius (*H.E.* iv. 23. 9) as saying, in a letter to Soter, bishop of Rome in succession to Anicetus, that the previous letter of the Roman church to the Corinthian was written by Clement. This is the earliest definite ascription of the authorship of such a letter to a Clement. Dionysius may have thought Clement to have been, like Soter, bishop of Rome, but Eusebius does not represent him as saying so.

Irenaeus (*Adv. Haer.* iii. 3. 3), bishop of Lyons, carries us a step in advance concerning Clement. He describes, at greater length than the extant reports of Hegesippus and Dionysius, a letter written by the church in Rome to the church in Corinth. The superscription, as well as his summary of the contents of the document and of its occasion, agrees with the so-called First Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians that has been preserved to our day. I see no good reason for doubting the substantial identity of the now extant letter with that mentioned by Hegesippus, Dionysius, and Irenaeus. The last named states the address of the letter with accuracy. He does not say that it was written by Clement, but that it was written when Clement was bishop of Rome, the

third in order after the apostles Peter and Paul had founded and established the church and placed Linus in the episcopate of it. This is probably the earliest extant mention of a Clement as bishop of Rome. It might reasonably be conceded that, since Irenaeus would be likely to regard the bishop as naturally representing in correspondence the local church (cf. himself and also his contemporaries, Soter of Rome and Dionysius of Corinth), his form of statement ought not to be taken as indicating that he did not think Clement the bishop to be the actual writer of the letter. Irenaeus very likely got his information about the letter, about its date, and about the episcopal succession, directly from the church in Rome, which he is reported as having twice visited. But he may have derived it from the writings of Hegesippus. Irenaeus affirms that Clement had companied with the apostles and been instructed by them.

Clement of Alexandria knew, praised, and quoted at some length the letter, ascribing it to a Clement whom he calls "apostle." Perhaps by this designation he means to describe him as an intimate disciple and immediate successor of the apostolic founders of the church in Rome.

In Origen we have, however, the first definite statement of identification. According to him (*In Ioh.* vi. 36) the letter was written by Clement, bishop of Rome, who was also the Clement addressed by Paul as a resident at Philippi.

Eusebius follows without question (*H.E.* iii. 16) the identification by Origen, and later writers follow Eusebius. There is no indication of any of them possessing any further evidence about the bishop Clement. He is an utterly colorless figure—a name and nothing more—not even a definitely assigned member of the papal procession. The remarks of Irenaeus about Clement as an immediate disciple of the apostles and imbued with their doctrine are of that complimentary vagueness that strongly suggests no other source for them than a constructive imagination, more probably perhaps that of some rudimentary chronicler belonging to the Roman church than of Irenaeus himself. The florid biographical details of the spurious later writings attributed to Clement are of course utterly without foundation in fact, and even the formal account in the *Liber pontificalis*, which depends in part upon them, cannot be judged to embody authentic information.

Jerome remarks on differences of opinion among the Romans themselves concerning their own early episcopal succession, and the varied accounts that have come down to us show abundant signs of fogginess about the beginnings of the church in the imperial capital as well as

elsewhere. Nor is this at all surprising. The early days of a struggling cult, generally despised and detested and sometimes subjected to actual persecution, are not the days for the development or existence of careful and eager regard for historic origins; and local church histories had not yet been thought of. As regards bishops, neither I Clement nor the *Shepherd* of Hermas knows anything of a monarchical episcopate in the church at Rome. Its government appears to rest with the entire body of the presbyters. There is no mention or suggestion of a single ruling bishop, not even in the exhortation of Clement (himself, we are asked to believe, a bishop) to the church in Corinth to respect the ministerial succession from the apostles. Only when the episcopate began to emerge in the West above the general level of the presbyterate (about the middle of the second century) would there be any probable effort to compile a list of the past bishops of Rome. And in view of the probable lack of records and the certain absence of critical scholarship at that age, we need not shrink from very decided skepticism about the general value of second-century ecclesiastical statements concerning first-century ecclesiastical events.

As regards the ascription of the letter to Clement, the apparently gradual development of the tale is to be noted. There was first the indubitable existence of a noteworthy letter, not containing any sign of the personality of the scribe, but addressed by the church in Rome to the church in Corinth; thus the letter is earlier cited without reference to any individual writer; next its actual author is reputed to be Clement; afterward this Clement is thought to have been bishop of Rome; and finally this bishop is identified with a Clement who was a friend of, and fellow-worker with, Paul, thus supporting the possibly already formulated reasoning that put him early in the list of a Roman hierarchy accredited by that time.

We have then before us, on the one hand, the direct testimony of Hermas to the contemporary existence in his own church at Rome of an official named Clement, whose accredited duty it was to send communications to foreign churches. There is no reason to doubt the accuracy and ingenuousness of this testimony, unless on the ground that it seriously interferes with the adoption of a certain other belief. And those who would affirm that the statement in the *Shepherd* about Clement is sophisticated (a "literary device") must reckon with the disturbing fact that the *Shepherd* displays no other trace of any influence by, or knowledge of, the famed letter of the church in Rome to that in Corinth. That it would betray imitation, or at least acquaintance, under the

postulated circumstances appears almost inevitable. In addition to the unimpeachable witness of Hermas we have an actual letter of the Roman church to the Corinthian, the immediate authorship of which came to be widely ascribed in antiquity to a Clement, though a mere conjecture based on the reference in the *Shepherd* of Hermas to a suitable Clement may have been the sole and only source of the original tradition. The conclusion would appear fairly necessary that, if the letter to the church in Corinth was indeed actually written by a Clement, he must be identified with the Clement mentioned by Hermas.

On the other hand, we have a belief current in antiquity, though apparently of gradual growth, that the Clement of the well-known letter to the Corinthians was an early Roman bishop of that name. It appears impossible by any ordinary and natural modes of procedure to identify this bishop of Rome with the secretary Clement of the *Shepherd*. No extant ancient author makes such an attempt. The bishop himself is a figure of dubious authenticity. To say nothing of other considerations, the varying positions assigned him in the episcopal succession at Rome indicate that there was no early and fixed tradition concerning him, still less a definite record. Nor is it probable that there was any actual and trustworthy tradition extant even in the church at Rome concerning any of the early occupants of that see (I do not include its reputed apostolic founder or founders in this statement), still less any veritable documentary evidence. Even the writer of the article on Clement in the *Catholic Encyclopedia* remarks that everyone is now agreed that the early popes Cletus and Anencletus (alias Anacletus) did not both have an actual existence. It is of course a different thing to suggest that Pope Clement I, whose only possible double is, not another nearly contemporary pope, but at best only a presbyter considerably removed in time from even the latest of the various dates assigned to his episcopal homonym, also had no actual existence. But I am inclined to believe that such is the lamentable case.

The evolution of the current belief appears to me to be about as follows: Hermas in his *Shepherd* incidentally mentions a Clement who is the official correspondent for the church at Rome with other churches. The *Shepherd* is widely read and held in very high esteem. A substantially contemporary letter of the Roman church to the Corinthian is also widely read and speedily attains a quasi-canonical authority. Its actual authorship is naturally ascribed to the secretary Clement mentioned by Hermas. It is believed, as a result of the reverence in which the book is held, and of the growing prominence of the episcopate over the presbyterate in the West, that the writer Clement must have been a bishop

of the Roman church. The date of the book is unknown, but its acquired authority, supported perhaps by the reference in it to Peter and Paul, and to the necessity of the apostolic ministry, leads to the belief that Clement, the author-bishop, must have been closely associated with the apostles. A conjectural place is assigned him accordingly in the already formed or forming list of the earlier bishops of the apostolic see, though there is lack of unanimity about his precise position. (It is perhaps of some significance that in an ancient Syriac list of the early bishops of Rome the name of Clement does not occur at all—so Bishop Lightfoot, in his edition of *Philippians*, p. 221, referring to *Ancient Syriac Documents*, p. 71.)

Perhaps a word ought to be added here about the alleged "archaeological evidence" furnished by the present existence in Rome of an ancient Church of San Clemente superimposed above a yet more ancient church, and that in turn above a dwelling-house (or houses) of yet an earlier period. But the utmost that can be regarded as substantiated by this series of structures is that perhaps as early as the fourth century the belief in Clement the pope, with all its accretions, existed in the city of Rome. Of this we were already aware.

But I have thus far left certain other conceivable theories untouched, and exigencies of space demand that they be but briefly treated.

Why not believe at any rate that Clement, the first-century pope, had an actual existence, even though the letter to the Corinthians may have been erroneously attributed to him, when it was really the work of that non-episcopal namesake mentioned by Hermas? This might be the appeal of those who are reluctant to yield to any iconoclastic tendencies and would defend the integrity of the pontifical legend against wanton assault. If there were any actual evidence for Pope Clement's existence other than a somewhat tremulous and wavering affirmation from about the middle of the second century and later, that might be a more satisfactory hypothesis. But there is no real evidence for him. His vacillating wraith is particularly unconvincing, even in the midst of equally unknown figures that precede (according to some forms of the ancient enumeration) and follow him. By coming out somewhat more into the open than do his shadowy colleagues he has made himself subject to examination. He is too plainly a creation *ad hoc*. In addition to what I have pointed out in the preceding pages, or rather in the light of those other reasons for incredulity, I will even confess that his very name appears to me suspicious, in spite of the improved explanation for it that I have suggested, and of which I am willing to make a present to anyone who can use it.

Why not then believe that there were the two Clements, and that the bishop was the author of the famous letter, while the Clement of Hermas, if not a sophisticated figure, was merely an accidental namesake of whom nothing further is known? This is a quite untenable alternative proposition. In the first place, to hold it would be to postulate that in the first century the bishop stood out, as otherwise he would hardly appear to do before the middle of the second century, as the official representative of the Roman church; that by the time of Hermas this official pre-eminence was at least in abeyance; and that it was resumed in the age immediately following. This is hardly conceivable. And, moreover, there are very serious chronological difficulties in the way of ascribing the letter aforesaid to a first-century writer, and especially to the reputed bishop Clement. I shall point out some of them in the discussion that follows. They have been glozed over, or a painful and unsuccessful attempt to explain them away has been made by other critics, merely or primarily because they felt themselves compelled to identify Clement the writer mentioned by Hermas with Clement the bishop, and therefore must even attribute an unnatural sense to these troublesome passages. Under my theory that torture of witnesses is avoided. The date of the letter may be discussed without embarrassment by the dragging weight of such a presumption. To this question I now turn, omitting some points covered in the preceding discussion.

1. It must be conceded, to start with, that the attribution of the letter to a Clement may have been the result of a mere conjecture resting on nothing but the mention of that name in the *Shepherd* as of the official representative of the Roman church in its foreign correspondence. Therefore it is improper to base any primary argument in regard to the date of the letter on the probable date of the *Shepherd* of Hermas.

2. The letter was known as early as the middle of the second century and quite possibly somewhat earlier (cf. Hegesippus). That establishes a *terminus ante quem* for its composition. A *terminus a quo* is not so definitely to be fixed. But—

3. All trace of rivalry and quarrel, such as had arisen in Paul's time between Jewish and Gentile Christians, appears to have vanished. But the younger generation in the Corinthian church (ὡς, chap. 3:3) has risen against its conservative elders and claimed the right to depose clergy who do not please it, and to instal others (chap. 44). It does not seem likely that such a question would have arisen in the first century, while the apostolic tradition and discipline might be expected to be yet strong, and many presbyters might still be living who were directly commissioned by the apostles. The indication suits better the second century.

Furthermore the letter was not written in answer to an application for counsel from the church in Corinth, but apparently *proprio motu*, on account of the public scandal that the trouble at Corinth had caused in the other Christian churches, so far distant as Rome and even among the heathen (chaps. 1:1; 47:7). Thus considerable time after the inception of the trouble must be allowed for before the letter would naturally be written, and an additional time on account of certain "troubles and hindrances" (chap. 1:1) in the church at Rome that had delayed its preparation; how much it is impossible to say; at all events not so much that the writer feared his communication would be out of date.

4. The age of the apostles is past, and apparently a long time past (chaps. 5; 42-44). Presbyters in the second or third ecclesiastical generation from the apostles, perhaps even farther removed, are in office (chap. 44). The messengers that carry the letter to the Corinthians were perhaps born into church families, or at least have lived as Christians from youth to old age (chap. 63:3). The church of Corinth itself is an ancient church (chap. 47:6). All this suits the second century, and either not so well, or not at all, the first.

But it has been argued that the letter speaks (chap. 5:1) of the martyrdom of Peter and Paul as having taken place "in our own generation," and therefore the letter should at least be ascribed to the first century. To this it is certainly sufficient to answer that "our own generation" means nothing more than "our own times," and the writer is contrasting these with the ages far past, of Moses and of David. It does not follow that the martyrdoms referred to took place in his own lifetime. On the other hand, it is almost inconceivable that if the death of the apostles were a living memory in the writer's mind he would have referred to them in such extremely vague and inconclusive language. It would be quite inconceivable that the legendary pope Clement, himself an immediate disciple and ordinate of Peter, and according to one story the first bishop of Rome, appointed by the apostle himself, should have so phrased the reference. The writer must have been as far removed from the event as the second century. Indeed I am far from convinced that he means to say that Peter and Paul suffered the death of martyrs. *Μαρτυρήσας*, used of each of them, often means in this age, and certainly sometimes in this letter, no more than "bearing witness for the truth," and the writer emphasizes the *repeated* sufferings of each as establishing their claim to places among the blessed. He does not say or even intimate (unless his reference to "our generation" and "those who contended

nearest us" can be stretched to mean this) that the apostles died in Rome. It might be without prejudice inferred that he thought Paul had gone "to the limit of the West" (Spain?) and died there. I have no question that he mentions these two apostles because of the tradition that they were the founders of the church in his city of Rome, but he appears to me to have no definite notions about the circumstances of their death. He is certainly far removed from the generation that saw the apostles. (It is quite unjustifiable to cite him in support of the later local traditions concerning their death and burial places in Rome.)

Again it is argued that chapter 44 indicates that men ordained by the apostles were yet living and in service at Corinth. On the other hand the writer appears to me to say merely that the apostles ordained certain men (not only at Corinth) and commissioned them to hand on the succession to others; all the succeeding classes of presbyters derived their ultimate authority from the apostles; and it was as unlawful to depose any of these presbyters ordained by such delegated commission as it would be to depose men who were ordained by the apostles in person.

5. The writer of the letter is thoroughly familiar with the Epistle to the Hebrews, which he frequently quotes. If that epistle was indeed written late in the first century the indication would, to my mind, better suit the second century as the time of the letter to the Corinthian church. I cannot agree with one of my more learned colleagues that there must be a close chronological and causal relation between the two letters. Nor am I able to share his feeling that the sayings of Jesus quoted in chapters 13 and 46 have the flavor of pure oral tradition and cannot be explained as "a conflation of written Gospel material."

6. There is no indication in the letter of any distinction in title or rank between episcopate and presbyterate, or of any current argument about the matter, either at Rome or at Corinth. That might equally well fit a date in the latter part of the first century, or one not too far advanced toward the middle of the second. But some critics interpret the warning in *Hermas* (*Vis.* iii. 9. 7-10; *Mand.* xi. 12; *Sim.* viii. 7. 4) as indicating that there was already beginning in the Roman church at that time a dispute concerning relative rank of bishops and presbyters, and therefore they would affirm that the letter in question must be assigned a date certainly earlier than that of the *Shepherd*. The argument appears somewhat infirm, since the contention about precedence need not refer to the question between episcopate and presbyterate. Deacons versus priests, or even priests of indubitably the same order, among themselves might have found temptations to discussion.

7. The lack in the letter of allusion to Gnosticism, which had begun to be prominent before the middle of the second century and is referred to by Hermas, is interpreted by some as another indication that the letter considerably preceded the composition of the *Shepherd*; but neither is any other doctrinal error mentioned in the letter, which, with all its pious divagations for illustrative purposes, has just the one question of the Corinthian scandal to deal with. It is not strange that heresies do not appear in it, whatever the precise relative date of the book.

8. But if the letter was actually written before the *Shepherd*, it seems hardly likely that it was written much earlier; for if, before Hermas wrote, the letter had already attained something of its great popularity, it appears quite probable that imitation, or at least distinct mention, of it would be found in the later work. There is no influence to be traced.

9. Some critics were disposed to take chapter 41 as plainly indicating a date of composition before the destruction of Jerusalem and its Temple. But this is manifestly impossible. Nor can there be any inference drawn from the date of the final capture of the city under Hadrian (135 A.D.), even if there had been some restoration of the Temple by the Jewish insurgents. The author of the letter is simply quoting from Scripture, and has no concern, probably no knowledge, whether the Temple-worship was still being carried on or not.

10. In the very first sentence of the letter the writer says that its preparation has been delayed by "unexpected and repeated troubles and hindrances" (thus I should translate, reading *περιστάσεις* with the Constantinople MS, and interpreting by *impedimenta* of the ancient Latin version). The phrase does not suggest to an unprejudiced eye that anything very terrible has shaken the Roman church. It sounds curiously like an apologetic introduction to a modern letter—"I really meant to write you long ago, but all sorts of bothering things have interfered." Yet critics almost unanimously have agreed that the words quoted have definite and unmistakable reference to a terrible persecution through which the church at Rome has just been passing. As the accredited list of persecutors includes from the first century only Nero and Domitian, the assaults of one or the other of these are believed to be meant. Earlier critics were sometimes disposed to decide for Nero; later, men, seeing the impossibility of dating the letter so far back, but being under the formidable preoccupation of mind resulting from the felt necessity of somehow identifying the Clement of Hermas with Clement the bishop, and anxious to gain every possible support for that position, have insisted

with substantial unanimity that Domitian's attack was plainly the one in mind. Of course these critics, starting with their presumption, would not be satisfied with such an obvious and simple rendering of the phrase at issue as I have given above. The latest translator gives us "misfortunes and calamities"; but *περιπτώσεις*, which he would prefer in place of *περιστάσεις*, appears hardly to be susceptible of such a strong meaning. It is rather merely "accidents." Moreover these critics have not succeeded in explaining satisfactorily why the writer uses such vague phraseology, if he is talking about a Domitianic persecution lately suffered, when his later pages show that he can speak plainly of *θλίψεις* from without. It is absurd to say that he was afraid of Domitian, who was still living. Nor do they explain how *ἐπαλλήλους* naturally fits the notion of a persecution at all.

I have pointed out in my article "On the Early Persecutions of Christians," cited above, that there is no evidence for believing that there was such a persecution of the church in Rome as that commonly attributed to Domitian. But even if my conclusion on that point is erroneous there is no possible justification for interpreting these words of the letter to the Corinthians as alluding to any such event. The natural reference of them to some internal matters of a troublesome but less tragic nature is intrinsically and alone perfectly satisfactory, and the otherwise indicated dating of the letter from the second century, instead of from the last decade of the first, is not interfered with, but rather assisted, thereby.

II. The final question that I must briefly discuss is connected with the relation between the extant letter of Polycarp and that ascribed to Clement. It is claimed that verbal similarities between the two prove beyond a doubt that Polycarp, when he wrote to the Philippians, must have had the other letter before him. Considerable lists of parallelisms have been collected by various critics, the fullest perhaps by Bishop Lightfoot. Some of these parallelisms are merely trivial and undeserving of consideration. They are accidents of the commonest kind. Very many, to say the least, of the rest appear to me to be merely such coincidences as would naturally be expected in the writing of two men not far separated in time, both steeped in biblical ideas and phraseology, and both writing exhortations. But even if it be conceded that there is here direct imitation, the passages certainly do not show which writer copied from the other. This elementary consideration appears quite naturally to have been disregarded by those critics who start with the notion that I Clement must be ascribed to the last years of the first century. (Some of them appear to me to confuse sadly the distinction

between primary and corroborative evidence.) But there is clearly no evidence in these parallelisms that points to I Clement as necessarily written before Polycarp to the Philippians. The otherwise indicated assignment of I Clement to a date considerably later than that usually ascribed to the letter of Polycarp is not thereby vitiated.

Within the limits of time and probability indicated above, any estimate of the date of composition of I Clement must be in some degree conjectural. I should be inclined to assign it to the neighborhood of 140 A.D., not far removed in time from the *Shepherd* of Hermas, but perhaps rather a little before than a little after it. But I am not especially concerned with the precise date of the letter, since my main theses are not conditioned thereupon. The three points of my particular interest are these: (1) whenever the letter was written, there is no evidence in it of any persecution of the Christian church in Rome by Domitian; (2) the letter may have been written by a Clement (presumably then the man mentioned by Hermas), but the ascription to him may be due to a mere second-century conjecture (perhaps first made by Hegesippus?); (3) the reputed Bishop Clement probably never had an actual existence.

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

AN INTRODUCTION TO THEOLOGY¹

Those of us whose theological studies took us to Germany a quarter of a century or more ago will recall the impression made upon our minds by the extraordinary extent to which every possible object of human knowledge was classified and indexed. The classrooms of the university were like so many shelves in a gigantic filing system, and each professor, as the lecture-hour began and we drew out our *Heften* to receive the day's store of new knowledge, took down from its appropriate pigeonhole the particular topic or topics which were to serve us with material for the day. What was true of each lecture was true of each course as a whole. It had its place in the organism of knowledge as part of a particular discipline with set boundaries and definite content. The relation of these different studies to one another and to the other studies of the university was explained in a special discipline entitled *Theological Encyclopedia*, whose function it was to give a bird's-eye view of the theological filing system as a whole.

But the student who turned to *Theological Encyclopedia* expecting to get light on the bearing of his study upon life was destined to disappointment. If the study of each special discipline was filled with details, this was even more the case with *Theological Encyclopedia*. Instead of a simple discussion of the great questions which are common to all the departments, he was confronted with an elaborate table of contents of each special discipline and a list of authors or of subjects with few of which he had any previous acquaintance, and in still fewer of which he had any vital interest. Order and system were there in remarkable degree, but interpretation in any large sense of the term was conspicuous by its absence.

There was something imposing in this Prussianization of knowledge. It reminded one of the serried ranks of soldiers on the Tempelhofer

¹ *A Guide to the Study of the Christian Religion*. By William Herbert Perry Faunce, Shailer Mathews, J. M. Powis Smith, Ernest DeWitt Burton, Edgar Johnson Goodspeed, Shirley Jackson Case, Francis Albert Christie, George Cross, Errett Gates, Gerald Birney Smith, Theodore Gerald Soares, Charles Richmond Henderson, and George Burman Foster. Edited by Gerald Birney Smith. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1916. x+759 pages. \$3.00.

Feld on the occasion of the emperor's annual review: each man in his own place, each under orders from his superior officer, each part of a great system embracing every department of the state and including every human life. But there were disadvantages too. What was gained in order was lost in initiative. Somewhere up at the top there might be a General Ludendorff who surveyed the field of knowledge as a whole and knew why each division was where it was and what was the relation of the parts to the whole; but of this the ordinary student knew as little as the ordinary private. He did his job, content within the limited boundaries of his own specialty, heaping up a few new facts, devising, if he were fortunate, a new theory or two, getting his name added to the catalogue of those already immortalized in his own little section, but ignorant of what was going on in the other sections of the great army of research. He was a scientist pure and simple, but with philosophy in the large sense of the word he was concerned little if at all.

Once in a while a voice was heard asking questions. Here and there one found among the professors a man of vision who realized that theology was concerned with religion, and that religion was a phase of human experience only to be understood by one who has himself lived. There were lecture-rooms where one gained not only knowledge but insight, not only information but inspiration. But there was no one who felt it his duty to apply to the study of theology as a whole the principles which here and there were vitalizing the study of its parts.

And yet clearly, if theology was to be reclaimed from the tyranny of classification and made the human thing which in its ideal it ought to be, some such effort was necessary. There must be someone to take the more thoughtful students of theology into his confidence, to tell them what was the meaning of the great enterprise on which they were asked to engage, to distinguish amid the mass of facts which they passed in review those which were significant from those which had had their day; someone to point out to them the crucial problems, the abiding realities; someone, in a word, to make theology what it has always been to the geniuses of religion, a search after wisdom, an interpretation of life.

Some such ideal inspired Wernle in the notable contribution which he made some years ago in his *Einführung in das Theologische Studium*. Here was a book which professed to be a theological encyclopedia, and yet was alive and interesting—a book addressed to theological students as young men coming up to the university with human needs of guidance and leadership; a book which set out to tell them the things that they needed to know in order to find their way about this great area of

knowledge without getting lost; a book that approached each of the big disciplines of theology with the questions: What does this mean? What is it after? What in it is alive? Above all, what is growing? What has promise of the future? It was a learned book, as everything German is learned. It was a technical book, as everything German is technical. But it was a book that was alive because it was written by a man for men, to interpret a phase of human life. It set up an ideal which must be followed by other teachers of theology if theology is not to degenerate into the arid waste of antiquarian triviality which it is commonly supposed to be.

Wernle's book appeared in 1908 (2d ed., 1911), and during all these years its challenge has been unheeded by our American theological scholarship. Not only has no translator been found for it, but no English-speaking theologian has felt moved to do in his own way and for his own public what Wernle tried to do for his. At last, however, we have an introduction to theology which professes to enter this unoccupied field and perform this notable task. It deserves, therefore, a hearty welcome, and its authors will not be surprised if it meets a scrutiny as exacting as its importance deserves.

Unlike Wernle's book, this is the work not of a single author but of a collection of writers. No less than a dozen different persons contribute chapters on such subjects as "The Preparation in College for the Study of Theology," "The Historical Study of Religion," "The Study of the Old Testament and the Religion of Israel," "The New Testament," "Early Christianity," "The Catholic Church," "The Protestant Reformation," "Modern Christianity," "Systematic Theology and Christian Ethics," and "Practical Theology." Chapters on "Christianity and the Great Social Problems" and "The Contribution of Critical Scholarship to Ministerial Efficiency" complete the list. The editor is Professor Gerald Birney Smith, of the University of Chicago, and among his collaborators are President Faunce, Dr. Shailer Mathews, Professors Powis Smith, Burton, Case, Christie, Cross, Gates, Soares, Henderson, and Foster. Most of these are members of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, and the book as a whole may fairly be regarded as its contribution to constructive theological scholarship. For every reason, therefore, it demands careful and sympathetic study.

Yet at the outset the reviewer finds himself embarrassed by a serious difficulty. How shall this book be judged and by what canons shall it be tested? Shall it be regarded as a contribution to the old *Theological Encyclopedia* or to the new? Does it offer us a philosophical

interpretation of religion as a whole, or is it simply the old filing system brought down to date? Clearly our standard of judgment will be different according as we take it for one of these or for the other.

On the face of it, it would seem as though we had here a book of the old type. There are changes in the rubrics to be sure. Church history is broken up into a number of different sections which are labeled with good modern names. The religion of Israel takes its place side by side with the New Testament. Chapters are added dealing with the practical implications of the subjects that are studied, and in many of the chapters, as indeed could not be otherwise when we take into account the men from whose pens they come, we find freshness of perception, breadth of vision, originality of approach. Yet in spite of this the book as a whole reads like a book of the old type. It is broken up into a number of little subsections, each dealing with its own division of the field. It has its selected lists of literature after the fashion of the old encyclopedias. It packs into a narrow compass a wealth of technical information that must tax the resources of the most advanced student unless he is content to take it in the docile and receptive spirit in which his fellow-student across the sea is accustomed to receive from his professor the pabulum that is given him.

Judged from this point of view there is much that can be said in commendation of this book. As a compendium of information as to the present state of theological scholarship it is comprehensive and in many of its fields adequate. Particularly excellent are the discussions of the New Testament by Professors Burton and Goodspeed and of systematic theology by the editor. There is, to be sure, a considerable amount of repetition. There are differences in the attitude of the different writers to their task which reveal a certain lack of editorial supervision (e.g., that of Professors Cross and Christie, who suggest problems; that of Professor Mathews, who offers us solutions). But these are minor blemishes in a very useful and important piece of work. If the impartation of information were the standard by which we were to judge the work of Dr. Smith and his collaborators we should have for them only gratitude and praise.

But as a matter of fact this is not the standard by which they ask to be judged. The editor begins by calling attention to the significant transformations through which Christianity is passing today, the changes in the ideals and the method of theological education, and the lack of literature from which one can learn how the modern divinity school is attempting to meet the demands of the age. He promises us a volume

which shall meet this need. It professes to be "a guide to the study of the Christian religion for Protestants." It does not attempt to take the place of actual study or to furnish a brief compendium of information. It is prepared primarily to aid students to understand the meaning of the various aspects of education for the Christian ministry. And still more, it is meant "for the pastors who wish to keep in sympathetic touch with the latest scholarship, but who find it difficult to obtain in convenient form the requisite information." This is the ideal which the book sets for itself, and by this test it must be judged.

Measured by this standard we must confess to disappointment. Compared with Wernle's book it is distinctly less successful. This is in part no doubt due to the fact that it is the work of a collection of writers and not of a single mind. It is hard to see how the particular piece of work which Wernle tried to do for his own day can be successfully accomplished by a number of different writers. This difficulty the editor feels, but he explains the choice of his own method on the ground that it is more difficult today to prepare an introduction to theology than it was a generation ago. Then, he tells us, it was possible for one broad-minded scholar to cover the entire field with reasonable thoroughness; but today specialization has advanced so far that no one man is competent to deal with all branches of learning tributary to a sound theological education.

If Dr. Smith's ideal were that of Hagenbach and his successors this would indeed be true, but if what is needed is really a guide to the study of the Christian religion it is to be feared that the gain in accuracy is ill compensated for by the loss of unity.

For what is it, after all, that we need in an introduction to theology which shall be a true guide to the study of the Christian religion in this transition period? Clearly it must be a book which shall do just what the old encyclopedia failed to do, namely, conceive the study of theology as a unity. It must define the subject-matter with which theology has to do, not simply in one or other of its disciplines, but in them all. It must discriminate between the great problems on which everything turns and the subsidiary questions on which one may differ without materially affecting one's point of view as a whole. It must give these vital problems the central place and subordinate the scientific division into disciplines to the human interest in the subjects with which the disciplines deal.

Among the topics with which an adequate introduction to theology must deal are such as these: What is theology, and what is its place in

the organism of knowledge?. What is religion, and what is its function in human life? What are the permanent types of religion which reappear from age to age and from nation to nation? What is the relation between the great complexes which we call the historic religions and the variant forms which struggle for the mastery within each? What do we mean by Christianity, and what is its place in the family of religions? What is distinctive in Christianity, and what is the significance of the rival claimants for the Christian name which have emerged from time to time and still persist? What do we mean by Catholicism, by Protestantism, by mysticism, by modernism? These are the questions on which the man who would understand the Christian religion needs guidance, and it is only as they contribute to the answer to these questions that the special disciplines of the theological seminary justify their existence. It will not do to leave their discussion to the chapter on "Systematic Theology," however excellently it may be written. One must put them in the forefront of the discussion. They are the landmarks by which the road builders must blaze their way.

When we apply this standard to the work of Dr. Smith and his collaborators we must be prepared for disappointment. There is no discussion of theology in its relation to the other great departments of human knowledge. Instead of this we are offered a brief chapter on the "Preparation in College for the Study of Theology." There is no adequate treatment of such fundamental conceptions as religion, Christianity, Protestantism, Catholicism, and the like. Instead of this we have a number of brief discussions dealing with special phases of each. There is indeed a chapter on the "Historical Study of Religion" which, in the structure of the book, seems designed to meet this need of preliminary orientation, but it touches only a part of the field, and this in the most inadequate fashion.

This inadequacy appears at two points: in its content and in its method. Professor Mathews begins with a short discussion of the nature of religion, follows this by a brief survey of the chief steps in its historical development, gives five pages to the development of religious doctrine, and passes immediately to an outline of the development of Christian doctrine, which, if in place at all, should be relegated to one of the later chapters.

More unsatisfactory still is the method of the discussion, and this in two respects: first, in its undue emphasis on the intellectual aspect of religion; secondly, in its failure to point out the real significance and limitations of the historical method as applied to the study of religion.

It is natural that Professor Mathews, as a theologian, should be interested in the doctrinal aspects of religion; but surely place should be found in the introductory chapters of a guide to the study of the Christian religion for some interpretation of the significance of religion as piety and for some analysis of the fundamental conception of social religion—the church.

Not less disappointing is the author's failure fairly to describe and adequately to interpret in their relation to the practical task which confronts the student of theology the contrasted types of religious experience which persist throughout all changes in outward environment: such types as mysticism, sacramentarianism in its various forms, and ethical religion. Failure to trace these to their roots in human nature and to understand the human needs to which they answer makes it impossible to find one's way intelligently through the great drama of Christian history and to know how to estimate the conflicting forces which today contest within Christianity for the mastery. Such analysis belongs at the very beginning of the theological course, for it will give the key to all that follows.

If we ask why so obvious a fact should be overlooked by so accomplished an author as Professor Mathews, the answer is that it is due, in part at least, to failure to perceive the limitations of the historical method. The historical method (so far as it is anything else than a synonym for the scientific method in general) means the attempt to study religion as the story of a life-process—a process, therefore, which involves constant changes. But change is only one aspect of life as we know it. There is permanence as well. What has been once tends to recur again. The plant unfolds through certain predictable phases. Human life blossoms out through youth to maturity and ripens into old age. Types appear to which individuals tend to conform. There is change, but change according to law.

It is so in the life of religion. Religion too is the story of constant change, but it is the story of change according to law. Here too there is something that lasts. Types appear which persist. The insights of the past are crystallized into classics which become the inspiration of the insights of the future. Social religion becomes possible.

To show this also is the function of theology. Indeed it is in these abiding achievements alone that the unique interest of theology centers. But for this there is need of a broader conception of history than Professor Mathews gives us in his article. Psychology must be called into play which studies the laws of the inner life; the social sciences that

analyze the persistent forms of social organization. It is not enough to represent the history of civilization with Professor Mathews as "the genetic succession of several creative social minds." We must first make clear what we mean by a social mind, and explain how far its creations are permanent, and how far they are simply the reflex of changing impressions which pass with the passing of the environment.

The lack of an adequate foundation in preliminary analysis puts the writers of the later chapters at a disadvantage which they are not able wholly to overcome. Each treating his subject as an independent field, they are constantly taking for granted matters which have not been discussed, or referring forward to topics to be treated later. Excellent as independent essays, they fail to fit neatly into their places as parts of a single articulate whole. Why, for example, should matters of literary criticism be discussed independently by the writers on the Old Testament and on the New? Why should the discussion of the literature of religion precede the discussion of religion itself? Why should the story of the Christian church be divided up between three or four different writers without any attempt anywhere to give a bird's-eye view of the whole?

Most unsatisfactory is the treatment of practical theology. Here at least we might expect that the central conception of the church, for which one has looked in vain through all the preceding chapters, would receive adequate attention. But alas! room is not found for even a single subheading on this topic. The conventional subjects of the seminary curriculum receive each its fitting place—homiletics, church polity, church administration, pastoral care, liturgies, missions, religious education—but the church itself is taken for granted. The student is apparently supposed already to know all about that. As for the psychology of religion, that latest addition to the theological family, that appears as the last of the subheads, put there, it would seem, because the writer (or was it the editor?) was not quite sure what he ought to do with it.

To this disposition on the part of the writers of the different articles to lose sight of the larger problems in their emphasis upon details there is one notable exception. In Professor Smith's chapter on "Systematic Theology and Christian Ethics" we have a luminous and well-arranged consideration of the larger problems to which reference has been made. After a brief discussion of the method of theological inquiry he passes on to consider how the content of Christianity shall be determined. After contrasting the different methods which have been used in the

past and outlining his conception of the definition of Christianity from the historical point of view, he then gives us a clear and interesting presentation of the main doctrinal problems, after which the question is raised as to the truth of Christian beliefs. Under this caption we have a fresh treatment of the leading apologetic problems. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of Christian ethics.

For Professor Smith's treatment of his difficult and important subject-matter we have only praise. His chapter is indeed a guide to the study of the Christian religion, in which intending students and pastors seeking light can find the leadership they need. With such clear evidence of insight as this chapter reveals the question arises why the book as a whole does not make a more satisfying impression. Why must we wait for chapter ix before getting light on the fundamental questions which determine our attitude toward all the rest? This is a question of large interest which carries us altogether beyond the bounds of this present review and raises problems of permanent significance for theological education.

The answer is to be found in the unsatisfactory state of our present theological education. We are passing through a transition period in which two widely different methods are contending for the mastery, and the disorganized condition of the curriculum is the natural result. There is the old scholastic method whose unit is ideas and the method of the newer education whose unit is objects. In the latter case we make the subject studied the unit of our curriculum; in the former case the discipline that studies it. In the volume before us we have a book written by men who apply the object method to the work done within their particular departments under a scheme which was worked out by men who made the unit of organization ideas.

It is clear that such a situation cannot last. It makes no difference whether you approach your discipline from the point of view of the older orthodoxy or from the genetic point of view which controls the writers of this volume. If you think of theology as a collection of independent studies which deal with isolated aspects of a larger whole you are doomed to have what you have here—abstraction, unreality, repetition. If you conceive of theology as the study of a definite object, mainly religious, which maintains its unity through all the vicissitudes of its changing history, you must express that unity in the organization of your curriculum. You will not, to be sure, cease to cultivate the special disciplines or underestimate their contribution to the common task, but you will give them an altogether different significance. They

will no longer be independent units standing side by side, but workshops in which tools are fashioned which will make easier the accomplishment of a common task.

This is only another way of saying that we must recover the philosophical point of view, using the term philosophy, not in its technical sense as a synonym for metaphysics, but in the larger sense given it by Schleiermacher, as the science of definition. We must see our problem whole from the start, even if afterward we have to break up our attack upon it into its elements.

This conception of the task will have far-reaching effects upon the order of the curriculum. It will radically change the significance attached to systematic theology. It will distinguish its narrower and more technical function as the study that analyzes and classifies the contents of Christian belief from its wider function as the fundamental philosophical discipline which defines terms and analyzes problems. For systematic theology in its more technical sense the student may be content to wait till he has passed through the historical disciplines which in the traditional curriculum precede it; but with systematic theology in its larger relations he must make acquaintance at the outset if he is to do fruitful work. First of all the studies of the course must be the philosophy of religion. But this change cannot take place without carrying with it other changes as well. The psychology of religion, for example, must be rescued from its present position as an appendix to practical theology and seen to be what it is in fact, an integral part of the philosophy of religion, namely, that part which helps us to define religion in terms of experience. It is the psychology of religion which must give us the conceptions through which to approach the study of religion fruitfully, to guard against the one-sided intellectualism which has been so pernicious an influence on the theology of the past, to relate the classical experience of the great saints of the past to the more modern, but none the less vital, experiences which are ours today.

It will not do to think of psychology as merely a department of history, as is the case with our present-day genetic psychology. It is this and must be studied as such, just as the history of doctrine is a part of general history and must be studied as such. But it is more than this. It is, I repeat, the science which furnishes the philosopher of religion with the formative concepts which define his subject-matter. For religion, as we are coming to see more clearly every day, is more than doctrine, more than ritual. It is life with God, and in the recurring experiences of the souls of men repeating themselves from age to age in

the changing social environment we have the permanent element in religion, the subject-matter with which theology deals.

What is true of the psychology of religion is equally true of the social sciences which deal with the permanent forms of man's communal life. These too should hold a much more important place in the study of theology than has been given them in the traditional curriculum. It is one of the merits of this book that it emphasizes this fact and assigns a special chapter to the importance of the social sciences for the study of religion. But it is not enough to recognize that the social sciences contribute to religion. One must see what they contribute, and why. The real reason why the social sciences are so important for the student of theology is that they define the fundamental conceptions with which religion in its social forms is concerned. Central among these is the church. The church is the unit of organized religion. The definition of the church therefore belongs to that introductory discipline which we have called the philosophy of religion.

It may seem as if we were attributing too much importance to mere matters of order and relation. If the church be discussed somewhere; it may be asked, what difference does it make whether the discussion comes early or late? But the question itself shows that the questioner is still living in the departmental world from which the newer education seeks to emancipate us. If religion touches all sides of life—feeling and will as well as thought—if it is both individual and social, constant and changing, the play of contrasting types and the persistence of common experience, then we must recognize these facts from the start, and they must direct us in all our subsequent study. Only so can we be delivered from provincialism in theology, whether it be the provincialism of dogmatism or the no less dangerous provincialism of modern historical criticism.

There is still room then for a book which shall do in fact what this book professes to do—furnish a guide to the student of the Christian religion which shall help him to find his way through the mazes of modern scholarship with its countless unanswered and unanswerable questions to the simple and central realities of religion in which Christians of every name and age have found their bond of unity.

WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN

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THE VERSIONS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT¹

This little book by Professor Margolis, editor-in-chief of the new Jewish Version of the Old Testament, is a popular presentation of the main facts with regard to the history of translations of the Hebrew Scriptures. The subjects discussed are the Targum, the Septuagint and the later Greek versions, ancient Christian translations, Jewish translations in the Middle Ages, Luther and the King James's Version, modern translations by Jews and Christians, agencies for circulating the Bible, and the difficulties inherent in all Bible translations. In the discussion of the older versions no new facts are presented, but a discriminating and interesting statement is given of the results of modern critical research. Jewish tradition is cited rather more frequently than is necessary, and the author does not always make sufficiently clear the untrustworthy character of this tradition. Another weakness from a scientific point of view is the failure to exhibit the relation of the official text of the Sopherim to the earlier text of the Old Testament, and to indicate the relation of the ancient versions to the earlier text or to the text of the Sopherim, respectively. It is nowhere stated, for instance, that the uncorrected Septuagint bears witness to a far earlier text than that translated by the Vulgate. In the use of the versions, as well as of manuscripts, everything depends upon their genealogical relation to one another. This relation is not brought out clearly in the present discussion.

The most interesting parts of the book are the discussions of mediæval and modern Jewish versions. This field is little known to Christians, since the information is found only in inaccessible technical works, mostly in German. Here the author is thoroughly at home, and he makes a lot of out-of-the-way knowledge accessible to the ordinary reader. The description of the methods of the editors of the recently published Jewish Version throws light upon an important undertaking that is destined to exert great influence in the history of Judaism.

A delightful feature of this book is the cordial appreciation on the part of its Jewish author of the service rendered both by Christianity and by Islam in the dissemination of the message of the Hebrew Scriptures. He quotes with approval the words of Maimonides that through the two daughter-religions the words of the Torah have been spread to the utmost isles and to many nations. The seventh chapter is devoted

¹ *The Story of Bible Translations.* By Max L. Margolis. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1917. 135 pages. \$0.75.

mainly to an account of the work of the British and Foreign Bible Society and of the American Bible Society, through which the Old Testament has been translated into nearly every language of the world, and the message of Israel's prophets has been preached to every nation.

HARTFORD THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
HARTFORD, CONN.

LEWIS BAYLES PATON

A HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF MILLENNIALISM¹

Everyone is aware of the widespread revival of millenarian ideas which has resulted from the war, but scholars have been too much inclined to take up a merely supercilious attitude toward the movement. The futility of these crude speculations is self-evident to them, and they fail to understand the difficulties of many earnest men, by no means wanting in intelligence, who have not their background of historical knowledge. Professor Case has done a notable service by discussing the whole question in a serious way and enabling the ordinary reader to put himself at the point of view of the modern scholar. He rightly feels that millenarianism must no longer be ignored as a harmless vagary. It is already distracting large numbers of men and women from the real problems which are urgently awaiting the church in these momentous times, and the mischief is bound to grow unless it is counteracted by a better instruction. The professional scholar has here a rare opportunity of doing something practical for the religious life of the country.

The method adopted in the book is "to sketch the origins of the millennial type of hope, to note the functions it has served at different times in the past, and in the light of its history to estimate its value as a modern program for the renovation of the world." The introductory chapter deals with the hope as it first emerges in gentile mythologies. It is shown that in Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian, and to some extent in Greek, religion we meet with the conception of a series of world-periods during which the conflict between good and evil powers passes through varying phases. The second chapter is occupied with the development of this mode of thought in the Old Testament and the Jewish apocalypses, and the two following chapters with the different forms which it assumed in the earlier and the later history of Christianity. In a closing chapter the results of the investigation are summed up and

¹*The Millennial Hope: A Phase of War-Time Thinking.* By Shirley Jackson Case. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1918. ix+253 pages. \$1.25.

their significance is examined from the modern point of view. The author recognizes that the Bible writers undoubtedly looked for a sudden crisis in which all things would be renewed, and deprecates any attempt to read a "spiritual" meaning into their language. He recognizes also that apocalyptic ideas had in their day a real religious value, maintaining a faith in the ultimate triumph of righteousness in times of utter darkness and despair. But he makes it clear that the hope of a renovation only to be effected through a destruction of the present order belongs essentially to a bygone phase of thought. This is apparent from the utter failure of all millennial forecasts in the past, from their fantastic character, from the pessimistic view of the world which formed their basis. All later experience and reflection have taught us that the Kingdom of God is to be realized, not through any cataclysm, but through the gradual operation of redeeming forces; and the task incumbent on us is to secure an ever larger scope for these forces in the individual and social and national life.

The book is written with a practical purpose, but it may be commended to the theological student for its remarkably clear and succinct account of the history of apocalyptic ideas. Dr. Case has compressed into brief compass a vast amount of material, which he has gathered from widely scattered fields. His summaries are based as a rule on generally accepted results, but occasionally he half commits himself to views which are at best conjectural; e.g., that Jesus did not himself claim to be the Messiah, that Paul conceived of death and other malign powers as personal demons. Debatable opinions of this kind seem to be out of place in a rapid survey of facts, and may tend to bewilder some of the readers whom the book is specially meant to interest. The apocalyptic teaching of the various New Testament writings, particularly of the crucial Book of Revelation, is excellently presented; but a few paragraphs might have been spared for the Epistle to the Hebrews, in which the primitive eschatology is so curiously blended with idealistic speculations. It is not a little surprising that in the review of apocalyptic history subsequent to the New Testament period no reference is made to Montanism. This was surely one of the most interesting of the millenarian movements, and was important above all the others in its effect on the official attitude of the church.

In so wide a survey it is inevitable that there should be omissions, and the wonder is that the author has contrived to include so much, and at the same time to avoid all overcrowding. Though he does not address himself to scholars, he always writes with conscientious scholar-

ship, and his book will appeal more strongly on this account even to the general reader. We have been particularly struck with his refusal to employ the weapons of ridicule, although he has sometimes to deal with theories which are patently absurd. He never forgets that the millennial hope, however it may impress the modern mind, has had a great and memorable history and represents a genuine type of religious thought. As a sympathetic and thoroughly competent discussion of a movement which in these days is attracting large numbers of converts the book will prove a welcome guide to the perplexed. It will help them to clearer light on the riddles of Scripture and the problems of their own time. In the larger perspective which it offers them they will learn to see the present crisis as only an episode in the age-long conflict with the Satanic powers.

E. F. SCOTT

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OCEANIC MYTHOLOGY

A recent¹ volume by Professor Dixon is the first systematic treatise that has appeared on the mythology of that extensive region often known as Oceania. Professor Dixon uses this term in its broadest sense, and includes not only the island areas of Polynesia, Micronesia, and Melanesia, but also Australia and Indonesia. New Guinea is included in Melanesia, while Indonesia is restricted to the Malayan Archipelago, although the more common usage is to include under this term a somewhat larger area, especially Formosa and the Malay Peninsula. The general boundaries of these areas are indicated on the map.

The material from each of the five areas is treated in separate sections under similar headings. The myths of origins and the deluge are first outlined in more or less detail, selections being given from those from different islands. A second chapter treats of special groups of characteristic tales, provided the material is sufficient. Another is then devoted to miscellaneous tales, while a brief summary brings out the local characteristics and the relationship to other areas. In the final chapter of the book these conclusions are "briefly summarized, in order that we may gain an outline of the growth of Oceanic mythology as a whole." No attempt is made at any special interpretation, nor are any comparisons

¹ "The Mythology of All Races," Vol. IX, *Oceanic*. By Roland B. Dixon. Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1916. xv+364 pages; 24 plates, 3 figures, map. \$6.00.

made with other regions, beyond suggesting certain affiliations, especially of the Indonesian area, with Southeastern Asia, and indicating the later Hindu and Mohammedan influences.

No one knows better than Professor Dixon the incompleteness of the material at his disposal. Many island groups are entirely unrepresented, and most of the others very incompletely. In many cases, especially in Polynesia, the material is lost forever. In others, such as parts of Melanesia, where even the number of tribes and languages is unknown, we have barely touched the surface. Nevertheless, the resemblances are such that much light is thrown on the interrelationship of the mythology of the different island groups, and the conclusions, while tentative, are at least suggestive, and the relationships suggested are usually in accord with those obtained from other lines of comparative study.

The cosmogonic myths are more highly developed in Polynesia than in any of the other areas. These "may be separated quite easily into two types: one (usually assumed to be the normal or only form) in which we have what may be called a genealogical or evolutionary development of the cosmos and the gods from an original chaos; the other, in which there is a more or less definite act of creation by a deity or deities." It is interesting to note that the first type is most developed at the extreme ends of Polynesia (Hawaii and New Zealand), while the other is more common in Central Polynesia. A comparison of all the Polynesian myths shows the same close affinity of Hawaii and New Zealand. As to outside relationships, Melanesian elements are more common in New Zealand and Micronesia, Indonesian in Hawaii.

In Melanesia there appear to be two strata: one relatively simple, with few cosmogonic myths but numerous ghost stories; and a second, more highly developed, but still by no means a unit. The latter shows affiliation with all the neighboring areas and is called Melanesian, while the former is distinguished as Papuan, as it is best represented in New Guinea.

In Indonesia the conditions are more complicated, and the results least satisfactory. After eliminating as far as possible tales and incidents from Indian and Islamic sources, a Malay and a pre-Malay, or Indonesian, group are distinguished. Though the affinities of these with the Asiatic continent are vague, Professor Dixon suggests that the Indonesian type may be related to the Mon-Khmer, and that the Malay mythology may find its antecedents among the Thai or Shan. From the most primitive people of Indonesia, the Negrito, there is no material available.

Very little of the mythology of Micronesia has been recorded, but what we have shows clear relationships to Indonesia on the one hand and Polynesia on the other.

In Australia two main divisions may be distinguished. The mythology of the central and northern portion of Australia stands more or less alone, "and so far as its peculiar tales of totem ancestors are concerned, it seems to be unique." The tales of Southern and Eastern Australia, on the other hand, show certain resemblances to those of Melanesia. From West Australia and Tasmania there is practically nothing.

In the final chapter a series of migrations are outlined as a possible explanation of the various relationships indicated by this study.

The volume is furnished with a number of excellent plates, some of which are colored. These illustrate some of the most striking masks, figures, and carvings from Oceania. There is also a full bibliography, and notes giving the source of all quotations and references. Considering the imperfection of our knowledge, and giving due regard to the cautious statements of the author, this volume may be regarded as an excellent summary of the field covered.

ALBERT B. LEWIS

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BRIEF MENTION

DOCTRINAL

TAIT, ARTHUR J. *The Nature and Functions of the Sacraments*. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1917. xiv+104 pages. \$1.25.

The surprising feature of this book is its date, which should have been 1867 and not 1917. For fifty years ago it was quite in order to combat the rising tide of Tractarianism by appeals to such Reformation theologians as Bullinger and John Jewel. But that in a work of the present day such appeals should still be made is startling, and that these sixteenth-century divines should still be regarded as final sources for Christian doctrine is, to say the least, depressing. It is quite in accord with this attitude that Dr. Tait tells us (p. 59) that the very last word on sacramental research has been spoken by the three "great" scholars "Goode, Mozley, and Dimock." This statement characterizes sufficiently the nature of this treatise and its value.

B. S. E.

DE TONQUÉDEC, JOSEPH. *Introduction a l'étude du merveilleux et du miracle*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1916. xi+461 pages.

The purpose of this book is to prepare the mind of the reader for what seems to the author to be a fair-minded attitude in the investigation of the problem of miracles. That there are a priori presuppositions in all arguments and in all judging of

testimony he recognizes. But there are some prejudices which are less consonant with all the facts of experience than are others. The author undertakes to show that general skepticism concerning the reality of miracles or the reliability of testimony to a miracle involves a dogmatic refusal to entertain seriously the possibility that the Catholic conception of a world ruled by a benevolent God free to adapt events to his purposes may be the true conception. If there are in fact unique events inexplicable by natural laws, we simply prevent ourselves from ascertaining those facts by an *a priori* skepticism.

In order to show that a prejudice in favor of supernatural events does not open the door wide to credulity, the author cites various instances of careful critical testing of testimony by those who believe in the possibility of miracles, but who are resolved not to be deceived. The conclusion is that a consideration of the problem on the basis of Catholic presuppositions is quite as respectable scientifically as is any other attitude.

As an introduction to further study the book is interesting. Without a detailed application of the method (such as the author insists must displace a general *a priori distrust* of miracles) to particular incidents, the argument, of course, leaves one entirely "in the air." But he has well carried out his purpose to show the reasonableness *a priori* of Catholic presuppositions. Whether these will stand the test of detailed *historical* criticism is another question.

G. B. S.

MCCONNELL, FRANCIS J. *Understanding the Scriptures*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1917. 144 pages. \$0.75.

This is a book of six chapters containing the Mendenhall Lectures delivered at De Pauw University. The point of view is indicated by this sentence: "Even very orthodox biblicists no longer insist that it is necessary to oppose the teaching that the first five books of the Bible were written at different times and by different men." The Bible is treated as the "Book of Life," "of Humanity," "of God," "of Christ," "of the Cross." These are interesting captions. Perhaps the most illuminating chapter is the one that treats the Bible as "full of the tingle and even the roar of the life out of which it was born." This enables us to understand the Scriptures as the product of the real world and genuine experiences of living men. Bishop McConnell also develops (pages 46-48) the principle of spiritual "awareness developed as the life becomes practiced to the doing of religious duty," which is most important in understanding the Bible.

O. S. D.

BARROW, GEORGE A. *The Validity of the Religious Experience*. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1917. xi+247 pages. \$1.50.

This work rests upon the conviction that theology must become a science whose subject-matter will be the facts of religious experience. In all scientific study there are, however, certain philosophical questions which must first be settled and which become the presuppositions of the specific science, such as the limitations of the field, the reality of the experience, the validity of the method, etc. These questions are philosophical, because they can only be determined in the light of truth as a whole. Before theology, or the science of religion, can begin its work there must be this preliminary philosophical investigation. It is this task which the author undertakes. This study gives the following results: there is a real, unique experience which we call religious; the test of religion is the test of sound reasoning applied to the facts of

religious experience; the source of religion is real and outside of the conscious experience; this source is superhuman; it is personal. These then are the presuppositions of theology, the foundation for a science of religion.

If these results are justifiable then certainly a great deal has been accomplished. They have been obtained, however, by a formal study of the facts of religious experience. But what are the "facts" of religious experience? They are not what people have said that they experienced. These statements are interpretations and embody a philosophy and a theology. Before this preliminary philosophical study can be made there must be a critical examination of the expressions of the religious experience in the attempt to get at the "facts." In reading the present discussion one feels that if this prior criticism had been more thorough, the results would have been quite different.

F. A. S.

QUICK, OLIVER CHASE. *Essays in Orthodoxy*. London: Macmillan, 1916. xliii+310 pages. \$2.00.

The author believes that the religious world is in sad straits. The foundations of the traditional faith have been shaken. There is no knowing what form religion will assume when the present storm is past. He is fully convinced, however, that the truth is contained in the old formulas. The language of the creeds may be for us, as it was for the fathers, "the vehicle of an eternal revelation of the ultimate constitution and ordering of the universe." The present unrest is due largely to the fact that the masses of the people have not been taught the real significance for daily living of the ancient doctrines. He undertakes to show the value of the statements of the creeds for everyday life.

F. A. S.

DUBOSE, HORACE M. *The Consciousness of Jesus*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1917. 144 pages. \$0.75.

The author disavows the intention of discovering by a careful and scientific study of the evidence what may be known of the consciousness of Jesus. He describes his method in the following words: "Every thoughtful student of modern-day theological literature has noted the too frequent absence of both the spirit and the letter of subjective inquiry from the methods of criticism. . . . A new school of criticism and interpretation is forming to which perhaps no better name can be given than the one already used, the subjective. This school will not be unmindful of historical and textual inquiry, but it will subordinate these and other processes to that light which shines from below, the consciousness which lives in the Word and is instinct and operative in its every utterance" (pages 6-7). "The argument in short is this: Jesus having removed himself from the limitations of his earthly life, during which his consciousness was manifested in many extraordinary ways, is succeeded by universal and continuous manifestation of himself in the Word, from which, in even more extraordinary ways than in his earthly life, his consciousness affects and engulfs the lives of men" (pages 17-18).

It is clear that one who does not possess this peculiar power of directly perceiving the noumenal behind the phenomenal cannot intelligently comment upon the results of this method of interpretation.

F. A. S.

BUTLER, SAMUEL. *God the Known and God the Unknown*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917. 91 pages. \$1.00.

The essays which make up this volume were first published as a series in the *Examiner* in 1879. With admirable confidence, and in brilliant English, the author undertakes to show in common-sense words (1) the existence of God and (2) the form of his bodily expression. After pointing out that pantheism and orthodox theism are both virtually atheistic, since the God of these systems is not really personal, he outlines his doctrine of panpsychism. The Known God is the unity of the animal and vegetable world. As the Known God comprises all living units in his own single person, so the Unknown God is a vaster personality composed of gods as our bodies are of living cells. "Beyond this second God we cannot at present go."

A. E. H.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

EDWARDS, LOREN M. *Every Church Its Own Evangelist*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1917. 162 pages. \$0.50.

We commend this little book to pastors and laymen, more for its appendix than for the treatment of the subject in the first 124 pages. The latter is concrete and practical; but the former is just what is desired to give the specific directions needed in the effort to make the church mobilize all its resources to achieve the true evangelistic task of the local congregation. The plans proposed here are sensible, and they will work.

O. S. D.

HOYT, ARTHUR S. *The Work of Preaching*. New edition with new chapters. New York: Macmillan, 1917. xiv+389 pages. \$1.50.

Professor Hoyt's book has been extensively used for twelve years both in classes and for private reading and study. It is probably the best of recent books in homiletics for this purpose. The new edition simply adds two chapters, one on "Interpretation of Life in Preaching," and the other on "The Elements of Effective Style." This gives 19 chapters in the new edition, covering 389, as against 348, pages. If a new edition was needed we feel that the two chapters on "Scripture Authority in Preaching" might well have been condensed in order that others, for example, "The Development," might have been amplified, or a new chapter on "The Sources of Sermon Material" might have been added. The revision has not been thorough enough. The book will be more useful in its new form, however. But the added material is not sufficient to warrant the added cost of the new book over the fifty-cent edition of the old one.

O. S. D.

COPE, HENRY FREDERICK. *The Modern Sunday School and Its Present Day Task*. New York: Revell, 1916. 252 pages. \$1.00.

This newly revised edition of a tested manual which has proved its usefulness in a half-dozen editions is commended. It covers in a popular yet accurate manner the most important topics in its field. A comparison with earlier editions gives interesting evidence of the progress being made in this field. The revision has been done with care, recent experience being presented either in newly written chapters or revised sections. New chapters discuss "Church Organization," "Parents and the School,"

and "Week-Day Religious Instruction." A new feature to be commended is the selected bibliography appended in footnotes throughout the book. It is an elementary manual characterized by practical idealism and educational accuracy.

H. F. E.

WARDLE, ADDIE GRACE. *Handwork in Religious Education*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1916. xviii+143 pages. \$1.00.

Miss Wardle's little volume treats in a specialized way a phase of the larger problem of religious education. The first half of the book develops in an illuminating way the fundamental basis for handwork in the Sunday school. In the successful accomplishment of this much-needed task the author has placed workers in the field of religious education under obligations to her. The later chapters give a detailed and varied graded program of handwork extending from early childhood into adolescence. This second part is characterized by many concrete directions and suggestions, which should be of immediate help to the worker. The book is cast in the form of a text with directions for handwork and added reading in connection with each chapter. A good bibliography gives added value to this handbook for the Sunday-school teacher and student of expression in religious education. The Sunday-school worker who reads this fresh study of a little-understood subject in the field of religious education will add to his efficiency and the sense of significance which should be present in this field.

H. F. E.

WINCHESTER, BENJAMIN S. *Religious Education and Democracy*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1917. 293 pages. \$1.50.

There are two parts to this book. Part I originally appeared under the title, "Week-Day Religious Instruction," and as a commission's report on Christian Education to the Council of the Churches of Christ at St. Louis. Its concern is the educational task confronting the Protestant Church in America. One hundred pages are given to a historical introduction, which touches upon important features of education during the Christian era and which forms a setting for the present issues. Fifty pages deal with the modern situation: "the mutual relations of church and state in providing education for democracy" are set forth, together with recent experiments in week-day religious instruction, such as the North Dakota, the Colorado, and the Gary plans; the need for a "wider religious education" than that afforded by the Sunday school is shown; and the task is thrown back upon the local community for solution through the co-operative experimenting of the church, the school, and the home.

Part II is valuable for its presentation of "curricula of moral and religious instruction in state systems of education" outside of the United States; of curricula used in the experiments noted above and in other schemes for religious instruction; and of proposed plans for more adequate moral and religious training.

A fact of no little worth is Mr. Winchester's intimate contacts with the later developments whereof he writes. The person who wishes to get his bearings in matters of religious education and to go forward may turn to this book with confidence.

F. G. W.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

- Brightman, E. S. *The Sources of the Hexateuch*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1918. 395 pages. \$3.00.
 Gordon, Alexander R. *The Prophets of the Old Testament*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1916. 364 pages. 6s.
 Kraeling, Emil G. H. *Aram and Israel or the Aramaeans in Syria and Mesopotamia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1918. xvi+155 pages. \$1.50.

NEW TESTAMENT

- Castor, George D. *Matthew's Sayings of Jesus*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918. ix+250 pages. \$1.25.
 Goguel, Maurice. *La Sainte Bible. Deuxieme Livraison—Les Evangelies Synoptiques*. Paris: Société Biblique de Paris, 1918. iii+128 pages. 70 fr. (by subscription).

CHURCH HISTORY

- Gerosa, Pietro. *Sant' Agostino e la Decadenza dell' Impero Romano (Estratto dal "Didaskaleion," Anno IV—Fasc. III-IV)*. Torino: Libreria Editrice Internazionale, 1916. 140 pages.
 Nau, F. *Revelations et légendes. Methodius. — Clement. — Andronicus. Textes édites, traduits et annotes. (Extrait du journal asiatique, Mai-Juin, 1917.)* Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1917. 59 pages. 3 fr.
 Zollmann, Carl. *American Civil Church Law. (Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law.)* New York: Columbia University Press, 1917. 473 pages. \$3.50.

DOCTRINAL

- Adler, Felix. *An Ethical Philosophy of Life*. New York: Appleton, 1918. viii+380 pages. \$3.00.
 Cross, George. *What Is Christianity?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918. x+214 pages. \$1.00.

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THE THEOLOGICAL CURRICULUM AND A TEACHING MINISTRY

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In one of his essays William Hazlitt says of the character of a scholar, "Such a one lives all his life in a dream of learning, and has never once had his sleep broken by a real sense of things." If ever the conscienceless Philistine might with aptness have applied this saying to the theological scholar, that time is past. The theologian has in these last terrible years been rudely enough awakened from his dogmatic slumbers. It may be that he has not as yet arrived at a real sense of things, but he is concerned to arrive. As he anxiously consults his academic time-table he finds some stations on the route over which the times are taking him with such rapidity not marked at all. Evidently the document needs revision.

At any other time it would have been quite useless, not to say audacious, to suggest the revision of a scheme so venerable and so enhaloed by the unquestioned affection of numbers of good people. But in a day when society is asking every institution to show its credentials the suggestion does not seem so violent. The theological seminary claims standing as a professional school, the training school of the ministry of religion. Its claims will be allowed or ignored according to society's judgment of its product. It is true that the product depends in no

small measure upon the raw material, but it depends quite as much upon what is done with the raw material. Does the process make these men actually serviceable to their age? What are the notions concerning his business with which the average young minister steps forth from the seminary into the community?

It is beside the mark to debate whether the priestly or the prophetic conception of the minister's function can claim the hour. Only the voice of the prophet has ever challenged an age as perturbed as ours. But what does the theological curriculum do to produce men of prophetic mold? It is evident that only a real sense of things can ground a truly prophetic ministry. It is that sense of things which gives body to such a ministry. It is that real sense of things which constitutes every prophetic ministry a glorified ministry of teaching. Only such a ministry can speak to the heart of the age in the interest of a better and more ample world-order. And the power of such a ministry lies not in some magical *opus operatum*, some unimpaired succession, some authority external to itself, but in its vision, its idealism, its plan and passion for a new order of life.

Whatever the notions concerning his business which the young theologian carries with him to the task, the standard theological curriculum, which still dominates the field, reveals the somewhat remarkable assumption that ample theological education involves chiefly a training in the Bible, church history, systematic theology, and homiletics (to which there may be added for good measure something of elocution, liturgics, hymnology, and the like), but that it is not necessary that the candidate for the ministry should know anything about the human subjects with whom he is to deal or the times in which these people live. It is not to be denied that the teaching function of the ministry had some place in the older curriculum. It was specifically included as catechetics, and it was also present by implication in the "matter" of homiletics, which was held to be derived from the Bible and Christian experience. In the actual practice of the church, catechetics has been greatly overshadowed by the lay instruction given through the Sunday school, and there has emerged in our Western world a whole new discipline with an English name—*religious education*.

This discipline is recognized as a candidate for honors along with the older disciplines. Originally thought of as relating specifically to the Sunday school, it is now claiming relation to the entire process by which religion is integrated with life, whether individual or social.

In this discussion the question of revising the theological curriculum is approached from the angle of religious education thus broadly understood, that is, from the angle of a teaching ministry. Not only is there need for a chair of religious education in every modern theological seminary, but there is also need for a thorough revision of all the other disciplines from the point of view of a teaching ministry. The minister is not to adorn the doctrine but to translate it into current life; the theological seminary is not to make the minister erudite but to make him a prophetic medium through whom the word of God may come to the people. This claim upon the seminary is beginning to be recognized, but the provisions for meeting it are as yet to a great extent but makeshifts. The full recognition of religious education as upon a plane of equality with the older disciplines is a first stage in the total adjustment process, and such recognition is painfully slow. Any study of the situation in American institutions today will but confirm Professor Ward's statement, made in 1915, that "this department is not finding it easy to get its own regular chair around the already crowded theological table."¹ Professor Coe aptly says of the present situation in the seminaries with respect to the educational task of the ministry:

The theological seminaries are somewhat generally increasing the amount of their instruction in this subject. But if we ask whether they are now ready to supply the churches of the country with pastors who are competent to guide their parishes in the reconstruction of religious education—competent, not in the sense of accomplished and matured craftsmanship, but in the sense of knowing how to begin and how to keep on learning—we must confess that no denomination has yet brought its seminaries to this standard.²

The movement toward a more adequate provision for instruction in the social application of Christianity is similarly retarded.

¹ "Religious Education in the Theological Seminaries," *Religious Education*, October, 1915, by Professor Frank G. Ward, Chicago Theological Seminary.

² Coe, *A Social Theory of Religious Education* (1917), p. 278.

Some provision, usually quite limited, has been made for it in courses upon Christian ethics; but in very few instances have such attempts evinced any adequate grasp of the problems involved, to say nothing of their failure to develop a comprehensive and fundamental range of instruction. For most institutions the work is yet to be done. But this, too, is part of the appeal of a teaching ministry to the theological institution.

There are two ends to be achieved through a thorough revision of the curriculum of our seminaries. The first end is to make room for such subjects as have been largely crowded out hitherto; the second is to make the older disciplines themselves more effective; and both of these ends are merged in the great aim of producing a teaching ministry of prophetic mold and temper. The revision of the older disciplines would not only make them more effective but would also make ample elbow-room at the crowded theological table for the newer disciplines. This would come about through a reduction of the older disciplines; in the total curriculum perspective they would occupy a relatively smaller space. And the reduction would be justified, for it would rid us of theological *impedimenta* which we cannot afford to carry in so urgent an age as ours.

It may be asked how it is possible to reduce the older disciplines. A brief consideration of the first three—the biblical, the systematic, and the historical—may serve to show that some reduction is possible. We turn first to the biblical studies. One ought to be able to assume that in this group of studies the historical method would be uniformly and consistently employed, but a survey of the most recent catalogues of a great number of theological schools gives quite the contrary impression. In the first place, a large proportion of these institutions attempt to give their students a mastery of one or more of the biblical languages; that is to say, they require either Hebrew and Greek or at least New Testament Greek for graduation. But every teacher of biblical languages knows that the average student never becomes expert therein; not only has he no special aptitude, but—as things now stand in our American colleges—he makes his approach to the language too late ever to acquire any facility in its use. This is

not to say that the pursuit of Hebrew and Greek should be abandoned by our theological seminaries, but only that the work should be put upon an elective basis, so that only those who have some real aptitude for language shall enter the linguistic courses and those who have no facility in language mastery shall be saved the useless drudgery involved in meeting the curriculum requirements. Such a readjustment would relieve the standard theological curriculum of its present linguistic burden.

When all this has been conceded, there remains the question whether we should not still be spending too large a proportion of our time in biblical studies. A considerable number of our seminaries have already dropped the linguistic requirement for their diploma or degree. Does it therefore follow that they have reached the point which the claims of a teaching ministry upon the curriculum would indicate? By no means, for they may still be wide of the mark in at least two directions. Biblical studies based upon the original languages too often, under the older ideal, lost themselves in a meticulous word-study which left the student in the end quite without the necessary historical background and perspective. And not a few modern courses, given upon the basis of the English text, err in the direction of a too detailed verbal exegesis. So long as we held to some theory or other of verbal inspiration this method seemed to have justification, for a whole article of the divine will might lie in some linguistic jot or tittle. But once we realize that the will of God is disclosed through life and personality, we seek the long perspective of history as our key to it. Again, we overburden our biblical group of studies through our attempts to homilize the Bible, to find all sorts of modern parallels therein. We work out some new social appreciation, for example, in our modern world, and then we come back to our Bible to find that, after all, it was there all the time. No one can take away from the moral dignity and sublimity of the teachings of the prophets or of Jesus; but we shall never quite get at that dignity and sublimity unless we are willing to interpret what they said in the light of the times to which they spoke instead of reading into it all our modern notions. We homilize and pragmatize our Bible to an extent which we little appreciate, and we do it all too

often in the name of the historical method, of which it is a distinct violation. The homilizing as against the historical tendency is in almost as much danger of obscuring the real contribution which the Bible has to make to our religious life as the older atomistic linguistic study was of ignoring it. That contribution is not that of a detailed code of morality, whether individual or social; not a theology, either biblical or systematic; not a ritual of religion. What the Bible has for us is a dynamic, an exhibit of the life of the spirit at work in the lives of men and in a developing society.

The candidate for the ministry needs to appreciate the Bible as literature, but as the literature of a movement or series of movements, as a deposit of the life of the spirit across a thousand years and more of history. He ought to understand the Bible as a literary deposit of religion, but of religion in process and therefore to be interpreted through history. He ought to grasp the relation of the Bible as literature and as the literary deposit of a religious movement to its own contemporary political, social, cultural, ethical, and religious context. He will then be able to throw the illumination of that cumulative experience upon the individual and social religious ventures of our own time. Now if our biblical work were framed upon the basis of such an understanding of its total intent, certain courses might well be wholly omitted from the requirements of a standard curriculum and the present proportions of others considerably reduced. Each course should be submitted to the test of the practical requirements of a teaching ministry. To be sure, there will always remain a place for certain postgraduate and specializing courses in biblical subjects which shall go thoroughly into the finer detail of exegesis and the like; but to suppose that the whole Bible can be covered in that fashion within the brief time at the disposal of the average candidate for the pastorate is absurd. Not even the biblical specialist knows the *whole* of his Bible in that way. What we need is such a series of biblical courses for the required basis of his work as shall put the student in possession not only of the main intent and movement of the whole Bible but in possession also of a method of getting closer to any particular portion of it with a view to making it

effective in the lives of the people to whom he ministers. Such courses should accordingly deal with the outstanding and culminating portions of the Bible which are available for the immediate uses of a teaching ministry.

Let us pass to a consideration of the place of church history in the curriculum. Our question is, How much church history must the seminary require in order to equip a competent teaching ministry? We are in danger of idealizing the history of Christianity, as we theorize about it, as though it were an immaculate procession of the Divine Spirit through the ages; whereas, upon closer inspection, it reveals so much of the grossly and basely human as to humble us. Indeed, as church history has sometimes been taught, we are in grave danger of losing the trail of the Spirit amid the maze of heresies and sectarian movements. Is there not a great deal of church history of that sort which would better be forgotten? To be sure, the specialist must continue to delve into that past and to add to its burden of detail. But is it not incumbent upon the teacher of church history, who makes use of the specialist's results, to free the average student of a greater part of that burden? What shall it profit a pastor to know their historical rise and to be able to differentiate with exactness Nestorianism, Eutychianism, Monophysitism, Diophysitism, Monothelitism, Diothelitism, Adoptionism, Pelagianism, semi-Pelagianism, Augustinianism, Sabellianism and the like, if he doesn't know how the spirit of Jesus can be reincarnated in modern life?

But we shall be reminded by some of our friends of the church-history department that, so far from being alone an intimation of the normal course of religion in human life, the history of Christianity is also a warning, for "history repeats itself." It is just as true to say that history never repeats itself; it never does, for the conditions which alone could make possible a repetition are never supplied. There are always new factors in the total situation which were never there before. He who knows history only in that discrete, factual way can never use it for the interpretation of the present, can never turn it to account as a preventive of moral disaster in his own time. We shall still have warning material enough if we confine our curriculum requirements in church

history to the mastery of the broader perspective and the great culminations of it.

The fact is that church history has been too often taught as if it were something quite apart from the total course of human life in Christendom throughout the Christian era; but it needs to be more closely integrated, more vitally integrated with so-called secular history. Life is all of a piece, and we can never get at the full interpretation of a so-called religious movement apart from its total economic, social, and spiritual setting. Much remains to be done in supplying the candidate for the ministry with courses which shall render him this service.

To insist on giving the student a detailed grasp of the whole course of church history is exactly like the endeavor to give him a similarly detailed, atomistic familiarity with the whole Bible in the brief time at our disposal. It can't be done; and the attempt to do it will deprive us of what is far more worth while. Even if he could gain such a mastery, he would need, in the interest of a teaching ministry, to forget much of its detail. To be sure, there is a certain continuity of movement the feeling of which he needs to gain, a sense of perspective, a notion of relative values. But most of his time would best be spent in contact with those epochs of achievement whereby the human spirit attained its Christian freedom and embodied it in new and more worthy institutional and practical life. Especially does there need to be a transfer of emphasis from the more ancient to the more modern epochs of Christian history and a fresh illumination thereby gained of contemporary life. We are quite too much bound by classicism, as though the spirit of God had wrought then only in free and adequate fashion and worked now only in faint adumbration of that past.

Such a testing of the courses in church history by their relation to the demands of a teaching ministry would at least result in the reduction of courses mainly negative so far as their relation to the needs of current life is concerned. That type of course which does little more than aid the student to stick an ancient label of heresy upon some modern movement of the free religious spirit would better be relegated. What shall it profit the minister to

label some new and perfectly legitimate appreciation of Jesus "Sabellianism," when it is neither heresy nor Sabellianism? As ours is a live world, not a world of mummies, the ancient labels *never* fit. Revised to meet the needs of a teaching ministry in the twentieth century, the courses in church history would deal with the continuities of Christian community life through the centuries in broad and bold outline, with more detailed attention to that which the centuries have actually conserved and which reappears significantly in the church life of our modern world.

When it comes to a determination of the place of systematic theology in the modern theological curriculum, the problem is, if possible, even more difficult. Is that place so significant that there can be no reduction, or has it any essential place at all? When we have done with "biblical" theology on the one hand and with the philosophy of religion on the other, what remains to systematic theology? In the older view the Bible contains a complete body of revealed divinity, a body of divinity inchoate, unorganized, to be sure, but simply awaiting the ordering touch of the systematic theologian to reappear as a perfect and wonderfully articulated system of Christian dogma. "Biblical" theology, upon which systematic theology was supposed to rest, assumed that the Bible was all of a piece, consistent, ultimate, timeless; but more recent labors in this field, wrought out by the use of the historical method, reveal the fact that the Bible presents not one single view but a variety of views upon almost any subject with which theology has to do. To be sure, there are certain main religious postulates upon which there is very general agreement, but there is no detailed agreement. For this reason we cannot have a "biblical" theology, to say nothing of a systematic theology upon an exclusively biblical basis.

But when systematic theology consciously passes from the exclusively biblical basis to an empirical or speculative basis, the notion of a finished system vanishes; there will never be any such finished system. As a system of belief and of doctrine, Christian theology will be ever in the making and ever subject to revision. Inevitably, then, much of the material upon which this discipline once assumed a dogmatic position has now become debatable;

not only so, it has become determinable only by the method of induction from broad areas of life and experience. The dogmatic a priori approach will never again be available as the chief approach of systematic theology. This means that a great part of the area once claimed by systematic theology in its dogmatic form has become speculative territory. Many of those subjects upon which the great systematizers pronounced with so much of assurance can now be dealt with only tentatively and very meagerly at that.

It is thus a fair question to ask how much speculative and tentative material can properly be included in the furnishing of the average candidate for a teaching ministry. Beyond a doubt we must orient him in the method of constructive thought; we must familiarize him with its main problems and the chief directions in which thought has moved toward a solution; and we must give him as comprehensive as possible a presentation of the fundamental Christian postulates. No man can ever learn in the most ample sense to live by faith who does not know how many open questions there are in his theological world. The minister needs to know where the real problems lie and in what direction solutions are most likely to be found. But the greater part of his time should be spent, not in intellectual gymnastics or theological dialectics, but upon the affirmations of our Christian faith and their relation to the modern world. Here are the storm centers for the average man, the man whom a teaching ministry will ever hold in mind. Living in the kind of world which this war reveals, what must he believe about man, about God, about sin, about salvation, about the future of society, about the future of the individual? Apologetic ceases to be dialectic defense and becomes constructive interpretation, daring even to say some new thing now and then.

Would it not be great gain if systematic theology were frankly to acknowledge the limitations of our actual knowledge and to give itself more largely to widening the areas in which a positive faith may be validated? But to do so would be to retire from a part of the field which systematic theology has formally occupied in the past; it would necessitate the withdrawal or reduction of

certain courses which systematic theology has heretofore felt obliged to offer; it would leave unsaid a great many things which the systematic theologies have been wont to say.

Thus far we have considered a revision and a possible reduction in three of the older disciplines of the standard theological curriculum—revision in the interest of a more effective teaching ministry, reduction in the interest of certain newer disciplines whose presence in the curriculum upon an equal footing with the older disciplines is demanded by the ideal of a teaching ministry. All this is equivalent to laying violent hands upon the sacred ark of the curriculum. But it is justified by the need of the modern church for a teaching ministry, by the claims of the modern layman, the modern workingman whom the church has lost, and the boys and girls of the community whom it is in too great danger of losing. What has been said is equivalent to the charge that a great share of the standard curriculum does too little to fit the modern minister to teach people what they most need to know: how to live a genuinely Christian life in a world where so many voices are speaking at once, where so many interests are clamoring for a hearing, where ideals and institutions are shifting and changing as rapidly as they are now. The Bible, church history, Christian doctrine, will continue to be taught; but these disciplines should be shaped anew, and in the process of reshaping room could be found for other disciplines now totally excluded or permitted barely to edge in.

The standard theological curriculum is too little aware of the kind of world in which we are living today. A genuine teaching ministry will require a far more intimate knowledge of contemporary life than the average curriculum furnishes. The minister needs to understand social organization and the evolution of social institutions; social groupings and their origins; class distinctions in our modern world and their causes; social movements, their ideals and limitations—all these he needs to understand in order that his teaching of religion may not be remote from conscious human need and actual human problems—a sheer anachronism. This is not to say that the minister should become an expert social engineer, but merely that, as a community leader whose

specialty is religion, he should be able to grapple with actual situations and contribute toward their solution that religious insight and sympathy without which no amount of organization or legislation can ever achieve a permanently satisfactory result. The trouble with much current morality in industrial and international relations lies with its evident limitations: with the fact that it is individualistic or nationalistic morality, belonging to a far simpler stage of social evolution but neglecting or ignoring whole areas of modern human relationship; with the fact that it brings to bear upon modern situations standards which are false by defect. This is the difficulty with every effort to make a direct transfer of biblical ethics to modern situations. The Christian principles must be translated into modern terms. Can the minister translate them?

A teaching ministry calls not only for the insight thus indicated, but also for ability to analyze and organize the resources of the religious community in the interest of broadening the horizons and increasing the effectiveness of the average Christian life. This demands ability to conduct helpful experimentation in a particular field until its available resources are at length determined and drawn into use and its life thereby rendered more ample. It demands an understanding of the social and educational agencies already at work in the community, the principles which underlie and control their activities, the limitations and unachieved ideals of these agencies and their actual measure of control over the lives of people in the community. All this is to say, in short, that a new discipline whose field shall be the social application of Christianity is a present imperative necessity.

But, further, the standard theological curriculum seems too little aware that we are in a growing world, that genetic process runs through the whole order of things. It too largely ignores the fact that there are children in the congregation, in the Christian home, in the neighborhood, and that—even as matters now stand—these children, as children, are the main resource of our churches for new members. We have been altogether too ignorant of our chief trust—the childhood which makes up the new generation. The pastor ought to be able to direct his people into new appre-

ciations of the budding life about them. He ought to know how the life of the normal child develops and the chief aids to such normal development; he ought to be able to show his people how to make home religion a more effective factor than it now is in the home of the average professed Christian; he ought to know in what ways the community should move to meet the claim of childhood upon it, and to be able to initiate such movements where they are lacking; he ought to be able to show what social customs and institutions promote a sound life of childhood and link up naturally with the aims of religion. Accordingly, his teaching ministry will include the instruction of the adult community of parents and teachers concerning the claims, the rights, and the processes of child life: its growth into completer personality, its realization of God, its relation to religion and the church. He will deal, also, with the method and content of religious instruction adapted to the children themselves.

A teaching ministry calls for a completer understanding of psychology, not only child psychology, but the psychology of the adult and the psychology of the group. This is involved in a successful development of community leadership. One of the imperative modern demands upon the ministry is a broad acquaintance with the principles of lay leadership and an ability to train leaders and teachers for all departments of church work as well as for teaching in the church school. The minister alone cannot begin to overtake the task, but he must cherish the ideal and grasp the standards and the technique of the process of it in his own brain, if it is to be done. He must be able to instruct leaders of boy life and of girl life so that there shall be constantly in the community a group of intelligent friends and associates of boyhood and girlhood. The minister who knows how to organize and promote such a leadership of youth will never have a dead church on his hands.

A teaching ministry will seek to broaden the curriculum of the church school so that it shall better meet the needs of the average Christian. The church ought, for example, to be teaching the individual who is a citizen in a rural community how to think Christianity in the terms of country life; it ought to teach the Christian

who works with his hands how to think Christianity in the terms of his occupation, how to think his Christianity in terms of his industrial relationships; it ought to teach the Christian who knows and cares little or nothing about the world-field to think in terms of world-wide missions, of international Christianity; it ought to teach the Christian who thinks his Christianity in terms of a heavenly endowment and inheritance how to think it in terms of community service, neighborliness, and good-will; it ought to teach the Christian who knows nothing of the great movements in the life of the Christian church how Christianity came to be what it is, that it has a history, and something of what that history is. Our average Christianity is too petty, too provincial, too easily satisfied with itself.

The newer conception of religious education makes it a far bigger thing than "Sunday-school pedagogy." It has to do with the entire process by which religion is integrated in individual and social life in our modern world. It demands a completer laboratory and clinical provision and technique than our average theological institution has yet dreamed of. It must be given its place alongside the older disciplines of the seminary, upon an equal footing, for it has to do with the approach of religion to life at the most opportune time. If the church in this new century does not learn the art of getting a hearing for religion in childhood and youth there will be no hearing, for the urgent and clamorous age in which we live will overwhelm the new generation with other interests. Not only so, but religious education may claim an equal footing with the older disciplines upon the ground that it has to do with the only process by which Christianity ever becomes ample, the process of continuous nurture and instruction.

There is need, therefore, not only of the revision and reduction of the standard disciplines of the present curriculum, but also of the addition of newer disciplines which shall imbue the whole system with a new awareness of our modern world, which shall keep it awake to a real sense of things. Among such newer disciplines which may claim admission upon an equal footing with the older are the social application of Christianity and religious education. A motion to accord them this recognition is in order.

THE DEMANDS OF THE RURAL CHURCH UPON THE THEOLOGICAL CURRICULUM

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In quite recent years it has come to be seen that the work of the rural pastor differs somewhat from that of the minister of a city parish. It is true that fundamentally human nature is the same in the country as in the city. The religious life in its general features is much the same. But human nature is profoundly influenced by its environment. Now as the environment of the rural population, the living conditions, the social heritage, the stimuli of life, are all quite different from those of the city population, we may expect to find that country people are different from city people and that religious life in the country is different from that in the city. Furthermore, as the character of religious work is determined by the conditions confronting the worker, we find that the things which a leader of religion in the country is called upon to do are quite different from the demands made upon the city pastor. Again, the things which a religious leader will be called upon to do depend upon the resources of the community in which he works. It is because of such considerations as these that there has come to be a demand that men looking forward to the ministry be asked to consider the rural field as a possible life-work. Competent men are being urged to accept such a ministry in the same spirit as they would choose the missionary field, or the realm of religious education, or any other special field of religious service. Now since the curriculum of the theological seminary is determined by the needs of the work for which the men are being trained, it follows that provision should be made for the training of men for work in rural churches. This paper is an attempt to study the task of the rural minister and to indicate in a general way the kind of training that he requires. Attention will be directed to the general

character and content of the study rather than to the organization of courses which would provide it. There will be no effort to contrast the needs of the country with those of the city; instead, the effort will be to make an examination of the rural situation on its merits without reference to the city requirements. At many points they will overlap, but no attention will be paid to that in the present discussion.

THE TASK OF THE RURAL MINISTER

The rural problem.—Our best approach to the study of the task of the rural minister can be made through a brief consideration of the rural problem as a whole. Much study has been given to this matter in recent years, and already the literature of the subject is large. There will therefore be no need for an extended exposition of the rural situation. The rural problem has been defined by Professor L. H. Bailey as "that of developing and maintaining on our farms a civilization in full harmony with our best American ideals." This definition was based upon the investigation made by the Commission on Rural Life appointed by President Roosevelt, the report of which was written by Professor Bailey. In the process of this investigation it was found that the conditions under which the farming population lived were not such as to produce a type of life equal to the average of that of America. The country was not keeping pace with the city in the attainment of life's values. To study the forces determining rural life and to get control of these so that they may be directed in such a way as to permit a fuller realization of life's possibilities constitutes the rural problem. Within this field there are many special problems, biological, educational, economic, social, etc. Each of these, however, is thought of as a factor in the whole, and no solution of a special problem is counted as satisfactory until it registers in the improvement of life as a whole. The definite end sought in rural reconstruction is the improvement of the total life of the people.

The church and the rural problem.—Students of this problem seeking agencies that might render real service in the building up of rural life have fastened attention upon the school and the church as the two universal and permanent rural institutions which might accomplish much for the future welfare of the country. They

have looked to the church especially for leadership and inspiration in the whole movement and for the care of the social and recreational life in particular. In discussions of this matter, however, writers have found difficulty in relating this work directly to the legitimate work of the church. There has usually been an appeal to the church to take up this task along with the genuinely religious activities with the assurance that in the end the church would profit by it. This position is clearly shown in a recent work on rural sociology. In discussing the relation of the church to the life of a rural community the writer sums up his position as follows:

The point to be remembered is that a church may become a social agency of power in a community, but if it becomes this alone it is only partly religious and is difficult to differentiate from the many other agencies which are dealing with social welfare in the modern world. It may degenerate into an ethical club, interested in man's relationship to man as the only thing of importance, and this is what is likely to happen unless the leaders of the church keep clearly in mind that the central function of the church is, after all, to keep alive in humanity a wholesome respect for the Creator of the Universe, in whom man lives, moves, and has his being; and that, after all, the concern of the church in social life is only as an adjunct to its more important function and should be considered as only an effort to establish the kingdom of heaven upon earth as a part of a general spiritual kingdom instead of making the perfection of human relationships the end of its service.¹

This statement reveals to us at once the need of coming to some understanding as to the nature and scope of religion. If the essence of religion lies in a wholesome respect for the Creator of the Universe and man's relationship to man is but an adjunct, a more or less incidental side issue, then the function and task of the church must be defined therewith. One can perceive in the present time a great deal of confusion in the minds of many Christian leaders just at this point. The strong ethical interest that characterizes our day, and the insight that has come to us as to the effect of social conditions on human destiny, together with the strong sense of social obligation, have turned the attention of the church toward caring for the relationship of man to man. But is this genuinely religious? Can a man who has devoted himself to the cause of

¹ Paul L. Voght, *Introduction to Rural Sociology*, p. 299. New York: Appleton & Co., 1917.

religion take on this new sphere of work with a good conscience? Should an institution whose business it is to train men to be religious leaders take account of this line of activity? This question is important for the whole field of theological training, but for the rural minister it is vital. He enters upon a field that is confronted by a problem the treatment of which will determine the status of human life upon the farm and in all communities dominated by the farm for generations to come. What shall be his relation to this vital human problem? This will depend upon how we conceive religion. In spite of the difficulties of the undertaking we must come to some understanding of this matter before we can proceed with our task.

How shall we conceive religion?—This subject has been studied intensively from many points of view in the past few years. While there is no one conception of religion that will be everywhere accepted, there are certain characteristic features upon which students are generally agreed. Out of this material upon which there is substantial agreement we may be able to formulate certain statements that will be sufficient for our present purpose. It is obvious that religion serves a human need. It functions in the interest of human life. Man is not interested in anything extra-human that does not affect him, that does not minister in some way to what he conceives to be his welfare. He is religious because through religious activities he is acquiring something which he deems good. Religion, however, does not minister to some one special need co-ordinate with many others, but concerns itself with life as a whole. Each of the special departments of life, as industry, education, art, etc., has its own limited field. Each satisfies some definite need and makes its own contribution to life. Each is necessary to a complete life, but all together do not insure the success of life. It is quite possible for one to gain the whole world and yet lose his own life. There must be an adjustment of these various values, these several contributions. They require evaluation in the interest, not of special needs, but of life as a whole. Out of the very conflict of impulses and desires certain values have appeared, or perhaps more correctly, certain adjustments of values, certain blendings of them in life, which are deemed of supreme

importance. We embody these in our life-ideal—that after which we strive. It is just this matter which is the concern of religion. It deals with the total life, the outcome of all our striving. It seeks to make life itself worthful, and by this to give a value to every activity that ministers to life. The function of religion cannot better be expressed than in the words of its greatest minister, “I am come that they might have life and that they might have it more abundantly.”

It follows from this that religion must be a social affair. Since it deals with the life of man as a whole and this life is not an individualistic thing, in the sense of separateness, but a social matter, then religion must deal with the life of the total group, in monotheistic religions with the race, and with the individual as functioning in the group. Religion then concerns itself with the highest good of man as a social being. Its interest is with the proper functioning of man in society, both from the point of view of the individual, that he may make his proper contribution to the whole, and from the point of view of society, that in its common life the individual may find his proper habitat. The attainment of this highest good involves man in a struggle with the physical world, upon which he is dependent, and with his own impulses and passions. The world must be made a fit home for man, it must be made to supply his needs so far as these are dependent upon his physical environment, and to permit him to live efficiently. Man's own instincts must be controlled in the highest interests of the social group. It is in this struggle in which life as a whole is at stake that God functions as the helper of mankind. It is significant for this point of view that God embodies in his own character the very values after which man strives. His purpose is that man may achieve the ideal that lures him on. Thus as one contemplates the character of God, admires and worships him, he is at the same time paying homage to his own ideal of human life and strengthening his own desires after the highest good. If he has real fellowship with God it is as he finds his own purpose to strive after human welfare one with the will and activity of God. If he communes with God the subject-matter of that communion is the well-being of man. It is not as the “Creator of the Universe” that God functions in religion,

but as the divine Helper of man in his life-struggle; it is as "Our Father."

The task of the church.—If now, with such a conception of religion as this in mind, we return to our original question we find that the country church as a religious institution is directly concerned with the rural problem. Other agencies may deal with various phases of it. The institutions having for their purpose the stimulation and direction of agriculture in its different aspects would deal with that part of the problem endeavoring to secure to the farmer and his family financial support adequate to their needs; so with all the other aspects of life. The church would then devote itself to the question of the adjustment of these various contributions to one another, the blending of them into a life that would be worthy of man with his powers and possibilities. In actual practice, however, it will be found that many vital interests have in the community itself no stimulus or direction, that many institutions that are in existence need revitalizing before they can accomplish their purpose, so that the church, still acting within its legitimate sphere, would be called upon to provide for these interests. Having its attention fixed on life in its completeness, it must see that the material and the opportunity for a full, worthwhile life are available so far as possible. It is to keep its eye upon the life of the people, and in the absence of other agencies be ready to take the initiative in securing the means necessary for the good of that life. The country church, like the country doctor, must be a general practitioner. In general, the rural community is not conscious of its needs, it is not aware in any adequate degree that rural life is not normal, it does not feel the need of making any improvement in living conditions. And yet improvements cannot be imported; they must spring from, and be a part of, the people themselves. Hence the church must be a real pioneer in many ways.

It is to the leadership of a church so situated that the rural minister is called. It has to be remembered that the church itself suffers under the same limitations as the rest of the community. In general insight and breadth of interest the country church of today is about on the level of the community in which it is situated. The minister has to depend pretty much upon himself. He has to

lead the church to see what needs doing and to direct its efforts. What sort of training does a man need who is to take up such work?

THE TRAINING FOR THE RURAL MINISTRY

General characteristics.—It will readily be seen from the character of the work that this training must be thorough. The rural field is no place for the short-course man nor for the Bible-school variety. His work, however, is that of using knowledge in directing life-forces rather than that of scholarly investigation. It partakes of the character of the practicing physician rather than of that of the research worker in the laboratory. He can forego the study of Hebrew and Greek without serious loss of efficiency in his own field. He can leave many questions of historical criticism, of the details of interpretation, of philosophical method, to the specialists in these particular fields. What he needs is to possess a working knowledge of the broad results of the labors of the specialists. This does not mean a superficial knowledge—just the opposite. Taking the results of many workers in limited areas of his field he is to see his subject broadly and as a whole. His work is constructive and creative in the realm of human life. He needs to be able to think in the ultimate terms of his problem. He requires to have a secure grasp of the principles underlying his work. He is not to be equipped with a program which he is to carry out. He is to be confronted with a situation in which he must discover what needs to be done and what can be done with the resources at his command. These resources will have to be organized in view of the actual situation, not according to some conventionalized scheme. While he may get many helpful suggestions from the experience of others he must understand the matter so well that he can make such modifications as the needs and limitations of his own situation demand. One characteristic of the rural minister's training should be that it puts him in possession of the basic principles of religion and life and gives him some aptitude in applying these principles.

Another characteristic that should mark this training is concreteness. The rural minister is not presenting religion to his people as something more or less complete in itself which he asks them to accept. He is not working out religious truth abstractly

and bringing it to his people in the hope that they will apply it in their everyday lives. He is not simply holding up to them an ideal of life and urging them to attain it, leaving them to discover the means by which the goal is to be reached. He is living with them, co-operating with them, pointing out to them the necessary means for the attainment of the desired goal, and helping them to acquire these means. He is dealing with life in its concreteness and completeness, and religion appears just in this total life, not as an element along with other elements which might be analyzed out and viewed as a thing apart, but as something into which every element enters, upon which every factor of life has some bearing. It is life itself with which he is concerned, but this life assessed from the point of view of the whole rather than from some partial standpoint. It is life taken synthetically rather than analytically. For this reason his training should be such as to acquaint him with religion actually functioning in life rather than with an abstract treatment of it. These two considerations must be kept constantly in mind as we go on with our discussion.

The content of the training.—We will assume that the men who are to be trained have sufficient general education to bring them in touch with the modern world, its scientific spirit, its way of thinking, and its feeling for the values of life. The studies which should enter into the training of these men might be brought into three groups: (1) religion, including generic religion and Christianity as its highest form; (2) man living in rural society; (3) studies related to ways and means of getting the minister's task done.

RELIGION

Historical studies.—Bearing in mind the two characteristics of his work we see that the rural minister needs to know religion fundamentally in its ultimate principles and concretely in its native setting in human life. To satisfy these needs requires that he study religion genetically. He should be led to see religion functioning in the lives of peoples. Beginning with the primitive, more simple forms, he will observe religion developing in, and along with, the developing life of the race. Through a study of the various religious activities in interaction with the other factors of life he will endeavor

to see what purpose they serve, what they do for the people who engage in them. He will note the rise and development of religious ideas, the forces which produced them, and the effect which these have upon life. His attention will be called to the native human impulses and interests involved in the various religious reactions and to the social situation which called them forth. The student will thus be able to arrive at some general principles as to the development of religion in the race and will be gathering knowledge and an aptitude that can be put to practical use when he himself undertakes the religious leadership of a community.

So much work has been done in this general field of religion that it is not an impossible task for a competent student to get a good working knowledge of it in a reasonable time. A brief study of primitive religion would be the logical starting-place. This would give the common ground out of which all religions have arisen. The Old Testament studied according to the modern historical method would enable one to follow the development of a religion from the primitive stage to a high type of ethical monotheism. This should be supplemented by the study, less intensive perhaps, of at least one other ethnic faith, so as to give a basis for an evaluation of the steps of the process. The time usually devoted to the study of Hebrew and to detailed textual interpretation would be ample for this and would result in a more valuable knowledge of the Old Testament as a record of religious experience.

Christianity should be studied in the same way. The life and teaching of Jesus should be seen and appreciated in the light of as full a knowledge as possible of the total situation—historical, political, social, and religious—in the midst of which he lived and taught. The peculiar religious philosophy of the time, its origin and development, needs to be thoroughly understood. This is important, not only because out of it came many of the technical terms used in the New Testament, but also because this formed the background of the life of the early Christians. The life of Paul and of the churches which he founded must be studied in the light of the larger world in which that life was cast. As Christianity moved out into the Roman Empire and converts were made among the pagan peoples, one should observe how this new religion adjusted itself to the

religious ideas and impulses already within these peoples and in their environment. The leading ideas that emerge and the institutions that arise should likewise be understood and evaluated against the background of the life in which they appear. So far as possible the history of Christianity down to the present should be studied as an element in the life of the people. Western Christianity is the religious aspect of the life of the people of Europe. Its development has been dependent upon, and implicated in, the development of the life of these peoples. Studying Christianity in this way is the sort of training a rural minister needs, since he is to deal religiously with the life of a community.

Psychology of religion.—In this historical study there has been more or less interpretation of religious phenomena from the point of view of psychology. It would be well, however, to take the matter up more systematically and devote some time to a psychological study of the religious experience. An understanding of the psychical processes involved in religious experiences and a critical examination of the values arising out of them do much to clarify one's conception of religion. In addition, the scientific handling of religious data has its own value for the man whose business in life it is to deal with just this material.

Theology.—This material needs to be studied from still another point of view. It needs to be organized for use. We need to sort out our material and get it arranged in manageable form. We find that it falls into groups about certain central realities. We need to reflect upon these and see what we can say about them and how these statements fit into our intellectual world. Our interest here is in present-day religion. We want to know what we can believe. Our historical study has shown us that beliefs change with changing needs. As life goes forward new needs arise, new desires make themselves felt. We pass judgment upon these desires, prefer some to others, and so direct our aspirations. Thus the emphasis of life may fall in a new place, we may feel the strain of life at a new point, and the character of the help we need may be quite different. Now it is this matter in which we are interested in our present study. In this present day, when the emphasis is placed, not upon persons isolated individuals, but upon persons as members of society,

and when other changes of an equally radical nature have taken place, how shall we think our religious problems? What goal should we strive after? What does salvation mean for us in this present situation? What are the difficulties in the way—the sins that so easily beset us as working members of a social order? How is God related to us, our aspirations, and our conflict? What help can we confidently expect from him in our striving? These and questions of a similar nature we shall ask. The answer to these questions will have to be sought through a study of the religious experience of the past and present interpreted, not as it was in an older day, but in the light of the fuller knowledge of the present; not by an animistic philosophy, for example, but by a scientific view of the world-process.

Such a treatment of the subject would give us a theology very different from that which has been handed down to us, but one admirably suited to our purpose. It would be strictly religious, freed from much material that came out of a philosophy long since discarded. It would deal with the living issues of life in the terms of life, and not in terms of metaphysics. It would deal with the concrete facts of present-day life as they appear to us, and not with abstractions. Its aim would be practical, to serve the present hour, with no illusions about absolute truth and an unchangeable system of doctrine. Its purpose would be to aid in the interpretation of life, not to become a fixed standard by which religious belief and life are to be tested. The very process of thinking through these problems of actual life in this living and concrete manner, seeking the answers to questions that the people themselves are dumbly asking, is the very training that will enable the rural pastor to be a prophet to his own people.

MAN AS A MEMBER OF RURAL SOCIETY

This subject is of equal importance with the preceding one and should be studied with equal thoroughness. It will readily be seen that there is much material common to the two groups of studies, since religion is within the experience of man and we have been studying it, not abstractly, but concretely. These two lines of study might well parallel each other and thus be found to be mutually helpful.

Social psychology.—It is of the utmost importance for the rural minister that he understand as fully as possible the meaning of the terms “individual” and “society”; that he may perceive clearly that these do not represent two distinct entities, each of which may be defined without the other, but rather that they are two aspects of one thing. We have as our given fact men living in social relations, enmeshed in a social network. We get the individual by abstracting him from this total unity, but what we find in this individual is the product of social intercourse. In studying society, on the other hand, we are studying the common life in which each individual shares and to which each contributes. It needs to be seen that this is no artificial arrangement, that it is not the result of a social contract or of the bringing together of individuals, but that it is of the very nature of man himself. It is a necessity growing out of his natural endowment. Thus we do not have two problems when we undertake to work for human improvement, an individual and a social problem, but that of improving the life of man as a living member of a social unit. Out of this study there would arise many special problems. For example, is there a rural type of mind? To what is it due? How could the social situation be controlled so as to remedy some of its defects, etc.?

Social organization of rural life.—The science of rural sociology is yet in its infancy. Some work has been done in this field and a few textbooks of a tentative character have been put out. Very much remains to be done in the way of gathering material and in its analysis. While the work is still in its early stages sufficient insight has been gained to make its study of great value to the rural minister. In such a study he would become acquainted with the history of the rural problem both in Europe and in America, especially as it has been affected by modern industrial conditions. Thus he would come to see his problem in its larger bearings. He would study critically the attempts that have been made to remedy existing evils. He would discover the present tendencies in rural life and their causes. By such studies he would become acquainted with the principles of general sociology as applied to rural life and he would acquire some skill in the investigation of special subjects. He would also come to know the various agencies at work upon

special phases of rural life whose co-operation he may secure when he comes to his own constructive work in a given community. Under competent leadership he would make a study of some rural community, undertaking to find out wherein it is lacking, what are its resources, how one could best go about remedying the situation, etc. Instruction in this department should of course be in the hands of a trained sociologist, one who has a sympathetic understanding of the mission of the church and who has given considerable attention to the rural situation.

Ethics.—Ethics, religion, and sociology are closely related subjects. They each have to do with human conduct, but each from its own standpoint. The same life is at the same time ethical, religious, and social. These aspects of life have developed together and have profoundly influenced each other. This development and this mutual interaction are present in the life of today. Ethics deals with life in so far as it is good or bad, right or wrong. It endeavors to discover the principles upon which moral judgments are based. These principles are discovered by an inductive study of the moral life of the race. As a religious leader the rural minister needs to be acquainted with these principles and their ground in the developing life of humanity. Having determined what these principles are they should be applied to some of the outstanding problems of rural life in the effort to see clearly what ought to be striven for.

STUDIES GROWING OUT OF THE PROBLEM OF GETTING THE TASK DONE

The sermon.—The traditional technique for sermonizing had as its presuppositions a certain conception of religion, a rather definite system of theology, and a fixed idea as to the purpose of the sermon. It had at its command an ecclesiastical vocabulary and a group of symbols which through long association with sacred things had acquired an emotional value and power. From our point of view these presuppositions have radically changed. The traditional vocabulary and the symbols have lost their meaning and much of their emotional value for the masses of the people in the country. It follows that the art of sermonizing needs to be worked out afresh if the sermon of today is to speak to the mind

and heart of country folk as did the sermon of fifty years ago. No more difficult task confronts the church today than this, and none more necessary of accomplishment.

Religious education.—In the average rural parish the burden of leading in the work of religious education must be borne by the pastor. It is quite essential therefore that he should receive such training as will fit him for this most important work. In this aspect of his work, as elsewhere, he needs to be made familiar with fundamental principles. Otherwise he will find himself trying to impose a ready-made educational program upon a situation which it cannot possibly fit and which is altogether out of harmony with the standpoint and method employed in his other work. He should be led to see that the aim of religious education is that the students, young and old, may become efficient members of society, devoted to the ideals of the Kingdom of God, working effectively to embody these ideals in the existing society, and finding their own highest values in this devoted service. He needs to realize that these students are now living in a society and that their ideas and standards of social life are being formed by the pressure of society upon them, and that this is as true of the child as of the mature man or woman. He should be enabled to test this society by the Christian principle of love, by the teaching of Jesus concerning brotherhood, and by what science has taught us about social relationships. Thus he will be able to form in the minds of the students a Christian ideal, not as an abstraction, but as a definite goal toward which a community can intelligently strive.

Religious organization.—One of our most difficult problems today is that of religious organization. We are coming to feel in an increasing measure that the situation arising out of the divisions of Protestantism is intolerable. The practical difficulties which these divisions have caused have been felt acutely in the foreign field. As a result a sort of a working agreement has there been reached which avoids some of the worst consequences. At home the rural field feels the disadvantages of this situation with equal keenness. It is an acute problem, and the future of religion in the country depends in large measure upon its solution. While it is a question that cannot be settled by the rural pastor alone, yet

because his work is so hampered by the present over-churching of small country communities it might very well happen that the movement for readjustment might begin with him if he were awake to the matter. In any case it is a general religious problem in which he is vitally interested and in the settlement of which he will be called upon to take a part. He should therefore study with considerable care this whole question of religious organization, the function of the church in the religious life, the basis of church membership, and related questions.

Social and recreational activities.—This subject has been considered to some extent both in the study of social psychology and in rural organization. The minister, however, needs some training that will enable him to deal with it practically. He will organize these activities, not just to have something going on, but with the serious aim of getting something definite done. He needs to know what sort of social enterprise or recreational activity will best accomplish his purpose, as well as to have some training in the art of organizing and leading such activities. There are also various philanthropic organizations throughout our land that are prepared to aid such undertakings with expert advice; it would be greatly to the advantage of the minister if he came into touch with these agencies and with the valuable literature which they are putting out.

Such a training as that which has been outlined above would meet the most outstanding needs of the rural minister so far as that training can be set forth by indicating the subjects and material of study. It can readily be seen, however, that much depends upon the manner in which the work is done and the atmosphere which surrounds it. It is needless to say that this work of preparation can best be done in a rural environment. An acquaintance with country people and their ways should be cultivated. Research work in definite communities should be encouraged and guided. The significance of the rural factor in our civilization should be clearly recognized and deeply felt. As his work proceeds there should gradually dawn upon the student a vision of what rural life may become and the contribution that it can make to the life of the world. Thus he will come to feel the worth and dignity of his task

and to see that it is worthy of his best efforts and most disinterested devotion.

PROVIDING A THEOLOGICAL COURSE IN CO-OPERATION
WITH A COLLEGE

The foregoing discussion is based on the assumption that the student has had a four years' college course or its equivalent and then devotes three years to theological study. As a matter of fact, however, many men decide to enter the ministry at an age when a college and seminary course covering a period of seven years seems impracticable, or for some other reason they wish to shorten the time of preparation for their life-work. Some of these who have had sufficient academic work to enable them to do so enter a standard seminary and struggle with the theological curriculum; others enter one of the numerous training schools or go directly into the ministry without either college or professional training. One of the leading denominational bodies reports that only one out of five of the men being ordained to its ministry has had college and seminary training. A large proportion of these men gravitate to the rural field. That they are unable to cope with the problems with which they are there confronted is evident. The fundamental educational requirement of the rural minister is that he be prepared to understand his own age, its presuppositions, and its way of thinking, and that he share in the general attitude of mind of the modern world in which he lives and works. This appreciation of the modern spirit must be more than a vague feeling; it should be brought clearly to consciousness, so far as possible, explicitly formulated, and accepted as a working principle. This acquisition is important for anyone living in the modern world, but especially for one who is to be a religious leader, in order that he may be kept from unprofitable scholasticism and be enabled sympathetically to understand religion as an element in present-day life.

Now it is the express purpose of the college to aid the student in acquiring this very thing; it strives to induct its students into the world in which they are to live, to enable them to become sharers in its culture and possessors of its spirit. It is therefore extremely unfortunate that so many men are taking up the duties

and responsibilities of religious leadership without the college experience, and it is peculiarly disastrous to the well-being of the rural church that so many of these men are becoming its religious guides.

In view of this situation there has been a demand that the seminaries offer a short course with lower requirements for admission so as to provide some preparation at least for such men as are now entering the ministry with little or no training. Another and more hopeful suggestion is that the seminary, in co-operation with a standard college, offer a college course of four years leading to an appropriate Bachelor's degree. This course would include the necessary theological subjects, together with a carefully selected list of college studies, so that the whole would provide a well-balanced college education and at the same time equip the student for efficient work in the ministry. This would have a marked advantage over the plan of giving the regular theological course to men who are without college training. These men, with rare exceptions, are not prepared to take the regular seminary course. The difficulty with which they have to contend is not alone lack of knowledge prerequisite to theological study, but also, and more important, lack of method of study and the attitude of mind which this previous training would have given them. These men have decided to preach just because of their religious zeal. This very religiousness which impels them to enter the ministry tends to make them emphasize religion as a thing apart from common life, something in itself sacred, something which must be treated in a special way. The traditional beliefs are considered the very substance of religion and must be preserved intact at all costs. It often happens that a man of this type goes through the seminary before he acquires the attitude of mind which permits him to make full use of his opportunities.

If, however, such a man is studying religion along with science, history, and literature, passing from the one classroom to the other, it is easier for him to approach the consideration of the facts of religion presented to him in the same way in which he considers other facts, so that his religious beliefs will find their place in his scheme of thought, fitting harmoniously with the rest of his growing

knowledge. The very atmosphere of the college, his contact with other college men, and his participation in the life and activities of the institution will be extremely helpful to the college student. The segregation of the minister during his seminary course is not an unmixed good. When one is forming his theological beliefs it is well to have the forces of real life playing upon him. This will enable him to view these beliefs as from the outside, to realize in some measure how they look to those outside the theological circle. It will tend to make him more careful about his affirmations and more critical in formulating his statements.

A glance at the studies outlined above shows that they are such as might properly be included in a college curriculum. As a matter of fact many of them are already offered as college subjects. The history and science of religion, the Bible, the religion of the Hebrews, and courses on various aspects of Christianity are recognized college subjects. In some schools certain of these courses are prescribed. The more technical subjects involve merely the application of general scientific principles to a special aspect of the field of the science. Homiletics, for example, deals with the composition and delivery of sermons. More and more the sermon is losing its unique character and becoming a public address on a religious topic, having as its object that of all serious public addresses, the influencing of conduct. Thus it falls naturally within the department of English and public speaking. Ecclesiology deals with the function of the church in religion. It is thus a sociological question, being a case of social organization. Religious education has as its problem the application of the principles of education to the teaching of religion. Thus the student who has mastered the principles of these various sciences has the groundwork upon which the different phases of professional duties rest.

This general plan seems to be perfectly feasible and to offer a solution to our present unhappy situation. In the interest of the country church, which is suffering most severely under existing conditions, it is desirable that some institution favorably situated make the experiment.

THE PRIMARY PROBLEM FOR AN EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY. III

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In a previous article¹ I have pointed out that the inveterate mechanistic-mystical dilemma, which seems to be the crux of the religious problem, especially as it presents itself today under the general antithesis of the religious and the scientific view of the world, now, with Bergson's treatment before us, demands the following formulation: First, how shall we understand the underlying unity of the mind's operations which give us on the one hand a mystical and on the other a mechanistic interpretation of the world, since we cannot be content to leave these two antithetical types of mental operation in a hopeless dualism? Bergson's theory of the original bifurcation of instinct and intellect in the evolutionary process whereby the *Élan vital* creates its way through the resistance of matter has suggested that probably a more adequate psychological examination of the contrasted operations of intuition and intellect would make unnecessary the "subtle metaphysic" which Bergson proposes as an explanation of the ultimate unity of these two types of experience.

In the second place, how shall we understand the underlying linkage between our intellectual cognitions and the material world with which they, in exact science, so successfully deal? (This phase of the problem is dealt with in Bergson's theory of "inversion," which holds that "intellectuality and materiality have been constituted in detail by reciprocal adaptation.")² Assuming that the organic solidarity of intuition and intellect could be revealed by psychology, how can this organically unitary knowledge-activity be seen as linked up inseparably with the whole substructure of our

¹ *The American Journal of Theology*, XXII (July), 1918.

² *Creative Evolution*, p. 186.

experienced world? for linked up in some intimate fashion it certainly is, upon the testimony of common sense, the exact sciences, and the whole realistic tendency in philosophy. If, now, such linkage could at last be brought to light by psychological analysis, there would then appear a real continuum embracing what realism would call the "independent reality," our mechanical-mathematical cognitions thereof, and our mystical interpretation of the whole. In other words, the ancient dilemma would be resolved, for there would no longer be a question as to which is more true, our mechanical or our mystical interpretations of "reality," but only as to what sort of interpretation carries reality farthest in its unfolding through human reconstruction. Or, to put it otherwise, we would no longer orient human interpretation as apposed, in its double aspect, to "reality," but rather as existing in the living midst of that reality, a dynamic integral part thereof.

So much for a condensed statement of the problem. The next question is, Can psychology give us an answer as trustworthy as the results of scientific investigation in other fields? If our theology is to be truly empirical, it must work with scientific tools. Certainly the progress of experimental psychology in recent years should encourage us to hope that the questions suggested above may find at last adequate scientific treatment. Though the experimental method as applied to cognitional and allied forms of conscious experience is still in a somewhat chaotic condition, it is certainly becoming more and more an exact science, and to it we must look for the assured results which dialectic and speculation have failed to furnish.

Probably such an inquiry as is here suggested would deal with such points as the following: What are the various stages and factors in the perceptual and conceptual apprehensions of *motion* as they approximate toward the mechanistic or the mystical types respectively? Probably analysis will show that there are three broad ways in which motion as such is denuded of mystical meaning: (a) the evaporation, so to speak, of immediate emotional interest through mere familiarity; (b) the same result through a long regressus of causal explanations, that is, the de-dynamizing of the immediately perceived motion through more or less remote con-

ceptual forms of movement or change; (c) the assignment of a supernatural cause, robbing the motion thus of its intrinsic interest. The opposite tendency will probably be seen to comprise such factors as these: (a) the enhancement of emotional appraisal through the relevance of the motion in question to vital and instinctive interests; (b) the tendency to clothe the motion or movements alluded to with "tertiary" qualities through the inevitably stimulated kinaesthetic imagery and sensations; (c) the reinforcement of such a tendency by the *social* imagery which these emotional and kinaesthetic factors usually arouse through vague association.

Again, what are the stages and factors in the two opposite tendencies which center, in unstable equilibrium, so to speak, in the quantity-quality perceptions which bulk so large in common experience, especially the visual and tactual kinaesthetic complexes with their spatial and other components, the stuff of "primary" and "secondary" qualities? Probably, in the one, the abstracting function of attention will be found to be the controlling factor, while in the other the feeling-tones and the emotional elements into which they so readily pass or with which they fuse will be the most important point for study.

Again, how do the imagery and reactions appropriate to our contact with the physical environment become complicated with the imagery and reactions appropriate to our contact with the social environment, and vice versa? How, in its many phases or degrees, does personal feeling wax and wane as we adjust ourselves to the people about us, displacing, as it waxes, the nonpersonal or mere *thing*-feeling, and reinforcing itself with the latter as it wanes? And how, on the other hand, does the *nonpersonal* feeling, the *thing*-attitude, wax and wane, with its varying *personal* feeling complementation, as we adjust ourselves to the inanimate objects and animals about us? Obviously habit and novelty, the thwarting or forwarding of our activities by the objects of our environment, directness and indirectness of interest—such factors are here of great importance.

More specifically the two categories of causation and purpose will be in special need of such a psychological examination. Instead

of two conceptions of causation, the anthropopathic notion, composed mostly of the "feeling of effort," and the mathematical notion of "function," are there many vaguely different, intermediate sorts of conception? A careful examination will probably discover that there are. What are they, and under what conditions do they arise? And how many varieties of finalistic conception are there, and how does the mind pass through the various stages, from the crudest *anthropoteleism* to what Bergson would call "radical finalism"? What are the situations in which the various types are elicited? And, again, what light can this sort of psychological approach throw upon the whole matter of "existence" and "value"? Are these, also, but foci, so to speak, around which the ellipse of conscious experience swings, "value" judgments and attitudes always tinged, though sometimes in the minutest degree, with the "existence" quality, "existence" judgments and perceptions always colored, though sometimes also in slight degree, by the "value" factor? And if so, what, once more, are the various determining conditions of the proportions of the elements in the complex?

For the present I can only express my conviction that such a method of approach is as promiseful as it is necessary and would prove not only an entirely new but an extremely important factor in any adequate statement of the religious situation; for it would doubtless make clear what, since Kant's time, men have more or less dimly apprehended, namely, that the antagonism of religion and science is due to highly contrasted methods of cognition, which, however, are somehow continuous with each other, unless the mind be a house hopelessly divided against itself.

In the meantime let us note that "functional" psychology and the so-called "empirical" logic which rests immediately upon it have pioneered a path in the same general direction as that indicated above. Its bearing upon the philosophy of religion can perhaps be most briefly pointed out by passing at once to a consideration of some contrasts between pragmatism and the other dominant philosophies of the day (for pragmatism is in philosophy what functionalism is in psychology and empiricism is in logic). And probably the contrast most closely relevant to our subject is that

involved in the discussion of the so-called "ego-centric predication."¹ It constitutes a chief bone of contention between realism and idealism and as such serves well to clarify the position of pragmatism as contrasted with both.

Both realism and idealism seek *in primis* for what we might call the citadel of consciousness, the very core of cognition. This for both of them is *the act of pure knowledge*, that is, knowledge of the formal logic type, of the self-evident kind, of the sort that has an inherent authenticity. Take, for instance, the point from which Bradley begins in building up his system of metaphysics and note how it is just what I have called the citadel of consciousness. "To think is to judge, and to judge is to criticise, and to criticise is to use a criterion of reality. And surely to doubt this would be mere blindness or confused self-deception. But if so, it is clear that, in rejecting the inconsistent as appearance, we are applying a positive knowledge of the ultimate nature of things. Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion."² On the other hand, take such a statement as the following on the side of realism: "The ultimate terms of knowledge are the terms that survive an analysis that has been carried as far as it is possible to carry it."³ Logical analysis, then, is the very ideal of knowledge for both philosophies. And, so to speak, around this citadel a moat is dug, an important separation between this pure knowledge and the innumerable varieties of mere "psychological" knowledge, which, indeed, is dangerous ground, infested with the sources of error. The depth of this moat is greater than the enemies of truth suppose; that is just its practical importance. For though neo-realism professes to treat knowledge "as a natural event" and bridges the gap between logical knowledge and psychological knowledge by means of a nervous system, stimulus-and-response, etc., this bridge is truly a drawbridge, for while contact with non-logical experience seems plausible enough as a part of this philosophy, for strategical purposes the connection is actually severed.⁴

¹ See Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 129 ff.; also *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method*, VII.

² *Appearance and Reality*, p. 136.

³ *The New Realism*, p. 32.

⁴ On this point compare Moore in *Creative Intelligence*, pp. 105 f.

Similarly Bradley, while admitting other possible criteria of reality, practically and indeed explicitly makes the difference between them and the one taken as the fundamental criterion a difference of kind and not of degree. If, then, the real center of knowledge is an isolated logical judgment, we have indeed a "predicament." But, as it seems to the pragmatist, it is a predicament for the idealist no less than for the realist. For the former the difficulty is to conceive reality, as apprehended from this logical center, as in any degree more attractive than a cosmic abstraction.¹ Royce is finally no less unsuccessful in demonstrating an absolute which is not merely abstract and logical. For the realist, however, the "predicament" is no less embarrassing; for his object is not to prove the ultimately purposeful character of reality, since his preoccupation is with science and not with religion, but to show how the real can be discovered as independent of experience. Realism seeks an existential sort of independence in reality and cannot find it. Idealism finds a qualitative sort of independence in the absolute reality and does not want it. And (we cannot repeat it too often) the core of the trouble is that both have really *dissociated* logical knowledge and non-logical experience. And so the predicament is not that our human world is ego-centric, but that these philosophies have assigned an arbitrary circumference to the cognitive experience from within which our exploration and discovery of reality must obviously begin. At the core Bergsonism, idealism, and realism have this common trait—they assume, as a basic factor in their technique of discussion, a hiatus between pure intellect and merely "psychological" experience.

Pragmatism would say, then, that the solution of the deadlock must and does come from removing that arbitrary and entirely artificial delimitation of intellect. That is done by doing more thoroughly what realism purports to do, namely, by regarding knowledge as a "natural event"; that is, by taking our functional social psychology all the way with us and refusing to drop it when formal logic steps in and says "thus far and no farther." In other words, we must dig no moat about the citadel of pure knowledge,

¹ See, for instance, chap. xxvii, "Ultimate Doubts," in Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*.

because, forsooth, pure knowledge, or logical thought, is not a citadel at all. The real tactics of the intellectual life are indeed more akin to modern methods of warfare than to mediaeval. Not even the mathematician locks himself in an immovable and impregnable thought-fortress, but "digs himself in" at whatever point his obstacles threaten his advance. That is just what we are all doing in all intellectual effort—when face to face with problems, we intrench ourselves in those aspects or phases of our whole experience which seem at the time to be steadfast and secure and attack the uncertainties and perplexities with what seem to be the most available or most effective weapons with which our conscious experience has furnished us. We are "instrumentalists" in practice, whether we are such in theory or not.

We must, I said, dig no moat around "pure knowledge"; which means that the conception with which psychology furnishes us is of cognitive activities that are inextricably intermingled with other activities of perceptual, sensational, and emotional sorts, which activities in turn are no less inextricably interwoven in the dynamic structure of our far-reaching environment. In a word, the physical-psychical-social organism we call man is in dynamic connection with his environment, and within his complex conscious experience there are everywhere dynamic functional connections between the most abstract and the most emotional phases of experience and those more elementary phases which we call motor, sensory and perceptual. There are no structural cleavages between environment and organism nor within the conscious processes of the organism.¹ But,

¹ For a characteristic statement of this so-called functional point of view see Irving Miller, *The Psychology of Thinking*, especially chap. vi. Note also the following statements, from the "empirical logic" point of view, as represented in A. W. Moore's article, "The Reformation of Logic," in *Creative Intelligence*: "The operations of habit, instinct, perceptions, memory, and anticipation become logical when instead of operating as direct stimuli they are employed in a process of inquiry" (p. 82). "The conditions under which non-logical conduct becomes logical. . . . The transformation begins at the point where non-logical processes instead of operating as direct unambiguous stimuli and response become ambiguous with consequent inhibition of conduct. . . . This modification of form and function constitutes 'reason' or better reasoning" (p. 83). "It is important to observe that these forms of interaction—instinct and habit, perception, memory, etc.—are not to be located in either of the interacting beings [the organism and the environment] but are functions of both. The conception of these operations as the private functions of an organism is the forerunner of the epistemological predicament" (p. 84; italics mine).

some will object, this functionalism goes too far. It psychologizes all entities into "instruments," all facts into useful fictions, all attainments into adjustments. Instead of exploring the ontologically solid shores of reality, we are kept forever floundering in a sea of words. For these many centuries the profoundest philosophers and the devoutest souls have been seeking permanence in the midst of change, unity in the midst of plurality, purpose in the midst of mechanism; but now this instrumentalist doctrine gives us all and nothing. For our monisms become useless once they are shown to be valid only because and in so far as they are useful; permanence is shown to be only a relative permanence; and all our faith in teleology is shown to be but the by-product of imagination in its service of biological and social adjustment. Every adjustment remakes both the environment and the organism, and nothing abides but adjustment, adjustment and yet more adjustment!

Is there then nothing to which we may assign some abiding metaphysical status? Let us avoid phenomenalism by assigning the metaphysical quality of "reality" to the *whole* of our experience, at a lump sum, at a stroke. Let us stop talking about our experience of reality and talk of experience *as* reality. We shall thus have to recognize that in spots, as it were, this real total experience gives us a kind of trouble which we have been wont to call unrealness. The simplest diagnosis of this trouble is that various elements of experience are discovered to fall apart or to become frictional among themselves. The established connections of the multifarious elements of experience are found to be ruptured. In other words, we find that some part, usually a comparatively small part, of experience has become "problem." The larger part which retains its stability remains "real." In everyday language we call this intact portion "fact." The specifically reflective process of thought then begins and consists essentially in an examination of the dislocated elements of our experience to discover where the tension begins, what are the factors most under strain, and to attempt various modifications of the involved elements in the effort to restore the normal condition of unstrained interaction. The organic vitality of experience is such that it is autotherapeutic. Otherwise it remains dislocated, fractured, and painful, or it grows well, in time,

we hardly know how. In any case *experience is reality*, though sometimes a painful or crippled reality. It is on the whole sound, though with parts now here, now there, that are, as it were, out of order.

But, it may be asked, Whence comes this disorder, this dislocation, this fracture? The dislocations, the strains, and the ruptures are due to uneven growth. They are growing pains, indeed. Some part has grown faster, has changed more rapidly, than some other part; the skeleton of science, as it were, is pushing the musculature of morality and religion too hard. Stress and strain, rupture and dislocation, are possible and almost inevitable indeed, just because experience as a whole is growing. There are no unrealities for the static life, if such a thing there be.

Is this, then, subjectivism? No and yes. *And again no.* Let us recall the "ego-centric predicament." We have said that pragmatism insists on allowing no metaphysical cleavage between a so-called independent entity and a cognizing mind. All cognitions, even the most pure logical knowledge acts, are functionally continuous with all sorts of psychological and physiological activities. Ideation is the clearing-house function of the socio-psycho-physical organism. Thoughts are continuous, organically integral, with sensations, conations, and affections. Let there be no doubt on that point. But sensations, conations, and affections are functionally related to, organically part and parcel of, things, events, men, stars. The nervous system is not merely responsive. It is selective and reconstructive. "Stimulus-and-response" realism should not obscure the fact that every psychical or psychological or physiological event is a function of *both* the organism and the environment, of both the stimulus and the stimulated. Experience, particularly knowing, is not something that represents reality or corresponds to reality, but is a *reconstructing* of reality by itself, within itself, in that phase or on that plane or at that juncture which we designate as the cognitive activity or the intellectual process of human life; which means that to assign metaphysical status to any center of reality is as arbitrary as to assign absolute centrality to any organ or function of a living organism. If the heart is the center, what of the brain? If the stomach is the center, what of

the sympathetic system? But from the standpoint of the heart's correlations with other structures and with other functions the heart is the center, and from that of the stomach the stomach is the center. So from the standpoint of the correlations of the human organism with those multitudinous activities of the world within the broad matrix of which its functions operate, from the standpoint of the ego, reality is ego-centric. Or, more adequately, from the standpoint of human consciousness reality is *anthropocentric*; and if we try to transcend our human viewpoint we still use it. We are in an "anthropocentric predicament." But shall we call it a "predicament"? If we persist in doing so, it is simply because we cannot school ourselves into relinquishing naïve realism's representational notion of thought and adopting the recreative, reconstructive doctrine which psychology presents.

But if this viewpoint be adopted, what shall we say of truth and error? "Truth" must at once appear to be the character of such reconstructive activities within conscious experience as result in harmonious interaction between the various parts of experience, such, in a word, as make for the total well-being of that conscious nucleus within reality which we humans are. The test of the truth of an idea is its working *within* experience, with other parts of experience, not with things outside of experience. In general, the question of the truth or error of any philosophy or religion must mean its worth as a great reconstructive function within the broad boundaries of common experience. A *true* religion is a *saving* religion. There is no other test, and there never has been. Humanity is too dynamic to accept for long in its soul's concerns any less vital test of truth than it applies to the recipes with which it prepares its food or to the specifications from which it builds its bridges.

But, it may be objected, the saving quality of our specifications for building bridges seems to be objectively conditioned, whereas the saving quality of religious faith seems, in these psychologizing days at least, to be inwardly or subjectively conditioned. Is there not, then, some incongruousness in judging a religion by its results and judging the plan for a bridge likewise by its results? What is at the bottom of this difficulty that common sense seems to feel in such a situation? It is, I think, just this: When the internal dis-

locations to which I have referred as "problem" situations (the awareness of something "unreal" in our experience)—when these occur, we feel an inward compulsion to follow a certain pretty definite order in our manipulations and reconstructions by means of which we attempt to restore the equilibrium, the harmony, of our whole experience. What, then, is this order that we feel compelled to follow, and what is the source of the compulsion?

Briefly the order is this: The more usual sensations have a preferential advantage over unusual sensations; habitual attitudes over novel; sensational data over conceptual data (in the sense of "facts" over "theories"); social standards over individual standards; "primary qualities" over "secondary qualities"; visual and tactual experience over auditory; immediate needs over remote ends; safety over mere comfort; quantity over quality; the day's work over the evening's pleasure; the useful over the aesthetic. Such a list could be indefinitely enlarged. The suggestions made are most general. What does this preference mean? "But," an objector interposes, "this order is not universal or constant. Men often choose the beautiful in place of the useful, if they are involved in a clash; men often give the individual's standard right of way over the social standard, even though they be martyred for it; men often prefer the evening's pleasure to the day's work, even though their families go hungry." Even so. And it is just to these exceptions that I shall gladly turn in a moment. But I insist for the present that these preferential advantages are given by most men in most cases. They form the general order of procedure when conflicts must be eliminated in experience; that is, unless reflection can succeed in rearrangement or modification of one or the other or both of the conflicting elements, which is just the business of reflective thinking. But in such reflection the one sort of element *generally* has an advantage. What, I ask, does this preference mean? This, that in the continuous reconstruction of experience by means of and within itself, what we mean by "evolution" is that certain activities precede other activities and so always condition the latter. The order in which our human life has evolved within the cosmic life is the explanation of the fact that in a conflict, say between a toothache and a theory of mental healing,

the toothache is very likely to get the right of way. It is easier to modify the theory to accommodate the tooth than to modify the tooth to accommodate the theory. Physical elements show a kind of pre-emption right when spiritual elements seem to collide with them. It may not be a matter of mere priority or of mere repetition; it may in part be a matter of proportion and organic structure. There is no doubt something more than mere chance in the fact that mathematics is the oldest science and in a sense the normative science. Mathematical science is the ideal of the exact sciences, because, probably, the evolution of our conceptual thinking has had such a life-history that quantitative and spatial thought-forms are indeed nearer to the simpler and more rudimentary reactions between organism and environment than qualitative thought-forms are.¹ In other words, the reconstructive activities of the socio-psycho-physical organism have a life-history that makes some more original, more basic, and others more secondary, more derived. In readjustments within the complex the former have an advantage.

But the order I have spoken of is only general, not universal. The exceptions are notable. In the long run they have often proved the more salutary. The artistic genius who prefers beauty to bread, the martyr who prefers conscience to comfort—these are indeed the great saviors and leaders of humanity. Doubtless the facts revealed in the general rule have their own usefulness. But the only test is value in vital function. The martyrs have demonstrated that the priority of the physical over the spiritual is not necessarily inherently valid. While we do, as a matter of fact, tend to measure the value of any element by comparing it with those which seem to have this (evolutionally conditioned) priority, this tendency has only the sanction of inveteracy, and must be corrected if occasion demand. If occasion demand? And what shall be the criterion? When shall we know that the occasion demands it? And how shall we determine which is right, to follow the common tendency or to take the less usual method of giving precedence to those elements of experience which seem at a disadvan-

¹ Recall Bergson's statement that "intellectuality and materiality have been constituted in detail by reciprocal adaptation."

tage? Again, there is no standard but the result. Which works best? Which achieves the more desirable results? In other words, shall we let our attitude toward life be *predominantly* mechanistic or mystical? Or shall we let the former somehow serve the latter? How shall we use the various instruments which the past and present have prepared for us and put at our disposal? "Who shall arbitrate?"

There can be no arbitrament but the results. But how shall we evaluate the results, how compare them? There is but one answer. To put it bluntly, *it is up to us*. We are, it seems, primarily selective organisms, and all that we are, as the past has produced us, must rise up and say what sort of result we most desire. Is it attainable? We can know only by striving for it. What instruments, what "philosophies of life," what faiths, what hypotheses shall we use? Those which experience teaches, as we live and strive, are on the whole, in the long run, for the largest situation, the most serviceable, those which most adequately attain the result we most deeply desire.

We must remember that for no healthy mind does the *whole* of experience ever need to be reorganized and inwardly readjusted. For the most part our experience is sound. We feel it, as a whole, to be real. Our world is always made, for the most part, of fact. All wholesome progress must rest its weight, as it were, upon this mass of fact, of reality. But we are truly pragmatic only so long as we remember that it is not hopelessly final fact, just because it is not independent of our reconstructive vital activities. We can rest upon a great ocean liner—solid and substantial it indeed seems as compared with the unstable waters glimpsed over the rail—not as one might rest in a prison, but as one rests in his home, because we are conscious that even the liner's mighty bulk is in some real degree responsive to our control. In fine, a *fact world* which is *independent* of our experience is as likely to be a hopeless world as a hopeful world. If our intelligence is not creative, reconstructively creative, then, so far as religious interests are concerned, it is an impotent intelligence. Impotent? Then, say some, let us turn to mysticism. Ah, yes, but your mysticism will not find intellect impotent to criticize and destroy. It will undermine the foundations

of mysticism almost inevitably. In other words, if intelligence is not creative, then its greatest power is, as the new logic of realism claims, *analytical*. And the only reality which analysis can, in the nature of the case, demonstrate is an abstract, atomistic, quantitative reality. This will satisfy the mechanizing tendencies of the mind but will starve the mystical.

Realism forces on us the enigma of the existence of a trans-empirical object of belief; instrumentalism the question of an empirical objective of belief, a goal in which belief-contents are continually reintegrated. For the instrumentalist the validity of the belief-content is inseparable from the reality of the belief-objective, and the reality of the objective is a matter of concrete experience. To seek it is the only way to prove it. Its *reality* is its *realization*. Even though it is a "flying goal," it is within experience; it is part of a progressive reality. Since it is a part of experience, there is no question of its existence, but only of its worth.

I said that the belief-content is continually reintegrated in the objective of the belief. This is a dynamic aspect, especially of religious experience, and is vital. Let a man believe today that there is a force in nature making for righteousness. The very act of belief is itself a force making for righteousness, and it is a force which stands rooted and grounded in nature. Let a nation go to war to prove that might is not right, that rather right is might, and lo! right becomes might with every blow struck, with every battle fought. In a word, we see a world struggling to renew itself through human moral progress. If men cherish for generations a faith in something they call divine, behold the world through the power of that faith becomes divine. The more sublimely moral men believe the world-life to be, the more sublimely moral it thereby becomes and is. In so far as we are a humanity believing in God, God *is*, in believing humanity. Our little definitions are brittle and partial. But the sweep of faith in its vast social reaches, its historical self-transformation, its renewing and creative power, is beyond the petty contradictions of its own small parts, which indeed grow just by mutual modification. A world believing in its own spiritual significance *ipso facto* has spiritual significance. In a large and world-historic sense it is at least a minimal truth that the belief

in God is self-authenticating. Man has found God by seeking him. Is one's country something real, other than himself? No. Without faith in one's country there is no country. The faith of Americans in America *is* America. The belief-content is reintegrated in the objective and the objective is reintegrated in the content. The experienced objective is fresh material for belief-content. The enriched content is a new and better instrument for a growing objective.

And so the world's God is one who lives and moves and has his being in his world. He cannot live if the world dies. And the world lives, and lives divinely, if we strive more and more humanly. And we do so strive, if we believe in ourselves.

Do we then believe in ourselves? Do we believe in our better selves, the selves we may become? Does America believe in its better self? Does the world believe in its better self? The only answer is action, choice, decision. History is recording and will appraise the great decisions. The individual, in so far as he can appraise his own choices, does know whether he believes in himself. To anyone but a misanthrope, to anyone who has escaped the malady of him who says, "The more I know of men the more I admire my dog," there is no question as to the moral grandeur of common human life.

Why, then, once more, do men cleave to "the true, the good, the beautiful," following the lure of an ever unfolding and ever renewing nobleness? Why do men believe in their better selves? Because, once more, they are selective organisms, and this is what they select. Why try to go behind it? Shall we say that this type of selection is itself the result of "natural selection"? Let us say so. There is something very heartening in such a statement, after all.

But, of course, the notion of "natural selection" is not meant to be heartening. It is a generalization meant for the intellect, not the heart. And so we have "mechanism and mysticism" on our hands again. But if "intelligence" is "creative," let us remember that it is a mystical intelligence as well as a mechanistic intelligence, that it is in some situations extremely mystical, in others extremely mechanistic; in most situations of common life it has any one of

many complexions, ranging anywhere from the one extreme to the other. If our social experience is the evolutionary background of the mystical moments, and if our manipulation of the physical environment of the mechanistic moments, and if religion and the religious problem consist, originally, just in our confronting of the otherwise physical-seeming world in emotion-provoking situations wherein we irresistibly react with the attitudes, concepts, and feelings of our social dispositions, the assertion of our selfhood—if this is true, then the religious outlook of our day can be nothing less than our purpose to direct, by the most efficient manipulation we can devise, all the energies and activities which enter in any way into our experience, toward the realization of those ends which, when our most wholesome self is stirred to appraisal, we are compelled, by the urgency of life within us, to choose and champion. And the sort of thought-forms, whether mathematical or poetical, coldly quantitative or vividly dramatic, which we most habitually use will be determined by the character of that particular small portion of the vast task to which we may have laid our hands.

CHURCH AND STATE IN MEDIAEVAL GERMANY. IV

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The death of Henry III in 1056 was the signal for open attack of the papal opposition upon the German monarchy. The accession of Stephen IX, a brother of Godfrey of Lorraine and formerly a monk in Verdun, to the papal throne in 1057 was contrived by Hildebrand, the cardinal-abbot of Monte Cassino, and Godfrey himself. Its effect was definitely to sever the Holy See from imperial control. The imperial authority was not even consulted.¹

This action was followed by the creation of the College of Cardinals in 1059 by Nicholas II, which permanently excluded German influence in papal elections. In spite of the guarded phraseology of this decree, it was a declaration of war upon the imperial authority.² In the same year Cardinal Humbert issued the famous tract *Contra simoniacos*.³ At once a storm of indignation arose in Germany. Anselm of Lucca, Hildebrand's agent with him in effecting the papal alliance with the Pataria, was refused a hearing at a German synod in December, 1059, where Hildebrand and Nicholas II were both excommunicated by the irate German bishops.⁴ In the next spring the Lorrainer cardinal Stephen was refused audience by the imperial court, and after waiting five days returned to Rome.⁵ In 1061 the German bishops condemned the Lateran decree, erased the name of Nicholas II from the list of popes, and declared his decisions null and void.⁶

¹ Hauck, III, 680; Lamprecht, II, 319.

² "Salvo debito honore et reverentia dilecti filii nostri Henrici, qui in praesentia rex habetur et futurus imperator, Deo concedente, speratur."—Labbé, *Concil.*, XII, 50; Hauck, III, 683 f. Nicholas II was archbishop of Florence, but French-Burgundian by birth. It is to be remembered that Florence was in the center of the Tuscan territory of Godfrey of Lorraine.

³ Halfmann, *Cardinal Humbert, sein Leben und seine Werke*, Göttingen, 1883.

⁴ Hefele, VI, 404.

⁵ Petr. Dam., *Disc. synod.*, 88; Scheffer-Boichorst, *Mitteil. des Institut.*, XIII, 125.

⁶ Deusdedit, *Contra Invasor.* ii; *Libelli de lite*, II, 309; Meyer von Knonau, I, 285.

From such tension to open rupture between the German church and Rome was a matter of a short time. The Lombard bishops, who both detested and feared the growing influence of the Pataria, especially since its union with Rome, vainly urged the empress to appoint Cadalus, bishop of Parma, a well-known opponent of the "new Clunyism," to the papal office.¹ Hildebrand countered with his friend Anselm of Lucca, who was elected by the cardinals as Alexander II,² and in order to thwart the possibility of imperial intervention summoned the Norman chief Richard of Aversa to Rome, with whom he had had an interview some years before at Melfi, under the shadow of whose soldiery Alexander II was elected.³

The German party was more alarmed than ever. In October, 1061, the German and Lombard bishops (most of whom, it should be remembered, were either German or German sympathizers) met at Basel, proclaimed young Henry IV "patrician" of the Romans, and, in order to rebuke the Hildebrandine party, elected Cadalus of Parma, a bitter enemy of Hildebrand, to be pope under the name of Honorius II.⁴ For the next ten years a war of the partisans racked Northern Italy. The empire was powerless to interfere, and most of the German bishops were too busy grinding their own axes at home to give attention to things beyond the Alps.⁵ Hildebrand was not yet quite ready to carry the war overtly into the German kingdom, but was soon to do so.

In the meantime Germany was sown and watered with the "new Clunyism." No attentive student of the history of the war of investiture can fail to be impressed with the conjuncture of circumstances in the middle of the eleventh century. The years between 1056, when Henry III died and the minority succession of Henry IV ensued, and 1075, when Hildebrand, as Pope Gregory VII, opened the great struggle, saw the development of

¹ Petr. Dam., *Epp.* I, 20, p. 242; Leo Ostiens, *Chron. Cass.*, III, 19; Benzo, VII, 2, p. 672.

² Meyer von Knonau, I, 669 f.

³ Hauck, III, 704; Leo Ostiens, *Chron. Cass.*, III, 19; Benzo, *ibid.*

⁴ Hauck, III, 705-6.

⁵ For the unimportant details of this schismatic conflict see Hauck, III, 717 f.; Giesebrecht, III, 80 f.

conditions which profoundly affected the history of both empire and papacy.

The rapid growth of the order of Cluny in Germany during the minority of Henry IV is not merely interesting; it was ominous for the future.¹ In this process the regent-mother Agnes was an unwitting tool in the hands of Anno, the crafty archbishop of Cologne. Already a patroness of the Italian Cluniac foundation at Fructuaria, in 1060 she colonized a group of Italian Cluniacs from Fontello in the old monastery of St. Blasien in the Schwarzwald.² In 1066 Anno colonized Sigeberg and St. Pantaleon near Cologne with Piedmontese monks, and in 1071 expelled the Benedictines from Saalfeld and Grafschaft and filled their places with Lorrainer and Burgundian monks.³ By 1075 the influx of French and Italian monks into Germany seemed like an invasion. Lambert of Hersfeld gives a glowing account of this migration of "transalpinos monachos" from Cluny, from Gorze, from Fructuaria, and rejoices in the discomfiture and exile of the Benedictines, who fled the cloisters, often taking the treasure and vessels of the monasteries as spoil with them.⁴

The shining product of this revolution—for it amounted to that—was the monastery of Hirschau in the Black Forest. Founded in the ninth century by Louis the Pious, it had long fallen into decay. About the year 1066 it was colonized by a band of monks from Einsiedeln, one of the earliest offshoots of Gorze.⁵ The Black

¹ Upon this significant sympathy of the German feudality for the Cluny reform see Hauck, III, 490 f.; Gerdes, II, 369-70 and notes, 519 f.; Chron. Hirsau., 1099; Lambert of Hersfeld, anno 1071.

² Meyer von Knonau, I, 280.

³ *Vita Annonis*, cc. 16-17, 23; Lambert of Hersfeld (anno 1071), 132; (anno 1075), 244-45.

⁴ Lambert (anno 1071), 133; cf. (anno 1075) 244-45. A monk of Gorze found St. Michael's in Bamberg empty when he arrived (Berthold, *Annal.* [1071], *MGH*, SS. V, 184). The old-line Benedictine abbeys, especially those which were "royal," violently resisted the incomers, satirizing their "unascetic" costume (*MGH*, SS. XXI, 432, vss. 84 ff.; *Casus S. Galli contin.* 31, p. 82; Chron. *Lauresham*, SS. XXI, 421; Hauck, III, 869); inveighing against their hypocrisy and stigmatizing them as tares and thorns among wheat (*Vita Oudalr.*, 24, *MGH*, SS. XII, 259).

⁵ Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, CL, 927.

Forest soon became a veritable drill-ground of Clunyism. Around Hirschau were St. Blasien, Grüningen, Ruggisberg, Peterlingen, etc.¹ A new codification of the Rule of Cluny was drawn up by Udalric,² the prior of Hirschau.

Within an amazingly brief time branch houses of Hirschau multiplied in Germany, especially in the south. By 1080 St. Blasien and Schaffhausen were united with Hirschau. In Franconia it absorbed Hasungen, Komburg, Schönrein. In Swabia it acquired St. Savior in Schaffhausen, St. George, St. Gregory, Zwiefalten, Petershausen, Weilheim, Blaubeuren, and Sindelfingen. In Bavaria, Kremsmünster, St. Paul, Admont, St. Margaret in Zell. In Thuringia, Reinhardsbrunn and St. Peter in Erfurt. In addition to all these Hirschau either founded or absorbed more outlying or detached monasteries, as Altdorf, Kloster Bergen near Magdeburg, Hugs-hofen, St. Michael's in Bamberg, Paulinzelle, Prüfening, Breitenau, Bosau, Langenau, Elchingen, Amorbach, Mettlach, Schwarzach on the Rhine and another of the same name on the Main, Theres, Wessobrun, Meherau in Bregenz, Lorsch, Bleidenstadt, Hornbach, Deggingen, Beinwil, Odenheim, Mölk, Scheuern, St. Emmeran, Prühl, Biburg, Mallersdorf, Reichenbach, Michelfeld, Ennsdorf, Weinhenstefan, Weltenburg, Münchenmünster, Kastel, Benediktbeuren, Seon, Corvei, Pegau, St. Jacob in Regensburg,

¹ Hauck, III, 865-76; Lamprecht, II, 368-70. The Black Forest region of Germany was very strongly pro-papal in the war of investiture. "Die Richtung und Entwicklung der Kirche, welche mit Gregor VII zur Herrschaft kam, ging vornehmlich von Cluny aus, und einer ihrer stärksten Vorposten, in engster Verbindung mit Cluny, waren die Klöster des Schwarzwaldes. Hier verkehrten die Legaten und Gegenkönige, hier feierten sie ihre Feste, hier suchten sie und ihre Anhänger Zuflucht in Zeiten der Noth. Die Mönche von Ebersheimmünster im Elsass haben Rudolf von Reinfelden sogar seine Krone geschmiedet. Es war nicht wie bei den Sachsen eine zufällige Uebereinstimmung in der Opposition gegen das Reich, welche diese Mönche mit Gregor zusammenführte, sondern der reine dogmatische Eifer."—Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsq.* (5th ed.), II, 44.

² Lambert (anno 1071), 133; *Vita Udalr.*, II, c. 34; Berthold, *Annal.* (1077). It was Bernhard, abbot of St. Victor in Marseilles and the legate of Gregory VII, who suggested to William of Hirschau the adoption of the Cluniac rule (Wattenbach, II, 45). For the text see Migne, CXLIX, cols. 635 f.; and for the history thereof, CL, 929. For the discipline of these Consuetudines Cluniacenses see *Const. Hirs.*, II, 21, col. 1067; II, 9, col. 1048.

etc.¹ At the same time Cluny proper founded or reformed Ilsenburg, Hillersleben, Harsefeld, Huysburg in North Germany, while St. Blasien in the south did the same with Muri, Kempten, St. Ulrich, Wiblingen, Ochsenhausen, Alpirsbach.²

The great German nobles were little less active. Welf of Bavaria, since 1070 duke there, and a bitter anti-imperialist, founded Weingarten; Berthold of Zähringen founded St. Peter in the Schwarzwald.³ Two Swabian counts united in founding Wiblingen on the Iller. Count Udalric of Bregenz founded Ochsenhausen. The bishops Adalberon of Würzburg, Gerard of Salzberg, Altmann of Passau, severally founded one or the other of the following: Lambach, Admont, Reichersberg, Göttweih, St. George, St. Polten, St. Florian, St. Paul, St. Lambert. In Saxony, Burchard of Halberstadt, Herrand, abbot of Ilsenburg, Gilbert, abbot of Rheinhardsbunn, sowed the north and east with Hirschauer or Cluniac houses, as Ilsenburg, Hillersleben, Harsefeld, Huysburg, Pegau, Kloster Bergen, Hammersleben, Reinsdorf, Paulinzelle, Oldisleben, Hadmersleben, Vizenburg, Drübeck, Notterlingsburg, Kalterbrunn.⁴ Whole villages got the contagion of the new

¹ Hauck, III, 870; Mayr, *Die Hirsauer Congregation*, Mitteil. des Inst., I (1880) 126 f.; Helmersdörfer, *Forsch. z. Gesch. des Abtes Wilhelm der Heilige*, 118. According to *Annal. Hirs.*, prolog and pp. 225-27, 266-68, 294, the total number of Hirschauer foundations was 97. The bibliography of the Hirschauer movement is extensive. Stüssmann, *Forschungen zur Gesch. des Klosters Hirsau, 1065 bis 1105* (Halle diss., 1903); Messing, *Papst Gregors VII Verhältniss, zu den Klöstern*, (Greifswald diss., 1907); Ernest Hauviller, *Ulrich von Cluny* (Kirchengesch. Studien, Band III, Heft 3) (Münster, 1896); Haffner, *Regesten zur Gesch. des schwäbischen Klosters Hirsau* (Studien und Mitteil. aus dem Benediktiner- und Cisterzienserorden, Band XIII); Cless, *Versuch einer kirchl.-polit. Landes- und Kulturgesch. von Württemberg*, II, Teil I, Abt., pp. 237 f. (Gmünd, 1807); Kerker, *Wilhelm der Selige* (Tübingen, 1863); Richter, *Annalen*, III, 2, pp. 86-87, 269-72, 347, 411-12; Godeke, *Die Hirschauer während des Investiturstreites* (1883); Egger, *Gesch. der Cluniazenser-Klöster in Frankreich und in der West-Schweiz bis zum Auftreten der Cisterzienser* (Freiburger Hist. Studien, Heft III), (Freiburg [Switzerland], 1907); Karl Schott, *Kloster Reichenbach im Murgtal in seinen Beziehungen zu Hirsau und den Markgrafen von Baden* (Freiburg i. B., 1912); Schreiber, *Kurie und Kloster im 12. Jahrhundert* (2 vols.), (Stuttgart, 1910); Gieseke, *Die Ausbreitung d. Hirsauer Reforms*; C. H. Baer, *Die Hirschauer Bauschule* (1895).

² Hauck, III, 869-71.

⁴ Hauck, III, 871-72.

³ Bernoldi, *Chron.* (1093), SS. V, 456-57.

monasticism, which was fired by fanatic, wandering preachers, and resolved "to have all things in common" like the apostles.¹ Wealth and numbers poured in upon the monasteries so fast that the Cluniac rule against lay brothers was broken down.² Gregory VII saw in this popular growth of Hirschau the possibility of establishing a German Pataria.³ The monasteries in these years grew like Jonah's gourd vine. When Otto I died in 1073 there were 108 monasteries in Germany; when the war of investiture began there were over 700.⁴

By the time the struggle between Henry IV and Gregory VII opened all West and Southwest Germany and large areas in the center and north had been colonized by Cluny or Hirschau, the German form of the Cluniac movement. More ominous still for the monarchy was the intimate alliance between Cluny-Hirschau and the powerful lay feudality. Its support is not to be attributed to disinterested or religious motives. Just as earlier the great dukes had espoused the Gorzean reform in the hope of finding in it a means to injure the crown's power over them by using the German church against them, so in the eleventh century the German feudality advocated reform for self-advantage. Lorraine, Bavaria, and Swabia were notorious storm centers of opposition to the Saxon kings.⁵

¹ Bernold, *Chron.* (1091); *De unitate ecclesiae conservanda*, II, 38; Gerdes, II, 272; Kerker, 156 f.; Richter, III, 2, pp. 412-13, notes.

² Bernold, *Chron.* (1093); Hauck, III, 875, n. 3; Gerdes, II, 530; Helmsdörfer, 90 f.; Kerker, 135 f. They are first mentioned by Lambert of Hersfeld in 1076 (ed. Holder-Egger), p. 277. The lay brothers were used in gardening and working on the grange (*grangiae*) farms and were called *conversi laici*, or, more familiarly, *fratres barbati* or *Börlinger*, i.e., bearded. Although not unlike Cluny, the Hirschauer monasteries were not so compactly associated together as the Cluniac (*Chron. Zwifalt.*, 16, SS, X, 82). Many of the older monasteries, as a popular move, during the war of investiture, in imitation of Hirschau, enrolled lay brothers in their midst (Wattenbach [5th ed.], II, 88). "Die Mönche der älteren Art kamen durch diese neuen Regeln, welche rasch verbreiteten, mehr und mehr im Missachtung beim Volke und bei den Grossen und sahen sich dadurch manchen Gefahren ausgesetzt."—Wattenbach, II, 89.

³ Berthold, *Contin.* (1079), 317; Richter, II, 2, p. 293; Feierabend, 25, note.

⁴ Hauck, IV, 49, n. 10; Koeniger, 101, n. 3.

⁵ Lamprecht, II, 135 f., 151 f., 163 f., 249 f.

By the third quarter of the eleventh century the controlling influences in the church, namely the Cluniac party and Gregory VII (1073-85), were more interested in church supremacy than in church reform; more interested in enlarging the political power and material wealth of the church than in furthering its spiritual ministry. Of course the real remedy for church corruption and the solution of the friction between the state and the church was for the latter to have renounced its vast material wealth and temporal powers, much of which was not necessary to it as a religious institution. But this the church was unwilling to do. Its love of wealth and its love of power were too great.¹ Its policy, with the accession of Hildebrand to the papacy, was one of uncompromising supremacy of church over state. It laid the ax at the root of the emperor's power by attacking the state's right of proprietary control over the church through the prohibition of lay investiture.

"Reform" was a means to an end, not an end in itself. It was a convenient watchword, like so many political shibboleths, embodying self-interest in an outward guise of virtue and ethicality which fooled the emotionally religious and the unthinking masses of mankind, but which never deceived the initiated and those who had the penetration to see that though the hand might be the hand of Esau, the voice was the voice of Jacob. The English historian, William of Malmesbury, who lived in the reigns of Henry IV and Henry V, clearly perceived the justice of the emperor's position and the hypocrisy of the church. He writes:

This was the period in which Germany for fifty years bewailed the pitiable and almost fatal government of Henry [IV]. . . . He was neither unlearned nor indolent; but so singled out by fate for every person to attack, that whoever took up arms against him pretended, to himself, to be acting

¹ Professor Adolph Harnack, in the Congress of Arts and Sciences at the Universal Exposition in St. Louis in 1904, in an address upon "Ecclesiastical and General History," used these words: "The whole history of the church in the Middle Ages . . . must be studied from the economic point of view. This is very evident even in the history of monasticism. . . . Light may also be shed on the development of the papacy from the same source, for one of the conditions of its becoming a sovereign power was the possession of landed property. In the struggle about the investiture of the bishops the questions at issue were concerned just as much with property as with dominion" (*Proceedings*, II, 633 [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1906]).

for the good of religion. . . . There were many things praiseworthy in the emperor: he was eloquent, of great abilities, well-read, actively charitable; he had many good qualities both of mind and person, etc.¹

The war of investiture was a maze of cross- and countercurrents. While the struggles between emperor and pope and between the German crown and the rebellious Saxons were the two main streams, the strife between the bishops and the abbots was no unimportant chapter. The feud between the "regulars" and the "seculars," as we have seen, was an old one. The monasteries for centuries had chafed under the superior jurisdiction of the bishops, and the papacy had developed a lucrative trade in selling them exemptions from episcopal authority. The German kings too had always sustained the bishops against the monks. Naturally most of the monasteries, except conservative ones like St. Gall and Lorsch, supported the Cluny reform as a means of emancipation from both the episcopate and the crown.²

While Henry III had lived he had attempted to hold the balance even between the rival groups of clergy. But when his strong hand was removed the weak regency of the empress-mother was unable to cope with the situation. The bishops as well as the lay feudality at once began a wholesale policy of spoliation of the monastery lands. When Agnes was removed from the regency and the rivalry of Anno of Cologne and Adalbert of Bremen ensued for control of the boy king Henry IV, the condition of things grew more aggravated than ever. For both were fierce and ambitious bishops who hesitated at nothing to attain their ends, whether by fraud or violence.³

The years of the minority of Henry IV were favorable days for the bishops. Between 1057 and 1065 we have the record of 20 grants of land made to them, and only 5 for the ensuing seven years (1066-73), when the king had attained his majority. For immediately upon the decease of Henry III the bishops waxed bold in their demands of the crown. The bishop of Brixen bullied the

¹ *Gesta regum Anglorum*, III, 288.

² Hersfeld, Fulda, Corvei, and Ottobeuren were notorious seceders (Feierabend, 27). On the whole see Sackur, II, 270-99.

³ Hauck, III, 728 f; Voigt, 40. f.

empress-mother into giving him the monastery of Dessentis and seized Kloster Polling; the bishop of Speier got Conrad II's foundation of Limburg, St. Lambert's, and the abbey of Schwarzach; the bishop of Freising obtained Benediktbeuren; the bishop of Halberstadt received the monastery of Drusbeck in the Harz as settlement for claims against the royal estates in his diocese; the bishop of Constance seized Reichenau; the bishop of Bamberg, Kloster Kitzingen. A typical case is the spoliation of the lands of St. Michael's in Bamberg by Ulrich, a *ministerialis* of the archbishop of Mainz. The years 1062-65 were even worse for the monasteries. The archbishop of Salzberg seized Chiemsee in 1062; the archbishop of Mainz acquired Seligenstadt in 1063; Adalbert of Bremen tried to seize Malmedy and Cornelimünster.¹

During the time of Henry IV's minority it seemed as if the suppression of the monasteries by the bishops and the German princes would be accomplished. By 1065 fourteen of the greatest and richest abbeys had been appropriated by the bishops and the Fürsten.² Otto of Nordheim, the new duke of Bavaria, devoured Nieder Altaich; Rudolf of Swabia laid his hand on Kloster Kempten. As Gerdes says, "Fast jeder grosse und kleine Fürst geistlichen und weltlichen Standes erhielt ein Stück aus der Beute."³

Sometimes, however, the rivalry between two jealous bishops for possession of the same foundation resulted in a deadlock. The distribution of the prizes might be made on paper but was impossible in practice.⁴ For example, Anno of Cologne and Adalbert of Bremen were both contestants for possession of Corvei and Lorsch, and neither got them.⁵ Anno was thwarted in his contemplated seizure of Stablo by the abbot of Malmedy, aided by his vassals.⁶ The monastic chroniclers of these early years of Henry IV, especially Lambert of Hersfeld, give a vivid picture of the spoliation

¹ Adam of Bremen, III, 45.

² *De unitate eccles. conserv.*, c. 33; *Libelli de lite*, II, 258 f.; Waitz, VII, 211-13; Voigt, 38-43.

³ Gerdes, II, 158.

⁴ Voigt, 40.

⁵ Hauck, III, 729; Voigt, 55; Adam of Bremen, III, 45.

⁶ Voigt, 46; Lambert, anno 1071.

of the monasteries at the hands both of the German episcopate and the lay feudality.¹

The feud between the bishops and the great nobles to enlarge their lands was quite as bitter as that between the bishops and the monasteries. The history of the archbishopric of Bremen is perhaps the best example of this struggle. This see, in early Saxon days, was very poor. Its enrichment began with the accession of Archbishop Unwin (1013-30), of the wealthy Immedinger family, who gave a substantial portion of his family inheritance to Bremen.² Under the careful administration of the archbishops Liawizo (1030-32) and Hermann (1032-35) the riches of Bremen increased.³ But the greatness of Bremen really began with the famous archbishop Adalbert (1043-71).

Adalbert was the son of a Saxon noble, Count Frederick of Goseck. If he had been permitted to grow up as a feudal lord instead of a bishop the history of Saxony might have been very different from what it was. While yet provost in Halberstadt, Adalbert's ability, striking personality, and no less striking physical bearing made him a marked man. Henry III made him archbishop of Bremen. The ambition of the Billunger dukes of Saxony was at this time giving serious anxiety to the emperor, and Henry wanted a strong man to hold it in check. In 1046 Adalbert accompanied the emperor to Italy, and when Gregory VI died he was offered the papacy, but waived the honor in favor of his old colleague of Halberstadt days, Bishop Suidger of Bamberg, who became Pope Clement II.

Bremen historically was the ecclesiastical center from which the conversion of the North had radiated. Its episcopal overlordship extended over Denmark, Scandinavia, the Northern Islands, Iceland, and the newly conquered Slavonic lands; Adalbert dreamed of erecting his see into a huge patriarchate of Northern Europe; almost, one might say, to make himself pope of all Baltic and North Atlantic Christendom. The resistance of the Danish kings, of Harold Hardraade of Norway, and of Hildebrand, then

¹ Lambert of Hersfeld, annis 1060, 1064, 1066, 1070, 1071, 1072, 1074, 1075, etc.

² Adam of Bremen, II, 40, and schol. 46.

³ *Ibid.*, II, 44, 65; Thietmar, *Chron.*, VI, 53.

the power behind the papal throne, who naturally could not tolerate such a separatist ecclesiastical project, ruined Adalbert's scheme.

Adalbert's early years in Bremen were his happiest and best. He admirably organized the diocesan administration and began work on the great cathedral. Bremen was walled and fortified. His court became one of the most brilliant in Europe, a refulgence possibly influenced by the commercial importance of the city. Italians, Greeks, Mohammedans, Spaniards, French, English, Norse; musicians, actors, literati, physicians, artists, were hospitably received within its gates.

But the most substantial opposition came from the dukes of Saxony. The upgrowth of such a powerful episcopate within their immediate lands, and one intimately identified with Franconian power, was most unwelcome to them. The Billunger feared, with good reason, that Henry III had planned to abolish the dukedom and vest its authority in Adalbert.¹ The assignment of the county of Frisia to him, when Duke Gottfried of Lorraine died, readily made the duke of Saxony so believe. Be this as it may, the enrichment of Bremen was a rapid one.² Adalbert tried to purchase the duke's good-will by alienation of numerous estates of the church of Bremen. The old duke Bernward seems to have been not unwilling to compound with Adalbert, but nothing could pacify his sons, Bernhard, Ordulf, and Hermann.³ The episcopal estates in Frisia were lost to Adalbert owing to a raid which the duke and his two sons made in 1059, and seven hundred pounds of silver were collected by them.⁴ Henry III had too many irons in the fire to be able to help the archbishop to any great degree, and all that Adalbert seems to have acquired during his reign were the forest lands in Loragau and Stiergau, with the donation of two royal *villae*, Bolga and Fivelgoe.

¹ Blumenthal, *Adalbert of Bremen*, 18.

² Adam of Bremen, III, 8, p. 41.

³ *Ibid.*, III, 9; Steindorff, II, 41.

⁴ Adam of Bremen, III, 41-43. The abbey of Luellberg was also destroyed about the same time (*ibid.*, III, 35). Ordulf blinded some of the serfs on the episcopal lands. Henry III sent money to aid in rebuilding.

What could not be accomplished in the lifetime of Henry III was done in the earlier years of the reign of his son, when the weakness of the crown gave opportunities for seizures. Thus soon after the death of Henry III the Frisian gau on the left bank of the river Ems¹ were given to Adalbert, and in 1063 the promised estate Lesum² of approximately seven hundred *hubae*, with the rights of coinage and toll, and much land about the city of Bremen, were ceded. In the same year the countships Emsgau and Stade came into his possession, not as gifts, however, for the king demanded one hundred pounds of silver as the purchase price for Emsgau.³ A short time afterward three more estates were transferred to his possession, as well as the privilege of hunting in four royal forests.⁴ In 1065 the king awarded to Adalbert the countships of the counts Bernhard and Werl, and the margraviate of Udo, with the fiefs, immunities, market, and toll privileges pertaining thereto. But as the king was in need of money at this time, the archbishop paid a thousand pounds of silver for the acquisitions.⁵ The abbeys of Lorsch and Corvei, however, never came into Adalbert's possession, although transferred to him by the king.⁶

During the absence of Adalbert at the king's court the Billunger played havoc with the lands and serf population of the Bremen diocese. In the end he was forced to buy off his enemies by alienating a thousand manors to Magnus Billung and nearly as much more in fief to Magnus' friend, Count Udo of the Nordmark, before he dared return to Bremen from his ancestral estates near

¹ Stumpf, No. 2540; cf. Adam of Bremen, III, 8, 45.

² Stumpf, No. 2622; cf. Steindorff, II, 16; Adam of Bremen, III, 8. Lesum was an old North German county which had once belonged to the Billunger, and had been "revindicated" by Conrad II. Hermann Billung at this time hoped to have it restored to him. Naturally the Billunger were incensed to see a territory to which they believed they had rightful claim pass into the hands of their worst enemy.

³ Stumpf, Nos. 2630, 2632; Adam of Bremen, III, 35; Meyer von Knonau, I, 357.

⁴ Stumpf, Nos. 2633, 2634, 2638.

⁵ Adam of Bremen, III, 45.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 27 and 44.

Goslar, whither he had fled. He died in 1071, four years before the death of his implacable rival, Anno of Cologne.¹

The rapacity of the German church, besides being manifested in the bitter feud between "regulars" and "seculars," in the strife between clergy and feudality, and in the exhaustion of the conquered border peoples by clerical taxation, is also reflected in the famous "Tithe War" of the early years of Henry IV. Since its institution by Charlemagne² the tithe had always been a lucrative source of income to the church. Under the Saxon kings the church had labored hard to subject all land, lay and clerical alike, to its imposition. While such a blanket right was not acquired, nevertheless the church got a substantial reward. Otto I gave the bishop of Osnabrück permission to levy the tithe on all lands within his diocese.³ Otto II permitted Corvei to collect it in Ammergau.⁴ These rulers were complacent in allowing the tithe to be imposed upon the royal domain. Naturally there was contention between bishops and abbots for the right, all the more so because the bishops tried, in turn, to impose the tithe upon the monastery lands.

The "Tithe War" was a feud between the archbishop of Mainz and the abbots of Fulda and Hersfeld, in which Thuringia was the bone of contention. Ecclesiastically the country was subject to Mainz, but part of the region paid tithe to the monasteries. The rest was exempt. The origin of this partial exemption is not known. Shortly before the death of Henry III, Liutpold of Mainz attempted for the first time to levy the tithe upon all Thuringia. The Thuringians resisted, pleading ancient customary law, no writ of exemption being in evidence. Liutpold claimed that Henry III had

¹ Meyer von Knonau, I, 513-22; Gerdes, II, 162-63. See my article on "The German Church and the Conversion of Baltic Slavs," *Amer. Jour. Theol.*, XX (1916), 372-89. The moral difference between Adalbert and Anno is to be observed. Anno of Cologne strove for personal aggrandizement; Adalbert of Bremen for the aggrandizement of the church of Bremen (Wattenbach, II, 71).

² *Capit. Herist.*, 779; Leges, I, 50. For its development see Violett, I, 376-77.

³ Waitz, VIII, 347, n. 2. Pages 347-72 contain a long account of the history of the tithe in Franconian Germany. In the reign of Henry IV, Benno of Osnabrück forged new documents for the extension of the tithe over Corvei and Herford (Wattenbach, II, 28-29). For its history in the twelfth century see Schreiber, *Kurie und Kloster im 12 Jahrhundert* (2 vols.), (Stuttgart, 1910), Part 3, pp. 246-94.

⁴ Waitz, VIII, 355. The same privilege was given to Memleben.

recognized the legality of his demand and included even the royal estates in Thuringia under the imposition. It was a barefaced piece of effrontery. The weak empress-mother Agnes compounded with the archbishop and alienated 120 manors of the fisc as the price of quittance.¹ But Fulda and Hersfeld repudiated the archbishop's claim. While the struggle still endured Liutpold endeavored to extend the tithe over the lands of the Thuringian nobles too. The triangular conflict dragged along for years without settlement and finally became one of the eddies in the war of investiture.²

Meantime in 1070 Henry IV had got the reins of government into his own hands. The change, so far as the German church is concerned, is reflected in two ways: first, in the diminution of grants of land to the bishops; second, in recovery of the "lost" royal abbeys by the crown. Henry IV clearly perceived the importance of the monastery lands to the fisc and attempted to regain possession of those which had been seized by the episcopal cabal during his minority.³ By strong pressure all but four of these were recovered, not, however, without their having suffered considerable reduction, owing to the rapacity of the bishops during their short possession of them,⁴ and naturally while in the

¹ *Ibid.*, VIII, 347; Stumpf, No. 2569; Lambert of Hersfeld, annis 1062, 1067, 1069, 1073, 1074, etc. The synod of Quedlinburg (1085) forbade lay collection of the tithe except in cases where the right had been "legally" granted.

² For the history of this Tithe War see Giesebrecht, III, 1116 f.; Hauck, III, 730 f.; Voigt, 56 f.; and especially Wolf, *Eichsfeldische Kirchengesch.* (1816), 60 f.; Dronke, *Codex diplom. Fuld.*, 370 f. Koeniger (55-56) has a good brief account of the tithe in the Saxon epoch. There is no proof that Henry IV promised the archbishop of Mainz the collection of the Thuringian tithe if he would divorce him from the queen Bertha (Giesebrecht, III, 1116). The pretensions of Mainz emboldened the archbishop of Salzburg to attempt the same measure in Bavaria, and he proceeded with such energy that most of the monasteries and nobles either paid or compounded. The sources abound with examples of feud between bishops and abbots, between bishops and abbots, between abbots and abbots over the tithe, e.g., *Vita Bernwardi*, cc. 13-15; *Vita Deoderici*, c. 16; *Vita Adalb.*, c. 9.

³ *De unitate eccles. conserv.*, c. 33; *Libelli de lite*, II, 258 f.; Voigt, 38-43.

⁴ "Bald ein Theil der Einkünfte verschenkt, bald der Besitz selbst in fremde Hände gegeben" (Gerdes, II, 178); Voigt, 51. During Henry IV's minority the bishops had annexed eleven countships. In all by 1073 the German episcopate is estimated to have held possession and collected the revenues from 53 countships.

hands of such "politicals" the monasteries had received few benefactions.¹

Such as we have described it, is the complex background of the war by investiture upon the verge of which we now are. It was a series of wheels within wheels, of struggle within struggle, at the bottom of every one of which, in last analysis, the church's lands and the church's resources were the subject of feud. One other factor yet remains to be mentioned, although this is not the place to enter into consideration of the causes of the great revolt of the Saxons under Henry IV.² It was inspired by a blend of tribal jealousy, political and economic grievance, and social unrest. It was in no sense due to any religious or ecclesiastical issue, even remotely. But so decisive was the influence of the Saxon rebellion that it has been said with good reason that a compromise between state and church might have been possible "in an atmosphere undisturbed by the Saxon war," but that this "was from the first rendered abortive by the obstinate determination of the Saxon race."³ Rebellious Saxony and the papacy had a common enemy in Henry IV, and Gregory VII was acute enough to perceive the value of Saxon support. The coincidence between the rebellion of the Saxons and the prohibition by Gregory VII of lay investiture was not accidental. The pope's action was deliberately timed.⁴

The rebellious Saxon nobles favored the Gregorian cause solely out of self-interest, and in spite of his detestation of the Germans the pope welcomed their alliance.⁵ No thinking person of the time was duped by the Saxon professions of religious devotion. Their special and local motives were clearly perceived.⁶ Real Gregorianism

¹ Even Adalbert of Bremen, whom Henry IV trusted much, could not persuade the king to be generous with him. Henry saw the necessity of hanging on to all the resources of the crown. When Magnus Billung surrendered after the revolt of Saxony, Henry, however, restored to Bremen the lands which the duke had seized. Adam of Bremen asserts that the estates of Plisna, Duspure, Gronningen, and Sigoriem were restored, but no record has survived by which we may control this statement.

² See Lamprecht, II, 324-35; Eckerlein, *Die Ursachen des Sachsenaufstandes, gegen Heinrich IV* (1883); Ullmann, *Zum Verständnis der sächsischen Erhebung* (Aufsätze für Waitz, 1886); Hahn, *Gründe des Sachsenkrieges* (1885); Tieffenbach, *Die Streiffrage zwischen Heinrich IV und die den Sachsen* (1886). For additional bibliography see Gerdes, II, 179, note.

³ Fisher, I, 133.

⁴ Gerdes, II, 176-77.

⁵ Meyer von Knonau, I, 140.

⁶ Guill. *Malsb. Gesta regum Anglorum*, III, 288; Bruno, *De bello Saxonico*, cc. 108, 116; *De unitate eccles. conserv.*, II, 16.

probably had less actual sway in Saxony than anywhere else in Germany. The Saxon hierarchy was notoriously political and secular in spirit and practice,¹ and the lower clergy were almost totally illiterate.² When the war began, Rudolf of Swabia, whom the papal party put up as king on March 15, 1077, was compelled to purchase a following by promises of land not only from the royal fisc but out of the domains of the church.³ The first thing striven for by all parties, and the last thing surrendered, was the lands, whether belonging to one or another of the partisans, or to the fisc, or to the church. As early as 1078 Gregory VII was compelled to order that no more church property was to be enfeigned, and threatened to put everyone who sought to enrich himself by seizure of church land under the papal ban.⁴ Six months later the synod of Rome ordered every noble, every bishop, every abbot who had seized any church land to restore it whence it came.⁵ In 1085 the legate Leo of Ostia, at the synod of Quedlinburg, issued a blanket ban against all despoilers of church lands.⁶ Nevertheless for years the lands of the church were subjected to almost perpetual pillage. The sources abound with such references.⁷ As a result of the anarchy there was a great exodus of monks from Germany into France.⁸

¹ See my article on "The German Church and the Conversion of the Baltic Slavs," *Amer. Jour. Theol.*, XX (1916), 372-89.

² *Vita Bennonis*, SS. XII, 63.

³ Bertholdi, *Annal.* (1077); Bruno, cc. 99, 108; Hauck, III, 810; Gerdes, II, 268-70.

⁴ Hefele, V, 109.

⁵ *Ibid.*, V, 114.

⁶ *Ibid.*, V, 333.

⁷ *Gesta Trevorum*, cc. 4, 16, 22; *Gesta Alberonis*, cc. 12, 14; *Gesta episcop. Mettens. cont.*, I, c. 1; *Laurentii gesta episcop. Virdun.*, cc. 9, 10, 22, 25; *Vita Churnadi archiep.*, c. 7; *Ann. Augsburg.*, annis 1077, 1084, 1088, 1090; *Ann. Sax.*, anno 1077; Bruno, c. 112; *Vita Norberti*, c. 18; *Chron. episc. Merseburg.*, c. 13, SS. X, 187; *Chron. Gosecens.*, II, cc. 22-24, 29; *Casus S. Galli passim*; *Gesta abbat. S. Trudon.*, X, c. 12; *Ruperti chron. S. Laurent. Leod.*, cc. 45-46, 50; *Gesta abbat. S. Trudon.*; *Chron. S. Huberti-Andag.*, c. 89. For Corvei's losses, Martiny, *Grundbesitz Corveys*, 305; for Fulda's, Dronke, *Trad. Fuld.*, 153; Bunte, *Güterbesitz der Kloster Fulda* (Jahrbuch für Emden), Band X, Heft 1; Ekkehard, *Chron.*, annis 1098, 1125; Ortlieb, *Chron. Zwifallens.*, c. 5, SS. X, 75, 3; Cosmas of Prague, III, c. 20, SS. IX, 75, 3; *Chron. S. Petri Efford.*, anno 1105; Jaffé, V, 232, 517.

⁸ Gerdes, II, 272. Pro-Gregorian monks wore beards, pro-Henrician ones shaved the face clean (*Gesta Trev.*, c. 10, SS. VIII, 183).

The masterly stroke of Henry IV at Canossa in defeating Gregory's designs with reference to Germany,¹ and the utter failure of effect which his second ban had, gradually gave Henry IV the upper hand. By 1093 Germany and Italy were under imperial

¹ Every historical scholar today who is worthy of the name knows that Canossa was a victory for Henry IV, and not for Gregory VII. The prevalent popular and erroneous belief, which has been carefully cultivated and fostered by the Church of Rome and has even deceived most Protestant historians, as Milman and Michelet, for example, is based upon the account of the incident as described by Lambert of Hersfeld, supplemented by later legendary materials. Von Ranke was the first scholar who challenged the integrity of Lambert ("Zur Kritik fränkisch-deutscher Reichsannalisten," in *Abhand. d. Akad. d. Wiss. zu Berlin* [Phil.-hist. Cl., 1855], or Ranke's *Werke*, LI-LII, 125-49). This was followed in 1873 by Delbrück's crushing critical study, "Ueber die Glaubwürdigkeit Lamberts von Hersfeld," Döllinger, *Kirchengesch.*, II, 1, pp. 131 f., and Hefele, *Conciliengesch.*, V, 89 f., since which it has been impossible to attach any credence to Lambert. Although he seems to have had copies of Gregory's letters before him when he wrote, Lambert, by transposing the pope's words, garbled the meaning (cf. ed. Holder-Egger, p. 291, notes). Henry was *not* kept outside the courtyard of the chateau of Canossa, and merely "intra secundum murorum ambitum receptus," as Lambert says, while "foris derelicto omni comitatu suo." Both statements are false, for Henry and his company were admitted to the place before the gate of the inner castle, according to Gregory's own account, which is confirmed by Berthold (*Reg.*, IV, 12; Berthold, *Annal.*, 289). The "castellum triplici muro septum" is a description of Lambert's own fancy borrowed from Vergil vi. 549. Moreover, Henry did *not* stand *en chemise*, as Michelet says, *nor*, "while the fierce winds of the Apennines were sweeping the sleet upon him in their passage from Monte Pellegro to the plain, [he] knelt barefoot, clothed in sackcloth, fasting from dawn till eve, for three whole days," as Symonds (*Sketches in Italy*) has written, *nor* "clad only in the thin white linen dress of the penitent," as Milman has said. Henry naturally, since he was appearing as a penitent, put off his royal insignia and assumed the garb of a penitent. But all that Gregory (*Reg.*, IV, 12) says is that "deposito omne regio cultu, miserabiliter utpote discalciatus et laneis indutus," which shows that he was comfortably clad beneath his white dress. Again, Henry did *not* "a mane usque ad vesperam perstabat," i.e., stand "three days and three nights," or even "three days" outside the castle door. Gregory himself, Berthold, and Donizo all say only that "on the third day" Henry was admitted to the papal presence (Lambert of Hersfeld [ed. Holder-Egger], 292, notes.) The famous "hostia-scene," in which Gregory is alleged to have prayed that he might be stricken dead if guilty, when swallowing the holy wafer, and challenging Henry to the same ordeal, is a dramatization imitated by Lambert from *Regino* of Prüm's account (anno 869) of the interview between Pope Hadrian II and King Lothar II of Lorraine. The incidents and the language are nearly identical. Neither Gregory nor Bruno has any such account of the incident, and Berthold's and Donizo's versions are much less sensational (see Holder-Egger, 297, notes). Finally it must be remembered that an act like that of Henry IV at Canossa, dramatic as it seems to us, was not fraught with novelty for men in the Middle Ages. It was no new thing in mediaeval Europe, either before or after the

control once more.¹ With the death of William of Hirschau in 1091 the Cluniac movement in Germany collapsed.² A generation of rack and ruin began to bring surcease of combat through very exhaustion and, as so often happens in such cases, room was made for a compromise party to get a hearing. The strife had given birth to an enormous amount of polemical literature, out of the bewildering maze of whose passions and conflicting ideas a mediate thought gradually crystallized. An unknown monk of Hersfeld, who was the author of the tract entitled *De unitate ecclesiae conservanda*, and Wido of Ferrara, author of the *De scismate Hildebrandi*, were the chief imperialist pamphleteers and urged a double and simultaneous investiture by both church and state, the one for

time of Henry IV, for a king to do public penance and even to be flogged. Otto I, Otto III, Henry II, Henry III, all did such penance without forfeiting the loyalty of their subjects. The imposition of penance was a discipline of the church and was universal. It was not even a humiliation. Gregory had to absolve Henry, for the moral sentiment of Europe would have regarded it as a monstrous abuse of the authority of the church if he had refused to do so. Henry professed penitence; he had to be forgiven. By the absolution Gregory was balked from going into Germany to try the king at Augsburg, and although the pope claimed that the absolution did not restore Henry to the kingdom, it is a quibble to say the ban deprived him of the right to rule, but that the raising of it did not restore him to the kingship. The utter failure of the second ban shows the futility of the pope's efforts, for it helped Henry's cause instead of hurting it. The real victor at Canossa was Henry IV, not Gregory VII. He foiled all the plans of his enemies. As Nitzsch, II, 100, has said: "Dieser Akt einer furchtbaren, rücksichtslosen Energie gab den Vermittlern die Oberhand über das Misstrauen des Pöbels." Whether Henry himself devised this astonishing way out of the situation in which he found himself at the diet of Tribur, or whether it was suggested to him by someone else, is a matter of conjecture. Personally I am inclined to think that the suggestion came from Hugh of Cluny, always one of Henry's staunch supporters, who was with him when he was suspended from the kingship at Tribur (see *ante*, p. 418, n. 6; p. 419, n. 1). Lambert of Hersfeld ended his history at this point (1077), giving up in despair any hope of resolving the complex mass of material which he had collected, and using almost the identical valedictory words of Lampadius, in his *Vita Sulp. Severi*. After the exhibition of partisanship, falsification, and mendacity which he perpetrated under the guise of "history" it is small wonder that he did so.

¹ Lamprecht, II, 361. By 1078 only three bishops remained with Rudolf of Swabia (Bruno, c. 93).

² Feierabend, 28.

the bishop's office, the other for his lands, as a solution of the controversy.¹

Even more effective was the pacific current of French ecclesiastical thought at the same time, for in France the strife over lay investiture never reached the colossal dimensions it had within the empire, although the Gregorian claims had produced acute relations between the papacy and Philip I, the dukes of Normandy (who were at the same time, be it remembered, also kings of England), the counts of Anjou, and others of the great French feudality, and where, too, many of the hierarchy had resisted the papal pretensions.

In this atmosphere, less surcharged with enmity, a moderate and liberal group of the French clergy was formed, imbued with the ideas of Cardinal Damieni, who in the early days of the Cluny movement had attempted to distinguish between the purely ecclesiastical and the feudo-temporal nature of the bishop's office, and had advocated a compromise settlement of the issue which would give simultaneous and due expression to the claims of both church and state. Progressive without being radical, resolute without being violent, this third party of moderates gradually grew in influence until, with the exhaustion of both combatants, it at last began to find a hearing.²

This compromise form of settlement slowly increased the number of its adherents and formally triumphed in England in 1106 with the concordat made between Henry I and Anselm, by which election

¹ On this mass of controversial literature see Bernheim, *Zur Gesch. d. Worms. Konkordat*, 6-22; Hinschius, *Kirchenrecht*, II, 552 ff.; Kayser, *Placidus von Nonantula*; Wattenbach, II, 10; Mirbt., *Die Publizistik im Zeitalter Gregors VII* (1894); Gierke-Maitland, *Political Theories of the Middle Ages*, nn. 34, 38, 46; J. de Ghellinck, "Polémique durant la querelle des investitures," *Revue des Quest. Hist.*, 93, N.S., 71-89; Imbart de la Tour, *Questions d'Histoire, sociale et religieuse* (Paris, 1907), 225-66. These two last articles contain much additional bibliography. It is significant of the depth to which Rome had intellectually degenerated that during the whole eleventh century the Hildebrandine propaganda had no Roman representative. All the thinking was done by Lombard and Franco-Burgundian publicists (Wattenbach, II, 195).

² Consult Esmein, *La question des investitures dans les lettres d'Ive de Chartres* (1889); Fournier, "Yves de Chartres et le droit canonique" (*Compte rendu du quatrième congrès scientifique internat. des catholiques*, Fribourg en Suisse, 1898); Lavis, *Histoire de France*, II, 2, pp. 218-20; Gierke-Maitland, *op. cit.*, n. 38.

of bishops and abbots was to be in the hands of the chapters, but held at the king's court, the consecration to be in the hands of the archbishop and bishops, and the temporal estates to be conferred by the king. The English settlement had a powerful influence upon France and French thought.

But there were still rocks and shoals ahead, and years were to elapse before a settlement finally could be made. The idea of compromise was distasteful to both emperor and pope, and even when each began so to incline from sheer exhaustion, neither dared take the initiative for fear of letting his cards slip out of his hand.

Henry V began his reign aided by the papal party.¹ His election was at Mainz on December 25, 1105, while his father was yet alive. Henry IV was deserted by almost all in Germany except the burghers of the Rhine cities.² The new emperor—or rather counter-emperor—immediately sent an embassy to Rome,³ the chief members of which were Bruno, archbishop of Trier; Henry, archbishop of Magdeburg; Otto, bishop of Bamberg; Eberhard, bishop of Eichstädt; and Gebhard, bishop of Constance, the last an intimate friend of Pascal II. It is important also to notice that the historian Ekkehard of Aura was in the embassy, a circumstance which gives his narrative unusual weight.⁴

But the embassy sent by Henry V failed to reach Rome. It was intercepted by a young count named Adalbert, acting for Henry IV, according to Ekkehard, and all the members of it were captured except Gebhard of Constance, who finally got to Rome.⁵ Presumably Gebhard performed the mission of the entire embassy, for at the council of Guastalla no evidence of friction between Henry V and the papacy was evidenced.

This council convened in the last week of October, 1106. Ekkehard was present and records that Pascal II promised to come to Mainz at the next Christmas.⁶ A serious endeavor seems to have been made at Guastalla to adjust the grounds of feud

¹ Ekkehard, *Chronicon Universale*, Migne, CLIV (999).

² *Ibid.*

³ Gregorovius, *Rome in the Middle Ages*, IV, 2, p. 324.

⁴ Ekkehard, Migne, CLIV (1005).

⁵ *Ibid.* (1003).

⁶ *Ibid.* (1013, 1015).

between pope and emperor. A decree was issued ecclesiastically legitimizing those bishops and lesser clergy who had been ordained during the war of investiture.¹ No mention was made of that formidable word "investiture."

If the papal party had cherished the hope that the new ruler would be inclined to their interests it was soon disillusioned. A Guelf emperor was as impossible as a Ghibelline pope. Before the year 1106 was far along it was evident that the Franconian leopard had not changed his spots. Henry V invested the bishops in Germany with both ring and staff, against which the council of Troyes in the next year protested. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the pope did not come to Germany as he had promised.² Instead, he went to France and spent the whole winter of 1106-7 either at Cluny or at St. Denis.³ At Châlons-sur-Marne in May, 1107, Henry V's ambassadors made uncompromising demand for a settlement of the war of investiture.⁴ Deserted by the Countess Matilda, abandoned by the Normans in Italy, even indifferently regarded by Cluny save the "irreconcilables," with the Gregorian party everywhere in Germany and Italy broken and reduced,⁵ the pope was powerless. A synod at Troyes protested against the emperor's demands,⁶ and a cry of indignation went up from the Italian clergy.⁷ But their wrath was impotent, for no one moved a hand. For four years Pascal II

¹ *Chronica regia Coloniensis* (folio ed.), 45.

² Ekkehard (1015).

³ For his activities in France at this season see Suger, *Vita Lud. Grossi*, c. 9 (ed. Molinier, 1887); and *Cat. des actes de Louis VI*, Introd., cxxxiii-iv; Luchaire, *Inst. mon.* (ed. la France), I, 140; Mühlbacher, *Papstwahl*, 42; D'Arbois de Jubainville, *Hist. des comtes de Champagne*, II, 96-97.

⁴ They were Bruno, archbishop of Trier; Reginard, bishop of Halberstadt; and Burchard of Münster. Suger, who characterizes Bruno as "vir elegans et jocundus, eloquentie et sapientie copiosus," gives a vivid account of the meeting. Cf. B. Monod, "Étude sur les relations entre le St. Siège et la royaume de France de 1099 à 1108," *Bib. de l'école d. Chartes* (1904), 99 f.

⁵ *Annal. Hild.* (1104, 1105); Hauck, III, 885.

⁶ Suger, p. 28. The acts of the council are lost, but the evidence for its deliberations may be found in Mansi, *Concilia*, XX, cols. 1217-20. Cf. Hauck III, 894 f. The *Annal. Hild.*, 60, says that even Gebhard of Constance was censured.

⁷ *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, 48.

hesitated and temporized, while a torrent of invective and reproach was poured out in Europe.

Meanwhile, in 1110, after the diet at Regensburg was over, Henry V had entered Italy with his army.¹ Reluctantly the pope, late in 1110, when the emperor was at Sutri, made an overture, proposing a convention, by the terms of which the state was to resign the right of investiture in return for renunciation to the crown by the church of the fiefs and political rights acquired by the church since the reign of Charlemagne.²

Henry V accepted the terms on condition that they were ratified by the bishops and nobles of Germany. It is difficult to believe that either the emperor or the pope conceived for a

¹ Suger, *Vita Ludovici Crassi*, c. 9, says that Henry V had 30,000 men with him. Ekkehard (1019) gives an account of the diet of Regensburg.

² *Paschalis II Privilegium primae conventionis* (12 February, 1111), in Doeberl, *Monumenta Selecta*, III, No. XX A; also in *MGH*, LL. II, 68 f. The preamble, after reciting the evils which have penetrated the church by reason of its participation in feudal affairs concludes: "Tibi itaque fili karissime rex Heinricus, et nunc per officium nostrum Dei gratia Romanorum imperator, et regno regalia dimittenda precipimus, que ad regnum manifeste pertinebant, tempore Karoli, Lodoicy, et ceterorum predecessorum tuorum. [This spared the temporal power of the pope.] Interdicimus et sub anathematis distractionem, ne quis episcoporum seu abbatum, presentium vel futurorum, eadem regalia invadant. Id est, civitates, ducatus, marchias, comitatus, monetas, teloneum, mercatum, advocatias regni, jura centurionum, et curtes que manifeste regni erant, cum pertinentiis suis, militia et castra regni. . . . Porro, ecclesias cum oblationibus [i.e., pious gifts in the form of produce or money], et hereditariis possessionibus [i.e., gifts of land owned in fee simple, and not feudally], que ad regnum manifeste non pertinebant, liberas manere decernimus."

Not every landed possession of the church was a fief; for if it had been an allod at the time of donation, it so remained. Most of the donations made since the beginning of Saxon times were fiefs, however, so that the effect of the decree, if executed, would have been to reduce the church to the proportion of land which it had possessed in the time of Louis the Pious. This would have been far from cutting the church to the quick, for even so early the church's landed wealth was enormous (see the first number of this article, in the January issue, p. 87, n. 4). It seems to me that there is little doubt of the wisdom of requiring the church to evacuate its purely feudal lands. But it was going too far, in an age of *Naturalwirtschaft*, to expect the church to renounce, too, its endowments in the form of tolls, market rights, etc. These were the very sources of income which tended to emancipate it from the *Naturalwirtschaft* of the earlier mediaeval period, and which would enable the church to keep abreast of the economic changes of the time. The question was not a doctrinaire one, but one of enormous practical interest. The latest work on Pascal II is by Korbe, *Die Stellung Papst Urbans II und Pascals II zu den Klöstern* (Greifswald, 1910.)

moment that such a radical solution would be possible. Henry V must have been "bluffing"; as for Pascal II, perhaps he hoped that latent sympathy might be stirred in his behalf if he thus exposed the papacy's extremity. He could hardly have indulged the illusion that the German bishops would passively renounce their great worldly power. He knew them too well for that.¹ Had not Urban II at the council of Milan in 1096 said that even parish priests conducted themselves like petty kings? The German clergy had too long been fed upon flesh by the Saxon and Franconian kings to renounce it now. Temporally, feudally, they were unwilling to yield and too strong to be coerced by either emperor or pope.

Pascal II was compelled to cancel the agreement, but proffered no other form of settlement. Henry V brusquely demanded imperial control of episcopal elections and unconditional right of investiture. The pope, after enduring two months of imprisonment, yielded.² If the first concession had angered the German bishops, the second enraged the Gregorians.³ A council at Vienne condemned the papal action, reaffirmed in energetic words that lay investiture was heresy, and held Henry V up to the obloquy of Christendom.⁴

The radical Gregorians in Italy raised a furious outcry. Bruno of Segni even attacked Pascal II himself, for which insult he was deprived of the abbotship of Monte Cassino. The unfortunate

¹ "In your kingdom," Pascal had written Henry V the year before, "bishops and abbots are so occupied in secular affairs that they are compelled to frequent the county courts and to do soldiering. The ministers of the altar have become ministers of the court" (*Gesta Trev.*, I, 222). The pope refused to go to Germany, alleging the "barbarous" manners of the people there (Ekkehard, *Chron.* [1107], SS. X, 105).

² Doeberl, *op. cit.*, No. 20 B. On these two privileges see Gerson Peiser, *Der deutsche Investiturstreit unter König Heinrich V bis zum päpstlichen Privileg vom April 13, 1111*, and Hauck, III, 894-903.

³ Pascal's letter of October 29, 1111, to the emperor shows the sentiment of revolt abroad in the church: "Ex quo vobiscum illam quam notis pactionem fecimus, non solum longius positi, sed ipsi etiam qui circa nos sunt, cervicem adversus nos erexerunt, et intestinis bellis viscera nostra collacerant et multo faciem nostram rubore perfundant" (Jaffé, V, 283; Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, 163, col. 291); *Chron. Cass.*, IV, c. 31; Baronius, *Annales* (anno 1112), c. 3; Suger, *Vita Lud. Gross.*, c. 9; cf. Hauck, III, 904-5.

⁴ Labbé, *Concil.*, XII, col. 1183. For extracts from sources, Richter, III, 2, pp. 575-77.

pope cast about for some means of renouncing the agreement which he had made, and a council was convened at the Lateran on March 28, 1112. The representatives were all Italians except two transalpine bishops. This fact is interesting, for it indicates that the old pro-imperial and German clergy in Italy had become wholly displaced during the long conflict.

The spokesman of the Gregorians was Bishop Gerard of Angoulême, who argued that the agreement made by Pascal II did not expressly forbid a revocation of it. The resolution of the council is a masterpiece of ecclesiastical casuistry, though it must be said that the method of revocation was no worse than the means by which the agreement had first been obtained.¹

Neither the findings of the council of Vienne nor those of the Lateran had any appreciable effect on Henry's position in Germany.² The ban served as a pretext for a feudal noble here and there to rebel against the king. But the crown was too strong to fear a repetition of what had happened in Germany in 1076, until the emperor's defeat at the battle of Welfesholz on February 11, 1115, gave new courage to the Gregorians and filled Henry V with mis-giving. Then Kuno of Praeneste was bold enough to carry the excommunication of the council of Vienne into Germany. But Pascal II was too timid to heap the papal excommunication upon the ban of the council.

The reason for the pope's prudence is to be found in the fact that Henry V had again come into Italy, where the great Countess Matilda had just died (1115), in order to prevent the execution of her will, in which she had made the papacy the beneficiary of her vast possessions in Tuscany. In spite of the emperor's efforts to secure a conference with Pascal II, he was unable to bring it about. The pope was too wary again to be caught in the imperial clutches and replied that all matters touching the relation of pope and emperor must be deferred until another council, which he would summon in due time. But the pope's call was never issued, for Pascal II died on January 21, 1118.

¹ Labbé, XII, col. 1163-82.

² Giesebrecht, III, 862.

His successor was John of Gaeta, the late pope's chancellor, who took the name of Gelasius II. Henry V, by this time grown impatient of the way in which Pascal II had dodged him, tried unsuccessfully to take the pontiff prisoner by a *coup de main*. Failing this attempt, the emperor had recourse to the old practice of creating a counter-pope and put up the archbishop Burdinus of Braga, who took the name of Gregory VIII.¹ He was a mere tool whom Henry V soon discarded and imprisoned when the door opened to another solution of the controversy.

Meantime Gelasius II had fled to France, summoned a synod at Vienne, of whose deliberations nothing is known,² and excommunicated Henry V and his papal puppet.³ At the same time, in Germany, Kuno of Praeneste and Adalbert of Mainz called an opposition synod at Cologne in May, 1118, and at Fritzlar on Saxon soil in July.⁴

The whole situation abruptly changed when Gelasius II died on January 18, 1119, and was succeeded by Gui of Burgundy, the archbishop of Vienne, who, on February 2, 1119, became Pope Calixtus II.⁵ During this decade the conciliatory ideas of Ives of Chartres and Hugh of Fleury gained ground, which the English settlement of 1106 reinforced.

It seemed a favorable opportunity to terminate the bitter strife. Calixtus had been a violent opponent of Henry V, but seems to have been sobered by the serious position of his office. On the other hand, the emperor too was in a more conciliatory mood than he had been in the early part of his reign. He sorely wanted peace, for the situation in Germany gave him great anxiety.

Henry V summoned the diet at Tribur, the date of which we do not know, where he proffered the olive branch to ambassadors of Calixtus II. The incongruity of the pope dealing with an

¹ Ekkehard (1037); *Chron. Cassinense*, Migne, CLXXIII, 885; *Annales Romani*, SS. V, 478-79.

² Labbé, XII, 1249.

³ *Chronica regia Col.*, p. 57.

⁴ Ekkehard (1039).

⁵ Ulysse Robert, *Histoire du pape Calixte II* (1891); Hauck, III, 907; Lamprecht, II, 383-87; Ender, *Die Stellung des papstes Calixt II zu den Klöstern* (Greifswald, 1913).

excommunicated ruler does not seem to have occurred to anyone. After these preliminaries the pope began to negotiate more directly with the emperor and sent the bishop of Châlons and the abbot of Cluny to Strasburg. We have a detailed account of these negotiations in the *Relatio de concilio Remensi*, written by one Hesso, "scholasticus."

The argument which seems to have had greatest weight with Henry V was that the English king had surrendered the right of investiture without losing the regalia. Calixtus II was at Paris when word was brought to him of the emperor's inclination to make peace with the church after the compromise form. But he still mistrusted. "Utinam jam factum esset: si sine fraude fieri posset," he exclaimed. The pope now sent Cardinal Gregory and the bishop of Ostia to confer with Henry V, who met them between Verdun and Metz. Here the formal documents were prepared which the emperor agreed to exchange with Calixtus II in person at Mouzon on October 23.

On October 19, 1119, the council opened at Rheims, where hopes for peace ran high. Four days later the pope went to Mouzon. His suspicions were made more certain when he discovered that Henry V had come with an army at his back. He had no mind to fall into the trap which had caught Pascal II, and returned to Rheims. Henry V was re-excommunicated and the council was dismissed. But the door was even then left ajar for the possibility of peace, for a canon was adopted which specifically declared that the prohibition of lay investiture applied *only* to the office of bishops and abbots as such, and not to their regalia.

In Germany the war was renewed in a desultory way. The truth was that everyone wanted peace from emperor and pope down. In a short time a commission of twelve princes was established, the members of which were divided equally between the two factions, who should draft an agreement to be submitted to a diet which was to be held at Würzburg.

The diet convened on September 29, 1121. The emperor was now as politic as he had been impolitic at Mouzon, and left everything, at least outwardly, to the princes. The separation of investiture from regalia was agreed upon, and Bishop Otto of

Bamberg, Duke Henry of Bavaria, and Count Berenger were sent to Rome to secure the cancellation of the ban of excommunication. Later the bishop of Speyer and the abbot of Fulda were also sent to Rome and returned to Germany in company with two cardinals and the bishop of Ostia.

Exactly a year had elapsed since the diet of Würzburg had met. On September 8, 1122, a council met at Worms. The concordat of Worms in 1122 distinguished between the spiritual and the temporal functions of bishops and abbots and instituted a double investiture, the emperor investing the new incumbent with the fiefs and secular authority of the office, the pope or his legate with the spiritual title and authority.¹

Here we may rest the subject. The concordat of Worms compromised the question of investiture for a season, but it did not settle the problem of the relation of church and state in the Middle Ages. Reopened under Frederick Barbarossa, continued under Henry VI and Frederick II, the most gifted ruler in the whole mediaeval epoch, the struggle culminated in the destruction of the mediaeval empire in all but name and the establishment of the completest theocracy the world has ever known. The church "bartered spiritual leadership for temporal rule, the legacy of St. Peter for the fatal dower of Constantine."²

As for Germany, certainly not the state nor yet the church was the ultimate winner in the great controversy. The real winners were the feudalized bishops and abbots and the German feudality. The prince bishops and warlike abbots of Germany, with their worldly ways, their hard faces, their political interests, lords of church lands which were actually huge ecclesiastical fiefs,³ and the German feudality were the real victors in the war.

Neither Germany nor the church was the same ever again. While nominally the former form of government seemed still to remain, actually the government of the Hohenstaufen was very

¹ Robert, *Calixte II*, c. 10.

² A. L. Smith, *Church and State in the Middle Ages*, p. 245.

³ "Lo, what lusty and warlike archbishops there are in Germany," wrote Richard to Prince Edward of England during the War of the Barons. "It would not be a very bad thing for you if you could create such archbishops in England."—*Annals of St. Burton*, MGH, SS. XXVII, 480.

different from that of their predecessors. Even more profound were the changes in social texture and in economic condition, for in these two particulars the state of Germany was revolutionized during the eleventh century. The moral decay and the decline of religious life was quite as great. The sources upon this subject are rich, varied, and unanimous.¹ In the bitter warfare of the partisans both sides had pillaged wantonly. Probably there was not a bishopric or monastery in all Germany which was not despoiled at least once. When Adalberon became archbishop of Trier in 1131, the revenues of the see would hardly support him for a day. The condition of Metz and Verdun was similar. Augsburg was captured and pillaged twice. Salzburg fared no better. The losses of Mainz were huge. Of the abbeys, all were more or less plundered, and numbers of them completely destroyed, as Goseck, St. Gall, Schaffhausen, Prüm, Stablo, Lüttich, St. Trudo, St. Hübert, and Corvei.

The twelfth and thirteenth centuries gave rise to men of deep spirituality and fearless hope, who protested vainly against the corrosion within the church—reformers like Arnold of Brescia, mystics like St. Francis, whose influence actuated the radical wing of the order (the Spiritual Franciscans) long after the main body had succumbed to corruption, legists like Pierre Du Bois. But materialized Germany furnished none of these. Richard of Cornwall's characterization of the German bishops of the middle of the thirteenth century holds true of them for centuries.

It required Luther's clarion call and the drastic secularizations of the Reformation and the Napoleonic era finally to emancipate the German church from the long, intolerable tyranny of sense over spirit, from the gathered vanity and cumulated materialism which corrupted it.

¹ Gerdes, II, 505-10, who cites numerous references.

THE CHURCH AND THE RELIGION OF RUSSIA

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"There is no book on the Russian Church," wrote one of her most prominent sons in answer to an inquiry of Professor J. Y. Simpson, of the University of Glasgow, "because our church cannot be discussed in a book. Better than from any book will you understand it if you go to such a religious center as the Troitzko, a famous monastery near Moscow, especially on the great festivals, or if you go to our churches, particularly in Lent."

This is an indirect way of stating the difficulty of defining the religion of a colossal nation as far removed from us in spirit as in space. With comparative ease and accuracy one may describe the ecclesiastical doctrines and institutions of a people; for these are tangible and visible—can be portrayed by voice or pen, brush or chisel. But the religion of Russia is broader and deeper than the creed, polity, cultus, and precepts of the Church of Russia. The life of the spirit defies definition. It is elusive as the dawn, pervasive as the fragrance of spring, and subtle as the skylark's song. It consists, not of temples and sacraments, priests and monks, dogmas and canons, but of moods and motives, aspirations and longings, hopes and fears, loves and beliefs, convictions and ideals—all welling up from the soul's depth. These we must understand far more by sympathetic fellowship with men's joys and sorrows than by a scientific analysis of their dogmas and institutions.

Moreover, to know the Russian aright we shall have to go from temple to *traktir*, or tavern. Here is gathered, night after night, a motley crowd of men and women of every degree—cabmen, market women, soldiers, musicians, dancers, poets, hawkers, philosophers, beggars, millionaires. In an atmosphere heavy with fumes of tobacco, sipping tea and, until recently, drinking vodka, singing, talking, they discuss every subject—religion, politics, ghosts, and

eternal questions. In the temple they stand at attention before priest and altar in silent awe; but in the tavern they talk, talk freely, their mind and heart under the impulse of their physical and spiritual needs. From the Yama, the famous public house of Moscow, have sprung a number of religious sects; there prayer meetings are held, Bibles are sold, coppers are collected for building churches and buying bells. The chatter of the tavern perchance throws as much light on the Russian genius as the chant of the cathedral.

Enough has been said to indicate the difficulty of doing justice to a nation's religion by putting it into words. We shall therefore with diffidence discuss first of all the Christianity of Russia as it has prevailed for a thousand years under the form of oriental or Greek orthodox Catholicism.

The first chronicler, Nestor, the Herodotus of Russia, who died in 1114, speaks of Princess Olga as the forerunner of Christianity in Russia, "as the morning star is the precursor of the sun, and the dawn is the harbinger of the day." At Constantinople she found the true God and was baptized in 879 by the patriarch Polyeuctes, with the emperor as her godfather. Her grandson Vladimir was destined to become the Russian Constantine, for he not only became a convert to Christianity but made it the religion of the state. He sealed his baptism in the year 988 by marrying on the same day Anna, the sister of the Greek emperor Basil. The day before he decreed that "whoever on the morrow should not repair to the river, whether rich or poor, he should be held for an enemy." It is needless to say that the people were suddenly gripped by pangs of penitence and were baptized, as much perhaps to save their necks as their souls. Thus Christianity was introduced in a formal way into Russia, an event which more than any other shaped the future destiny of the nation.

To understand the religion of Russia today we shall have to consider the character of the Christianity which Vladimir brought into Kiev in the tenth century.

It was oriental Catholicism, which reached the summit of its glory in the Cathedral of St. Sophia, in the soaring domes, the princely patriarchs, the majestic pomp, the sumptuous ritual, and

the unrivaled treasures of silver and gold, gems and mosaics. Hither came the commissioners of Kiev in search of a religion. Awed into submission, they reported in glowing terms to their prince: "When we stood in the temple we did not know where we were, for there is nothing else like it upon the earth; there in truth God has His dwelling with men; and we can never forget the beauty we saw there. No one who has once tasted sweets will afterwards take that which is bitter; nor can we now any longer abide in heathenism."

How did the religion of the patriarchs of St. Sophia in the tenth century differ from that of the Galilean fishermen in the first and from that of the contemporary popes of Rome? The answer to these questions depends on the viewpoint one holds.

Professor Glubokovsky says: "Orthodoxy [this includes Russian Christianity] is the authentic and primitive Christianity of our Lord Savior and of his apostles. Orthodoxy successively preserves and holds it, adapting it and developing it amid various historical conditions. It results therefrom that in its inward trust Orthodoxy thinks itself as Christianity in its primordial completeness and uncorrupted entirety."

With the same zeal the Russians claim to have original Christianity, and reject the Catholicism of Rome. In his *Encyclical* of 866, Photius, patriarch of Constantinople, cited and condemned five ritualistic and doctrinal errors in Western Catholicism—points sufficient to warrant a permanent division of the two churches, Greek and Latin. They were as follows: (1) the Roman custom of fasting on Saturday; (2) the use of milk, butter, and cheese in the first week of Lent; (3) compulsory celibacy of the priesthood; (4) the separation of baptism and confirmation; (5) the addition of *filioque* to the creed. The seriousness with which these differences in incidentals were taken throws light on the character of Christianity at that time both in the East and in the West.

It is interesting to listen to the interpretation of the schism of the ninth century given by a cultured Russian in a conversation two years ago with Professor Simpson. He said:

Hereby orthodoxy was saved from the spiritual despotism and the dogmatic and disciplinary innovations of the Roman rival; from those alterations

of doctrine and waywardness which resulted in the fruitful protest of the sixteenth century, from the celibacy of the priesthood with its attendant evils, from the sacrilegious commerce in indulgences, from the horrors of the inquisition, from the baneful might of excommunication, from the exclusive monopoly of the Holy Scriptures by the hierarchy for its profit.

These confident claims to apostolicity and an unperverted catholicity the Protestant historian cannot admit unchallenged. Professor Harnack says: "In its external form as a whole this church (Greek or Russian) is nothing more than a continuation of the history of Greek religion under the alien influence of Christianity. . . . It takes the form, not of a Christian product in Greek dress, but of a Greek product in Christian dress."

It is a far cry from the Nazarene preaching on the mount to Constantine in his imperial robes at Nicea. Under the influence of oriental mysteries, Greek philosophy, Jewish and Roman law, and vulgar paganism, the simple gospel and the community of believers underwent a profound change, a reversion to a lower plane rather than an advance on the higher plane of the religion of Jesus and the apostles. The brotherhood of the saved became a domineering hierarchy; faith in a living Christ became assent to definitions of Christ; the indwelling spirit of holiness and love became church law and custom; the love feasts became mysterious sacraments; the benign admonition of the brethren became the arrogant rebuke of the priests; heartfelt sorrow for sin became a dreary round of penitential works; fervent expectation of the coming Lord became hope of immortality. The church of gospel and life became the church of doctrine and law. The religion of the spirit became a religion of authority; servile obedience took the place of filial service. When these changes were wrought primitive Christianity was transmuted into Greek Catholicism. The transformation may have been a historical necessity, but it can hardly be conceded that it was a continuation of the Christian religion in its original purity.

The difference between Eastern and Western Catholicism is not covered by the five points in the *Encyclical* of Photius or by the statement of Professor Simpson's cultured Russian friend. The two Catholic churches are rooted in the same subsoil, but the stem

of ancient Catholicism is divided into two distinct branches: the one Graeco-Slavic, the other Romano-Teutonic, each bearing fruit after its own kind.

The terms which indicate the differences between the two churches are national and racial—Graeco-Slavic and Romano-Teutonic; those which describe resemblances are spatial and religious—catholic, i.e., universal, and apostolic, i.e., Christlike. The term Catholic connotes much that they have in common. They have the same trinitarian theology and the two-nature Christology, clergy and laity, priests and bishops, abbots and monks, sacraments, masses, virgin, saints, images, icons, relics, sacred days, and seasons. To the casual observer, the *filioque* and the pope excepted, they are as much alike as two peas of the same pod.

Notwithstanding these resemblances the two churches differ widely in spirit and method. The difference is rooted in the theory of salvation which came from Greece and not from Palestine. Redemption is not, as held by some, forgiveness of sin, nor, as held by others, release from the power of demons. It is regarded as deliverance from the state of decay and death. Through sin and the fall man was separated from God, the source of life. As the branch lopped from the vine he is withering and dying. Sin accordingly is not guilt to be atoned and forgiven, but disease and death to be healed and overcome. The goal of redemption is in the other world, for here and now in this realm of death deliverance is not possible. At best one can obtain in this life through the services of the sanctuary only foretastes of the blessedness to come and momentary anticipations of the beatific vision.

Roman Catholicism shared with Greek orthodoxy this view of an otherworldly redemption, the hope of exaltation to blissful immortality. Sin, however, was regarded as guilt which requires satisfaction and forgiveness. Even in this life, therefore, men may obtain pardon and find peace and joy in faith and love. Western Catholicism accepted also Augustine's vision and program of a City of God on earth—the nations of the world controlled by the divine will through the agency of the Catholic church. With the rule of St. Benedict in one hand and St. Augustine's *Civitas Dei* in the

other the Church of Rome demanded in the name of her Lord that the individual renounce the world and the institution conquer the world. Doors and windows were thrown open toward imperial Rome, whose spirit of dominion and conquest entered the Holy City and lent itself to the realization of the Kingdom of God upon earth. Roman Catholicism may be compared to an ellipse with two foci, the one representing redemption in the world to come, the other the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth. Greek Catholicism is like a circle with its center representing otherworldly redemption—only that and nothing more. The Catholicism of the West appeals to the will, develops to some extent the individual through the institution, is active and aggressive. The Catholicism of the East appeals to the phantasy, is contemplative and mystical, and indifferent toward the political order, which is in a state of hopeless dissolution. The two churches differ as the Greek philosopher and the Roman emperor, the one laying aside his cloak, the other his scepter, and each in his own way taking up the cross of Christ.

From this point of view we are now prepared to consider the distinctive characteristics of Slavic Christianity. It is a venerable institution that ministers to the religious needs of ninety millions of souls. Observe its holy synod, its patriarchs, bishops, priests, monks, cathedrals, churches, chapels, monasteries, virgin, saints, relics, icons, vestments, candles, ritual, mass, choirs, dogmas, precepts, mysteries—a highly complex structure into which are built the feelings, superstitions, learning, philosophy, and art of a thousand years—so different from the groups of disciples and brethren who once worshiped in the spirit in Jerusalem and Antioch, in Ephesus and Corinth. As one looks about him he may wonder whether it is the glory of Greece Christianized or the Christianity of Jesus Hellenized. Of its purpose there can be no doubt. It seeks to deliver men from this perishing world and this body of death by infusing into him the essence of the being of God. This motive controls every detail of this elaborate ecclesiastical structure as the vital principle of the acorn controls the oak from root to fruit.

The central doctrine of the Graeco-Slavic Christianity is the incarnation of the Logos, the divine-human Christ. A Greek

Father once said, "The idea of God becoming man is what is new in the new, nay, is the only new thing under the sun." This is indispensable, because man can be delivered from death only when he is brought into organic union with God—such a union of the divine and human natures as was effected in the God-man, Jesus Christ. Thus the substance of divine life is infused into man's nature, man is deified and endued with life immortal. This is the mystery of salvation. True, there is a suggestion of this process in the writings of Paul and of John. The latter speaks of the word become flesh, revealing grace and truth unto the world. But these blessings are conceived as spiritual qualities which are appropriated by faith. The gospel was an appeal to reason and conscience, begetting a life of faith working in love. In the centuries after the apostles, grace was turned into a hyperphysical substance imparted in portions through sacramental channels, after the manner of oriental mysteries. Truth was resolved into incomprehensible dogmas passing all understanding, to be accepted with implicit faith as a heavenly mystery. Thus by a subtle process of transformation, salvation by grace through faith came to mean the deification of man's mortal nature by a pharmacological infusion of the substance of the Logos incarnate through the mysteries of worship. Preaching plays a small rôle—the ritual is everything. Ecclesiastical rules overshadow moral laws. Word, doctrine, deeds are of little avail; only so the divine life is infused into man through the mystery of cultus. Professor Glubokovsky supports this view in an article in 1913, when he says:

Orthodox Christianity manifests itself, not as a doctrine, but as a life of mystic communion with God in Christ, and of restoration of the grace of the Holy Spirit in the entire brotherhood of the faithful. . . . That is why in orthodoxy are so prominent the sacraments of grace, which embrace the whole existence of man in every respect. They are here, not an outward symbol, not a ritual accessory, but an indispensable element of the vivifying power of Christianity itself, which is assured by hierarchical priesthood in direct succession of the Lord Savior.

The idea of redemption has perceptible influence in shaping the government, worship, and piety of oriental orthodoxy. At first under the oversight of the patriarch of Constantinople, then of the

patriarch of Moscow, the Russian church is now controlled by the Holy Synod of Petrograd. And this notwithstanding an ancient Russian prophecy which ran as follows: "The first Rome was betrayed; the second or new Rome [Constantinople] fell; and they both were succeeded by the third, Moscow; but a fourth shall never be." Peter the Great founded the Holy Synod and thus brought the church more directly under the power of the czar. Its members were appointed and all its actions must be ratified by him. According to the *Fundamental Laws*, Art. 42, of Peter the Great, "the emperor as Christian sovereign is the supreme Defender and Protector of Dogmas of the Divine faith, Guardian of Orthodoxy and of all piety in the Holy Church." This does not mean, however, that the czar has power to define doctrine or to dictate in spiritual matters. These come under the jurisdiction of the hierarchy speaking through the Holy Synod. An official connected with the Synod said to Professor Simpson in 1916: "The Emperor is the protector, but not the head, of the Russian church. The head of the church is our Lord. . . . That is the great distinction between us and the Romans. There is no necessity to have a head of the church upon earth when we have such a head in Heaven." The czar may at times have tried to exercise lordship in religious matters, and the hierarchy may have tried to control civil affairs; but in these attempts both acted contrary to the orthodox ideal of the relation of church to state in Russia; however, closer than in any other orthodox land is the union between czar and synod. "For," says Professor Glubokovsky, "it has been wrought into life itself in her history and was welded together until it became monolithic. Orthodox church has historically produced orthodox czar in Russia and secured for him a monarchical form of government, and the czar, on his part, protected and defended her, assuring to her inner sway and outward grandeur. Orthodoxy was made one with the people in the autocratic sovereign." This sense of unity is expressed in the famous triad—the slogan of all reactionaries: "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationalism."

The redemptive idea accounts for the indifference of the orthodox church toward secular dominion, in this respect so unlike the

Roman Catholic church. It has no care for the control of empires and kingdoms on earth, for its sole purpose is to deliver men from this perishable world and to exalt them to the life immortal in a world beyond. It has no program for the transformation of the state into a City of God. All it asks is the protection of the state, so long as the rulers are orthodox, while it performs its spiritual and religious functions. The highest ideal would be a universal empire in the bosom of which the orthodox church would continue its saving work. But, since such an empire is not in existence, each nation has its own church without destroying the unity of Christianity, a unity, not in a visible head, but in a common creed and cultus.

The Russian church is primarily an institution of worship, not of doctrine or of deed. Even its dogmas are volatilized and visualized in the ritual. Weary of theological controversy and hair-splitting distinctions, the oriental Catholic has resolved no more to speculate, but to contemplate, divine truth. The incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ—the God-man—and the Trinity are presented in dramatic symbolism, the benefits of which are obtained by mystic absorption rather than by logical thought. Man has no other communion with God than to behold him. He has no fellowship with him, but simply enjoys the vision of him. The blessings of redemption are mediated also through hundreds of efficacious formulas, small and great. Signs, pictures, sacred acts punctiliously and submissively performed, communicate divine grace and prepare the devotee for eternal life. The house of worship, its ornaments, sanctuaries, altar, icons, candles, the vestments of the priests, the singing of the choir, the liturgy in every detail reaching its climax in the mass, complete the act of worship by which the believer feels himself transported into heavenly places and obtains foretastes of celestial bliss. Nothing so well satisfies the religious longings of the moujik as the sacred icon in which the spiritual is fused with the material and the heavenly becomes visible in the form of the earthly. Icons are found everywhere in private and public places. Not a house without its icons, images of virgin or saint. Men serve them in joy and in sorrow, upon going on a journey or returning from it,

through all the vicissitudes of life. Candles are placed before them. They are covered with gold leaf and adorned with costly gems. They are invoked and kissed—for where the image is, there is its prototype. The miraculous power of the saint works in his icon. Respecting the late war a scoffing Russian writer said:

The Japanese prepared for the campaign by dispatching troops; and we answered by opening our folding *ikons*, and raising aloft our religious banners and crosses. . . . At last, with a wagonload of holy images our Commander-in-chief set out hopefully. . . . The religious among the masses explain our reverses by saying that on the journey to the Far East two different consignments of holy images got mixed; and those which were to have helped the Admiral on sea were exchanged for the *ikons* meant for the General of the land troops.

Arrant nonsense as all this must be to the puritan and scientist of the West, there are intelligent Russians today who countenance it. With reference to miracles wrought by saints the Russian friend of Professor Simpson said (1915): "I do not know if St. Metrophanes actually did this or that, or whether any proportion of the stories of St. Seraphim are true, but I do know that in the Russia of today there is a great belief that God is working in the world both through his servants who still remain and through those whom he has taken to himself." This indicates an attitude of expectancy, a naïve sense of wonder, in the Russian mind. In his own way he believes in God with a working faith and is always on the watch for signs of his activity in the world.

To define by contrast, Russian Catholic worship is sacramental and representational; Roman Catholic worship is sacrificial and propitiatory. The aim of the former is the deification of man's nature by its enduement with divine forces through sacred rites and symbols. The aim of the latter is to satisfy and placate God, that the worshiper may be restored to divine favor and gradually become righteous before God. Even the motives for the monastic life correspond to these views of worship. In the East asceticism serves to purify a man and thus to prepare him to receive the divine life; in the West it is intended to satisfy God and thus to win divine favor.

The final test of Russian orthodoxy is the piety or quality of life which it cultivates. Its fundamental motive, as in govern-

ment and in worship, is preparation for the other world, which is always attended by a deep-seated pessimism with regard to this world. "Behold the perfect Christian!" cried a Russian, as he stood before an image of a crucified monk. The monk, who bears the whole yoke of Christ, represents the highest ideal of Christian living. The layman is a Christian of a lower degree. He continues in the social order and observes only the necessary precepts of Christ as prescribed by the moral laws and ceremonial commandments, which require only partial asceticism. The youths are taught the Decalogue, the Lord's Prayer, and the Beatitudes. Emphasis is put on the fact that men are judged according to their works. In this way moral living is to some extent encouraged. But the tendency is to develop far more a ritualistic than an ethical piety. Besides the Decalogue, "nine principal commandments of the church" are taught. These have to do with the observance of festivals and fasts, the honoring of the clergy, the necessity of annual confession, the avoidance of heretical literature, and the solemnizing of marriage on proper days. Innumerable ecclesiastical customs have grown up in the course of the centuries which also have the force of divine laws. These are a burden more than a guide in Christian living.

Withal a desponding melancholia has settled upon the orthodox Christian of the East, so far as he reflects his creed and lives it. From the world he expects nothing and is therefore prepared for the worst and is resigned to his fate. The passive virtues are highly developed. Pity is shown everywhere to "the partners in sorrow," as Marcion in the second century already called his fellows in the faith. Into this enveloping gloom, which paralyzes thought and action, the church and her hope of a blissful immortality casts a ray of light which illuminates but a narrow path for the pilgrim heavenward, while to right and left there is blackness and darkness.

What shall we say of this church more than a thousand years inseparably united with a great nation? Some paint her in dark colors with only an occasional streak of light. Others depict her in bright colors, shading here and there into somber hue. Each paints the thing as he sees it.

True, the Church of Russia has been the buttress of autocracy, the mother of superstition, and the seed plot of intolerance and persecution. Under her care men have remained ignorant, credulous, dependent, timid, easily misled, without self-control, childlike. Many of her priests and monks are greedy, drunken, sensual, sycophants of the government, and betrayers of their sacred trust.

In the *Memoirs of Catherine II* we find the following indictment:

. There [i.e., in Russia] a most illiterate or most degenerate sect, under the name of Christians, relies on abstract points of doctrine instead of morals, miracles instead of reason, the performance of ceremonies instead of the practice of virtue, and purchasing expiation for crimes instead of repentance. There the devotee is assuredly a knave and the hypocrite a villain. . . . The principal cause of the vices of the people is the immorality of their religion; and he who considers that in the Russian Greek Church there are neither sermons, nor exhortations, nor catechisms, will at once see the rectitude of my opinion.

The judgment of few Western scholars is more trustworthy than that of Professor Harnack, who writes not as a friend or a foe but as an unprejudiced historian of the liberal Protestant school. He says of the Russian church:

There is no sadder spectacle than this transformation of the Christian religion from a worship of God in spirit and truth into a worship of God in signs, formulas, and idols. . . . Where can we find in Jesus' message even a trace of any injunction that a man is to submit to solemn ceremonies as though they were mysterious ministrations, to be punctilious in observing a ritual, to put up pictures, and to mumble maxims and formulas in a prescribed fashion? It was to destroy this sort of religion that Jesus Christ suffered himself to be nailed to the Cross, and now we find it re-established under his name and authority!

The picture of orthodoxy in its brightest colors is drawn in an article of the current year by Professor Glubokovsky. He writes as an ardent apologist and shows how pagan Russia became "Holy Russia" through the services of the orthodox priesthood. "The mysterious process of the healing of the Christian soul by the operation of grace contributed from the first more than anything else to spiritual ascendancy over heathen vanities, base human

ideals of earthly prosperity, and the despotic rule of arbitrary brutal force." According to one of the oldest manuscripts the people "ate the leavings of the offerings to idols, also that which was strangled or mauled by beasts and torn by birds." The church at once began to combat these savage instincts and insisted on compliance with the apostolic teaching that the people "abstain from meats offered to idols, and from blood and from things strangled, and from fornication" (Acts 15:29). In the penitential discipline of the twelfth century unclean food of any kind was forbidden, with special mention of the following: "The meat of squirrels, the meat of strangled animals in which was blood, or the first milk of the cow after calving, or the flesh of bears and beavers." The building up of the national life on canonical foundations like these was not a small achievement.

But of far greater value was the influence of the church on family life and on social and political institutions. The marriage relation was ennobled, the position of wife and mother was dignified, and children were trained in filial obedience and reverence for things divine.

In founding the new social order the church worked for the abolition of serfdom by enforcing the principle that all the people are equally "God's and the czar's." The flotsam of life's wrecks was used in the building up of new social unions outside the existing classes of society, partly for religious and moral purposes and partly out of compassion and for charitable reasons. The church also was a powerful factor in the consolidation of tribes and nations into a united empire. In the fratricidal struggles and intestine wars of the period between 860 and 1054 the decentralizing forces of the numerous small principalities were counteracted by preaching the peace of Christ. The Slavonic tongue used in the services of the sanctuary became the outward sign of the solidarity and the kinship of all Slavs under the shelter of the Holy Mother church. The historian Nicolai Karamzine wrote that "during the centuries of Tartar domination the Christian faith alone enabled us to maintain our place on the human level, preserving our civic sense, keeping our hearts from being petrified within us and our consciences from becoming mute forever; in our humiliation as Russians we yet

felt ourselves raised as Christians, and we loved our mother-country as the land of the orthodox faith."

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, during a period of terrible confusion within and without, when alien races of other creeds pressed Russia on all sides, and personal ambition and hatred within increased the danger of complete destruction, the country was not completely exhausted by the invasion of foreigners simply because, together with the inhabitants of Smolensk, the Russians never forgot the salutary confession: "Brothers, we are all of the same kin, because through baptism in the holy font we were born promising to believe in the Holy Undivided Trinity, knowing that God is living and that the Truth exists."

In the summer of 1916 the chairman of the State Council officially reported that the Russians "were led forward by the example of their fearless priesthood," who often sacrificed their lives like true warriors of Christ.

Even Professor Harnack does not leave his picture of an almost moribund church without its lighter shades. "Among these Christians," he says, "priests and laity, there are men who have come to know God as the Father of mercy and the leader of their lives, and who love Jesus Christ, not because they know him as the person with two natures, but because a ray of his being has shone from the gospel into their hearts."

Even this church, with its traditionalism, dogmatism, ritualism, and monasticism, as much loved by some as hated by others, has often been the earthen vessel of a heavenly treasure and may have in it latent potencies for the revival of a more spiritual religion and the making of a new nation.

We have now seen the Russian in church and have seen what the church has done for him; let us see him in the tavern, and see what nature has done for him and what he may do for religion.

He is an interminable talker, as is always the case where the percentage of illiteracy is high. What does he talk about? The conversation of an Englishman sooner or later turns to sport; of a Frenchman, to women; of a Russian, if he is educated, to Russia; if he is a peasant, to religion. The Russians are forever en route

for a place where they may find out something about God, and if there is an animated conversation in the hostelry of a monastery, a third-class carriage, a teashop, or a tavern it is almost always sure to be about religion. Their tenacious orthodoxy, their obstinate sectarianism, their magnificent churches, their punctilious observance of innumerable ceremonies, their icons, ghosts, witches, familiar spirits, and magic rites are but the shadow cast by their incurably religious nature. Paraphrasing Paul's words when he saw Athens "full of idols," we might cry in Moscow, "Ye men of Moscow, in all things I perceive that ye are very religious." Religious they are, not merely because of the church, but partly in spite of it. Beneath a petrified ecclesiasticism the native fires of the Slavic spirit have never been quenched. They have smoldered at times, but the dying embers revive, and at intervals there burns a bright flame.

While Russia is a composite empire spanning two continents, she is not a mere conglomerate of tribes and nations. She is an organic unit controlled by a common soul. Her literature, art, music, philosophy, religion, theater, and dancing are something intrinsically Russian. Her dominant spirit is not the product of Byzantine Christianity. It is rooted in the Slavic nature, in Scandinavian mythology, and in oriental mysticism. The remote past with its passions, dreams, fears, and hopes throbs in the living present. It is a distinctively religious spirit, if not essentially Christian.

Those who know the Russians best tell us that the most obvious characteristic of the Slavic spirit is love for the suffering, pity unlimited. Rozanof writes: "Is there one page in the whole Russian literature where a mock is made of a girl who has been betrayed, of a child, of a mother, of poverty? Even the thief is an honest thief. (Dostoieffsky's *Honest Thief*.) Russian literature is one continuous hymn to the injured."

Born of pity is the grace of unbounded hospitality and interest in the destiny of the individual. Mr. Stephen Graham says:

You are not looked at askance because you seem poor. The tramps and pilgrims on the road are never made ashamed of themselves. A contrast to America, where the tramp is an object of mirth, where he is regarded almost as

an enemy of society. The Russian takes the tramp in. He has real hospitality, and not only hospitality of hearth and home, the giving of food and a night's shelter, but also a more vital hospitality, that of mind and heart.

The Russian does not limit his love to the honest, the religious, the penitent. He loves the dishonest, the criminal, the despicable, the repulsive, the man who can give no explanation of himself. Half the novels are expressions of love toward "criminals." Over the portal of Russian life and literature might be carved the words, "Neither do I condemn thee."

The Russian instinctively revolts from the orderly and conventional, though subject for ages to the dictates of orthodoxy and of autocracy. He is the antipode of the Teuton, wild in his emotions, anarchic in spirit, amused by laws and regulations. He loves the individual far more than the state. The state to him is a hindrance to freedom and when left to himself the Russian tends toward the chaotic. Russian order, which emanated from Petrograd, was made in Germany. The Slav delights in divine disorder, a glorious promiscuity. The Western soldier marches as if he had been made to order—an automaton from the factory. The Russians march without a semblance of regularity or precision. Some walk, others run; even wives and mothers may be in the ranks carrying bundles for husbands and sons. In the church the worshipers gather in crowds, standing throughout the service; people and colors surrounded by frescoed walls, the faces of the saints, the cloud of witnesses mingle in kaleidoscopic confusion. It is the disorder of the starry sky, of the trees of the forest, and the shrubs and flowers of the mountain side. Withal there is a belief that everyone by instinctive divination finds his place and plays his part in the incomprehensible maze of the world's life. The genius for the disorderly breeds a hopeless incapacity for discipline, efficiency, and progress, which are the cardinal virtues of the West.

The Slav is by nature of a unique, deeply mystic tendency, blending with a lively emotional phantasy and a strain of sadness ending in despair of the world. This is the product of blood, natural surroundings, and the age-long vicissitudes of life. He lacks the bright energy of the Teuton, who "welcomes each rebuff that turns earth's smoothness rough." He gives way to melan-

cholia, loves self-laceration, and often yields to self-destruction. Suicide, even among the children, is extraordinarily frequent. All life expresses itself to the Russian in losses, terrible losses. The coffin-maker in Tchekhof's story, "Rotschild's Fiddle," has a ledger in which he notes down at the end of each day the day's losses. Dostoieffsky voices the religion of the sadness and suffering of Russia, never suggesting, however, that suffering should be removed. He suffered himself, and in his personal suffering discovered the national passion. He learned to know Siberia, not as a foul prison, but as a way of redemption, the path of life. He has no interest in the non-suffering normal person, but prefers the man who is torn, whose soul in all its misery is laid bare. The Russian accepts many things submissively which the Anglo-Saxon considers wrong in themselves—war, disease, pain, death. These have their eternal value and therefore should be cheerfully borne.

Who never ate his bread in sorrow,
Who never spent the midnight hours,
Toiling and waiting for the morrow,
He knows you not, ye Heavenly Powers.

Even sin is not considered as deadly. When committed it is nothing to grieve over. What is done cannot be helped. Varsonophy, a pilgrim from Mount Athos, used to say:

Eh, eh, don't grieve about your sins; be done with them, they don't count. Sin 539 times in a day, but don't grieve about it. That is the chief thing. If to sin is evil, then to remember sin is evil. There is nothing worse than to call to mind one's own sins. . . . There is only one deadly sin and that is despondency; from despondency comes despair, that is more than sin—it is spiritual death.

The Russians seem by nature bent toward the contemplative, mystic mood of Mary; and yet many among them, we are assured, have developed the virtues of serving Martha. They visit the poor, feed the hungry, clothe the naked. "Almost every cultured Russian of grace or character," says Mr. Graham, "has some social or personal responsibility or care—the passion to put right the affairs of some unhappy family, the will to raise drunkards and lawbreakers from spiritual death. It is national and natural, and

it is strange that this should be the characteristic of a people who have a passion for going into the desert and saving their souls."

There is clearly a difference between the Russian church and the Russian spirit. The one in the course of a thousand years has necessarily modified the other. The church has been in a measure Russianized and Russia has been in a way Christianized. Yet neither original Christianity nor the Russian genius has had a free field. For both the Slavic spirit and the apostolic gospel have been as much hindered as helped by orthodoxy and autocracy, institutions which are far more impositions upon the nation than its natural product.

A new era is dawning. Even in orthodoxy the gospel has not been wholly stifled, though the religion of the Slav has found expression in other than ecclesiastical channels. The sayings of Jesus are read in private and public. Men have caught a glimpse of the Savior and Master obscured by the drapery of an ornate ritual. The Slav is quick to respond to the call of the Nazarene. Wherever his words are heard, peasant and priest have shown simple trust in God, delicate moral feeling, and an active brotherly love, the very essence of Christianity. The independent religious life of Russian sects nearly always takes the form of childlike faith in the Heavenly Father, of humility and mercy, and of deep reverence for the Christ. The church herself, by keeping the gospel accessible even in veiled form, has the corrective for its own defects and the potency for its own reformation.

In a time of transition, such as Russia is now in, one hears prophets of hope and of despair. Both may be true to fact. In 1914 Mr. Menshikov in an article in the *Novoye Vremya* (Petrograd) says:

For about a thousand years orthodoxy has existed among the Russian people. For about a thousand years the poorly educated but devout clergymen have been able to communicate their faith to the good-hearted and ignorant people. But something catastrophic has happened, and this great religious mood began to die out, at first among the aristocracy, then among the intellectual classes, then among the clergy. . . . Finally, when the pastors began to desert their charges, their flocks also scattered.

A dissolution of this sort always is a forerunner of evolution. Far more hopeful is the report of Professor Simpson, who has had close contact with the leaders of the church. He says:

The religious condition is indeed promising. Amongst her priests are many in whom there is a longing for the revival and redemption of religious life generally. Amongst her people there are brotherhoods or unions of zealous orthodox souls who gather in special houses, listen to the preaching of particular priests, and sing evangelical hymns. Vodka has been put away and plans are considered to provide good pastimes and useful, reasonable entertainment; to bring educational and religious influences to bear on the lives of the people.

Besides the return to the simple gospel and the affirmation of the Russian spirit, the influence of the West in politics, art, and religion must be reckoned with. This may be an aid or an injury—an aid if it serves to quicken and stimulate the natural and national genius; an injury if it domineers and checks it. For the real Russia now is in as great danger of obscurity by a Christianity and civilization borrowed from Germany or France, England or America, as it was by the importation of Byzantine Christianity and culture in the tenth century. A cry of warning is raised against a growing non-Christian Russia of the Prussian or Parisian kind, glorying in the rationalism, skepticism, and secularism of the West. These are far more alien to the Slavic spirit than were the Greek patriarchs and monks with their dogma and ritual. Only by being true to herself will Russia be true to God, the gospel, and humanity, and fulfil her mission among the nations of the world.

He who would understand the condition of Russia at present and forecast its future must look into the past. It is not without analogy in the history of nations. Especially clear is the resemblance between the rise of the Teuton and the Slav—a resemblance all the more clear because of obvious differences.

The baptism of Clovis, king of the Franks, in 496 marks the entrance of the pagan tribes of the West into the Christianity and culture of Rome. It was their heritage, not their creation. The union of Roman and Teuton was consummated when Pope Leo III, on Christmas Day, 800, placed the crown of the Caesars upon the brow of Charlemagne. Then the Holy Roman Empire was born with divine sanction, universal and eternal in its scope. Old

and refined as was the culture of the Tiber, it was alien to the genius of the Rhine. Barbarous tribes dwelt in houses which they built not, and ate of vineyards and olive yards which they planted not. The Teuton was only the pupil, and not the master, of his heritage. Time came when he learned his lesson and reached his maturity. In vital touch with the ancient classics and the sacred Scriptures, by way of renaissance and reformation he came to himself and brought forth a religion and culture true to his genius. The tribal chaos of the middle age became the national cosmos of the modern age. The authoritative uniformity of Catholicism was superseded by the free diversity of Protestantism. Through toil and travail, out of the middle age the modern world was born. Then too disintegration preceded reintegration, dissolution attended evolution, hope alternated with despair. Nations were divided against nations. Principalities, dukedoms, and kingdoms devoured one another. There were wars, some thirty years and some a hundred years long. These were the birth pangs of a new age.

Vladimir, baptized in 988, was the Clovis of the East. After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Ivan III placed the two-headed eagle of the Greek emperor on his coat-of-arms and assumed the title of czar, taken from the Latin Caesar. The Byzantine empire which perished at Constantinople rose in Moscow. Ivan III was the Charlemagne of the Slav and with the Muscovite patriarch shared the domination of the Orient. Orthodoxy and autocracy ruled the Russian. The Slav, like the Teuton, inherited his Christianity and culture, a finished and a foreign product. They were imposed upon him and not produced by him. For a thousand years he has been in training through trials and tribulations innumerable. He too has learned his lesson and is coming to his own. His middle age is just now passing and his modern age is dawning. Autocracy and orthodoxy are crumbling. Revolutions, civil strife, and foreign wars work misery and woe. The spirit of order is brooding over the chaos and in due time will be enthroned.

The bogatyr in Russian folklore is an epic hero who with gigantic force and unbridled license breaks the bonds imposed upon him by ages of paternal and cruel guardianship. In this creature of the

imagination we have a parable of history. He typifies one hundred and thirty millions of Russians rising in their might, breaking the fetters of an ecclesiastical and political tyranny, casting off oppressive institutions of alien growth, to produce a civilization and culture pulsating with the Slavic spirit. It will not be a replica of Germany or of France, of England or of America, but a new Russia blending in its life the mysticism of the Orient and the aggressiveness of the Occident, and contributing to humanity a new ideal of religion and society that will forever enrich the heritage of the race.

CRITICAL NOTES

THE KINGDOM AND THE MUSTARD SEED

If the crux in the study of primitive Christianity is the eschatological problem, the crux in the eschatological problem is the question: For Jesus, is the Kingdom of God present or future? Is he establishing it or is he preparing for it? *Is he* Messiah or *is he to be* Messiah? During recent years New Testament scholars have for the first time been coming to view the eschatological language of their sources historically instead of dogmatically, and to recognize that though, as Père Batiffol said, "Jesus promised the Kingdom of God, what came was the Church," the church was not the Kingdom of God he was meaning to promise. Though there are outstanding exceptions, students of Jesus' mission have very generally come to recognize that he was a literal eschatologist, sharing the conviction of John Baptist that the long-expected Kingdom of God was at hand, to be realized within his own generation, and this not in some figurative, inner, "spiritual" sense, but as an outward world-renewal, essentially as the prophets and apocalyptists had foretold. They have come further to recognize that, at least during the later weeks or months of his career, Jesus believed himself called and destined to be Messiah, the divine agent in the establishment of the new order, meaning by Messiah essentially what a first-century Jew would understand it to mean, not a modern homiletic "spiritual" reinterpretation of that ancient title. So far there seems to be rather widespread agreement.

But being asked when the Kingdom of God cometh, Jesus' answer is not understood alike by all, for his answer, at least as expressed in our extant sources, seems not to be clear, explicit, unequivocal. To be sure, the bulk of his utterances reveal precisely the attitude expressed in the petition of his model prayer: "Thy Kingdom come." He looks forward to the arrival of a state not now present, at a day and an hour unknown to himself, as to all men and all angels, though surely within the limits of the present generation. So of his own functioning as Messiah; that is to begin when the Kingdom begins. His parting words to a hostile people are, "I am Messiah, and ye shall see the Son of Man coming,"

where his messiahship becomes actual with his apocalyptic advent. Such is the conception reflected in the bulk of his sayings, as we need not pause to demonstrate. But students find, so they tell us, here and there sayings of another sort, which seem to indicate that in some sense and to some degree the Kingdom of God had begun to be during and in Jesus' mission; that it was already present in part, though not in full realization, and that Jesus, therefore, was already Messiah, not only in personal identity, but in function. Many general considerations, as well as the bulk of Jesus' utterance, already adduced, make strongly against this view, but we must face these alleged contradictory passages. Shall we reject them as not genuine utterances of the Master, because untrue to his clear position, or is there a way of understanding them as congruous with the prevailing expression? If it be true that they really express a view opposed to the futuristic view of the prevailing tenor of Jesus' teaching and of all general considerations, then surely they are to be flatly rejected as not genuine expressions of Jesus' thought. We may not believe him to have been vague, uncertain, of wavering mind on this cardinal point. But the indicated lack of harmony between these sayings and the others may conceivably be due, not to Jesus himself, but to his reporters, translators, and exegetes.

There is a saying in Luke (17:21), without parallel elsewhere, that famous saying, dear to the homilist, "The kingdom of God is within you," which we tear out of one of the most futuristic and apocalyptic contexts in the whole New Testament to use in this translation and this timeless sense. Behind our ambiguous English rendering is a less ambiguous Greek, and behind that a probably still less ambiguous Aramaic, which, unless the whole passage is nonsense, can only have meant, "As you are vainly looking here and looking there, hoping by observation to foresee the approach of the catastrophe, lo, of a sudden, the kingdom of God shall be there, in your startled midst, like the incalculable lightning-flash," which is the figure dominating this verse and its immediate context. This is not a static description of the *locus* of the Kingdom, but a vivid declaration of the suddenness of its appearing, as are all the verses that follow.

Then there is the saying (Matt. 12:28=Luke 11:20) which we read in our English Testament as, "Then is the kingdom of God come upon you." But the Greek verb here (*ἐφθασεν*) does not signify precisely what *ἐλήλυθεν* would mean; it is *hapax legomenon* in the gospels, and is surely chosen by the Greek renderer of Jesus' Aramaic discourse to express a special shade of meaning. That meaning is well brought out

in Burkitt's translation, "It shews you the Kingdom of God at your doors before you were aware of it."¹ This one Greek verb, with whatever ambiguity may attach to it, cannot be regarded as proving a second point of view in Jesus' mind.

On the whole, more weighty in this connection than the exact exegesis of the isolated and ambiguous Greek phrases *ἐντός ὑμῶν* and *ἐφ' ὑμᾶς*, is the witness of a whole group of parables, generally called "the parables of the Kingdom of God," from the introductory phrase, "the kingdom of God is like," or equivalent wording. The most often cited of these is the parable of the Mustard Seed, which begins in Mark (4:30-32), "How shall we liken the kingdom of God, or in what parable shall we set it forth? It is like a grain of mustard seed," etc. Luke (13:18 f.) has practically the same wording, while Matthew (13:31 f.), in his stereotyped fashion, writes, "The kingdom of heaven is like unto a grain of mustard seed." The likeness of the Kingdom to the seed is thus clearly stated by all three, and is naturally always made the norm of the exegesis of the parable. Precisely this locution is not found again in Mark, though the immediately preceding parable (4:26-29) has something very like it: "so is the kingdom of God, as if a man should cast seed on the earth," etc. These are the only parables which Mark verbally connects with the Kingdom. The locution, however, is especially characteristic of Matthew. The parable of the Tares, his substitute for the Markan parable of the Self-growing Seed, just cited, begins, "The kingdom of heaven is likened unto a man that sowed good seed in his field" (13:24-30). Then (13:33), "The kingdom of heaven is like unto leaven, which a woman took and hid in three measures of meal till it was all leavened." Then (13:44), "The kingdom of heaven is likened unto a treasure hidden in the field." Then (13:45 f.), "The kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is a merchant seeking goodly pearls." Again (13:47 f.), "The kingdom of heaven is like a net that was cast into the sea." None of these parables is in Luke except that of the leaven, where Luke reads (13:20 f.), "Whereunto shall I liken the kingdom of God? It is like unto leaven," etc. It is this group of parables in Matt., chap. 13, which is commonly called the parables of

¹ F. C. Burkitt, *Jewish and Christian Apocalypses* (1914), p. 22. Similarly, in the *Interpreter*, VII, 147, Burkitt gives the sense of the phrase, "a reality on the point of arriving, like the wind before the thunderstorm." Compare the comment of Franz Dibelius, in *Studien und Kritiken* (1913), p. 287; the Kingdom of God has come *over* you (*ἐφ' ὑμᾶς*), i.e., not yet come to you, but gathered above you and soon to come down on you (as in I Thess. 2:16).

the Kingdom of God. Before we ask them to testify in our present inquiry, let us follow Matthew's use of this same introductory phrase in his later pages.

We find (18:23-34) that "the kingdom of heaven is likened unto a certain king who would make a reckoning with his servants." Further (20:1-15), "the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that was a householder, who went out early in the morning to hire laborers into his vineyard." In 22:1-13, "the kingdom of heaven is likened unto a certain king, who made a marriage feast for his son," while in 25:1-12 we find that "the kingdom of heaven shall be likened unto ten virgins . . . and five of them were foolish and five were wise." In these four instances, exegetes have not, as a rule, sought a statement of what the kingdom is like, although the declarations of Matthew are perfectly definite that it is like a king making a reckoning with his servants, like a householder hiring laborers, like a king giving a marriage feast, like ten virgins. We all ignore entirely these purely formal statements, taking them as merely a piece of meaningless Matthean rhetoric, and proceed to interpret the stories at their face value, precisely as if they began, "A certain king would make a reckoning with his servants, and when," etc.; or "There was a man who was a householder who went out," etc.; or, "A certain king made a marriage feast for his son," etc.; or, "There were ten virgins who took their lamps," etc. These stories may or may not on examination prove to have some illustrative bearing on the Kingdom of God; in any case the Kingdom is not like the person or thing happening to be named first, nor did Matthew, still less Jesus, mean to say that it was. Immediately after the parable of the Ten Virgins, Matthew writes, "For as a man, going into another country, called his own servants," etc. (25:14-30, the parable of the Talents). It is pure accident, with no calculation, that he did not write, "The kingdom of heaven is like a man going," etc., nor would any exegete conceive it to alter in the slightest degree the interpretation of the parable had it so begun. In the parable of the Marriage Feast, Luke's parallel begins, "A certain man made a great supper." Does anyone suppose that Luke means anything different from Matthew because he does not write, "The kingdom of God is like a certain man who made a great supper"? Or would anyone, from Luke's text, have suspected a likeness between this distracted host and the Kingdom? He may be like God in a certain situation; he certainly is in no respect like the Kingdom. Just before this parable Matthew has another, the parable of the Vineyard, which he begins, this time following Mark and so omitting

his usual phrase, "There was a man that was a householder, who planted a vineyard," etc. Left to himself, Matthew would have said, "The kingdom of heaven is like a man that was a householder, who planted a vineyard," etc. But he would have meant nothing different. All these parables we take as simple stories, and ask for the obvious meaning of the story, quite without regard for the phrase about the Kingdom. So far our discussion is a repetition of very familiar positions.

Now *exactly* the same procedure is in order with all the so-called "Kingdom-of-God parables" in Matt., chap. 13. The very name is misleading and begs the whole question. "Only in the editorial process," says Johannes Weiss,¹ "have they been placed under this rubric." They are one and all simple, brief stories or pictures of life, each with an obvious illustrative value. They may or may not illustrate some aspect of the Kingdom of God, but the introductory phrase, in its one or two occurrences in Mark, and constantly in Matthew, is absolutely as conventional, artificial, and meaningless as in Matthew's later examples. In plain words, the Kingdom of God is *not* like a grain of mustard seed at all, any more than it is like ten virgins, or like a king calling his stewards to account. All the elaborate exegesis that tells us how the Kingdom is like the seed, because it is planted and grows gradually into full and splendid stature, is so much wasted ingenuity. If there is anything in the world the Kingdom is *not* like, in Jesus' mind, it is a gradually growing seed, whose increase can be daily noted. Rather, as he repeatedly says, it is as sudden and unexpected as a flash of lightning. He exhausts all the resources of the Old Testament and of his own imagination to depict its abrupt and unlooked-for dawning. It is like Noah's flood, like Sodom and Gomorrah, like the burglar, like the returning master, like the tardy bridegroom, like everything that comes "in such an hour as ye think not. Watch therefore; when men are saying, Peace and safety, then sudden destruction cometh upon them; let your loins be girded about and your lamps burning, and be ye yourselves like men looking for their lord, that when he cometh and knocketh they may straightway open to him." The Kingdom of God is like *that*; it is not in the least like the mustard seed, growing slowly, surely, equably, visibly, into a tree. Jesus never said it was like such a seed. Nor did he ever mean to say it was like leaven, slowly and surely leavening a mass of dough.

One only needs to compare the twin parables in Matt. 13:44-46 to see how futile is any exegesis based on this phrasing. "The king-

¹ *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, XVI, 449.

dom of heaven is like unto a treasure hidden in the field, which a man found and hid, and in his joy he goeth and selleth all that he hath and buyeth that field." Very good; by chance the phrase happens to fit fairly well here. But go on. "The kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is a merchant seeking goodly pearls, and having found one pearl of great price, he went and sold all that he had and bought it." These are twin parables, with one point, and we may safely defy any exegete to point out how the Kingdom is in one case like the treasure and in the other like the man who found it. "There was a treasure hidden in a field; there was a merchant seeking goodly pearls"; so the little stories should begin, standing on their own feet; then we may ask whether the pearl and the treasure illustrate the exceeding price of the Kingdom: doubtless they do. Illuminating here is the so-called (and miscalled) parable of the Sower, which in all the synoptics begins this parabolic discourse. Mark (4:1-8) begins, "Behold, the sower went forth to sow." Matthew (13:3-8) repeats the same words, and Luke (8:5-8) has, "The sower went forth to sow his seed." In this fashion all the parables should begin, so far as their real intent is concerned. It is sheer accident, not any difference of meaning, that keeps this parable from beginning, especially in Matthew, "The kingdom of heaven is like a sower who went forth to sow." Mark, indeed, relates this and the other parables to the kingdom by his following words, "Unto you (disciples) is given the mystery of the Kingdom of God, but unto them that are without, all things are done in parables," words repeated by Matthew and Luke. But it never occurs to anyone to seek light on the nature of the Kingdom by tracing a likeness between it and the sower, or even between it and the seed. As a matter of fact, the sower is unessential to the parable's point. It might as well begin, "As seed was sown, some fell," etc.; it is not a parable of the Sower, but of the various sorts of soil, as Jülicher calls it. Here alone lies its significance. The early Christian exegesis of it put by all three evangelists into Jesus' mouth is, to be sure, not from Jesus, but it expresses in a rough and ready, if all too allegorical, fashion, what he had in mind. He is the sower; the seed is his message; the soil is the varying hearts of men; the fruitful grain, bearing thirty, sixty, a hundred fold, is the responsive and faithful disciple, with his works of love and brotherhood.

Precisely the same situation is illuminated by the parable of the Mustard Seed. The sower is the same, the seed is the same, the grain bearing a hundred fold corresponds to the tree in whose branches nest

the birds of the heaven. Neither is the Kingdom of God; both refer to Jesus' own work in proclaiming the message of the Kingdom and the call of God. He and his work are obscure, his following is partial and at best scanty, but he has faith that in the end there will be an abundant harvest.¹ The seed is tiny; but, planted, it will grow, and a great company of ransomed souls, a great body of citizens ready for the coming Kingdom, will be the full growth, or the fruit. As thus the fruits of his work will be abundant, just so later he faces death in the serene confidence that he will give his life for the ransoming of many. Here is faith sublime. "A man casts seed on the earth and lies down to sleep and rises, night and day, and the seed springs up and grows, he knows not how. The earth bears fruit of herself; first the blade, then the ear, then the full grain in the ear. And *when the fruit is ripe, then* he puts forth the sickle, because the harvest is come." Then, and not till then, dawns the Kingdom of God. That is what all these parables are saying; not what the Kingdom of God is like, but what faith Jesus has in the ultimate, divinely blessed consummation of his humble efforts. The parable of the Leaven but repeats the same thought in a new figure. Jesus' message and influence *were* like leaven; what could be more vivid and apt? They were like a mustard seed, or like the sower's grain, scattered prodigally on every soil, sure somewhere to find fertile ground and conditions of abundant fruition.²

But Jesus never thought and never said that the Kingdom of God, to whose blessed advent he looked forward, was like a grain of seed or a bit of leaven. Whether the conventional Semitic rhetorical phrase, "both ancient and usual as a Jewish preface to parables,"³ which seems to make him declare such likeness in our Greek and English translations, is due originally to him or to his reporters is a question outside our present

¹ Henry Churchill King (*The Ethics of Jesus* [1910], pp. 62 f.), says, "The parable of the mustard seed . . . seems to me plainly not primarily eschatological. . . . It is one of his own encouragements of himself."

² Cf. McNeile *ad* Matt., chap. 13 (p. 204), on the six parables of this chapter. "He seems to be describing His own experiences. He and the disciples had preached with varying success (Sower and Dragnet); the failures had been due to the opposing influence of the Devil (Tares); but nevertheless the preaching had brought to earth the beginnings of a development which would end in the splendid consummation (Mustard Seed and Leaven), to share in which is a prize worth any sacrifice (Treasure and Pearl)."

³ *Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem* (1911), p. 52. In the same volume, p. 276, Allen remarks that the phrase "Kingdom of Heaven" "may of course in such a parable as the mustard seed denote anything that anybody cares to read into it."

inquiry.¹ Nor can we here inquire how far certain forces and ideals of the Kingdom were already beginning to be effective, in such fashion as to serve for Jesus as an earnest and a certain proof of the imminence of the new age itself. In any case, with a true understanding of these parables, mistakenly called parables of the Kingdom of God, disappears the last exegetical basis for the idea that Jesus thought of the Kingdom as something already present, in some degree, in his own time and his own activity.

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¹ Cf. Weinel, *Biblische Theologie des N.T.*, 2te Auflage (1913), pp. 51 f.: "To be sure it is here not certain how far the introductory phrases, in which alone for the most part the thought of the Kingdom of Heaven stands, really belong to the material, and how far they are Matthew's own addition. . . . It remains in part open to question how far the parables speak of the Kingdom of God at all. . . . Among Matthew's 'Kingdom-of-heaven Parables' there are quite a number which have nothing whatever to do with the Kingdom of God as such."

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

A NEW JEWISH VERSION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT¹

In all periods of their history the Jews have recognized the necessity of translating the Hebrew Scriptures into the vernacular of the countries in which they have lived. In Palestine they made the Aramaic Targum, and in Egypt the Greek Septuagint, even before the beginning of the Christian era. Under Moslem rule Sa'adia made the Arabic version. In modern times, when German was the language of most of the Jews in Europe, Mendelssohn and his school produced a translation in that language. In still more recent times there has been a great migration of Jews into English-speaking countries. For a time these immigrants used the Authorized English Version, but as their numbers increased they naturally felt the impropriety of reading a Christian interpretation which frequently showed a christological bias, and they demanded new English renderings of their own. The attempt was made to meet this need by the translations of Benisch, Friedländer, and Leeser, which have enjoyed extensive use in the synagogues of England and America.

The progress of modern science has antiquated these works and has created the need for a new rendering that should do for Judaism what the Revised Version has done for Christendom. In 1892 a committee of Jewish scholars was formed who divided the books of the Old Testament among themselves with the idea that their separate versions would subsequently be harmonized by an editorial commission. By 1908 it became apparent that this plan would indefinitely delay the completion of the undertaking, and accordingly the new method was adopted of appointing an editorial board which acted unitedly upon all proposed renderings. The distinguished Hebrew scholar and textual critic Professor Max L. Margolis, of Dropsie College, Philadelphia, was chosen editor-in-chief, and upon him has fallen the brunt of the labor. He prepared the manuscript of the new version with lists of the alternate readings of the versions and proposed translations of doubtful passages, and submitted this manuscript to the other members of the board for individual

¹*The Holy Scriptures According to the Masoretic Text*: a new translation, with the aid of previous versions and with constant consultation of Jewish authorities. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1917. xv+1136 pages. \$1.00.

consideration. Then the entire board met in joint session on one hundred and sixty days during seven years and voted upon the renderings to be adopted. The new version comes, accordingly, with the combined authority of seven noted Jewish scholars.

In estimating the value of this version one should realize clearly what it aims to be and what it does not undertake. First, it does not attempt a revision of the so-called Masoretic, or traditional Hebrew, Text, even in the vowel points. As the editors remark in their preface, "A translation destined for the people can follow only one text, and that must be the traditional." In this respect this version shows no improvement upon the British and American Revised versions, both of which in the Old Testament are based upon an uncorrected text, while in the New Testament they are based upon a critically emended text. This procedure, of course, leaves many passages just as obscure in the New Version (NV) as they are in the Revised Version (RV). Thus in Gen. 49:10, where RV translates "until Shiloh come," NV translates, "as long as men come to Shiloh." This is even more senseless than the rendering of RV, to say nothing of the question whether the Hebrew will bear such a translation. In this case the vocalization of the ancient versions, *shello*, is certainly preferable, and we should translate, "until he come to that which is his," or, "until he come whose it is." In I Sam. 13:1, where RV translates "Saul was [forty] years old when he began to reign; and when he had reigned two years over Israel," NV translates, "Saul was ——— years old when he began to reign; and two years he reigned over Israel." But "two years" is just as impossible as "one year old" of the received text, and should either have been corrected or left blank like the other numeral. In Isa. 1:10-13 the perverse sentence division of the Masoretic accentuation is adhered to, with the result that the poetry is destroyed and the prophetic polemic against sacrifice is obscured. The Song of Deborah (Judg., chap. 5) is translated just as glibly in NV as in RV, although at many points the Masoretic Text is admittedly so corrupt as to be unintelligible. Instances of this sort might be multiplied indefinitely. In NV we miss even the occasional marginal notes of RV which call attention to the different readings of the ancient versions.

In the second place this version, although it calls itself "a new translation," is not such in any true sense. It does not attempt to throw former versions aside and to give as correct a rendering as possible into modern English, but it seeks merely to revise the Authorized Version. The language of the Authorized Version has endeared itself to Jews as

well as to Christians, and they do not welcome departures from it unless these are inevitable. Consequently the Jewish editors have followed the example of Christian revisers and have retained the language of the old version in all cases where it was not too flagrantly incorrect. The Christian reader peruses this translation with less shock than he experiences in passing from the Authorized to the Revised Version of the New Testament. It could be used in any Christian church without the congregation noticing the difference. Accordingly it should be known as the "Jewish Revised Version" rather than the "New Version." It is merely a third step in the process of correction, of which the two preceding steps are the Revised Version and the American Revised Version. As a result of this timid attitude toward the old version this translation, like the Revised Version, is much less accurate than it might have been if it had been independent. The opening words of Genesis follow AV in translating, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," although every Hebrew scholar knows that this is an impossible rendering. In Gen. 37:3 ff. Joseph is still said to have "a coat of many colours," although the expression certainly means "a coat reaching to the hands and feet." Numerous instances might be cited like these in which faulty renderings have been retained out of deference to established English custom.

On the other hand, this version is freer in its treatment of AV than is either RV or ARV, and consequently it marks a distinct advance. An interesting case is I Sam. 13:21 where RV translates: "Yet they had a file for the mattocks, and for the coulter^s, and for the forks, and for the axes, and to set the goads." Here NV renders: "And the price of the filing was a pim for the mattocks, and for the coulter^s, and for the forks with three teeth, and for the axes; and to set the goads." This translation is based upon the recent discovery by Macalister at Gezer of a stone weighing two-thirds of a shekel inscribed with the word *pim*. The English version has unquestionably warped a number of passages in the Old Testament in order to conform them to the christological interpretation of the New Testament. These dogmatic translations are rightly corrected in NV. Thus in Isa. 7:14 RV retains the erroneous translation, "Behold a virgin shall conceive," with the marginal note "or maiden"; while NV correctly translates, "Behold the young woman shall conceive." The translation of Isa., chapter 53, in this version is much better than in RV, although there is still room for improvement. Hostility to the Christian interpretation of certain messianic passages has occasionally led the Jewish translators to a rendering that is just as dog-

matic as the one from which they are trying to escape. Thus Isa. 9:6b RV translates in a most misleading fashion: "His name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace." Instead of this NV substitutes, "And his name is called Pele-joez-el-gibbor-abí-ad-sar-shalom," and in a footnote says, "that is, Wonderful in counsel is God the Mighty, the Everlasting Father, the Ruler of peace." This rendering is exegetically impossible. What the context demands is a description of Messiah, not of God. Such a periphrasis for Yahweh is never found in Isaiah or any other prophet, and such a long and clumsy sentence is never used by Isaiah as the name of an individual. Modern commentators are agreed that the passage should be translated: "His name shall be called Wonderful Counsellor, Godlike Hero, Enduring Father, Peaceful Ruler." This translation has neither a Christian nor a Jewish bias.

One great superiority of this version over RV is the preservation of the Hebrew order of the books of the Old Testament. The revisers had no justification for retaining the order of the Septuagint and Vulgate except their fear of disturbing popular prejudice. This order confuses the original threefold division of the Canon, Law, Prophets, and Writings, and leads to misconceptions of the origin of such books as Daniel and Chronicles. It is highly desirable that the Hebrew order should be restored in our current English version.

Another advantage of this version is its consistent indication of poetry by printing the members of the parallel couplets in separate lines. RV does this in the case of the so-called Poetical Books, but it does not do it in the case of the Prophets, although these are mainly poetical. NV indicates all poetical passages, both in the Prophets and in the Historical Books. This is an immense advantage for the literary appreciation of these books.

Still another advantage of this version is its omission of the apocryphal titles which RV has retained from AV. Thus instead of "The First Book of Moses, commonly called Genesis," which suggests to the English reader that the Pentateuch claims to come from the hand of Moses, NV has correctly "*Torah*, the Law; *Bereshith*, Genesis." Even here it may be questioned whether the translation "the Law" instead of "Law" is not misleading.

One more advantage of this version over ARV is its rendering of the personal name of the God of Israel by "Lord" instead of "Jehovah." The name Jehovah is a linguistic monstrosity formed by pronouncing the vowels of one word with the consonants of another word, and in

spite of custom should be rooted out of the English language. Either we should say "Yahweh," as the ancient Hebrews said, or should substitute "Lord," as did the later Jews. It is probable that pronunciation of the divine name was avoided at the time when most of the books of the Old Testament were written, hence the translation "Lord" is entirely justifiable. It is a vice of ARV that it has everywhere inserted Jehovah.

Viewed as a whole this is a better version of the Old Testament than any that has yet appeared. It marks a distinct advance upon both the British and the American Revised versions. It will be a valuable exegetical aid to Christian students by showing the traditional Jewish rendering of difficult passages, and there is no reason why it should not be read and studied in Christian churches as a better aid in getting near to the spirit of the Old Testament than any other complete version that we possess. Still it is by no means a final version. We still wait for a translation that shall be based upon a critically emended text and shall endeavor to give a correct rendering of the original without regard to tradition, Jewish, Christian, or English.

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THE RELIGIOUS VALUE OF JESUS¹

During the winter of 1915-16 Mr. Glover, of Cambridge University, gave a series of lectures on Jesus in many cities of India, with the purpose of promoting Christianity in this missionary field. These ten lectures, put into shape for publication in the Orient away from the accessories of scholarship, for which the author apologizes, are now presented in book form under the auspices of the British Student Christian Movement. The volume is a small one, apologetic and evangelistic in aim, theological in spirit, homiletical in content, rhetorical in style. Exclamation and interrogation points abound, and there are sharp slurs at opposing opinions and interpretations, appeals to the conservative tendency in the common mind, evasion of fundamental historical problems, smoothing over of theological difficulties. "There is nothing archaic about Plato, Virgil, Paul, or Jesus" (p. 21) indicates the non-historical point of view, the pragmatic animus of the author. Moffatt has aptly called the book "a charming impressionist study." Glover seems to have

¹*The Jesus of History.* By T. R. Glover. New York: Doran, 1917. xiv+225 pages. \$1.00.

found much inspiration in Carlyle's *Heroes and Hero Worship*; he says (p. 2) that Carlyle's lecture on "Mohammed, the Hero as Prophet," may be taken as a landmark for English people in this new historical treatment of the world's great religious teachers and leaders. Carlyle, writing in 1840, did not take Jesus as his type of prophet because at that date the general public—and probably Carlyle himself—would only think of Jesus christologically. Glover would now like to do for Jesus what Carlyle did for Mohammed—present him historically, and yet in an idealized and eulogistic way, with superlative phrases and practical evaluation. Glover proceeds to name his book *The Jesus of History*, when it is in fact a book on *The Religious Value of Jesus*. The author is uncertain about the results of the historical interpretation of Jesus, and is not overinterested in them anyway; but he is sure and enthusiastic about the religious value of Jesus—his superiority, truth, and power. He speaks of historical questions concerning Jesus which "students may discuss" (p. 138). He presents Jesus in his divinity: "We are not at all so near him as we have imagined. He eludes us, goes far out beyond what we grasp or conceive . . . we realize how little we know about Jesus" (p. 165).

The ten heads under which this interpretation of Jesus is arranged in chapters are as follows: i, "The Study of the Gospels"; ii, "Childhood and Youth"; iii, "The Man and His Mind"; iv, "The Teacher and the Disciples"; v, "The Teaching of Jesus upon God"; vi, "Jesus and Man"; vii, "Jesus' Teaching upon Sin"; viii, "The Choice of the Cross"; ix, "The Christian Church in the Roman Empire"; x, "Jesus in Christian Thought." The last two chapters intentionally deal with the period subsequent to the public ministry of Jesus, on the ground that we can make an adequate estimate of the person and work of Jesus only when we include the later history which he set in motion. "The consensus of Christian opinion gives the very highest name to Jesus Christ. . . . The Church has risen in power with every real emphasis laid on Jesus Christ" (p. 213). The author does not ask us to subscribe to the classical christological doctrines of the church, but he holds that with care we can use christological theories to recover the facts which those who framed the theories intended to explain. What did they really mean to say, what had they experienced which they thought worth expressing? They were face to face with a very great new experience, and they cast about for some means of describing and explaining it (p. 215). "The historical character of Christian life and thought is surely evidence that Jesus Christ has accomplished something real; and when we get a

better hold of that, the problem of his person should be more within our reach" (p. 221). And he closes his book with the proposal that we moderns construct our own doctrine of Jesus Christ according to our own experience of him; in Herrmann's phrase, making "such a confession of the Deity of Christ as springs naturally to the lips of the man whom Jesus has already made blessed" (p. 225).

Glover does not disclose to us his own doctrine of Jesus constructed out of his own experience of Jesus. At many points in the book he seems to assume a natural rather than a supernatural Jesus. He gives no acceptance to the miracle working beyond what we can assume to be within the range of natural law. In chapter ii, where we might have expected a discussion, he makes no reference to the miraculous conception or the infancy narratives in general; he seems to hold them legendary. The doctrine of the sinlessness of Jesus seems not to be maintained, for he writes: "With every chance to see weakness in his character, they [his disciples] did not find much amiss in him" (p. 78). The problem of the messianic consciousness of Jesus is given slight attention. He says that Jesus accepted the title Messiah and used the title Son of Man messianically (p. 177). But "when the question is asked, 'Was Jesus the Messiah?' the obvious reply is, 'Which Messiah?' For there seems to have been no standard idea of the Messiah. The Messiah was, on the whole, as vague a term as, in modern politics, socialism or tariff reform. Neither of them has come; perhaps they will never come, and nobody knows what they will be till they do come. Jesus is not what they expected" (p. 68). This may be a successful, and perhaps a permissible, way of dismissing the problem of the messianic consciousness of Jesus in order to relieve modern theology and homiletics. It is certainly not a legitimate handling of the problem from the point of view of a historical interpretation of Jesus.

Glover's doctrine of the divinity of Christ is that he was conscious of "his own peculiar relation to God" (p. 177). He knew God and revealed God as no one had done before him and no one has done since. He brought men "to face the fact of God, to realize the seriousness of God and of life, and to see God. . . . Decision for God, obedience to God, that is the prime thing—action on the basis of God and of God's care for the individual" (p. 71). With regard to his death, our author holds that Jesus voluntarily chose it and that he gave to it a theological significance. "It is no martyr's death that he incurs" (p. 170). "Something must be done to touch the heart and to move the will of men, effectively; and he must do it" (p. 174). "He is the

great interpreter of God, and it is borne in upon him that only by the cross can he interpret God, make God real to us, and bring us to the very heart of God. That is his purpose" (p. 178). "He chose the cross; and in choosing it, Christians have always felt, he revealed God; and that is the center of the great act of Redemption" (p. 181). On the whole this seems to be a "moral-influence" idea of the atonement, yet by claiming a uniqueness for this act of Jesus he does not quite detach himself from the supernaturalistic doctrine of Christ's work. "Jesus Christ transcends our categories and classification" (p. 22).

Regarding the resurrection of Jesus the author also leaves the reader in uncertainty as to what he thinks: "Is it the detail or the central fact that matters? Take away the resurrection, however it happened, whatever it was, and the history of the Church is unintelligible. . . . Something happened, so tremendous and so vital that it changed, not only the character of the movement and the men—but with them the whole history of the world" (p. 178). That must then have been a supernatural event of the first magnitude; but the Gospel accounts of the resurrection of Jesus cannot be depended upon to tell us what happened. Can we only say, "Whatever it was"? If the matter stands that way it is likely that historians will prefer to find natural causes for the resurrection faith of the disciples and its influence upon early Christianity. History is not now written by postulating supernatural interventions. How long will christological doctrine survive when the New Testament supernaturalism is rejected, and some vague, undefined supernaturalism is proposed in its place? Although the Christology of the Gospel of John is more of the kind that Glover holds, he will not use that either because "the exact relations of history and interpretation in the Fourth Gospel—the methods and historical outlook of the writer—cannot yet be said to be determined" (p. 10).

The book gives only a religious study of Jesus—his religious significance. It presents no discussion of the dates, length, and course of Jesus' ministry, no consideration of the geography of the ministry, no exposition of how he related himself to the Jewish parties in his day, no treatment of the political situation and Jesus' attitude toward it, no study of the official trial of Jesus, no interpretation of his general teaching—such as is contained in the Sermon on the Mount. This teaching concerning conduct and character is not only untreated, but is repudiated. "Men, he saw, do not want precepts; they do not want ethics, morals, or rules; what they do need is to rethink God, to rediscover him, to re-explore him, to live on the basis of relation with God. . . . If Jesus

had merely put before men an ethical code, that would have been to do what the moralists had done before him—what moralists always do, with the same naïve idea that they are doing a great deal for us. His object was far more fundamental” (p. 70). This is a depreciation of ethics in general and of Jesus’ ethical teaching in particular that must be rejected and refuted by philosophical and practical science and by the entire modern system of education in school and church. It is an unhistorical reading of the influence which Greek ethics has had, from Socrates to the present day, not to speak of the immeasurable and continuous benefit in the Orient of Confucian and Buddhist ethics. Certainly also the Christian religion for nineteen hundred years has kept prominent in its belief and practice the ethical teachings of Jesus, as we read them especially in the Gospel of Matthew, chapters 5-7, 10, 13, 18, and 23, together with Paul’s ethical teachings in the Galatian, First Corinthian, and Roman letters. The correct affirmation concerning Jesus is precisely the opposite of Glover’s statement above: Jesus saw that men *did* want (need) ethics, and he gave one of the finest, most helpful ethical messages that the world has received.

The claim of the author, in the title of the book, that he has presented to us “the Jesus of History” is not made good in his pages. From the viewpoint of a historical interpretation of Jesus the treatment is mystical, homiletical, superficial, and fragmentary. He has given useful expositions of some phases and items of the Gospel story, which students will wish to consult. But the book is not a major contribution to that great reconstruction of the Jesus of history which stands imminent as the supreme task of some surpassing New Testament scholar.

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TWO NEW HARMONIES OF THE GOSPELS¹

From the University of Chicago come two Gospel harmonies, or, to follow the language of the books themselves, a *Harmony of the Synoptic Gospels* and a *Super-Harmony of the Gospels*. At least the latter title appears on the cover slip of Dr. Sharman’s book, while he himself says in his prefatory statement that “the book cannot be regarded as a

¹ *A Harmony of the Synoptic Gospels*. By Ernest DeWitt Burton and Edgar Johnson Goodspeed. New York: Scribner, 1917. xv+275 pages. \$1.25.

Records of the Life of Jesus. By Henry Burton Sharman. New York: Doran, 1917. xix+319 pages. \$2.50.

harmony of the records." This variant phrasing, however, represents individual choice of nomenclature rather than divergence of aim and substance in the two works. Both present in parallel columns the American revision of the Authorized English Version of the Synoptic Gospels reprinted with all the marginal notes. Dr. Sharman prints also, in a second part, the same text of the Fourth Gospel, with marginal references to parallel material in the synoptics.

Both books, that is, aim to enable the reader to make a comparative study of a particular English version of the Gospels; neither exercises any criticism on this version, or tries to help the student to get behind it or beyond it, save as certain variant readings belong to the *apparatus criticus* of the marginal notes which form a part of the version itself, as reprinted. There can be then no criticism of the substance of the works; there the editors have exercised no judgment of their own and make no contribution. Where they have been active is simply in the arrangement of the material, its division into sections, the placing of these sections in sequence, and the juxtaposition of parallel material. Here approval or dissent may properly manifest itself.

Both books give the synoptics in the canonical order, Mark being in the middle, with nothing to suggest its priority to the others. This is simply an application of the principle adopted by the editors of both works not to let any theory of synoptic relationships govern the arrangement of the material. The student who takes up either work ignorant of the synoptic problem will undoubtedly soon discover for himself that there is such a problem, and may perhaps be led to find a clue to its solution in the assumption of Mark's priority. If he does he has done an independent piece of critical work and reached results of his own; the neutral editors have given him no help to that solution. This wholly objective method has obvious merits. It gives us, not the editors' conclusions, but the opportunity of finding conclusions for ourselves. As we open these books we find ourselves where Gospel study was in 1830. A harmony which would put at the student's disposal the result of scholarly researches since that time, so that he need not recapitulate the labors of these ninety years, would have other values as obvious.

Both works further try so far as possible to keep the text of each Gospel in its usual order. Dr. Sharman, indeed, who has some three hundred and twenty octavo pages at his disposal, and can repeat his material *ad libitum*, succeeds in doing this throughout, save in three chapters of Matthew, the contents of which are to some extent

rearranged. Burton and Goodspeed, with a much smaller book, similarly rearrange nine chapters of Matthew and one section of Luke. The result is that we have, not a continuous narrative such as any one of the Gospels gives us, but (save for those portions where the three are parallel in order as well as in content) a text with many duplications of material. For example, section 2 of Burton and Goodspeed gives Matthew's genealogy of Jesus as a part of a chapter headed "The Infancy Narratives," while section 18 (the baptism of Jesus) gives Luke's genealogy as a part of a chapter called "The Period of Preparation." In each case the other genealogy is given in brackets in its proper column, as a "parallel passage in a non-parallel section." So section 21 gives Luke's account of the rejection at Nazareth, where it is manifestly out of its chronological order, while the account of the same scene in Mark and Matthew is deferred until section 69. We have thus the same episode furnishing two of the 186 sections into which the whole material is divided, and these two so far apart as to suggest separate incidents chronologically remote from one another. The same thing occurs repeatedly.

We have, in short, a comparative arrangement of the *Gospels*, not of the *Gospel material*. The documents themselves are normative and are kept so far as possible intact. It is evident that another method, in which the Gospel material was the prime concern, and where the arrangement of any single evangelist might be freely broken up and the parallel passages brought together simply on the basis of their parallelism, would furnish another sort of harmony. By avoiding duplication it would much reduce the number and complexity of the sections and would furnish a single coherent running text with the virtues of all the existing synoptic texts and none of their defects, superior to any in completeness and order. Such a harmony our students have in Ross Finney's English edition of Huck's *Synopse*, which has the critical advantage of placing Mark first, and shows at a glance by its spacing the use made by Matthew and Luke of their common sources, Mark and Q. Here we can study the synoptic *material* with the aid of the most widely accepted solution of the problems involved; as an example of this sort of harmony the English Huck is yet to be improved upon. But for the other sort, a harmony of the Gospels as completed documents, where problem and solution alike are left to be discovered by the student, there is nothing better than what Dr. Burton and Dr. Goodspeed have given us; indeed, nothing as good. It is doubtful whether Sharman's greater measure of fidelity to the order of the existing texts, with its increased complexity

and duplication, really makes a more useful work. In each book references forward and back, whenever sections appear out of their original order, enable the student to follow the consecutive text of any Gospel. Convenience in usage indeed is attained in a notable degree in both books. A great merit of both also is the presentation on a single page of all parallel material, from every part of every Gospel in question. This is an indispensable feature, the lack of which in the English Huck is that book's chief defect as a working manual for students.

Dr. Sharman's synoptic parallels to the Fourth Gospel are generously inclusive, possibly too much so, but it is a very great convenience to have all possible connecting links thus brought together. In the book by Burton and Goodspeed one is puzzled by the Fourth Gospel reference in the caption of a section from Luke, chap. 24, "The Appearance in Jerusalem, *Thomas Being Absent*." This is undoubtedly a slip rather than an isolated suggestion that after all the Johannine account is historic and normative. On the same page (267) footnote 3 is marked 2. On page 263, note 5, *authorities* has lost a letter.

Professors Burton and Goodspeed have given us a book for the hand and the classroom, Professor Sharman one for the desk and the seminar table. For both, New Testament students will be grateful; by both, New Testament study will profit.

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A NEW VOLUME ON PAULINE THEOLOGY

The latest treatise on the Pauline theology¹ is one important result of a very potent cause, the publication in 1913 of W. Bousset's *Kyrios Christos*. The excellence of Bousset's book is recognized universally, but a new tribute to its power is offered by this latest work, which has adopted Bousset's conclusions almost as a whole.

Even a cursory comparison of the two volumes will show the justice of this statement. The essential foundation of Paulinism lies in a contrast of "spirit" with "flesh," the latter being interpreted in Hellenistic categories (Morgan, pp. 16-21; Bousset, pp. 130-34). Paul's doctrine of the spirit is largely an inheritance from earlier Christianity, but he differed from his predecessors in three important regards (pp. 22-24;

¹ *The Religion and Theology of Paul*. By W. Morgan. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1917. xii+272 pages. 4s. 6d.

Bousset, pp. 128 f.). Most important is the equation "Christ= Spirit" (p. 24; Bousset, p. 126). The *κύριος* title for Christ is a cult title, contrasting Jesus with the "lords" of pagan cults. It was unknown to Palestinian Christianity, and the form *mar* originated in an Aramaic-speaking group of Antioch (pp. 46-51; Bousset, pp. 108-21). The "two Adam" doctrine proves Paul's supernatural conception of Christ (pp. 54-56; Bousset, pp. 158-60). Hence a new meaning was given "Son of God" (pp. 56-58; Bousset, pp. 181-83), which, however, fell short of full deity (pp. 52 f.; Bousset, p. 185). Paul's terminology was derived from Hellenistic gnosis and approaches Philo's Logos doctrine (pp. 61-63; Bousset, pp. 174-77), but Paul introduced certain important modifications of his own (pp. 63 f.; Bousset, pp. 177-80). The incarnation was the simple assumption of a fleshly body, to break the power of "sin-in-the-flesh" (pp. 65-67; Bousset, p. 183). Paul viewed the death of Christ under a threefold aspect: forensic, as freeing from the Law, and as destroying the "body of sin" (pp. 100-102; Bousset, pp. 160-62). And so on.

This following of Bousset, however, is distinctly not that of a copyist. Dr. Morgan has been convinced of the justice of almost all of Bousset's conclusions, but he has made those conclusions thoroughly his own. His method of presentation is independent of Bousset's, his choice of illustrative texts is usually different, and his treatment is on the whole more convincing. Indeed, most readers will think that he has followed Bousset to improve on him. Dr. Morgan's independence is exhibited particularly in his second "Part" (pp. 113-270), in which the conclusions are elaborated according to the more conventional divisions of Paulinism. This elaboration is always faithful to the premises, but it advances far beyond them; compare especially the important chapter on "Ethics" (pp. 178-97).

The most thorough departure appears in the treatment of the Sacraments (pp. 203-27). Dr. Morgan protests against assigning *ex opere operato* conceptions to Paul, for the apostle's outlook left no room for such conceptions. To be saved by faith and to be saved by a rite are antinomies. To be nourished by faith and to be nourished by a rite are likewise antinomies. And there can be no doubt as to Paul's choice of antinomies, for his attitude toward faith is fundamental.

This argument is not very convincing. The appeal to the necessity of unified thinking is always hazardous in historical reconstruction, particularly in the domain of religion. And it is most hazardous in the case of a man like Paul, who stood midway between two thought-

worlds. Dr. Morgan realizes this partly when he writes (p. 212), "He [Paul] has not fully grasped the distinction between symbol and efficient cause, or its far-reaching importance."

This phrase, "has not fully grasped the distinction," is the key to much more than the obscurities in Pauline sacramentalism. It is the key to very much in Paulinism, and Bousset's chief failure lies in ignoring this and in insisting on too close a unity in Paul's thinking. There is not "a" Pauline theology. There are at least two, one based on Jewish categories and the other on Hellenistic. Older expositors endeavored to force everything into a scheme deducible from Pharisaism, but Bousset has run into the opposite error of ignoring the extent of genuinely Jewish thinking in Paul. The result is a distorted picture, which makes too absolute a cleavage between the various stages in the earliest Christian development. Bousset's presentation is wonderfully clear and attractive, with its sharply defined strata, but this very sharpness of definition is untrue to the nature of theological development.

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A THEOLOGY FOR THE SOCIAL GOSPEL

Like a breath of fresh air from the living world the message of Professor Rauschenbusch's book sweeps through the musty halls of the conventional theological edifice.¹ Its virility and originality eloquently testify to the great loss which Christian thinking has suffered in the recent death of the author. It compels attention to phases of life and experience which, although of primary importance today, found little or no place in the traditional expositions of Christian convictions. It cannot fail to stimulate everyone to profitable thinking. As Professor Rauschenbusch himself said, "This book had to be written sometime." The host of Christian ministers who are beginning to feel the importance of the social point of view will be grateful that the pioneer interpretation of the social gospel was undertaken by one who embodied so pre-eminently in his life the spirit of that gospel.

The social gospel represents a moral passion for the welfare of men rather than a supreme concern for one's individual salvation. The fundamental ideas underlying our inherited theology are mainly those

¹ *A Theology for the Social Gospel*. By Walter Rauschenbusch. New York: Macmillan, 1917. 279 pages. \$1.50.

which concern the individual's relation to the God of the universe. Man's nature and destiny are judged in relation to a metaphysical doctrine of God. Professor Rauschenbusch completely reverses this order of thinking. He is first of all concerned to know the moral and religious facts of man's life in its social relationships. The content of his religion is derived precisely from the social interests which lie so close to his heart. He has almost nothing to say about God as a cosmic being. It is only in so far as God is concerned with human welfare that this social theology has any place for him.

The discussion begins with the doctrine of sin. If it be true that this age is lacking in a sense of sin, the reason for this lack is to be found in the persistence in theology of the pale abstraction called "sin" in the standard textbooks rather than in any such "new theology" as is here suggested. Because of the attempt to trace all sin to Adam "theology has had little to say about the contributions which our more recent forefathers have made to the sin and misery of mankind. The social gospel would rather reserve some blame for them, for their vices have afflicted us with syphilis, their graft and their wars have loaded us with public debts, and their piety has perpetuated despotic churches and unbelievable creeds." The social point of view makes terribly real the transmission of sin. Hurtful ideals become embodied in social sanctions, and every child is thus inevitably educated in such a way as to become a partaker in the evils which ought to be eradicated. Rauschenbusch's exposition of the social conception of sin is one of the most original and valuable contributions of the book. It is further expanded in a powerful chapter entitled "The Superpersonal Forces of Evil." Social groups possess a psychological character and exercise a potent compulsion over the thoughts and actions of men. Because states are what they are, citizens of those states are now engaged in mutual slaughter, although the individuals on one side of the battle have no grievance against the individuals on the other side. Business is so organized as inevitably to draw men into the competitive struggle where generosity gives way to shrewdness. The superpersonal realms may have evil or good characters. No individual can live in defiance of their standards. Unless these social groups shall be righteous, individual righteousness is difficult, if not impossible. In the place of the Kingdom of Satan which has played so large a part in the theology of the past, Rauschenbusch would put this social "Kingdom of Evil." Salvation means rescue from its power. But such salvation can come only through social redemption. The superpersonal forces must come under the

"law of Christ" if Christian life is to be made completely possible for individuals.

The positive counterpart to this Kingdom of Evil is the Kingdom of God. To be saved means to belong to this kingdom. Professor Rauschenbusch holds that the central idea in the teaching of Jesus was that of the kingdom. He traces the inadequacy of theology in the past to its neglect of this fundamental doctrine. "If theology is to offer an adequate doctrinal basis for the social gospel, it must not only make room for the doctrine of the Kingdom of God, but give it a central place and revise all other doctrines so that they will articulate organically with it" (p. 131). Traditional Christianity shifted emphasis from the kingdom to the church. It thus lost the revolutionary and democratic idealism which belongs to the conception of the kingdom, and in consequence became the custodian of special privilege. "The Kingdom of God breeds prophets; the church breeds priests and theologians" (p. 137). "It [the kingdom] sees, not doctrines or rites to be conserved and perpetuated, but resistance to be overcome and great ends to be achieved" (p. 140).

Since the conception of the kingdom is thus made normative, it is important to know just how it is defined. It is here that those who are sticklers for exactness will find a weak place in the system. There is no careful exegetical or historical study to determine precisely the content of the phrase as Jesus used it; yet Jesus is valued as the "initiator of the Kingdom." "The Kingdom of God is humanity organized according to the will of God" (p. 142). This involves "the divine worth of life and personality" and "a progressive reign of love in human affairs," expressing itself in the elimination of exploitation of men and the establishment of a democratic society with equal opportunities for all. This conception, while undoubtedly expressing fundamental emphases of Jesus' own idealism, is easily seen to be really the expression of the author's own social hope. This ideal unquestionably has been stimulated and developed by a study of Jesus' teachings, but it comes quite as truly from the human appeal of modern life. While the noble message of the book is actually derived from the living prophetic experience of a modern Christian, the attempt to propound it all under the authority of Jesus leads to historical difficulties.

The significance of Jesus is sought in the fact that he was the "initiator of the Kingdom of God." In his Christology Rauschenbusch shows the strong influence of the Ritschlian point of view. Jesus appears as a unique individual who taught a perfect theology so far as the social

gospel is concerned. This originally perfect Christianity was soon corrupted by "that wave of 'Hellenization' which nearly swamped the original gospel" (p. 147). As initiator of the kingdom, the important thing about Jesus is his moral will and his social sympathy. It is his "unity with the will of God" rather than a divine essence which describes his significance. Schleiermacher's definition of Jesus in terms of a perfect God-consciousness is reproduced with the social rather than the individual-mystical emphasis. "Jesus experienced God in a new way." "This consciousness of God which we derive from Jesus is able to establish centres of spiritual strength and peace which help to break the free sweep of evil in social life. Jesus set love into the centre of the spiritual universe, and all life is illuminated from that centre" (p. 154).

With these ideas the theology of the book is virtually complete. It might be summarized as follows. We find ourselves living in a social world where evil is active on every hand thwarting human welfare. Religion should deliver us from these evils. Jesus has provided deliverance by giving to men the ideal of the Kingdom of God and above all by initiating such a socially creative regenerative attitude that in his ideal and especially in his personal life there is communicated a moral power and a spiritual enthusiasm which will purify men from evil passions and bring them together in the fellowship of the kingdom. This means not only personal transformation, but the redemption of evil superpersonal forces.

The last few chapters of the book are secondary in importance. To the reviewer it seemed that the principal reason for including them was that the author found before him certain time-honored theological terms, such as revelation, the Holy Spirit, the sacraments, and atonement, and determined to show how these might receive a social interpretation. Revelation is the prophetic spirit animating every social reformer. Baptism and the Lord's Supper are rites which have been sadly perverted in the history of the church, but which might become symbols of a social consecration. Eschatology has indulged in orgies of uncontrolled imagination, but may be redeemed if it expresses faith in a future dominated by social justice. In this connection Professor Rauschenbusch gives us a delightfully suggestive modern picture of the doctrine of future retribution when he portrays those who have exploited others sentenced in the next life to make good the social wrongs which they have inflicted in this life. It is a gospel far richer in spiritual content than the crude picture of heaven and hell with

which we are familiar. The final chapter on atonement is an effort to give social significance to the death of Christ. In what sense did Jesus bear our sins? The social point of view enables us to see that Jesus was killed by social forces. Ecclesiastical narrowness, political corruption, miscarriage of justice, the mob spirit, militarism, and class contempt were really responsible for the death of Jesus. But these are super-personal forces which are active to a greater or less extent in all men. In so far as we keep them alive we are guilty of the very sins which put Jesus to death. It is not a forensic or a vicarious penalty which Jesus bears. It is the actual consequence of the actual sins of which we are guilty. The redemptive power of his death is found in its capacity to evoke repentance from us, in its revelation of divine, self-sacrificing love, and in its reinforcement of prophetic religion. In this exposition comes a curiously anthropomorphic representation of the effect of the death of Jesus on God: "The death of Jesus must have been a great experience for God. . . . If the principle of forgiving love had not been in the heart of God before, this experience would fix it there. If he had ever thought and felt like the Jewish Jehovah, he would henceforth think and feel as the Father of Jesus Christ" (p. 264). With this may be compared another statement: "He [Jesus] not only saved humanity; he saved God. He gave God his first chance of being loved and of escaping from the worst misunderstandings conceivable" (p. 175). One wonders if such statements would have been made if the author had not been laboring under the apologetic necessity of giving some kind of content to the traditional conception of the atonement as removing an obstacle to God's ability to forgive.

This brings us to a concluding remark concerning the method of theologizing employed. The social conception, which is so admirably evident in the content of the message, has not been carried over into the realm of method. The author gives us a social gospel but not a social way of theologizing. The norm for theology is the Kingdom of God, which was central in Jesus' thought and teaching. But this normative place of the kingdom in theological thinking rests back on the socially unexplained divine initiation of the kingdom by Jesus. "The Kingdom of God is divine in its initiation, progress, and consummation. It was initiated by Jesus Christ, in whom the prophetic spirit came to its consummation, it is sustained by the Holy Spirit, and it will be brought to its fulfilment by the power of God in his own time. . . . The Kingdom of God, therefore, is miraculous all the way, and is the continuous revelation of the power, the righteousness, and the love of God" (p. 139).

Would not Catholic theology say almost exactly the same things about the church? This is the language of a theology which justifies its doctrines by appeal to a superhuman authority rather than by consulting the exigencies of social life. The method of theologizing demanded by the social gospel would consist in such a historical exposition of growing life as to make self-evident the principles which must receive worshipful attention if humanity is to be rightly served. The strongest portions of the book are those in which this straightforward, prophetic interpretation of social situations is given. But the influence of the Ritschlian point of view has prevented Rauschenbusch from that thoroughgoing historical-social interpretation which would connect the present situation with the past out of which it grew, and at the same time suggest the better future which is the goal of our faith and hope. The actual content which is given in the book to the Kingdom of God is so modern, so compatible with social historical interpretations, so completely devoted to the religious needs and opportunities of the modern world, that the methodological retention of an appeal to a socially unexplained authority suddenly invading history in the past has little real effect on the actual exposition. An ounce of such virile, inspiring religion is worth a pound of methodology. The author has rendered a great service and will deserve the gratitude of hundreds of Christian leaders and teachers who are becoming aware that the social gospel possesses power and inspiration such as are found only in great periods of religious revival.

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A STUDY IN SCHOLASTICISM

In recent years there have been four prominent works devoted to the history and content of mediaeval scholasticism: those by Father Denifle, by Clemens Bäumer, by the Belgian professor De Wulf, and by R. Seeberg, in the seventeenth volume of the new *Realenszyklopädie*. Of these writers, the first three are Catholics, the last Protestant. But all of these works have handled the subject along the old lines and were not distinguished for novelty of treatment. They were works of erudite but conventional interpretation.

Unless the reviewer is in error of judgment, the present work¹ marks a new point of departure and a wholly new and original method of

¹ *Vorgeschichte und Jugend der mittelalterlichen Scholastik: eine kirchen-historische Vorlesung*. Von Franz Overbeck, aus dem Nachlass herausgegeben von Carl Albrecht Bernoulli. Basel: Schwabe, 1917. xii+315 pages. M. 7.

explication of the nature and content of mediaeval scholasticism. For it attempts to interpret mediaeval scholasticism in the light of Nietzsche's philosophy and the modern psycho-analysis of Freud and Jung. In a word, it is a trans-valuation—to use the Nietzschean term—of scholastic philosophy, an investigation of its moral concepts and a criticism of its moral values, interwoven with enough purely historical material to give the subject basic texture.

In order to understand the genesis and composition of this book one needs to know something of the history of the author. Overbeck was for many years professor of church history in the University of Basel and died in 1905. He was a colleague and intimate friend of Nietzsche, who was professor of philology there from 1869 to 1879. Other members of this circle were Jakob Burckhardt, the well-known author of *The Renaissance*, Paul Rée, the psychologist, and Köselitz, the musician. Everyone who has read much of Nietzsche's biography knows that he had the admirable quality of imparting his mood to others and of stimulating their thinking by his own. Overbeck, whose friendship for Nietzsche has found its *scriptor rerum gestarum* in Bernoulli's two-volume work, *Overbeck und Nietzsche* (Jena, 1908), with whom Nietzsche lived for some time and who administered the pension of \$600, which the authorities of the university granted to Nietzsche upon his retirement owing to ill health, derived much from this intimate personal contact with the author of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*.¹ From Nietzsche he got the moral and ethical *Hintergrund*, as he got the biological from Freud and Jung. It is no wonder that from such association we have a new treatment of scholasticism. Bernoulli, who has edited these lectures from Overbeck's manuscript, is quite justified in saying that Overbeck's examination is likely to mark a new era in the study of scholasticism. Even though one may not agree with all that is here said of the mediaeval scholastics and their system of philosophy, the originality, the suggestiveness, the stimulus of this book are very great. It is a new and positive contribution to the literature of the subject.

Overbeck was naturally drawn to writing upon scholasticism from his profound study of church history and theology. He was a deep and enthusiastic student. He wrote to Nietzsche on July 4, 1887: "Knowledge is a joy to me." Nevertheless, in spite of his interest in the new interpretation he had in mind, Overbeck looked forward with some

¹ Overbeck was a large contributor to the German newspapers and gazettes in regard to Nietzsche. For a list of his articles see Mügge, *Nietzsche, His Life and Work*, p. 413.

misgiving to the opening of the autumn semester of that year. On October 24 he wrote again to Nietzsche: "Morgen fange ich mein neues Kolleg über Scholastik an und stehe im Anfang in ominöser Weise unter dem Eindruck, wie es der europäischen Menschheit nur möglich war, sich aus dem Wüste wiederherauszufinden, mit dem sie ins Mittelalter trat und den sie zunächst noch häufte." Overbeck's doubts were dissipated by the success of the course which was repeated and enlarged in after-years. Indeed, Herr Professor Bernoulli, his literary executor and intimate friend, to whose devotion we are indebted for the preparation and publication of these lectures, says that the memory of this brilliant course still pervades the halls of the university.

It is like the west wind on a keen October morning or the sting of the salt sea spray to come upon the ideas and even the terminology of Nietzsche in such a mediaeval milieu as scholastic philosophy. Scholasticism to Overbeck was a slavish system of philosophy and morality in which submission was obedience; it was a double morality of cruelty and pity. It was a philosophy of the grave, for it took men from among the living. Overbeck had the same contempt that Nietzsche had for a philosophy whose superstructure was based upon ideas which were repugnant to the intelligent mind—that feeling that sinful man owed a debt to the deity because of man's first disobedience and the fruit of the forbidden tree, and the paradoxical solution of God offering himself in his own flesh and blood in atonement for the inherited guilt of mankind. He sees in scholasticism that baneful building up of priestly power and the turning of life against life which Nietzsche so arraigned; whereas natural man should believe as a plant believes, in the sun. He has scorn for the dictum of St. Thomas Aquinas that the saved are happier in heaven because of the sufferings of the damned, and supreme contempt for the faith of the Middle Ages.

The late Sir Leslie Stephen has written: "The vast development of scholastic philosophy in the Middle Ages showed only how far unlimited ingenuity and subtlety may lead in the wrong direction." No one needs to be told today that scholasticism is a system which had its day and has ceased to be. But, even though it has disappeared as a *system*, scholastic influences are still all too vivid forces in some quarters of thought. Destructive criticism has its value, and one rises from a reading of this book with the sense that he has read a masterly essay in that species of criticism. The work ought to be translated if only for the antiseptic quality of thought which characterizes it. The editor has faithfully preserved the lecture form of the original manuscript, a fact which gives

the subject the added impression of direct address to the reader, as if he were before Overbeck himself in the classroom. There is not a heavy page in the book; it is wholly free from "bookishness" or "dry-as-dustiness." The bibliographies are excellent and are chiefly the work of the editor. The table of contents is good, but there is no index.

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TERTULLIAN'S APOLOGY

This book¹ is an outgrowth of Professor Mayor's lectures on the *Apology* in the divinity schools at Cambridge. About 1892 he collected his notes in an interleaved copy of Oehler's text (Halle, 1849), adding to them from time to time for a period of fifteen years with the intention of publishing them ultimately—in fact he did publish the notes to chapters i–v, with an introduction, in the *Journal of Philology*, XXI (1893), 259–95. Upon the death of Professor Mayor in 1910 his executors requested Professor Souter to prepare the notes for publication, a task the difficulty of which will be readily understood by anyone who is familiar with Mayor's notes on Juvenal and the third book of Pliny's *Letters*. Professor Souter has not only reduced a great mass of material to order, but has added valuable notes of his own. Mayor's notes are not exhaustive—they were intended as a supplement to the earlier commentaries. For this reason, and because they consist in large measure of citations from the Greek and Latin and references to the literature, the lack of the author's finishing hand is felt less than in most cases of posthumous publication. The result is what Souter correctly describes as "by far the best commentary ever published" on the *Apology*. In view of the extreme difficulty of the Latin and the lack of notes of a more elementary character, a translation has been added, which will appeal to the average user of the book as much as any other feature.

The Introduction is a reprint of the article in the *Journal of Philology*, with the addition of a bibliography of the important works on Tertullian that have appeared since 1893.

The notes and translation deserve a better text than Oehler's. Souter, however, does not always follow this in his translation. The divergences are generally pointed out, but the source of the accepted

¹ *Q. Septimi Florentis Tertulliani Apologeticus*. The text of Oehler annotated, with an Introduction, by John E. B. Mayor. With a translation by Alex. Souter. Cambridge: University Press, 1917. xx+496 pages. 12s. 6d.

reading is not always given; even where the translator follows Mayor's reading, Oehler's text is unchanged, e.g., p. 24, 25, *in verecundiam* Oehler, *inverecundiam* Mayor and Souter; p. 28, 32, *virulentiam* Oehler, *iurulentiam* Mayor and Souter; p. 58, 13, *producto* Oehler, *producto* Mayor and Souter; p. 126, 14, *ex voluntate* Oehler, *involuntate* Mayor and Souter. In some cases the translator has followed a variant reading without calling attention to the fact, e.g., p. 6, 1, *quia* Oehler, translation "what," some manuscripts have *quod*; p. 58, 4, *iustitiae innocentia* Oehler, translation "justice and innocence," a variant reading. The punctuation of the text and translation does not always correspond, e.g., p. 4, 32, *certe damnati maerent* ends a sentence, while in the translation it begins the new sentence; p. 28, 4-6, the *ut*-clause belongs with what precedes; in the translation it stands as an independent clause but goes with what follows; cf. also p. 132, 9. The manuscript problem of the *Apology* is in such a chaotic condition (see Souter's note, p. xvi) that an editor might well hesitate to make changes, even if he felt the need, and in this case the desire to print the work as the author left it was the controlling one. It would have been a great relief, however, if the spelling had been modernized. Oehler has *Jupiter, thura, coeno, musito, mercenarius, Sylla, quatinus, nae* (for *ne*); with one or two exceptions the revised form only is found in Mayor's notes: *adolatio* (p. 90, 17) is corrected in a footnote.

A few additions and corrections may be made in the notes: p. 166, 6, on *oditur*, add Jerome, *Tractatus in Marcum* (*Anecdota Maredsolana*, III, 2, p. 327, 11); p. 170, 12, on *defendo* = *vindico*, see *Archiv f. lat. Lex.* III, 17, 18; p. 184, 33, on *instructu*, correct *Gen.* to read *Exod.*; p. 214, 9, for Minucius 23, 1, read 21, 9—the same error in Harper's *Lexicon*; the Tacitus citation is not a parallel; p. 271, 14, on *supputationem*, add Arnobius 2. 71, Zeno i. tr. 9, 4, Martianus Capella 6, 609; correct *Hier. in eccl.* p. 395 to read 394; p. 297, 5, the reference to Seneca *De benef.* is i. 11. 1 instead of vii. 11. 1 (marked incorrect in the "Addenda et corrigenda," p. viii); p. 400, 3, on *caesionum*, read *Iuu.* 3. 278 instead of 3. 88—Mayor cites this passage of Tertullian in his note on *Iuu. ad loc.*; p. 446, 28, Mayor's note "*Expressor* here only" is incorrect; the word is found in Avienus 4. 38 and in Aug. in Ps. 54:22; p. 459, 6, *domestica seditioni tela* is from Juvenal 15. 64; a further parallel in *Scriptores Hist. Aug.* 22, 1.

The translation is excellent, neither too free nor too literal. In a few cases there is room for dispute, e.g., p. 8, 14, need we press the meaning of *sortitur*, "cast lots"? p. 36, 28, *otiosum est* is translated "it needs

leisure"; the usual meaning, "useless," "superfluous," fits very well; p. 38, 12, *caelo et terra* is translated "from heaven or earth"—it should of course be "from heaven and earth," the nouns in both Latin and English should be capitalized; p. 78, 29, *gula* is translated by "tongue." The theologian will doubtless find other passages to which he will take exception.

These criticisms are not intended to detract from the merits of the book. The work is a worthy monument to a great scholar, in which those who made its publication possible may well take pride.

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AN OUTLINE OF GREEK RELIGIOUS THINKING

In a series of ten lectures prepared for the general reader Professor Clifford Herschel Moore has sketched the course of religious thinking among Greeks, Romans, and early Christians from Homer to Origen.¹ It should be remembered that the book does not purport to be an account of all the religions of this period, but is designed as an outline of religious *thought*. As the author himself explains, his discussion is restricted to the Greek ideas about the nature of the gods, and to their concepts of the relations between gods and men and of man's obligation toward the divine. These lectures are a most welcome contribution, coming as they do from the side of classical scholarship and from the pen of one thoroughly competent to speak with authority in his chosen field.

Since the book is written for the general reader it is quite properly a statement of results rather than an exhibition of critical processes in the discussion of disputed problems. In the first place familiar phases in the religious thinking of Homer and Hesiod are clearly set forth. With equal clearness the second lecture, on Orphism, Pythagoreanism, and the Greek Mysteries, traverses a field with which the general reader is probably less familiar, but one which is of much importance for the understanding of Greek religious thinking. Two lectures are devoted mainly to the religious attitude of the Greek poets, particularly Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. The significance of Plato and Aristotle for religion is expounded at considerable length; and of the later philosophies stoicism naturally receives most attention. The spread of Greek

¹ *Religious Thought of the Greeks from Homer to the Triumph of Christianity*. By Clifford Herschel Moore. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916. vii+385 pages. \$2.00.

religious thinking among the Romans and the migration of oriental cults from Asia and Egypt into the western half of the Roman Empire are briefly but satisfactorily described.

The two closing lectures sketch the early history of Christian thinking. Here the author practically transcribes in summarized form the opinions of Harnack as given in his *History of Dogma*. Jesus is said to have preached an ethical gospel hardly if at all colored by any strong interest in current Jewish apocalypticism. The next stage of Christian thinking is Paul's gospel of atonement, faith, and moral regeneration. A third stage is reached in the Gospel of John with its emphasis upon Christ's divine nature and the incarnation of the Logos. This is thought to mark the beginning of Greek influence upon Christianity, an influence which emerges more prominently in the apologists and the Alexandrians, culminating in Origen. No very marked influence from the mystery cults or from popular pagan religious ideas is discovered prior to the second century, when from this source asceticism and sacramental notions about baptism and the Lord's Supper are supposed to have come into Christianity. These, as will be perceived, are the familiar views of Harnack and his school. Perhaps if the scope of the volume had permitted critical discussion, Professor Moore would have told us why he passes so lightly over the views of the more recent *religionsgeschichtliche* school which has now come to occupy so prominent a place in our interpretation of the history of early Christianity.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF WANG YANG-MING

The interests and importance of the subject presented in this volume¹ cannot be overestimated when one considers how a system of thought so dynamic and original could have been evolved out of the Confucian classics after they had been interpreted and observed in formal and static ways for over two thousand years. To state the history of Confucianism during these centuries in brief, it had passed through various interpretations and applications, but most of them had been limited to formal interpretations, until the twelfth century, under the Sung dynasty, witnessed a significant upheaval of metaphysical and ethical thoughts, thanks to the more or less original geniuses of the philosophers

¹ *The Philosophy of Wang Yang-ming*. Translated from the Chinese by Frederick Goodrich Henke. Introduction by James H. Tufts. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1916. xvii+512 pages. \$2.50.

Lu, Chou, the brothers Cheng, and Chu. Two distinct tendencies are represented by these philosophers. Lu Hsiang-shan held a dynamic and monistic view of the universe and human life, while the view of Chu Hui-an was static and dualistic. Now the philosopher Wang, the subject of this volume, who lived three hundred years after Lu, opposed the dualism and empiricism of Chu by emphasizing the unity of the universal reason and the individual intuition, or conscience. This was done partly by following in the footsteps of Lu and mainly by a strenuous mental struggle and drill of his own. He was not a mere thinker, but a soldier and statesman, who tried to embody his ideas and convictions in his life of difficult tasks and sad vicissitudes. He was an idealist, but a pragmatist, in a wider sense of the word.

Wang left almost nothing in the way of a systematic treatise on his philosophy, but his ideas and discourses were faithfully recorded by his friends and disciples. Besides these records, there is a considerable number of his letters and miscellaneous writings, not only on philosophy and ethics, but on statecraft, political economy, and military affairs. Thus, naturally, these documents are of various styles, ranging from the regular classical style to the colloquial of daily use, including even his conversation in written language with a dumb man. Taking these facts into account, one cannot but admire the painstaking labor and patience of Dr. Henke, the translator of Wang's philosophical writings and sayings as produced in this volume. His translation is very faithful to the original, though often too verbal and with occasional errors. He omits almost no word or phrase, and the reader can rely upon the translation as a whole as a reproduction of the original. Yet any reader should not be induced by the title of the book to think to get out of it a systematic or coherent view of Wang's philosophy, but be careful and persevering enough to pick up the philosopher's ideas out of a conglomerate of his sayings and writings.

This last point induces the reviewer to express his wish that the translator had given a fuller introduction to the philosophy, not only elucidating Wang's philosophical system as a whole, but pointing out its specific points, especially in contradistinction to Chu Hui-an. The translator's preface is too meager for this purpose, and his separate essay published in the *Monist* (1914) gives very little clue to the specific connotations of Wang's philosophic terms. One can imagine how obscure Marcus Aurelius would be if translated and introduced to readers who had no knowledge of Stoicism or of Roman life with only a few introductory remarks on Stoic teaching. The present translator has done a

similar performance, or one even less intelligible, reproducing Wang's technical terms, which are full of specific contentions on his part in opposition to his predecessors, as if they were common terms used among modern Western philosophers. Of course, a very keen-sighted reader could notice the specific bearings of Wang's terminology, as Professor Tufts has done more or less accurately in his introduction. Nevertheless, a good translation demands that the specific points of the original terminology be pointed out, by adding the original words in many cases and by explaining them in footnotes. But this has been done only very meagerly; for instance, the note on page 240 on the "intuitive faculty," the philosopher's cardinal doctrine, is inaccurate and misleading.

Two points are to be emphatically criticized in this connection: that the translations of most technical terms are too plain, i.e., too modern, and that most of them are more in accordance with Chu's connotations than with Wang's. These terms are too numerous to be fully listed in this connection; only a few important ones will be reviewed.

Liang-chih is the cardinal point in the whole system of Wang's philosophy and ethics, just like the *vous* of the Stoics or the *ātman* in the Upanishads. It is the primeval creative principle of the universe as well as the prime mover of the human soul; and Wang emphasized the importance of realizing this fundamental force and intelligence in everyone's untainted conscience. No one can expect any word in English to convey adequately these implications; yet the "intuitive knowledge," "intuitive faculty of good," as rendered by the translator are too strictly psychological. (It may be added that the reviewer would propose "prime conscience," of course with explanatory remarks.)

As a corollary to the doctrine of *liang-chih*, the phrase *chih-chih* or *chih-liang-chih* means "to realize the *liang-chih*," "to bring the *liang-chih* to full light and efficiency" (both in thought and life), whereas the translator's renderings are: "to extend knowledge to the utmost," "to extend the use of intuitive knowledge of good to the utmost." These are contrary to Wang's contentions, that "knowledge of things" and "extending" it, as understood and emphasized by Chu Hui-an, are not only useless, but harmful, and that the real knowledge consists, not in extending the use of perception and reasoning, but in concentrating one's own mind (or soul, if you please) to the innermost depth of the "prime conscience," which is of course intuitive but in a very special sense. This is emphasized, for instance, in a passage on p. 212, of which the translation is very inadequate, because the translator has used the word "extending" for "to get to the bottom," "to fully realize," or "to evolve

out of the prime source." Moreover, the translation has obscured the issue between Wang and Chu by using the same "extending" for both philosophers. By the way, the translator's "good-evil mind" used in this passage is ambiguous, because it is the same word as "mind which is able to discriminate between right and wrong," as found in other passages (p. 232, etc.).

Similarly with the phrases "natural law," "moral law," "heaven-given principle" for *t'ien-li*; "passion-nature," "vital force," "feeling" for *ch'i*; "principles" for *li*; "nature" for *sing*; "investigation of things" for *ko-mu*; "path of duty" for *tao*, etc. In these the renderings are mostly in accordance with Chu's interpretations and often contrary to Wang's specific contentions. We cannot enter into these discussions, but one instance will suffice to show the translator's wavering. Compare p. 214 and p. 311, where Wang discusses the meaning of the word *ko* and the translator has failed to catch Wang's contention against Chu. Of course the difficulty here, as in many other passages, is that the two philosophers based their respective teachings and practices upon different interpretations of the same words and phrases found in the classics, and consequently a certain amount of ambiguity may be inevitable in reproducing those passages. Yet a clear discrimination is all the more necessary. At any rate, the translator has rendered those phrases more in the sense of Chu's interpretations than in Wang's, as we have remarked above. The result is that many of Wang's specific contentions are much obscured.

The missing of the philosopher's specific characteristics may be illustrated by another instance. The word *kung-fu*, originally derived from Buddhist "meditation," had a vital bearing on Wang's thought and life. It meant a methodical drill of mental attitude, spiritual exercise, so to speak, whether in quiet sitting or in active life. The translation is throughout simply "task" or "work," and in some passages the word is omitted. The inadequacy of these renderings is shown, for instance, on p. 55, ll. 2-3; p. 90, l. 1 from bottom; p. 105, ll. 10-12; p. 128, ll. 5-3 from bottom; p. 149, l. 7 from bottom; p. 186, l. 14 from bottom; p. 190, l. 3, etc. The reader may ponder on these passages and see whether Wang's special mental drill is represented.

Another defect of the translation is closely connected with the point cited above, that due heed has not been paid to the relation and reaction between Buddhism and the later Confucianists, including Chu and Wang. In fact, the upheaval of Confucian philosophy in the twelfth century was largely a result of Buddhist influence, a point which needs

a separate study. In spite of the opposition, in many points, of these Confucianists to Buddhism, their philosophic conceptions and terminology were largely borrowed from Buddhism. Not only the distinction and correlation between the metaphysical entity (*t'i*) and phenomenal manifestation (*yung*), between empirical knowledge and mystic intuition, but many phrases and conceptions concerning spiritual exercise and meditative life entered the Confucian arena from Buddhism. The philosopher Wang followed, in this respect, the footsteps of the Sung philosophers, especially of Lu Hsiang-shan, and some of the cardinal points of his metaphysics and spiritual exercise can hardly be grasped without referring to the Buddhist background of the system. How much the translator has oscillated in his understanding of Wang's thought on the metaphysical entity and phenomenal manifestations is shown in the variety, seemingly rather arbitrary, of his translations of these terms, where they are correlated or separately treated. "Structure," "natural disposition," "original nature," "nature," "original character," "beginning characteristics," "underlying substance," "original form"—these are words for *t'i*, the metaphysical entity; while *yung*, phenomenal manifestation, is rendered by "use," "functioning," "function," "manifestations" (pp. 53, 58, 59, 88, 91, 108, 121, 124, 154, 156, 167, 192, 206, 207, 211, 274, 300, 342, 344, etc.). Moreover, on p. 121 alone the phrase "natural condition" is used for either of the two conceptions (i.e., "natural condition and functioning" and "structure and natural condition" for the two terms), and on p. 274 the two are combined to "original function." This shows how the translator has missed a very important point in Wang's metaphysics, viz., that he accepted, together with the Sung philosophers, the Buddhist distinction between the entity and manifestation, and yet emphasized, as in the case of the Tien-tai school of Buddhist philosophy, the correlative unity of the two conceptions.

Similarly, the neglect, on the part of the translator, of the Hindu inheritance in Wang's philosophy is shown in the very imperfect rendering of those passages concerning the spiritual illumination in meditation. *Kung-fu* is one of the missed points. To cite some more: "The little intuitive knowledge" (p. 150), "the little intelligence and cleverness" (p. 169), "this small part of intuitive knowledge" (p. 178)—these are obscure and misleading, if not erroneous, renderings of Wang's statements of his mind, or better "prime conscience," bright and illuminated at the infinitesimal point, so to speak, which, however, is enough to illumine the cosmos. This point may best be illustrated by comparing it with the utterances of the Upanishads on the *ātman*, such as Chhan-

dogya (III, 14. 3). Can the translator's words convey this mysticism of Wang Yang-ming? Similarly, "seek better circumstances" (p. 110), "a thing to trifle with" (p. 200), "the thing that oversees the mind" (p. 243), "the mind which has regard for itself" (p. 244), "bring one's thought to one's notice" (p. 248)—these are either very faint or decidedly mistaken renderings of the phrases referring to the brightness of the spiritual illumination and perpetual illumination.

Or, again, can any reader imagine that the following two passages refer to one and the same original? They are: "Surely what you have said is of no immediate concern to me, for I have already made preparation for all sorts of imaginable circumstances" (p. 75); and "When all nature is exuberant in growth, it is also peaceful, calm, and free from any thought for itself" (p. 104). In fact the original refers to a Taoist-Buddhist sentence expressing that the ultimate reality is a "vacuity" (i.e., transcends all phenomenal distinctions), and yet contains in itself the source, or germs, of all manifestations.

Without citing more similar instances and minor mistakes, let us point out two of the most serious mistakes. On p. 128 a disciple's inquiry is stated thus: "Apprehensiveness is present as the result of one's ignorance." The real meaning is: apprehensiveness (to use the translator's word) and cautiousness are a method of mental drill to be adopted when one does not know just the point (of thought to be thought in meditation). The point has to do with the Buddhist method of *sati*, and Wang's contention was designed to impress upon his disciples that this state of mental drill ought to be directed toward the awakening of the "prime conscience," and not the suppression of all thought, as Wang understood Buddhism to insist on. The meaning of the passage is clear when parallel passages are referred to, as in pp. 147, 183, 243, 245, 260-61, 264, 369, 420, etc., where the translator offers us better renderings.

On p. 199 the translator has Wang say: "After I had been at Lung-ch'ang I did not discuss the meaning of the intuitive knowledge of good, for I was not able to interpret it." This astonishing translation almost nullifies Wang's life, effort, and deeds; because that day (in fact, at midnight) at Lung-ch'ang was the most significant juncture in Wang's whole life, when he underwent a sudden conversion and attained the great illumination in the truth of the "prime conscience." Wang's life since then was nothing but a master's life in endeavoring to realize that truth in his life and to transmit it to his disciples and posterity. A little care should have prevented the translator from mistaking "I have had nothing but" for "I did not discuss." Even apart from the letters, how

could the translator have rendered the passage in question as he has done, since he himself had stated Wang's great life-event in his biography (p. 13), and must have known that most of the writings translated belonged to Wang's later years, after his day at Lung-ch'ang? For example, how could any writer have Christ say: "After I had been baptized in the Jordan I did not preach the Kingdom of God, for I was not able to interpret it"?

In spite of these and other defects and mistakes, the work of translation must have been a long, arduous, and painstaking one. The reviewer appreciates the translator's labor, but would suggest ways in which the work could have been improved and made more useful. These suggestions may be summarized as follows:

1. That a general introduction be added, stating the philosophic system of Wang as a whole and pointing out carefully its specific points, especially with reference to his contentions against the Sung philosophers, as well as to his relation with Buddhism and Taoism.
2. That his biography be rewritten, with a special care for his psychological development, taking materials from his letters instead of from the rather tedious and disconnected accounts made by his disciples, as reproduced in the present volume.
3. That Wang's terminology be thoroughly remodeled and reproduced in accordance with his specific contentions and connotations, and explanatory notes be added, together with the originals as far as possible (perhaps in the index, too), distinguishing them from Chu Hui-an's interpretations.
4. That cross-references be made to passages treating of similar subjects or describing the same events and experiences in the philosopher's life.
5. That most of the figurative expressions and allusions to ancient anecdotes be explained by notes.

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BRIEF MENTION

THACKERAY, H. St. J. *The Letter of Aristeas*. [Translations of Early Documents, edited by W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box.] London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1917. xx+116 pages. \$1.00.

This new translation of the *Letter of Aristeas* brings another important document from the ancient world within easy reach of modern students. Mr. Thackeray has produced an altogether admirable edition. The introduction tells just those things

about the document that are needed for an adequate understanding of its contents. The date of the narrative is placed between 120 and 180 B.C., a position intermediate between that of Schürer (200 B.C.) and that of Grätz (under Tiberias or Caligula). Upon the debatable topic of the trustworthiness of the narrative a genuinely critical judgment is given. The translation reads well and is accompanied by brief and lucid explanatory notes which supplement and enrich the narrative at many points.

J. M. P. S.

DIFFENDORFER, RALPH E. *Missionary Education in Home and School*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1917. 407 pages. \$1.50.

Here is a book which sounds the emancipation of missionary education from a slavish devotion to the collection box and from a narrow view of what its materials are. Its thesis is as follows: "We are to include in missions the process of Christianizing all our social relations in the community, in industry, in national life, and in international affairs." Co-operation to this end is a moral problem with a range of activities from the "doing of chores" to "international altruism," and involving the promotion of right attitudes and behavior. These aims are discussed chapter-wise under the heads of friendliness, sympathy, helpfulness, co-operation, stewardship and generosity, loyalty, and the sense of justice and honor. The intelligent strengthening and directing of these "springs of action—the native social impulses and feelings—" will tend to adequate missionary ideals, to a world-wide brotherhood, and to the enlistment of every Christian as an active agent in the establishment of the Kingdom of God.

The second part of the book outlines special methods of missionary education for the different periods in the individual life. The principles which govern the making of modern curricula are used in the adaptation of missionary material and in accordance with the usual departmental divisions from childhood through adult life.

Questions for further study and discussion, together with a bibliography, are given at the end of each chapter, thus affording an adequate textbook while not detracting from its interest for consecutive reading.

F. G. W.

HUTTON, J. GERTRUDE. *The Missionary Education of Juniors*. New York: Missionary Education Movement of the United States and Canada, 1917. iv+140 pages. \$0.60.

This is a handbook intended primarily for those who work with the older children of the church school. However, those who are concerned with the task of religious education in general should not overlook this helpful volume. The missionary enterprise is looked upon as the practical working out of the principles of Christianity. How boys and girls who are beginning to read with pleasure, who are now constructively active, and who are getting a glimpse of the extent of the world may be animated in a normal fashion by the Christian spirit is the question which is answered. The author tells how to start out with the interests which make up the home and community life and to widen out in a wholesome way so as to take in those which are remote. Many of the puzzling problems which confront all earnest parents and teachers are illuminated by this discussion.

F. G. W.

SAUNDERS, K. J. *Adventures of the Christian Soul*. Cambridge: University Press, 1916. xiv+145 pages. 3s. 6d.

This volume is based upon an essay which in 1908 won the Burney prize at the University of Cambridge and was later elaborated into a series of lectures given at various colleges in India. In its eight chapters the author gives some account of the subconscious, the religion of childhood and of adolescence, conversion, and certain aspects of Christian mysticism. While the Introduction states as the main thesis of the book the view "that there is, deep-seated at the heart of all the worthiest types of religious experience, a sane yet passionate love, and that only if this love has an Object who is real and worthy and who responds to it can its wonderful fruits be accounted for," the book itself is more in the nature of a general discussion of the themes indicated by the chapter headings. The author shows considerable acquaintance with the more recent literature of the psychology of religion, particularly with the writings of American psychologists. There are frequent citations from James, Coe, Pratt, Starbuck, Irving King, Stanley Hall, and others. The treatment is for the most part balanced and fairly objective. One agrees with the author in his refusal to glorify the subconscious at the expense of the conscious, in holding that religion is "natural and innate in the child consciousness," in the view that "the normal age for decisive religious conviction" is from thirteen to fourteen. However, the author deals with conversion as if it were typically an adolescent rather than an adult phenomenon, whereas the radical experience more properly termed conversion is characteristically an adult phenomenon. The mystical type of experience is exalted too highly and at the expense of the experience of "the ordinary religious soul"; religion must stand or fall by what is possible for the "ordinary religious soul." One gains now and then the feeling that the author is interested in validating a perfectly conventional theology by appeal to the new science of the psychology of religion. An illustration of this appears on page 56, where the author says: "May it not be, then, that in the primitive family we see the great archetype of Love, the divine family of Heaven, the mutual love and service of the Holy Trinity, deeply represented and symbolized?" The author does not seem to realize that he has been carried beyond the field of the psychology of religion at such points. Indeed the thesis of his book, though not its discussion, is rather a question of ontology than one of psychology.

H. B. R.

STRONG, AUGUSTUS HOPKINS. *A Tour of the Missions—Observations and Conclusions*. Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press, 1918. xxii+223 pages. \$1.50.

At the close of forty years' noteworthy service as a theological teacher Dr. Strong goes to see how the gospel is transforming non-Christian peoples. More than a hundred of his pupils have been in the foreign mission field. Contrary to his personal wishes his coming was heralded, and he had an ovation all the way. Although he had expected to preach no more sermons and make no more addresses he was obliged to make fifty or sixty extemporized talks at churches, schools, and colleges. This book is a record of his impressions and conclusions, which he had not intended to publish. Such a record from a severely trained, widely cultivated, profoundly sincere mind and heart suffers from no lack of careful discrimination, positive conviction, and clear statement.

The mission fields visited are Japan, China, the Philippines, Burma, numerous points in India, Ceylon, and Java. Everywhere we have Dr. Strong's reactions clean cut and unequivocal. The descriptions have the vivid literary touch that the distinguished author is so capable of giving, and the reader gets striking impressions of lands, peoples, and religions.

Dr. Strong is so repelled by the revolting marks of some of the non-Christian religions that he finds it difficult to see any value in any of them. In this respect he differs from Dr. Clough, who used to tell his audiences that if they could not or would not accept the gospel of Jesus Christ then they should live up to the teachings of their own religions.

Many of Dr. Strong's friends and admirers reading his closing chapters will regret to find him so disturbed. He seems almost to have lost hope. False teaching has gained a controlling influence in most of the theological schools, the ministry has been affected, and the taproot of the gospel and missions has been cut. He still believes that a mighty revival of religion is coming, and that we shall then get back to the old and secure foundations. As to his own denomination he says: "We Baptists must reform, or die."

Perhaps few of us contemplate with perfect equanimity the present world-situation, and the general reconstruction—social, political, and religious—that is put before us. That God is making a new world is pretty evident; that he will use us if we are willing to be used we cannot doubt; that the good work already done—to which Dr. Strong has been a large contributor—will be conserved general history seems to teach. Is it not a time for robust faith that the best is yet to be? When the Lord called, Abraham went out not knowing whither he went.

J. W. M.

WHITTINGHILL, O. G. [Editor]. *La Chiesa e I Nuovi Tempi*. Edita Dalla Direzione Della Scuola Teologica Battista. Rome: 1917. xxxi+307 pages. Lire 3.50.

This volume is No. 8 in the Library of Theological Studies. It is dedicated to all those of whatever religious faith who have suffered or suffer for the truth. It consists of an introduction of twenty-one pages and nine essays by as many Italian scholars.

The introduction defines the main issues involved. The modern age for example is more exclusively scientific than any previous age; is characterized by the new criticism; and is in a very special sense democratic. The outstanding weaknesses of the church are: unbelief, inflexible orthodoxy, and the union of church and state.

The subjects of the essays are: "The Church and the Churches"; "Church and State"; "The Church and Social Questions"; "The Church and Philosophy—especially the Philosophy of Religion"; "The Church and Science"; "The Church and Criticism"; "The Church and Priesthood"; "The Church and Heresy"; "The Church and Morality."

Each of these subjects is, of course, a perennial problem, and the solution of no one of them is very near; yet they demand constant attention from many angles. Thus we are ever seeing them in larger and clearer proportions.

These essays show wide reading, they are conceived and written in a liberal spirit, and the conclusions are sane.

J. W. M.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITICS

Orfali, P. Gaudentio. *De Arca Foederis*. Paris: A. Picard, 1918. vi+111 pages.

NEW TESTAMENT

Burton, Ernest DeWitt. *Spirit, Soul, and Flesh*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918. 214 pages. \$2.00.

Kent, Charles Foster. *The Shorter Bible—The New Testament*. New York: Scribner, 1918. xix+305 pages. \$1.00.

Sheldon, Henry C. *The Mystery Religions and the New Testament*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1918. 153 pages. \$0.50.

Slaten, Arthur Wakefield. *Qualitative Nouns in the Pauline Epistles and Their Translation in the Revised Version*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918. vii+70 pages. \$0.50.

Valitutti, Francis. *Chronology of the Life of Christ*. Saratoga Springs: Valitutti, 1918. 60 pages. \$0.30.

Wearing, Thomas. *The World-View of the Fourth Gospel*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918. 74 pages. \$0.79.

CHURCH HISTORY

Bainvel, J. V. *Le saint coeur de Marie*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1918. xi+360 pages. Fr. 4.

McGlothlin, W. J. *The Course of Christian History*. New York: Macmillan, 1918. 323 pages. \$2.00.

DOCTRINAL

Hébrard, Dom. *La vie créatrice*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1918. xxxix+595 pages. Fr. 7.50.

Hocking, William Ernest. *Human Nature and Its Remaking*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918. xxvi+434 pages. \$3.00.

Jones, Edgar DeWitt. *Ornamented Orthodoxy*. New York: Revell, 1918. 221 pages. \$1.25.

Newton, R. Heber. *Catholicity—A Treatise on the Unity of Religions*. New York: Putnam, 1918. vii+362 pages. \$1.50.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

MacCulloch, John Arnott, and Machal, Jan. *The Mythology of All Races*. Vol. III, Celtic and Slavic. Boston: Marshall Jones, 1918. x+398 pages. \$6.00.

Müller, W. Max, and Scott, James George. *The Mythology of All Races*. Vol. XII, Egyptian and Indo-Chinese. Boston: Marshall Jones, 1918. xiv+450 pages. \$6.00.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

Coffin, Henry Sloane. *In a Day of Social Rebuilding*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1918. 212 pages. \$1.00.

Fiske, Charles. *The Experiment of Faith*. New York: Revell, 1918. 180 pages. \$1.00.

Horne, Herman Harrell. *Jesus—Our Standard*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1918. 307 pages. \$1.25.

Murray, J. Lovell. *The Call of a World Task in War Time*. New York: Student Volunteer Movement, 1918. 214 pages. \$0.60.

Sayler, James L. *American Tithers*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1918. 48 pages. \$0.15.

MISCELLANEOUS

Kellogg, Vernon, etc. *The Abingdon War-Food Book*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1918. 58 pages. \$0.25.

Pickett, Deets. *The Wooden Horse—or America Menaced by a Prussianized Trade*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1918. 88 pages. \$0.25.

Sherman, Ellen Burns. *On the Manuscripts of God*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1918. 184 pages. \$1.00.

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